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We are especially indebted to MGI’s research team—Holly Benner and Jessie Duncan at the Brookings Institution, Catherine Bellamy and Richard Gowan at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and Kate Chadwick at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation—for their instrumental role in developing the ideas in this action plan and managing the Project’s extensive U.S. and international consultation agenda.
The Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Project seeks to build international support for global institutions and partnerships that can foster international peace and security—and the prosperity they enable—for the next 50 years. MGI is a joint initiative among the Brookings Institution, the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

Since its launch in the spring of 2007, MGI has sought to develop its recommendations and conduct its work in a manner best suited to address today’s most urgent global challenges—namely, by fostering a global dialogue. In a world where 21st century transnational threats—from climate change to nuclear proliferation and terrorism—require joint solutions, discussions on these solutions must take place both inside and outside American borders. As MGI launched this ambitious but urgent agenda, the Project convened two advisory groups—one American and bipartisan, and one international. MGI’s advisors are experienced leaders with diverse visions for how the international security system must be transformed. They are also skilled politicians who understand the political momentum that must power substantive recommendations.

MGI brought these groups together for meetings in Washington D.C., New York, Ditchley Park (UK), Singapore, and Berlin. With their assistance, MGI also conducted consultations with government officials, policymakers and non-governmental organizations across Europe and in Delhi, Beijing, Tokyo, Doha, and Mexico City. MGI held meetings at the United Nations, and with African and Latin American officials in Washington D.C. and New York. On the domestic front, MGI met with Congressional and Administration officials as well as foreign policy advisors to the U.S. Presidential campaigns. Ideas generated in international consultations were tested on U.S. constituencies; ideas generated among U.S. policymakers were sounded out for their resonance internationally. American and international leaders were brought together to consider draft proposals. Through this global dialogue, the Project sought a shared path forward.

MGI’s findings also derive from extensive research and analysis of current global security threats and the performance of international institutions. MGI solicited case studies from leading regional and subject experts that evaluated the successes and failures of international responses to the “hard cases”—from the North Korean nuclear threat to instability in Pakistan and state collapse in Iraq. Both in the United States and internationally, MGI convened experts to review the Project’s threat-specific analyses and proposals.

Financial support for the MGI project has also been robustly international. In addition to the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ditchley Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and UN Foundation, MGI has received funding and in-kind support from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. A number of think tanks and other institutions in Japan, China and India hosted workshops to debate the Project’s findings. MGI is indebted to its diverse supporters.

MGI’s research and consultations provide the foundation for the following Plan for Action, a series of policy briefs, and MGI’s book, *Power and Responsibility: International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats* (forthcoming, Brookings Press 2009). The authors are solely responsible for the following analysis and recommendations. Based on MGI’s consultations, however, they are confident this is a historic opportunity for the United States to forge new partnerships to tackle the most pressing problems of this century.
The MGI project has consulted with field leaders and policymakers from around the globe and across party lines to generate discussion and debate, as well as build consensus among diverse perspectives.
The 21st century will be defined by security threats unconstrained by borders—from climate change, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism to conflict, poverty, disease, and economic instability. The greatest test of global leadership will be building partnerships and institutions for cooperation that can meet the challenge. Although all states have a stake in solutions, responsibility for a peaceful and prosperous world will fall disproportionately to the traditional and rising powers. The United States most of all must provide leadership for a global era.

U.S. domestic and international opinions are converging around the urgent need to build an international security system for the 21st century. Global leaders increasingly recognize that alone they are unable to protect their interests and their citizens—national security has become interdependent with global security.

Just as the founders of the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions after World War II began with a vision for international cooperation based on a shared assessment of threat and a shared notion of sovereignty, today’s global powers must chart a new course for today’s greatest challenges and opportunities. International cooperation today must be built on the principle of responsible sovereignty, or the notion that sovereignty entails obligations and duties toward other states as well as to one’s own citizens.

To build a cooperative international order based on responsible sovereignty, global leaders must act across four different tracks.

**TRACK 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring Credible American Leadership**

No other state has the diplomatic, economic and military capacity necessary to rejuvenate international cooperation. But to lead, the United States must first re-establish itself as a good-faith partner.

Unilateral U.S. action in Iraq, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, rendition, and the rhetorical association of the Iraq war with democracy promotion have damaged American credibility internationally. The United States must demonstrate its commitment to a rule-based international system that rejects unilateralism and looks beyond military might. In turn, major states will be more willing to...
share the burden in resources and expend political capital to manage global threats. A new American President should:

- Send his top cabinet officials for early consultations on international priorities with allies and the rising powers alike;
- Deliver consistent and strong messages on international cooperation domestically and internationally—including in speeches in the lead-up to the Group of 8 (G8) and the UN General Assembly meetings in 2009, laying out a vision for a 21st century security system; and
- Close the Guantanamo Detention facility and initiate efforts toward a more sustainable U.S. detainee policy and declare U.S. commitment to uphold the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture and other laws of war.

Over time, the United States will also need to dramatically upgrade its civilian foreign policy corps, including doubling the size of the foreign service in 10 years and re-writing the Foreign Assistance Act to elevate development priorities and improve aid effectiveness.

**TRACK 2. Power and Legitimacy: Revitalizing International Institutions**

The legitimacy and effectiveness of key international institutions are enhanced by increasing representation of emerging powers and re-focusing mandates toward 21st century challenges.

