INTRODUCTION

REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM
IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Gi-Wook Shin

On December 14, 2005, with much fanfare, sixteen Asian leaders held the first East Asian Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The main theme of the summit was a grand idea of community-building in East Asia under the slogan “One Vision, One Identity, One Community.” The summit was supposed to be a genuinely East Asian affair, designed to promote regional economic and security cooperation outside the existing umbrella of U.S. military power and political leadership. The United States was pointedly not invited, and did not send observers to the inaugural session. However, as the Washington Post reported, the summit “ended up in ‘creative ambiguity’ to mask discord about where it is headed.”

Proposed by Malaysia and championed by China—which sought to assume a leadership role—the EAS was distinct from existing regional frameworks such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a trans-Pacific organization that includes the United States and other nations from the Western hemisphere. The EAS grew out of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process, which was originally conceived as a platform for the ten ASEAN countries to cooperate with three Northeast Asian nations: Japan, China, and South Korea.

The grand vision of East Asian community-building immediately came up against the rift between China and Japan. With support from Indonesia and Singapore, Japan succeeded in opening up membership in the nascent organization to India, Australia, and New Zealand, potential allies in an effort to head off creation of a Sino-centric regional grouping. China countered by securing Malaysia’s consent to give the APT the primary responsibility for community-building.

Tensions among the three Northeast Asian powers were manifest at the summit meeting. A three-way meeting among the leaders of the three—a feature of past APT gatherings—could not be organized. China and South Korea refused to hold such a meeting with Japan as a protest against Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine. This shrine...
honors Japan’s war dead, and includes men whom the allies convicted as war criminals after World War II. Japan was no less wary of China’s attempt to use the EAS to assert its leadership role in regional affairs. In the end, territorial disputes and sparring over unresolved issues of history among the three nations marred the EAS.

The mixed message of the EAS illustrates the volatile and ambiguous situation that Northeast Asia faces today. Over the years, the region has seen growing intraregional trade and investment, as well as increasing cultural and social exchanges. Furthermore, Northeast Asia has developed dense networks of Japanese and overseas Chinese and has been active in building regional institutional frameworks such as APEC, APT, and the EAS. It has also witnessed the proliferation of free-trade agreements (FTAs), such as the Japan-Singapore FTA (2001) and the ASEAN+China FTA (2004). Japan and South Korea are currently negotiating for a bilateral FTA.

At the same time, nationalist forces remain powerful in Northeast Asia. While China continues to remind the region of Japanese expansionism during World War II by pointing to the lack of Japanese remorse, as evidenced by Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine in the face of outcry from neighbor nations, Chinese criticism has evoked a similarly strong reaction in Japan. And Japan has clashed with South Korea and China over territorial issues.

Public opinion polling reveals these countries’ increasingly unfavorable views of one another. Renewed controversy over Japan’s colonial past in Korea and the deteriorating sociopolitical psychology between Japan and China clearly illustrate that historical memories continue to limit the opportunities for reconciliation in the Northeast Asian region. These tensions are deeply rooted in complex historical and cultural relations, and all East Asian nations share some sense of victimization. The legacy of a victim psychology and a conflict-ridden history has not favored regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

With respect to future prospects for regional cooperation, there is a mixture of optimism and pessimism. Optimistic assessments point to the primacy of economics over politics and the potential for multilateral cooperation to solve problems that transcend national capabilities. Pessimism stems from the recognition that nationalism is still a more powerful force than multilateral regionalism, and Northeast Asia’s historical legacy of colonialism and war hinders the rise of “new regionalism Asia.”

Despite these ambiguities, it is clear that the dual forces of regionalism and nationalism will coexist in the foreseeable future. Reformulating their interactions constructively is one of Northeast Asia’s key challenges.

To be sure, the current interplay of national and regional forces occurs in a global context, especially in the context of the U.S. presence as a global power. The United States has shaped the region’s postwar political and security “map” and remains a major source of foreign investment and a crucial market for Northeast Asian products. U.S. “soft power” (higher education, films, and fashions) shapes the culture and lifestyles of Northeast Asian people and society.
The United States has also played a leading role in APEC since its inception, and maintains a long-standing security alliance with Japan and South Korea. The United States remains a key player in the region.

The essays collected in this book seek to assess current interactions between national and regional forces in the context of the U.S. presence, and to suggest their future direction. As the two forces are intertwined, it is imperative to consider their interplay rather than to examine each separately. The book’s primary objective is to make sense of how the seemingly contradictory forces of regionalism and nationalism interact in Northeast Asia, and to identify potential future trends that have policy implications for the United States and the region.

We regard regionalism as an idea or an ideology, which advocates that regional interactions should serve as a key framework in international affairs. Although we do not claim consensus among the authors in this volume, this is our broad working definition. This volume does not deal with the process of regionalization, nor with the underlying economic, cultural, or political integration. To be sure, there are regional interactions driven by the market, but policymakers have also devoted significant attention to the discussion of regional frameworks. As such, this book focuses on state-level policy and discussions.

More specifically, the authors in this volume address a number of interrelated questions. What competing visions of regional integration are now being considered? Will they be realized? How do national tensions, especially the renewed Sino-Japanese rivalry, stunt the movement toward regionalism? What role, if any, can Korea, positioned between the archrivals, play in the region? What is the American relationship to Northeast Asian regionalism? Can the United States play a constructive role in mitigating the Japan-China contest for regional hegemony? Does the system of Cold War alliances built by the United States still have currency in Northeast Asia? By addressing these questions from both Asian and U.S. perspectives, we hope to shed new light on the interplay of national and regional forces in Northeast Asia, a strategic region that now stands at a historical turning point.