The leadership and mandates of key international institutions—from the G8 to the UN Security Council—have not kept pace with the new powerholders and dynamic threats of a changed world. Emerging powers are excluded from decision-making processes that affect their security and prosperity. Traditional powers cannot achieve sustainable solutions on issues from economic stability to climate change without the emerging powers at the negotiating table. Global leaders should:

- Create a new Group of 16 (G16) to foster cooperation between the G8 and Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Mexico (the Outreach 5) and the nations of Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria. Replacing the outdated G8, the G16 would serve as a pre-negotiating forum to forge preliminary agreements on major global challenges;
- Initiate voluntary veto reform at the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a confidence building measure toward UNSC reform;
- End the monopoly of the U.S. and Europe on leadership at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and refocus the IMF’s mandate to exercise surveillance over exchange rate policies and to facilitate the smooth unraveling of global imbalances; and
- Strengthen regional organizations, including a 10-year capacity building effort for the African Union and support for a regional security mechanism for the Middle East.

Expansion of the UNSC would be the most dramatic signal of commitment to share the helm of the international system. However, the conditions for this are unlikely to be propitious in 2009, and a mishandled effort could undermine progress on other fronts. Decisive expansion of the G8 in 2009 would lay a credible foundation for action on UNSC expansion within the first term of the new U.S. President.

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The aim of the MGI project is ambitious and urgent: to launch a new reform effort for the global security system in 2009 … for the global system is in serious trouble. It is simply not capable of solving the challenges of today. You all know the list: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, pandemics, failing states … None can be solved by a single government alone.

— Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union; MGI Advisory Group Member
**TRACK 3. Strategy and Capacity: Tackling Shared Threats**

Enhanced international cooperation and international institutions are utilized to manage key global threats.

The global agenda—the 2009 conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 2010 review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and global trade pressures—demands action. In the case of climate change, continuation of current trends in the use of fossil fuels would constitute a new form of “mutually assured destruction.” There is no doubt of the catastrophic effects if nuclear weapons are used or fall into the wrong hands. Global leaders should:

- Negotiate a climate change agreement under UNFCCC auspices that includes emission targets for 2020 and 2050 and investments in technology, rain forests and mitigation;
- Revitalize the core bargain of the non-proliferation regime by nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States and Russia, reducing their arsenals, and by all states endorsing the Additional Protocol and working to develop an international fuel bank; and
- Initiate G16 “pre-negotiations” on an open and inclusive trade regime to conclude a World Trade Organization (WTO) round that benefits poor countries.

Progress must also be made across other key global challenges—deadly infectious disease, the abuse of biotechnology, regional and civil conflict, and global terrorism. Global leaders should:

- Build local public health capacity to achieve full implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) and develop an intergovernmental panel on biotechnology to forge scientific consensus on the dangers and benefits of biotechnology;
- Increase international investment in conflict management with a goal of 50,000 international peacekeeping reserves and two billion in funding for peacebuilding; and
- Establish a UN High Commissioner for Counter Terrorism Capacity Building to focus international efforts to build counter-terrorism norms and capacity.

**TRACK 4. Internationalizing Crisis Response: Focus on the Broader Middle East**

Internationalize crisis response in the broader Middle East to address regional conflict and transnational threats.

Global leaders must have confidence that a 21st century international security system will produce better outcomes on the crises at the top of their national security agendas. The Middle East is the most unstable region in the world, and a vortex of transnational threats. The G16, in cooperation with leading regional actors, can help to identify shared interests in regional stability and catalyze more focused international support. Global leaders should:

- Move the Annapolis process forward to support an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement;
- Commit adequate forces and civilian capacity for a stable peace in Afghanistan;
- Focus U.S. and international efforts on a political settlement and civilian surge for Iraq;
- Sustain regional and international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program; and
- Initiate efforts toward a regional security arrangement for the Middle East that could, as existing crises eased, provide a mechanism to guarantee borders and promote stability.

We are witnessing the early stages of a shift of the center of gravity of international relations from the Atlantic to the Pacific. A simple expansion of the G8 is not enough—new great powers must share responsibility as equal partners for setting the agenda. For its part, China increasingly sees that its security is closely tied to global security. Particularly in the area of climate change and energy security, there is vast scope for cooperation.

— Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs University; MGI Advisory Group Member
International Cooperation for a Changed World

American and global leaders face a choice: they can either use this moment to help shape an international, rule-based order that will protect their global interests, or resign themselves to an ad hoc international system where they are increasingly powerless to shape the course of international affairs. The agenda for action will not be completed in two years or ten. Yet, we cannot wait to start. The longer the delay in new approaches and new cooperation against today’s threats, the more difficult the challenges will become. Global leaders must chart a shared path forward that marries power and responsibility to achieve together what cannot be achieved apart: peace and security in a transnational world.

A new American President will have to re-start a global conversation with the world’s traditional and emerging powers that moves from monologue to dialogue. Partnership and cooperation must be the centerpiece of successful American leadership in confronting 21st century threats, where protecting U.S. security is intimately linked with promoting global stability.

— Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations;
MGI Advisory Group Member
The greatest test of global leadership in the 21st century will be how nations perform in the face of threats that defy borders—from nuclear proliferation, conflict, and climate change to terrorism, threats to biological security, and global poverty. Ours is now a world where national security is interdependent with global security.

Globalization has resulted in unprecedented opportunities. The ability to tap into global markets for capital, technology and labor has allowed the private sector to amass wealth unfathomable 50 years ago: it has helped lift hundreds of millions out of poverty in emerging economies. For China, integration into the global economy has been the driver of one of the most remarkable stories of national progress in human history—500 million people have been raised out of poverty in just thirty years.¹

Yet, the forces of globalization that have stitched the world together and driven prosperity can also tear it apart. In the face of new transnational threats and profound security interdependence, even the strongest nations depend on the cooperation of others to protect their own national security. No country, including the United States, is capable of successfully meeting the challenges, or capitalizing on the opportunities, of this changed world alone. It is a world for which we are unprepared, a world that poses a challenge to leaders and citizens alike to redefine their interests and re-examine their responsibilities. While that is true of every country, it is especially true of the most powerful—which must exercise the most responsibility.

U.S. foreign policy has lagged behind these realities. A new approach is needed to revitalize the alliances, diplomacy, and international institutions central to the inseparable relationship between national and global security.

U.S. leadership is indispensable if the world as a whole is to be successful in managing today’s threats. But American leadership must be re-focused toward partnership—continuing partnership with allies in Europe, Asia and Latin America, and cultivating new partnerships with rising powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa. The policies, attitudes, and actions of major states will have disproportionate influence on whether the next 50 years tend to international order or entropy. The actions of a new U.S. President, working with the leaders of the traditional and rising powers, will profoundly influence the shape of international security and prosperity for a global age.

A Foundation of Responsible Sovereignty

Unprecedented interdependence does not make international cooperation inevitable. Rather, shared interests must be translated into a common vision for a revitalized international security system that benefits all.

— James Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn and Company; Former World Bank President; MGI Advisory Group Member
Foresight, imagination, pragmatism and political commitment, fueled by effective American leadership, created a new international era after World War II. Institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization) contributed to extraordinary economic growth and helped to prevent major-power war. Innovation and political engagement on the same scale are needed to achieve security and prosperity in the years ahead.

However, the vision necessary for a 21st century international security system is clouded by a mismatch between existing post-World War II multilateral institutions premised on traditional sovereignty—a belief that borders are sacrosanct and an insistence on non-interference in domestic affairs—and the realities of a now transnational world where capital, technology, labor, disease, pollution and non-state actors traverse boundaries irrespective of the desires of sovereign states.

The domestic burdens inflicted by transnational threats such as poverty, civil war, disease and environmental degradation point in one direction: toward cooperation with global partners and a strengthening of international institutions. Entering agreements or accepting assistance is not a weakening of sovereignty; it is the exercise of sovereignty in order to protect it.

The MGI Project’s consultations have informed and validated the view that a new era of international cooperation should be built on the principle of responsible sovereignty: the idea that states must take responsibility for the external effects of their domestic actions—that sovereignty entails obligations and duties towards other sovereign states as well as to one’s own citizens. To protect national security, even to protect sovereignty, states must negotiate rules and norms to guide actions that reverberate beyond national boundaries. Responsible sovereignty also implies a positive interest on the part of powerful states to provide weaker states with the capacity to exercise their sovereignty responsibly—a responsibility to build.

MGI emphasizes sovereignty because states are still the primary units of the international system. As much as globalization has diminished the power of states, there is simply no alternative to the legally defined state as the primary actor in international affairs nor is there any substitute for state legitimacy in the use of force, the provision of justice, and the regulation of public spheres and private action.

MGI emphasizes responsibility because, in an era of globalization, adherence to traditional sovereignty, and deference to individual state solutions, have failed to produce peace and prosperity. In a transnational world, international cooperation is essential to give states the means to meet the most fundamental demands of sovereignty: to protect their people and advance their interests.

Responsible sovereignty, in sum, is a guidepost to a better international system. Just as the founders of the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions began with a vision for international cooperation based on a shared assessment of threat and a shared notion of sovereignty, today’s global powers must chart a new course for today’s greatest challenges and opportunities.

— Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Affairs; Former Ambassador of Singapore to the UN; MGI Advisory Group Member

Responsible sovereignty—the idea that states must take responsibility for external effects of their actions—is a brilliant new idea whose time has come. No village can accept a home whose actions endanger the village. Neither can the global village accept the behavior of nations which endanger the globe.
The Political Moment: U.S. and International Convergence

A new vision for global security will only succeed if it is powered by political commitment and has the support of diverse regions and influential constituencies. International politics and global realities are converging to make such cooperation possible.

U.S. Interest

In the United States, MGI consultations with policymakers and recent polling highlight that American citizens and American leadership across party lines are concerned with a declining U.S. image internationally.

In a 2007 national poll, 81% of Americans favored a Presidential candidate who said the United States should “share the burden” and not be the sole supplier of resources, finances, military forces, and diplomacy for peace in the world. Americans polled rejected “going it alone,” and believed the United States should be a global leader and a “role model” for democracy. Presidential candidates have mirrored this bipartisan public sentiment: both major candidates have spoken out for restoring U.S. leadership and moral standing, viewing this as critical to the protection of U.S. security.

The next U.S. President has the opportunity to feature international cooperation as the centerpiece of a strategy to restore America’s global leadership. Americans want their country to be respected, they want to lead, and they want to feel more secure as a result of U.S. engagement.