Historical Precedents

In the context of global power, the interplay of national and regional forces is not new. A century ago, Northeast Asia faced a situation analogous to what confronts it today. At the time, with the decline of China, the rise of Japan, and the increasing presence of the West, the Northeast Asian regional order was undergoing a fundamental transformation. While Japan was more successful than China or Korea in meeting the challenges from the West, all three countries were struggling to find an appropriate place in the new era. It was in this context that both nationalism and pan-Asian regionalism emerged as major sources of change, providing a framework to guide the direction of “modern” East Asia. Nationalist and regionalist arguments often competed with each other but still
shared the same objective: to protect national sovereignty in the face of the penetrating foreign (Western) forces in the region.7

The West came to Northeast Asia with a proclaimed “civilizing mission” and many Asians embraced the notions of “civilization and enlightenment” to reform their ancient system according to the Western model. Fukuzawa Yukichi of Meiji Japan, for instance, took a pro-Western position, advocating “dissociation from Asia” and adoption of Western civilization.8 Many Chinese and Korean leaders took a similar stance. Yet embracing the West did not mean giving up their own Asian or national heritage, or excluding the possibility of developing an alternative conception of civilization. On the contrary, Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans all sought to meet the challenges from the West by utilizing (though selectively) elements of their own tradition and culture, whether they were pan-Asian or distinctively national in character.9 The turn of the twentieth century saw the rise of these competing forces and arguments—global, pan-Asian, and national—which resembles what we see today in Northeast Asia.

The stories of these countries’ development of nationalism are well known. Nationalism was a key principle of Japanese Meiji restoration in Japan, and also guided Chinese and Korean efforts to reform their society and politics.10 Equally important but less known is the movement of Asian regionalist thinking in the early twentieth century. Many in the region at the time believed that East Asian nations could survive the white onslaught only if China, Japan, and Korea acted together. They stressed their common experience—namely, the invasions that they, the yellow race, had endured at the hands of unified white Europeans and Americans—and exorted Asians to unite in the same way.11

Such a call for a broad, regional identity and solidarity was not entirely new. Koreans, for instance, had long identified themselves as part of a China-centered regional order. This sense of a small China, or so chunghwa, was an important part of Korean elite identity during the Choson dynasty. But this time it would have to be different. In particular, this new form of regional identity and solidarity would have to reflect and accommodate a new regional configuration characterized by the decline of China, the rise of Japan, and the presence of the West.12 It was no accident that Asianism first appeared in Japan, nor that its proponents often advocated Japanese leadership to promote regional solidarity and security.13

While seeking to become “civilized” and “sovereign” based on the Western notion of “civilization and enlightenment,” Japan as a new regional leader looked for an alternative focused on Asia, and claimed that since Asian people were similar racially and culturally, they could develop a new and distinctive civilization.14 Influenced by social Darwinian racism, which was then popular among East Asian intellectuals, the Japanese viewed race as the primary category of distinction in the world and understood the current global situation as an age of racial struggle, especially between the yellow and white races. Although the geographic boundary of the yellow race was nebulous, the notion of yellowness was largely restricted to the idea of the East—meaning Korea, China, and
Japan. The three nations were depicted as “lips and teeth,” implying that they all belonged to the same race due to shared cultural heritage, and were urged to cooperate against the threat of Western white imperialism.\(^{15}\)

Although such a view resulted in aggressive imperialist expansion, leading to Japan’s annexation of Taiwan and Korea, in the early years it contained an element of idealism, especially compared with the later notion of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere that imperial Japan pursued.\(^{16}\) In one historian’s view, Asianism had a “solidarity-oriented, non-dominating conception of Japan’s role in reviving Asia as well as the conception of Japan as ... the harmonizing or synthesizing leader.”\(^{17}\) For this reason, Japan was willing to support and protect political exiles and revolutionaries from neighbor nations, such as Sun Yat-sen of China and Kim Okkyun of Korea.

By the 1930s, imperial Japan aggressively promoted regional economic integration that would encompass its formal colonies (Korea and Taiwan), Manchuria, South China, and even Southeast Asia. Trade between Japan and other parts of the “yen bloc” greatly expanded during the 1930s. By 1940, for instance, 67 percent of Japan’s total exports went to its colonies or semi-colonies: Korea (24.7 percent), Taiwan (7.9 percent), Kwangtung Province (11.1 percent), Manchuria (10.7 percent), and China (12.6 percent).\(^{18}\) Many Japanese and Koreans moved to other parts of the empire, including Manchuria; by the end of colonial rule, about 3.5 million Koreans (14 percent of the total population) resided in Japan and Manchuria.\(^{19}\) As Bruce Cumings points out, Japan “pursued, with its colonies, a self-reliant, go-it-alone path to development that not only generated remarkably high industrial growth rates but changed the face of Northeast Asia.”\(^{20}\)

Concomitant with East Asia’s growing regionalization, the Japanese attempted to create a regional identity through an aggressive assimilation policy in its colonies. Japanese colonialists argued that, although other Asian people like Korean and Taiwanese had a lower “degree of civilization,” under Japanese patronage they could achieve “enlightenment and civilization” and eventually become imperial citizens (sinmin) of the Japanese empire. Such a transformation was possible, it was argued, because the yellow race together possessed superior elements, and the only reasons for the present racial decline were bad government and confining geographical factors.\(^{21}\)

Colonial assimilation, along with dense regional trade networks, was a key component of the grand design of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Sphere subordinated regional neighbors into Japan’s imperial production and trade networks and sought, through the assimilation policy in its colonies, to create a regional identity.\(^{22}\) However, the Japanese version of forced regionalism and regionalization in Northeast Asia was inherently a closed system and eventually failed. It not only provoked strong resistance from its colonial subjects but also led to military conflict that culminated in the Pacific War. The Sphere has also left a legacy unfavorable for the emergence of regionalism in Northeast Asia after 1945.\(^{23}\)
A New Postwar Order

Japan’s defeat and the West’s victory in the Pacific War dramatically changed regional configurations in Northeast Asia. Japan lost its prominent status as a regional leader, and the United States and the USSR became the hegemonic powers in the newly developing regional order. The old East-West division during the Co-Prosperity Sphere era was replaced by a new alignment along two axes: capitalist (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and communist (China and North Korea). The new configuration made it extremely difficult to form any regional entity. Even within the capitalist bloc, South Korea did not normalize its relations with Japan until 1965, and after normalization, it refused to accept Japanese leadership in any new regional entity or organization. Instead, Korean politicians on both sides of the peninsula commonly employed a “Japan-bashing” strategy. These ideological (capitalist versus communist) and national (Korea versus Japan) divisions in the postcolonial period hampered the (re)emergence of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Instead, nationalism prevailed in both capitalist and communist blocs in the postwar period.