Just as important, current global realities leave no alternative to cooperation. On January 20, 2009, the next American President will inherit crises in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea, Darfur, Pakistan, and the Middle East. There will be many regional and national challenges to a viable foreign policy: the rise of India and China, an energy-brash Russia, and an African continent caught between new economic opportunities and a legacy of conflict and failed governance. The international community will demand action on climate change and the global food crisis. An American recession will

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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: SEVEN REALITIES ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>For the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>In a world of new transnational dangers, the United States cannot defend itself unilaterally against what threatens it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To gain sustained cooperation on threats to U.S. security, the United States must also address the security concerns of other nations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military power, used in isolation, can be counterproductive in securing the cooperation needed to ensure U.S. security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>International institutions are much more important to American security goals than U.S. policy makers admit or the public realizes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The international institutions that the United States uses daily to meet its security needs must be strengthened or reinvented.</td>
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<td>American policies since 9/11 have led other states toward “soft balancing”: resisting reforms of the international system perceived as beneficial to the United States.</td>
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<td>If the United States wants cooperation in strengthening international institutions, the U.S. must see them as more than tools to be used or ignored to suit short-term political interests.</td>
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National sovereignty becomes responsible sovereignty when nations pay heed both to the domestic demands of their own citizens and to their international responsibilities. Patriotism requires internationalism.

— David Miliband
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom
Excerpt from speech to Peking University, Beijing, February 29, 2008.
focus attention on vulnerabilities in the global financial system. Key U.S. allies will seek renewed U.S. commitment to multilateralism.

The United States cannot retreat from this agenda any more than it can manage it alone. America needs global partners: to combat threats to the American people, to wield influence with actors such as North Korea and Iran, to share the burden on complex challenges, and to sustain global systems that allow the United States access to capital and markets critical to economic growth in a dismal domestic budget environment. It is in America’s self-interest to act now, while its influence is strong, to model leadership for the 21st century based on the premise of partnership and recognition of interdependence.

**Global Interest**

MGI consultations in key capitals in diverse regions—from Beijing and Delhi to London and Doha—reinforced that unilateral U.S. action in Iraq, and across a range of foreign policy issues, has cast a long shadow on America’s standing in the world and alienated even close allies. Key international stakeholders are eager for strong signals from a new U.S. administration that it is willing to re-value global partnerships and re-commit the United States to a rules-based international system.

International public opinion polls reinforce this sentiment. Of more than 24,000 people across 24 countries surveyed in March and April 2008, a majority expressed negative views of the role that the United States is playing in the world. In 14 of 24 countries, two-thirds or more of respondents expressed little or no confidence in President Bush to do the right thing in world affairs. The belief that the United States does not take into account the interests of other countries in formulating its foreign policy is extensive even among U.S. allies such as the UK and Australia and overwhelming in the Middle East and Asia.

Yet, internationally, most policymakers also still recognize that there is no prospect for international security and prosperity in the next 20 years that does not rely heavily on U.S. power and leadership. The United States has the world’s largest economy, strongest military and broadest alliances. The world needs the United States to use its leadership and resources for the resolution of transnational threats. If the United States blocks international solutions on issues such as climate change, nuclear security and financial stability, sustainable global outcomes are unachievable.

Traditional and emerging powers also share with the United States a self-interest in a resilient and effective international order. Europe is the world’s most rule-based society, yet erosion of a rule-based international system means that Europe is taking on commitments, such as on carbon emissions and foreign aid, with increasingly marginal

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**Chuck Hagel**

U.S. Senator from Nebraska; Excerpt from address at MGI speaker series event at the Brookings Institution, June 26, 2008

On his first day in office, the next U.S. President will face a daunting agenda — one that will be impossible to address through unilateral action. This agenda will contain regional crises, evolving geopolitical dynamics and broader threats with the potential to undermine global security. This action plan demonstrates concrete steps for how an American administration can leverage international cooperation to tackle these challenges.
impact. Japan has a vital interest in a stable transition in security arrangements in Asia and globally. Leaders in China, India and the emerging economies recognize that their economic growth relies on a strong and resilient international trade and finance system. To continue to develop its oil and gas reserves, Russia will need international technology, and sufficient trust from its partners to invest in and secure transnational pipelines. None of the traditional or rising powers profit from unchecked proliferation, or the spread of global terrorism.

We must capitalize on momentum generated from a convergence of global and U.S. domestic interests to build an international security system for the 21st century. The case for amplified international cooperation is not a soft-hearted appeal to the common good but rather a realist call to action that is demanded both domestically and internationally.

There continues to be an American consensus that we are less respected by other countries and this is a major problem.

**More Respected v. Less Respected:**
Compared with the past, would you say the United States is more respected by other countries...less respected by other countries...or as respected as it has been in the past?

**Major Problem v. Minor Problem:**
Do you think less respect for America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?

Global governance requires simultaneously dealing with different issues in different ways while recognizing and using to good effect the linkages among them. Just as many of the threats we face today are mutually exacerbating, their solutions can be mutually reinforcing. We are more likely to make progress on specific issues if we work on them in the context of a broader agenda.

— Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution; Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State; MGI Advisory Group Member

During MGI consultations, U.S. and international experts and policymakers stressed that only through responsible international action on transnational threats can nations create the capacity to defuse and ideally prevent regional and global crises. If short-term crises crowd out lasting reforms, nations and policymakers will deny themselves the tools to stem future disasters. If action languishes, nationalistic opportunism may provoke unilateral actions that undermine sustainable solutions. Conflict, isolationism, and protectionism then become imminent threats to global security and prosperity. Climate change and nuclear proliferation will become existential challenges to our planet: the clock is already ticking.

Historically it has taken war or catastrophe to bring about a redefinition of sovereignty and a re-building of international order. Our challenge is to use the urgency of looming security challenges, and the prospect for positive results, to drive progress. International order will require power to underpin responsibility. Our analysis identified five pre-requisites: 1) effective U.S. policy and leadership; 2) institutionalized cooperation between the United States and the traditional and emerging powers; 3) negotiated understandings of the application of responsible sovereignty across key threat areas; 4) effective and legitimate international institutions; and 5) states capable of carrying out their responsibilities toward their own people and internationally.

We have incorporated these prerequisites into a plan for action with four parallel tracks: to restore U.S. standing internationally; to revitalize international institutions; to respond to transnational threats; and to manage crises. We start with the United States because American credibility is critical for effective leadership. We make crisis management the fourth track to underscore that if not addressed in tandem with the others, ad hoc solutions will not be sustainable. The institutional tools in track two are not ends in themselves—they emerge from the agenda on transnational threats. We present them as the second track in order to apply them in track three. Each track identifies both opening actions to build political momentum and a continuing agenda to sustain the concerted engagement required to produce results.
Before investing political energy and resources, other states will look first for signs beyond rhetoric that the United States seeks genuine global partnerships and is committed to an agenda for cooperative action.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. political system has vacillated in its support for the international rule of law and international institutions. The United States has established itself as sheriff and judge of the international system but has at times neglected to abide by the rules itself. In reality, no country gains more from a strong international legal regime than the United States, precisely because the United States has so many interests to protect. A rule-based international system safeguards American citizens, military forces, and corporations.

While the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11 garnered widespread international support, U.S. actions in Iraq generated popular and political anger against the United States both in the region and internationally. This sentiment has diminished the willingness or ability of other nations to cooperate with the United States.

The rhetorical association of the Iraq war with democracy promotion has further undermined American ideals once admired globally and squandered one of the United States’ great assets: its reputation for protecting and promoting human rights and the rule of law. Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, and rendition have damaged American credibility on human rights in large parts of the world, especially in Muslim-populated countries.

U.S. engagement and leadership will be required across many issue areas, but first the United States must reestablish its bona fides. The following acts taken by the United States would signal a willingness to re-commit to a rule-based international order, and look beyond military might as a primary foreign policy tool.

I strongly believe that many of the emerging threats the world now faces, such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and transnational terrorism, must be met by strong U.S. leadership and renewed engagement with the global community. Restoring U.S. standing in the world and encouraging the constructive use of American power is central to fostering greater international cooperation to counter these threats.

— Howard Berman
Representative from California, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, United States Congress; MGI Advisory Group Member
Deliver Consistent and Strong Messages on International Cooperation

The messages of the United States on the value of international cooperation and its commitment to global partnerships must be consistent and strong. Style, tone and vocabulary will make a difference. From the outset of the administration, broad and intense high-level consultation—by the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and senior ambassadors or envoys—will signal to the international community American dedication to dialogue and cooperative approaches. These high-level officials should engage traditional and rising powers early in the administration to gather insights on the priorities of key states.

The new U.S. President should commit the United States to leading efforts to revitalize the international security system. The President must deliver a strong message internationally that the United States is dedicated to global partnerships and will uphold the rule of law, and speak to U.S. audiences on the importance of international cooperation to U.S. national security. Following international and Congressional consultations, the President should lay out the main elements of a multi-year agenda for key international agreements and institutions, and call on global and regional leaders to work together over the course of his term to make decisive progress on a defined action plan. This agenda could be set out in speeches in the lead-up to the 2009 Group of 8 (G8) meeting in Italy, and at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in September 2009.

Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-Based International System

The United States must make clear that it will uphold the articles of the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture and other laws of war and reiterate that it has no authority to torture anyone. The President has an obligation under international law, and with a view to reciprocity, to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of all prisoners, whatever their status.

The 44th President should also immediately announce his intention to close the Guantánamo Detention facility and charge, transfer, or release its approximately 270 detainees. Simultaneously, the U.S. administration should announce an effort to develop a sustainable detainee policy, not only for Guantánamo but for U.S. detention facilities worldwide. The next President must work with Congress on a new detention framework to address national security concerns while providing basic legal protections.5

A Continuing Agenda: Restoring Credible American Leadership

Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for Cooperative Diplomacy. The United States needs a stronger civilian foreign policy capacity to help restore its international leadership and effectively counter 21st century security threats. Strengthened civilian tools for development and diplomacy are critical to combat key global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, global poverty and conflict. Yet, U.S. spending on defense dwarfs civilian-side investments. The Bush Administration’s fiscal year 2009 budget request included $38.3 billion to fund the civilian-side foreign affairs and foreign aid budget.6 In comparison, the President asked for $515 billion for the Department of Defense’s core budget, before factoring in the cost of waging war in Iraq and

After years of missed opportunities and some ill-considered U.S. initiatives, the next Administration inherits a complex and challenging strategic situation. This is compounded by...the urgent need to revitalize and rebuild international institutions and to rebuild frayed or dysfunctional relations with key partners. The MGI project does a masterful job of identifying the challenges as well as the opportunities for American leadership...creatively weaving together a series of critical subject areas to be addressed on parallel tracks.

— Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, African Affairs; MGI Advisory Group Member
Afghanistan. The United States is also tied for last out of the 22 donor nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in terms of international aid as a percentage of gross national income.