Postwar security arrangements in Northeast Asia have further hampered the development of regionalism. In contrast to its multilateral approach in Europe, American foreign policy in East Asia followed the principle of bilateralism. U.S. policymakers, as Daniel Sneider notes in Chapter 11, recognized the power of Asian nationalism—especially the mistrust of Japan and a reluctance to support any revival of a broader security role for Japan—as a formidable obstacle to regionalism in East Asia. As a result, the United States did not actively pursue the establishment of a multilateral entity like NATO, and consequently based its relations with Japan and South Korea on bilateral alliance structures. To be sure, in the early years of the postwar period, the United States proposed a multilateral trusteeship of Korea with the USSR, Britain, and China, and later spoke of forming some broad collective security arrangements that would include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. These activities aside, American interests in a regional approach to security in East Asia were “largely ineffective and episodic in nature” until its much later support for the establishment of APEC. Instead, the U.S.-built alliance structure with Japan and South Korea was aimed at containing the communist powers of China and Soviet Union.

For their part, unlike the leaders of ASEAN, Japanese and South Korean political leaders have also eschewed collective regional security arrangements. They have been largely content to rely on the United States for their own national security. As Peter Katzenstein points out, the bilateral structure “has made it much more difficult for Asian states to develop broad, interlocking, institutionalized political arrangements of the kind that have characterized the European experience.”

Cold War geopolitical considerations played a crucial role in shaping the postwar normalization of relations among nations in Northeast Asia.
Inconvenient issues of reconciliation were largely left off the diplomatic agenda. Japan established diplomatic rapprochement with countries it had once invaded or colonized: with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) in 1952, with the Republic of Korea in 1965, and with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1972. Japan’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) have not yet been normalized. Unlike Europe, however, Northeast Asian nations have failed to come to terms with the past. Japan paid no reparations to its former colonies—though it gave “grants and aids” to South Korea for normalizing their relations—and Korea was excluded from the San Francisco Treaty of 1952 that settled Japanese war crimes and atrocities.

Geopolitical calculations had the greatest impetus for Japan-ROC and Japan-PRC normalization. In the case of the PRC, the strategic need to end the U.S.-led isolation of China and to secure Chinese support against the threat from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and 1970s was predominant. If the Cold War logic did not prove to be the sufficient driving force in the early Japan-ROK relations, the need for economic assistance did. Still, the “normalization” was not complete, as territorial issues were deliberately shelved. Territorial disputes are not unique to Northeast Asia, but as has occurred in recent years, they can easily emerge as rallying points of nationalistic elements.25

Even before the normalization process, the United States played a significant role, whether intended or not, in shaping the process of historical reconciliation (or lack thereof) in the Northeast Asian region. Unlike the Nuremberg Trials, the Tokyo Trials focused on the actions that most directly affected the Western allies—the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the mistreatment of prisoners of war—and largely ignored other crimes committed against Asians (such as the Manchuria invasion and Nanjing massacre). The United States and its allies waived their rights to reparations in the San Francisco Treaty, and questions of responsibility for wartime atrocities and compensation for victims remained unresolved. Perhaps most significant was the U.S. decision to preserve the emperor system, in the belief that it would facilitate postwar Japan’s reconstruction process. However, as a recent report by the International Crisis Group points out, “the abolution of the emperor left the country without anyone to blame.”26 As Japan’s importance as a bulwark against communism in the region increased, the United States overlooked or ignored issues of Japan’s historical responsibility.

Intraregional interactions in the economic and cultural spheres were likewise limited. Japan was not reconnected to its former regional colonies and networks for many years, and instead relied on the United States during its postwar economic development. South Korea, too, depended heavily on trade with the United States. Japan and South Korea did not normalize their relations for 20 years after colonial rule had ended, and South Korea barred the imports of cultural products from Japan until the late 1990s. China and South Korea normalized their relations only after the demise of the Soviet empire.
While regional linkages were slow to develop, nationalism, as during Meiji Japan, was extensively mobilized for economic modernization, first in South Korea and Taiwan and later in China. Economic division of labor within the region was “vertical” (as opposed to horizontal or regional), and followed what is called a “flying geese” model, with Japan leading the group. Japan sought to create a “yen bloc,” including Southeast Asian nations, but its influence was limited. When the financial crisis of 1997 hit East Asia, Japan showed little leadership in rescuing the region from the troubles. Instead the U.S.-influenced transnational International Monetary Fund (IMF) was a key player in dealing with the Asian financial crisis. Northeast Asian nations have joined regional entities like APEC, but these lack the coherence and solidarity that the EU or ASEAN commands.

With the rise of the Northeast Asian economy, some scholars and experts began to talk about regional identity by advocating what is called “Asian values.” Although the colonial legacy of resentment and nationalist politics persists, Northeast Asia has transformed, in a relatively short period of time, from a war-trodden, struggling region to a prospering economic powerhouse. Its ascendance has not only shifted the region’s balance of power vis-à-vis the rest of the world but has also spurred scholarly interest in the common roots of its economic success. Scholars in Asia and elsewhere noted crucial differences between East Asian and Western forms of capitalism and began to appreciate the unique features of the former. In particular, they reevaluated the Weberian thesis that regards Confucian heritage as responsible for East Asian backwardness, contending that Confucian ethics and institutions contributed positively to economic success in the region. Political leaders also joined scholarly efforts to positively evaluate Asian values and institutions in social and economic development. Southeast Asian leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad were especially active advocates. In an article published in late 1993 for Foreign Affairs, a prominent Japanese journalist even asserted that “Asia has at long last started to define itself. Asian consciousness and identity are coming vigorously to life.”