The first priority is to create the civilian capability to understand and work with local counterparts to address the drivers of terrorism, proliferation, poverty, conflict, and financial instability. This would involve doubling the size of the Foreign Service within ten years. U.S. representatives on the ground, with an understanding of local politics, culture, history and language, are best placed to inform policy choices. Such capacity and flexibility requires more than the 7,000 Foreign Service officers in the State Department and 1,000 in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The very administration of foreign policy and foreign aid must also be overhauled. Whereas the private sector has responded to globalization by decentralizing operations, personnel shortages have driven the State Department and USAID to centralize policy and programs in Washington while proliferating the number of actors delivering foreign aid. In 2008, there are more than 50 separate units in the U.S. government involved in aid delivery. The result: diminished capacity to act locally and no systematic means to ensure that civilian capacities are used to their best effect to advance national interests. The Executive Branch and Congress must work together to conceptualize anew the administration of diplomacy, defense and development to support common national security goals. A new Foreign Assistance Act must elevate global development as a ‘third pillar’ of U.S. foreign policy along with diplomacy and defense.
Rebuilding an effective international security system will require institutionalized venues for dialogue and negotiation among the major and rising powers, as well as mechanisms to achieve buy-in and legitimacy from a wider set of states. Neither the membership nor decision-making mechanisms of today’s international institutions facilitate such a dialogue.

By 2050, the four most dynamic economies in the world, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are projected to produce 40% of global output. Yet only two of the four are permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and only Russia is a participant in the G8. Emerging powers express intense frustration about their lack of inclusion in the decision-making processes that affect their security and prosperity. Conversely, there are fewer issues that the G8 alone can resolve without the participation of emerging powers. While no individual nation wants to see itself restrained by international norms, all nations have an interest in seeing others abide by a common set of rules.

If the United States and other traditional powers seek sustainable solutions on issues from conflict to climate change and nuclear proliferation, they will need to make room for these new powers at the negotiating table. If new powers are not integrated as partners in the shaping of a revitalized international security system, the enterprise has little chance for success.

The Russian incursion into Georgia in 2008, for example, reinforces rather than diminishes the need for institutional mechanisms that bring emerging powers into a framework that intensifies international checks and balances. Some argue that the West should isolate Russia. While there is no question that the international community must condemn Russia’s military action, isolation will only spark Russian nationalism in the short run, when Russia can afford its truculence due to high energy prices. Rather, the goal should be to play to both the international community and Russia’s long-term interests. In the long run, Russia will need technology and capital to sustain its energy sector and diversify its economy. It will need access to international markets. Bringing Russia into a wider grouping of nations that demonstrates these possibilities will better encourage restraint than trying to isolate Russia at a time when it is strong.

U.S. leadership in driving an expansion of the UN Security Council would be the most dramatic and effective signal of a changed commitment to international order. However, the conditions for this are unlikely to be propitious in 2009, and a mishandled effort at expansion will do more damage than good. The new U.S. administration should work on parallel tracks to improve bilateral relations with the traditional and rising powers, including through decisive expansion of the G8, and lay a credible pathway towards early expansion of the Security Council.
Create a Group of 16 (G16) to Bridge Effectiveness and Legitimacy

The creation of a new G16 at the 2009 G8 summit meeting in Italy would be a bold change to foster dynamic, cooperative interaction between the United States and the major and rising powers. Even if formal inauguration of the G16 is not possible in 2009, a core group already exists: the G8 plus Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico (called the “Outreach 5”). The United States and other members of the G8 should insist on meeting with this full group routinely, and use this grouping to forge consensus within the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other multilateral fora on transnational issues. As circumstances allow this G13 should add Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria to include voices from diverse regions with significant populations and economic influence. By 2012, when the United States has the G8 Presidency, or preferably earlier, the G16 should be fully established.

The G16 would represent economic, political, and military powers from several regions—incorporating those states whose positive contributions and blocking powers make them essential participants in a wide range of international and transnational agreements. The G16 would take the place of the existing and outdated G8. Its purpose would be to serve as a pre-negotiating forum, a place where the smallest possible grouping of necessary stakeholders could meet to forge preliminary agreements on responses to major global challenges. It would be a place to build knowledge, trust, and patterns of cooperation among the most powerful states. The G16 could, depending on the issue, draw on the insights and energies of a wider range of nations, large and small, by developing “groups of responsibility” to tackle specific problems.

The G16 would also engage heads of the UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), World Health Organization (WHO), regional organizations and other international institutions and tap the private and civic sectors for input. The G16 would not be an alternative to the UN or other multilateral or regional bodies, but a vehicle to make them more effective. It would not handle acute threats, which should be addressed at the UN Security Council. Informal agreements within the G16 would be taken to more representative bodies for discussion and review. Like the G8, it would schedule and conduct meetings flexibly—convening at the Leader’s level annually, at the Foreign Ministers level more often, and promote interaction among G16 national security advisors, political directors, and other officials.

Restrain Use of the Veto on the Path Toward UN Security Council Reform

The G16 will be a critical part of an international order based on responsible sovereignty, but it is not a substitute for an effective and credible UN Security Council, which must remain at the core of the international security system. However, an early initiative on UNSC membership expansion would risk political deadlock and detract attention from progress on other issues. Three steps are needed as interim measures on a path toward more comprehensive reform: 1) a commitment by permanent members to act on membership reform within a defined time period; 2) discussion within international forums to build a shared definition of threat and conditions for the use of force; and 3) action on procedural and veto reform at the Security Council.