This attention to common “Asian” roots, however, has not led to any systematic regionalist movements, let alone the emergence of any distinctively “Asian” identity. It remained largely at the rhetorical or discursive level, focusing on issues of values, ethics, or morality. In some instances, political leaders advocated Asian values in order to defend the legitimacy of their authoritarian political systems. Before the Asian value arguments and movements gathered any momentum, many parts of Asia were hit hard with the financial crisis in the fall of 1997. Asian values were criticized and even blamed as the main cause of crony capitalism and the consequent financial collapse. Regional identity has yet to emerge.
New Regionalism, Persistent Nationalism, and Renewed Rivalry

In recent years, we have seen a reemergence of regionalism in Northeast Asia. This is the product of multiple factors. In particular, the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, the 1990s financial crisis, and most recently, U.S. unilateralism all combined to encourage new thinking about regionalism among the leaders of Northeast Asian nations. As noted earlier, market forces have helped to drive regionalism in Northeast Asia, but it is misleading to characterize what has been happening in the region as “regionalization without regionalism.” On the contrary, there has been considerable debate among policymakers about a new regional order, including potential institutional frameworks for such an order. Regionalism as a set of ideas or ideology has become an important guideline for policymaking in China, Japan, and Korea. For example, such efforts have produced ASEAN Plus Three and the EAS.

Despite such developments, there is no shared view of a new regional order. Instead, competing versions of regionalism are emerging, especially between Japan and China. In this volume, scholars and policymakers from Japan, China, and South Korea all offer concrete visions of how regional integration and institutionalization may take shape. Their differing visions reflect in part the way that nationalism and regionalism are intermixed. Japan and China’s intense competition for leadership plays out in clashing ideas on regionalism, while emergent powers such as South Korea seek to use regionalism as a vehicle for their national aspirations.

New Regionalism

The demise of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s challenged the region’s Cold War alignment (capitalism versus communism) and created political space for new thinking. The significance of ideological divisions has diminished and, as evidenced by the normalization of its relations with South Korea in 1992, China has been integrated fast into the region. The early 1990s, as Aggarwal and Koo detail in Chapter 1, saw an outpouring of proposals aimed at promoting economic regionalism in Northeast Asia, as well as a proliferation of Track 2 initiatives for regional dialogue and cooperation.

The Asian financial crisis was a catalyst for promoting new Asian regionalism, one that would offer an alternative to the U.S.-led APEC. The crisis demonstrated how a broad regional entity like APEC could not resolve regional issues, and as such, cast doubt on existing notions of regionalism. Likewise, the very idea of Asian values, which many Asian leaders regarded ambivalently but largely accepted in one form or another, lost credibility. Tokyo was determined to use the crisis as an opportunity to bolster regionalism. As a concrete step, it proposed to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), but this failed to materialize in the face of U.S. resistance. Seoul and Beijing also suggested a series of regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Vision Group, and
the East Asian Study Group. In 1999, China, Japan, and South Korea held a tripartite summit during the annual meetings of APT.

Asian regionalism has also been promoted as a collective reaction to U.S. dominance in world affairs. Chinese leaders view the Bush administration as attempting to form alliances to balance, if not contain, the rise of China, and they have responded by exploring multilateralism. In the past they had believed that the United States and its allies generally controlled multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, which served as mere tools to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Now they realized that the United States was widely perceived as disdainful of global institutions and restraints, and that anti-American resentment was increasing worldwide. Chinese leaders became more receptive to multilateral organizations in which the EU, Russia, China, and other rising powers (such as ASEAN and India) could work in tandem with smaller states to limit the willful actions of the United States, the one hegemonic power.

In Korea too, recent regionalist thinking reflects Koreans’ discontent with American policy. Its proponents are unhappy with what they perceive as the one-sided and unequal nature of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. They also have reservations about the U.S. strategy for fighting global terrorism after 9/11. Korea’s young, new political elites are particularly displeased with the Bush administration’s handling of the North Korean nuclear issue and some even view the United States as a threat to Korean national security that is equal to or even greater than that posed by the North itself. Koreans are also eager to bolster their defense against the powers of globalization by diversifying trade partners; regional economic integration offers one such defense. South Korea is an active participant of ASEAN Plus Three and an advocate of the EAS, from which the United States is pointedly excluded. It was in this context that President Roh Moo Hyun defined the current period as an “era of Northeast Asia,” urging his nation to actively participate in the new era by becoming a “hub” in the region.

More than any other single factor, the new regionalism reflects the impact of China’s rapid rise as an economic power, and the fact that it has become the driver for economic growth in Japan and Korea, and a force for economic integration across East Asia. Chapter 1 of this volume deals with China’s rise as a driver of regionalism. For instance, intraregional trade has increased steadily for the last ten years, and business links with China for Japan and South Korea have been particularly noticeable, as Table 1 shows. For these two countries, intraregional trade among East Asian nations (including ASEAN) reached 36.7 percent and 40.5 percent by 2004, making China their largest trading partner. Without China, the figures amounted only to 24.3 percent and 28.6 percent. In fact, without China, as Table 2 shows, there has been little change in intraregional trade in East Asia.
Table 1. Changing Distribution of East Asia’s (EA’s) Intraregional Trade, 1999–2004 (% of total)

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Table 2. Changing Distribution of East Asia’s (EA’s) International Trade Without China, 1999–2004 (% of Total)

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<td>Japan</td>
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Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia
Closer economic ties necessarily increase flows of people and other links—even if purely business-related activities—across the border. Korean and Japanese students represent the largest proportion of the rapidly increasing group of overseas Japanese. In September 2003, the Chinese government quietly introduced an unprecedented measure: Japanese citizens traveling to China for under fifteen days would not need a Chinese visa. While motivated primarily for economic reasons—that is, the promotion of tourism—such measures will no doubt increase societal interaction between the two nations.

Cultural interpenetration has also become a growing trend within Northeast Asia. Korea lifted its longstanding policy of barring Japanese cultural products from entering its domestic market, and has also been exporting its own cultural products throughout East Asia. The phenomenal success of Korean pop culture known as “hallyu” (the Korean wave) is particularly noteworthy. Hallyu has produced more favorable impressions of Korea among Japanese, and there is some hope that cultural exchanges will facilitate reconciliation and cooperation in the Northeast Asian region. Although its long-term implications remain to be seen, there is evidence that pop culture genres such as TV dramas, films, and music are having a “softening” effect on once antagonistic relations between Korea and Japan.

Persistent Nationalism

Despite these encouraging signs, we must be cautious about unwarranted optimism toward regional integration. Nationalism remains a powerful force in Northeast Asia, and anti-Japanism is still an important part of Chinese and Korean political consciousness. In turn, Japanese views of China and Korea have not improved. As Table 3 shows, Koreans’ view of Japan has remained largely negative for the last fifteen years. There was a temporary recovery in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the Kim Dae Jung government sought reconciliation with Japan, but by 2005 the Korean view had again deteriorated. Table 4 indicates a similar pattern in Japanese views of China and Korea: by 2005, only 10 percent and 15 percent of Japanese held “favorable” views of them, respectively. Chinese views of Japan likewise remain more negative than positive and have deteriorated in recent years (see Table 5 and Figure 1).

To be sure, Northeast Asian nations have been democratizing and/or promoting globalization since the 1990s, but neither democratization nor globalization has uprooted or weakened the power of nationalism in the region. If anything, globalization and regional interdependence may produce a crisis of national identity and thus even strengthen nationalist sentiments in some quarters. It is no coincidence that we see a growing power of “identity politics” in the region. A decade of economic slump in Japan and the financial crisis in South Korea provided a fertile ground for the rise of populist and nationalist leaders in Junichiro Koizumi and Roh Moo Hyun. In China, social disruption...
in the midst of rapid modernization necessitated a new form of social cohesion: Chinese leaders found the answer in nationalism.

Table 3. Korean Perceptions of Japan and China

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>5.4%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
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<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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Table 4. Japanese Perceptions of Korea and China

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<tr>
<td>Toward Korea</td>
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<td>Toward China</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
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Source: Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 1990; July 29, 1995; December 5, 2000; April 27, 2005.

Table 5. Chinese Perceptions of Japan

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<th>By Chinese</th>
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<tr>
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Furthermore, there is a strong indication that nationalist politics appeal to the younger generation in Northeast Asian nations. In China, surveys among the country’s youth regularly register a highly negative view of Japan on issues of history. A 2004 survey in Japan by the liberal Asabi newspaper showed that support for Koizumi’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine is strongest
among younger Japanese (twenty- to thirty-year-olds). Korea shows a similar trend: according to a survey reported in a major Korean daily, the younger generation has been the most anti-Japanese constituency among all Koreans. On the one hand, it may be true that the passing of the war generations will end some of the vivid, bitter animosities. On the other hand, the importance that second and third generations still attach to past issues and the way they perceive them are not only a result of time, but also a reflection of the kind of historical knowledge they acquire.

Figure 1. Chinese Perceptions of Japan and Korea, 2005

In Japan, uncertainties and anxieties created by the post–Cold War security environment and a decade of economic stagnation provided a fertile ground for easy and extreme answers in the form of nationalist politics. The nationalist message took advantage of a growing sense of helplessness in the face of assertive Chinese nationalism, increasing American unilateral power, and unpredictable developments on the Korean peninsula. Nationalist scholars have made headway in producing textbooks to “make Japanese proud of themselves.” Koizumi added fuel to the fire by visiting Yasukuni right up to the end of his administration, in defiance of outcries from neighboring nations and the concerns of many Japanese. New guidelines for Japan-U.S. military cooperation were voted into law, with even half of the Democratic Party in favor of constitutional revision.
to boost Japan’s military. Japan also sought to restore such symbols as the flag and the national anthem. Driven by nationalism, these developments are all part of Japan’s quest to become a “normal nation.”

On the part of China, its leaders are promoting nationalism to bolster social and political cohesion. Beijing needs a new unifying force to mobilize the nation in pursuit of common goals, such as economic modernization, and the “glue” is nationalism. In particular, in the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese leadership appealed to nationalism (patriotism) to shore up their tainted legitimacy. China’s policy toward ethnic minorities is based on the notion of a grand multi-ethnically unified one China. Nationalism also underpins Chinese foreign policy, both in the region and elsewhere. Territorial disputes, human rights issues, military development, nonproliferation issues—all of these touch the nationalist nerves of Chinese leaders in Beijing. They do not want to jeopardize relations with their Asian neighbors, but neither do they want to lose face. Assertive nationalism inevitably creates uneasiness in regional international relations.

In Korea too, nationalism remains strong in politics. With economic development, democratization, and improved inter-Korea relations, Koreans possess greater pride and self-confidence than ever before. Further, in accordance with Korea’s enhanced status, they seek to redefine their identity vis-à-vis the United States and their Asian neighbors, as well as the North. For Korea’s new leaders, neither the end of the Cold War era nor the Asian financial crisis was seen as the “end of history.” Instead, the end of the Cold War, they claim, led to American unilateralism, while the financial crisis showed the harmful effects of globalization. As a result of South Korea’s prolonged engagement policy, these progressive scholars and leaders no longer see the North as a looming threat, but as an object of pity and compassion. Likewise, they view cooperation with East Asian neighbors, especially China, as crucial to containing American dominance in the region. If there is any difference between Korea and Japan, it is that the left in Korea—as opposed to the right in Japan—is at the forefront of nationalist politics.

Despite increased intra-Asian trade, cultural exchange, and talks about East Asian community, Korea, Japan, and China all continue to find politics of national identity appealing. After all, nationalism is not only about ideology, but also thrives on narrowly defined “national interests.” Disputed territories always serve as symbols of national sovereignty that cannot be compromised. Japan and China’s mutual suspicion over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and other territorial waters, as well as the recent escalation of Japan-Korean tension over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands, are but two potent reminders. Disputes over the history of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo also reflect lingering nationalism in South Korea’s concept of “irredentism,” and China’s rising Han nationalism. In short, persistent powers of nationalism present a formidable barrier to the formation of Northeast Asian community.
The Japan-China Rivalry and Korea’s Place

One major consequence of a newly developing regional order—spurred by the rise of China, the reemergence of Japan, and continued appeals to nationalism in Northeast Asia—is renewed rivalry between China and Japan. China and Japan are almost natural rivals for regional leadership in Northeast Asia. Each country considers itself to be Asia’s rightful leader, China on the basis of its historically central role and recent rise in the region, and Japan on the basis of its accumulated economic power. In both China and Japan, growing nationalism is creating domestic pressure for a more active and assertive foreign policy, with the potential for tension on a wide range of issues where their perceived interests diverge. It seems almost inevitable that the “double rise” of Japan and China, which Yinhong Shi outlines in Chapter 8, would lead to their quest for regional hegemony. In fact, besides bilateral issues such as territorial disputes, they are already competing over the framework of East Asian regionalism—Beijing’s preference for APT versus Tokyo’s interest in including India, Australia, and New Zealand. History issues and territorial disputes fuel tensions between the two powers, but as Randall Schriver points out in Chapter 12, such controversies “may not have as much to do with the past as [they have] to do with the future.”