As a confidence building measure, the United States should lead on voluntary veto reform at the Council on the most serious aspect of the Council’s business—the authorization of the use of force, sanctions, or peacekeeping operations. It would substantially enhance the legitimacy of the UNSC were the Permanent Five (P5) to agree—informally—that they would not use the veto to block action on these issues unless at least two permanent members opposed that action. This would allow the Security Council to avoid an impasse in responding to conflict and humanitarian crises even if tensions arise among members. This double veto agreement would provide the foundation for future efforts to improve the Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy. The veto could still be used to block non-operational resolutions (condemnatory, exhortative, etc) of the kind that clog the Council’s agenda. And in extremis—in defense of core interests or core allies—the veto could still be wielded.

Opening Actions: Revitalizing International Institutions
A Continuing Agenda: Revitalizing International Institutions

Reform Representation and Mandate of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In order to achieve a global system of economic governance that reflects changes in capital, power, and population, efforts to increase the decision-making authority of emerging economies in the IMF and the World Bank must be bolstered. The stability of the international financial system will require stronger capacity to detect and prevent financial crises in countries with large capital balances that also have limited financial transparency and experience in crisis management. To consent to such scrutiny, emerging markets will want stronger representation in the IMF and World Bank. The United States and Europe should offer a further redistribution of shares to emerging economies and cede their monopoly on heading the World Bank and IMF as part of a package to strengthen and target the roles of these institutions.

Forestalling future economic crises will require the IMF to exercise transparent and independent surveillance over the exchange rate policies of the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and other systemically significant countries—powers it has only just begun to acquire. On financial crises such as the sub-prime mortgage collapse, the IMF would ideally play a preventative role, alerting members to potential weaknesses in the system before a crisis unfolds. The IMF has the ability to spark dialogue, provide in-depth analysis and independent assessment, and serve as an “honest broker” to bring together the G16 and key regional groups to redress the economic threat posed by global imbalances.

Mandated to assist poor countries left behind by the global economy, the World Bank’s traditional leadership role in global development has eroded. Middle-income countries have other sources of capital; poor countries have other sources of development and technical assistance. However, the Bank has an important role to play in promoting inclusive and sustainable globalization, particularly by helping developing countries link to the global economy, and in helping emerging economies bridge the divide between rich and poor within their own borders. On climate change, the World Bank has also emerged as a key international player, as it has with respect to fragile and post-conflict states: these areas should be prioritized and further developed in the Bank’s future assistance efforts.

Expand the UN Security Council. The legitimacy of the Security Council is grounded in the Charter, but depends as well on perceptions of whether its decisions truly reflect global opinion. Expansion to increase the representation of emerging powers and major donors is needed to sustain their cooperation and financing for institutional investments and for UNSC resolutions. The United States would send a strong signal to emerging powers if in 2009 it announced its commitment to UNSC reform and articulated a credible path forward. By doing so, it would also re-assert its leadership at the UN.

Seats in the Security Council should not simply be a reflection of power, but should be an inducement towards responsibility. Linking new seats to contributions to international peace and security would send a strong signal. Expansion should also deal with concerns about a loss of the Council’s efficiency. The smallest possible expansion that can meet the goal of rebalancing and legitimating the Security Council must be pursued.
First, the P5 should agree to an expansion from the current base of 15 to 21 seats. The General Assembly would elect the new members for six to ten year terms based on criteria including: financial contributions to the UN and larger contributions to international peace and security, including at a regional level. The criteria for election could be pre-negotiated by the G16 (or the countries that would constitute it if its creation lags) and then debated within the UNSC and General Assembly. A central feature of a viable package would be a fixed date set for when long-term seats are reviewed for possible transformation into permanent ones.

Revitalize UN Management of Security and Development Efforts. The past four years have seen a debate over management reform at the UN that has fluctuated between sterile and politicized. At the core of the debate has been the balance between the powers accorded to the Secretary-General as chief operating officer of the UN, and the powers accorded to member states as ‘board members.’ Of particular concern has been the consensus system (ironically, initiated by the United States) by which the General Assembly’s budget committees authorize the UN’s budget and manage its spending. This has degenerated into a one-state, one-veto tool for micromanagement.

The debate needs to be refocused on the UN’s operational roles both in security and development. This is where the UN most directly affects human lives, where the UN makes the largest investments, and where current management reform efforts are most lacking. While there are substantial inefficiencies in UN headquarters, its net budget of just over $2 billion pales in comparison to the more than $15 billion spent in 2007 on peacekeeping and by the UN’s development and humanitarian agencies.12 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently proposed an ‘accountability initiative’ that would focus on modernizing management performance

We currently have multilateralism a la carte where nations choose among the forums that best pursue their interests. We need instead to restore the legitimacy of the United Nations and pursue UN Security Council reform. We cannot allow efficiency to trump legitimacy in international institutions—or permit the reverse to be true.

— Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India; MGI Advisory Group Member

Undermining U.S. and International Convergence: The Risks of a Concert/League of Democracies

Some have proposed creating a League or Concert of Democracies as a new institution designed to strengthen security cooperation among the world’s liberal democracies. If the United Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would “provide an alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action, including the use of force.”14 In addition, many have argued that such a Concert or League would create a mechanism to mobilize support for emerging democracies.