China’s rise offers Japan both concerns and opportunities. As its largest trading partner, China has certainly created business opportunities for Japan. But as historian Mark Peattie argues in Chapter 7, it would be a mistake to underestimate the lasting legacy of the “poisoned well” of historical enmity and mistrust that was dug during the Sino-Japanese conflict from 1931–45. Echoes of that past are again present as both countries paint each other as a potential threat.

Tokyo is particularly concerned about China’s development of military power, which it sees as evidence of China’s strategic goal of increasing influence in the region and ultimately ending U.S. unipolar domination. Japan also worries about China’s growing assertiveness with respect to territories in dispute with Japan and other countries. The Japanese government has addressed these concerns by strengthening its alliance with the United States, which is seen as a hedge against the rise of China. Furthermore, many Japanese insist it is time for Japan, as a “normal” power, to assert its own national interests in the same manner as other states. It is in this context that Japan has sent troops to Iraq to support the U.S. war and has been vocal on the North Korean nuclear issue. Politicians who criticized the prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni or who tried to reassure the Chinese or Koreans in other ways were accused by the right-wing media of playing into the hands of those who would besmirch Japanese sovereignty.

Similarly, the Chinese are concerned about the growth in ultra-rightist nationalism in Japan and its expansionary role in international affairs, including the dispatch of troops to other parts of the world such as Iraq. Beijing is also uneasy about recent efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the possibility that it may extend to Taiwan. Although Chinese leaders do
not want any conflict in the region, they prefer to be more proactive in regional affairs. In particular, after the 1997 financial crisis, China adopted a more positive stance toward multilateral cooperation in the region, taking a leadership role in creating APT, for instance. China and Japan are each particularly sensitive to the expanding power of the other and to the possible encroachment on their own regional influence. While we may not expect any direct military conflict such as a war in the region—precisely what happened a century ago when Japan’s rise challenged China’s regional hegemony—the historical rivalry will continue and perhaps intensify in the foreseeable future.

South Korea, as a country placed in between, is deeply concerned with the growing rift. During much of the Cold War era, South Korea viewed China as an enemy that it had fought during the Korean War, and saw Japan as part of the trilateral alliance system (along with United States). But at the same time, as Scott Snyder points out in Chapter 10, South Korea’s views on Japan’s management of history issues are complementary with those of China. As tensions between Japan and China increase, the current Roh government has sought to become a “balancer” in Asia, provoking controversies within and outside South Korea. Many have interpreted the move as an intention to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance and to move closer to China.

There are signs that an increasing number of Koreans prefer China as an alternative to security dependence on the United States. A shocking report published right after the April 2005 general election revealed that the ruling Uri Party members showed a preference for China over the United States (50 percent versus 42 percent). From the Korean perspective, China could positively constrain the Bush administration’s hard-line policy; a robust relationship with China would also give Korea wider diplomatic flexibility. Koreans remained reluctant to accept Japanese leadership in a new postwar regional order—largely due to the legacy of colonial rule—but seem more willing to embrace China as a new regional leader. As Table 3 shows, the Korean public’s view of China has steadily improved over the years. 50

The combination of shifting identities and alignments, underscored by the persistent power of nationalism, makes Northeast Asia’s future highly uncertain. The forces of regionalism may be powerful enough to contain excessive nationalism and create a stable peace regime. Despite a growing rivalry, China and Japan have strong incentives to avoid a conflict, as David Kang points out in Chapter 2. China is so dependent on Japanese investment and its market that a rift with Japan would threaten China’s “peaceful rise,” especially its economic development and political stability. Japan, too, has a strong stake in avoiding economic dislocation, political instability, and environmental degradation in China. Lately, there are growing concerns and criticism within the Japanese ruling circles about Japan’s “Asia Policy.” Notably, the newly elected Prime Minister Abe made visits to China and South Korea immediately after assuming his post.

Despite such signs of cooperation, multilateral regionalist institutions remain weak, nationalist politics will undoubtedly persist, and the Japan-China rivalry
may only increase tensions and conflict. While one may not necessarily agree with Shi’s assessment in Chapter 8 that “there is already between China and Japan a kind of political/strategic cold war situation, with some prominent features of a classical Cold War,” it is certain that Northeast Asia is entering a critical juncture in its history.

**Future Prospects**

Looking ahead, the authors of this volume considered three keys questions. Can regionalism be sustained in Northeast Asia? What will Northeast Asia look like two decades from now? What conditions are needed for better regional cooperation among Northeast Asian nations?

There is no question that Northeast Asia must continue to promote and institutionalize its already dense economic networks and cultural exchanges. In the same vein, Taiwan and North Korea should be encouraged and helped so they can be incorporated into a regionalist framework. Without their incorporation, as Tomoyuki Kojima points out in Chapter 9, any regional community, especially one grounded in security, would be unstable and ineffective. It goes without saying that any conflict in the Korean peninsula or along the Taiwan Strait would have catastrophic consequences for the region as a whole.

The first, most important, and daunting task for sustained regional cooperation is creating a shared vision of Northeast Asia’s future. To develop this, I would emphasize that Northeast Asian nations must first come to a common understanding of the past. Whereas a shared view of the past (World War II, at least) served to unify (Western) Europe after two devastating wars, history still divides the three close neighbors in Northeast Asia. There exists a big gap among Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese in understanding the past, both their own and that of others. In Northeast Asia, reconciliation has been “thin,” and the history issue continues to mar regional cooperation. Nations in Northeast Asia have yet to achieve “thick” reconciliation. They need to move beyond nation-state–oriented, binary victim/aggressor concepts and approaches, and to understand reconciliation as a mutual, interactive process. While the state is a major player, the reaction of society is the most crucial part of the fuller, thicker coming to terms with the past. Citizens’ groups, NGOs, victim-activist groups—be they domestic, transnational, or international, and regardless of political orientation—should be more actively involved.51

Second, Northeast Asian nations must recognize that elements in their shared past may contribute to promoting regionalism. China, Japan, and Korea often argue over history, but it is nonetheless true that elements in their past may also contribute to a regional identity. Previously, some scholars and leaders of East Asia invoked “Asian values” (primarily Confucian heritage) as a common ground for East Asian regionalism. This view is backward-looking and does not offer any viable vision for the future. Instead, East Asians should search for common ground in values and experiences from modern history that can offer
a new basis for their shared regional view. Coping with Western influence since the nineteenth century is but one area of common ground. Their experience of building modern nation-states and economies is another example. The Meiji model of economic development worked not only for Japan but also for South Korea and Taiwan in the postcolonial period. Some elements of the model are even found in the Chinese transformation that is taking place much later. There exist ample cases and instances of common experiences that can be readily used to formulate a shared view of Northeast Asia’s history in the modern era.

Third, this endeavor needs to be forward-looking. Common values and cultures should not be exclusively regional or come from the past. They can include elements from current global culture, as Asian nations have already embraced globalization. There is certainly a temptation to be anti-global or anti-American in formulating a new regional order. But globalization can function as a check against the formation of a chauvinistic view of regional order and rivalry. History shows that when Japan pursued an exclusive regional order in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it created tensions, conflict, and war. South Korea managed to avoid falling into the kind of xenophobic nationalism found in the North, mainly because it was incorporated into the capitalist world system in the postcolonial period. Nationalism, regionalism, and internationalism will always coexist, and they need not contradict each other. Rather, they provide mutually reinforcing ideologies. In this critical time of change and cultivation of a shared and open-minded view of the region, we need a redefinition of these ideologies.

In the end, building a vision for Northeast Asia’s future beyond narrow national and political interests requires enlightened political leadership. Unfortunately, until now, the region has not seen any visionary leader who is committed to cultivating regional reconciliation and cooperation. On the contrary, many leaders in Northeast Asia have often politicized the history problem for domestic, nationalist consumption. As seen in the recent eruption of disputes between Korea and Japan, and China and Japan, political leaders have done little to tame anti-Japanese, anti-Korean, or anti-Chinese nationalist sentiments among the populace. Interpretations of the past are unavoidably political, producing divided memories, and there is a strong temptation to politicize the process for current ideological purposes. However tempting, politically convenient, and even psychologically satisfying it may be to blame others, such an approach will neither heal past wounds nor provide a foundation for the future. We need political leadership that can build public support for sometimes unpopular policies aimed at regional reconciliation and cooperation.

The U.S. Role in Northeast Asia

It is a critical time for the United States as well as for Northeast Asia. The United States is not an outsider in Northeast Asia, but has a critical stake in this important region. The United States played a crucial role in shaping the
contour of this region for much of the second half of the twentieth century. America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea remain largely intact, and the unfortunate legacies of the Cold War—a divided Korea and the thorny Taiwan issue—also remain salient.

Yet recent signs do not bode well for the United States, especially its relations with Northeast Asian nations. Many Asian nations were displeased with the U.S. handling of the financial crisis and the North Korean nuclear issue. The United States has often been isolated in the Six Party talks over the North Korean nuclear issue, and its policy discrepancy over the North has strained the U.S. alliance with South Korea. In other areas too, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the United States has often found itself alone, with only a handful of partners, opposing many in the world’s states and peoples. In the view of one political scientist, the Bush administration “turn[ed] creeping unilateralism into runaway unilateralism, trashing multilateral treaties or treaties in the making, one after another.”

Meanwhile, China has been active in promoting regional frameworks and institutions through which it can assert its leadership. Often, the United States is excluded from participating in those entities, such as APT and EAS. Furthermore, many Asian neighbors regard promoting a pan-Asian community as a way of checking the dominant U.S. influence in the region. When many nations in Asia are looking to China for opportunities and new leadership, Washington seems to be embracing the “China threat” theory. Its proponents regard China’s emergence as a regional hegemon in Northeast Asia as the most dangerous scenario the United States might face in the early twenty-first century. The rise-of-China thesis is often conflated with the “China threat theory.” Asian neighbors, however, may not necessarily agree with the U.S. view. As David Kang argues in this volume, Asian countries are more likely to bandwagon with China than to balance against it. In addition, Asia’s Sino-centric past—not Europe’s multipolar past—could be Asia’s future as China continues to rise.

The growing China-Japan rivalry should be a cause of concern to American policymakers. On the one hand, the United States has in recent years successfully repaired and strengthened its once strained relations with Japan. On the other hand, U.S. relations with China and South Korea have not been as cordial. Such a contrasting relationship with these two powers in the midst of the intense rivalry could backfire, pushing China and South Korea to join together to balance the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chinese leaders see the United States and Japan as using each other to hedge against China; South Korean leaders tend to agree with such a view. The United States needs a more balanced policy toward Northeast Asia.

U.S. policymakers should pay attention to the growing nationalism in the region. While nationalist sentiments have largely focused on targets within the region, the United States is also a focus of nationalist reactions, as is seen in the recent rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea. Nor is the United States free of responsibility for the history problem in Northeast Asia, especially
with regard to the history of World War II and postwar settlements. Unlike in Europe, where it has promoted reconciliation between France and Germany, the United States has done little to promote comparable reconciliation between China and Japan. In this context, the suggestion by then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick that America could take a lead in resolving the history issue through Track 2 meetings among U.S. and Northeast Asian historians is overdue, but still illuminating.

No one can deny that the United States has vital economic and security interests in Northeast Asia, a region on the fast track. Still, as Michael Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Philippines, writes in Chapter 13, the United States has not successfully engaged the East Asian regionalist agenda. The Clinton administration was more committed to promoting “globalization” than regional ventures, and the current Bush government has not actively involved itself in East Asian regionalist frameworks like APT and EAS. The American failure to lead a resolution of the Asian financial crisis through an Asia-Pacific institutional framework like APEC greatly disappointed many Asian countries.

Simply put, the United States has not played the same kind of proactive role that it embraced in the formation of European community in the postwar era. In part, this was because the system of security alliances built in the Cold War period has worked well to meet American interests. In addition, the United States may simply be too occupied with other pressing issues, the Middle East and Islamist terrorism in particular, to devote policymaker attention to this region. But as former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schwirer argues in Chapter 12, the United States cannot afford to leave others, particularly China, to shape Northeast Asian regionalism. American inaction leaves a distinct, if not entirely accurate impression that the United States is in gradual retreat from the region. As China’s Zhu Feng points out in Chapter 4, there is a perception among Asian leaders that the United States may be even anti-regionalist in East Asia.

Ultimately, Northeast Asia is too vital for the United States to ignore. Instead of standing aside, American policymakers must address the issue of regionalism in Northeast Asia with far greater seriousness, and devote attention and thought to defining a vision of regional integration and institutionalization that meets American goals. As the authors in the last section of this volume agree, America is not without options. It could inject renewed interests and vitality into APEC, actively seek participation in other regionalist institutions like EAS, or even explore the creation of new multilateral mechanisms. In the final analysis, U.S. policymakers must realize that the United States is not an outsider, but a critical part of the Asia-Pacific region, whose importance and influence will only increase in the years to come. The United States must finally come to grips with the need to shape a vision and a strategy for this critical region that goes beyond the Cold War.
Notes

1. A grant from the Korea Research Foundation (03-R27) aided research for this chapter.


22. Despite the rhetoric of assimilation, colonial subjects like Koreans and Taiwanese were never given equal rights within the Japanese Empire.

23. As an illustration of this point, consider the following statement about Korean perceptions of free trade with Japan: “Due to the legacy of mutual antagonism during the period of Japanese colonialism, Japan can make no suggestion for grand integration without evoking memories of Japanese control in Korea. Many [Koreans] still remember all the ‘visions of Asian migration’ made by the Japanese as justification for its colonialism. The lingering suspicion about the motives behind Japan’s recent efforts to enhance its regional posture reflects the prevalent perception that the Japanese public is by nature narrow and egoistically minded. In spite of all the liberalization measures Japanese assert to have taken, many both in and out of the region still perceive that Japan has been, and remains, a closed and mercantilist economy” (Chungsoo Kim, “Perception of Free Trade: The Korean Debate over the Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement,” working paper [Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001], 10). Note that this remark was made in the pre-Koizumi era, when the Japan-Korean relations were relatively good.


27. See Pempel, *The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis*.


31. Here again, key proponents were from Southeast, not Northeast Asia. See Kim Dae Jung, “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), 189–94.

33. According to a report by the Japan Center for International Exchange, in 2002 there were 45 Track 1 policy dialogues/meetings and 113 combined Track 2 and 3 meetings among East Asian nations. These programs and meetings are multilateral (largely focused on security and human security issues in a broad sense) and intended to promote community-building in East Asia. In 2003, the number of the Track 1 and Track 2 policy dialogues/meetings increased to 75 and 150, respectively. In the first half of 2004, there were 50 Track 1 and 80 Track 2 meetings. See the Japan Center for International Exchange, “Dialogue and Research Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security and Human Security Issues and Community Building,” June 2004 <http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/2003/overview.html>.


36. Public polls show that 62 percent of South Koreans felt that the Bush speech characterizing North Korea as part of “an axis of evil” was responsible for “escalating tensions in the Korean peninsula.” Only 31 percent thought of it as a measured description of the North Korean threat. Also, only 24 percent of South Koreans “favor the U.S. war on terrorism” and 20 percent “believe military action in Iraq [to be] justified.” See Eric Larson and Norman Levin, “Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitude Towards the U.S.” Technical report (Menlo Park, CA: Rand Corporation, 2004).


42. Recent backlash in Japan against the Korean wave (e.g., anti-Korea cartoons) is one good example.
43. “Pukhan, miguk, chungguk, ilpon hogamdo chosa,” (“A Survey of Attitudes toward North Korea, the U.S., China, and Japan”), Chosun Ilbo, August 15, 2005.

44. Rozman, *Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism*.


46. On March 1, 2005, in his speech commemorating the March First Independence Movement of 1919, President Roh strongly warned that Korean leaders’ relative restraint on history issues should not be taken to mean they had all been resolved. As if to prove his prediction, the Korean government and public reacted vehemently to the passage of an ordinance in the Shimane Prefecture in Japan designating a “Takeshima Day.” This Japanese claim was not new and the dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands also focused on fishing rights, but its passage by an overwhelming majority (33 against; 1 abstention) reflected rising nationalist sentiments among Japan’s politicians.


50. As Figure 1 shows, China views Korea much more favorably than it views Japan. However, recent disputes over the history of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo show that China and South Korea are not free from the power of nationalism in their relationship. The incident provided a timely wake-up call for South Korea, and there was an outburst of protest among the Korean public. Although the two governments had effectively contained the issue by late 2004, the controversy may erupt again in the future.

51. See Shin, Park, and Yang, *Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia*.

52. See Douglas Webber, “Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian Crisis,” *Pacific Review* 14, no. 3 (2001).


55. A survey conducted in late 2004 and early 2005 by the Committee of 100, a Chinese-American organization in the United States, supports this
claim. The survey found that 91 percent of “the congressional staff” regarded China as a serious or potential military threat, and 87 percent as an economic threat. Reflecting these views, an overwhelming majority of the staff surveyed (79 percent) held unfavorable impressions of China. See Committee of 100, “Committee of 100 Survey: American Attitudes toward China 2004–2005,” (New York: Zogby International, 2005).

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Chosun Ilbo. “Pukhan, miguk, chungguk, ilpon hogamdo chosa,” (A Survey of Attitudes toward North Korea, the U.S., China, and Japan), August 15, 2005.