In MGI’s consultations across diverse regions, we found few takers on the idea among any states, democratic or not, whether in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America. The Concert, no matter its official mandate, would alienate China, whose cooperation is essential for progress across other areas of shared interest, such as climate change, terrorism and nonproliferation. Instead of building on international convergence, MGI interlocutors in China said such a concept could form the basis for a second Cold War. Policymakers in India argued that such a club would heighten, not reduce, international insecurity by creating divisions rather than unifying nations, while officials from other key states allied with the United States privately underscored that such an institution would be counter-productive, especially by isolating China. Others noted that the idea wrongly assumes that democracies would agree on the use of force, which was clearly refuted in the case of Iraq.

If the purpose of the Concert is to support emerging democracies, others queried how the Concert would differ from the existing Community of Democracies. Among all regions we heard that if the goal of the Concert is even broader than authorizing the use of force and promoting democracy, then it would assure its irrelevance by excluding countries (e.g., China, Egypt) crucial to solving global threats.
within the UN Secretariat and improve transparency and accountability of the Secretariat to the member states. It would also helpfully focus on the accountability of member states to the Organization—whether member states live up to their commitments and back mandates with resources.

The UN Ambassadors of the G16, along with others, could commit to supporting this initiative and extending it to incorporate the rest of the ten largest UN spending activities where not already covered by the Secretary-General’s initiative. The goals should be increased effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency in the UN’s oversight and coordination of dozens of complex peacekeeping and development response efforts worldwide. Early movement on such reforms would help a new American President argue with confidence for a stronger UN role in the areas of peace and security, and would bolster international arguments for an expansion of the UN’s role in development.

**Strengthen Regional Organizations.** Regional organizations have played a pioneering role in re-defining sovereignty, developing cooperative norms across states, serving as first-responders to regional crises, and jointly addressing transnational threats. Beyond the G16 and the United Nations, regional organizations will play increasingly important roles in managing and implementing security arrangements. Regional organizations can also make use of their core comparative advantage—proximity, in both physical and political terms—to rapidly respond to breaking crises.

Effective regional arrangements (formal or informal) are also vital for ensuring state compliance. Global institutions are regulatory and normative devices, but the diplomatic suasion and pressure that is often required, especially in managing escalating crises, resides equally if not more so at the regional level. While many threats have global sources or causality, they are also felt primarily at a regional level. This is especially so for developmental and environmental issues, as geographic regions are frequently bound together in common environmental or climate systems. But it is also true of security issues such as terrorism. Even global phenomena like pandemics have regional concentrations. The G16 and the U.S. should focus concerted attention on strengthening regional fora as key elements of a revitalized international security system.

The development and functions of regional organizations around the world vary. The Bush Administration recently shifted towards a policy of recognizing European security architecture as a positive contribution to both regional and global security—a policy that should continue. Efforts to encourage the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to develop modalities for civilian-military cooperation should also be supported. In Africa, the United States and the G16 should support a ten-year capacity building program for the African Union (AU), particularly in the area of peace and security. This will require multi-year legislative commitments of financial resources and sustained policy attention. As part of a wider engagement strategy with Asia, the next American President must also focus policy attention and resources on Asian regional security arrangements such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Six-Party Talks to strengthen the infrastructure for cooperation among Asian powers. The U.S. and G16 should also support the development of a regional architecture for the Middle East (see track 4)—where despite a proliferation of transnational threats and conflict, a robust regional structure does not exist.

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The notion that the United States and other powerful nations understand what is in the best interest of those across the developing world, or act based on these interests, has vanished completely. As a result, international institutions dominated by these nations face a serious legitimacy gap in the eyes of the broader global community.

— Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for Democracy; MGI Advisory Group Member
The central task for a 21st century international security system is creating cooperative arrangements to counter the rise of threats that defy borders and challenge sovereignty and, at times, survival.

MGI has focused on six global challenges—climate change, nuclear proliferation, threats to biological security, terrorism, conflict, and poverty and economic instability. Each requires near-term attention and a sustained strategy. Different countries and regions will prioritize different threats. In an interdependent world, action is necessary across this full agenda in order to get reciprocal cooperation on any one nation’s top priorities. In other words: you have to cooperate with others if you want them to cooperate with you.

The global agenda—the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in December 2009 to forge a new international agreement on climate change, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in 2010, and the combination of a global food crisis and the failure of the latest Doha Round meeting—put climate change, nuclear proliferation, and global poverty and economic instability at the forefront of the debate.

In all these issues, both powerful and vulnerable states are affected. In the case of climate change, continuation of current trends in the use of fossil fuels would constitute a new form of “mutually assured destruction.” There is no doubt of the catastrophic effects if nuclear weapons are used or fall into the wrong hands.

This agenda must also centrally involve actors beyond national governments. The private sector holds the capital and technology to solve problems ranging from climate change to catastrophic disease. Local governments are leading innovators on energy security and efforts to combat global warming. Labor views will be crucial to design means to ease transitions in a global economy. Non-governmental organizations play a central role in advocacy and action on key threats. Schools, universities and centers of excellence remain leaders in generating ideas. In today’s world, public-private dialogue and action will be an essential part of an international security system for the 21st century.

— Rajendra K. Pachauri
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on Climate Change Under UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Auspices

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has estimated that the world has seven years to begin the reduction of annual greenhouse gas emissions to avoid global temperature changes by mid-century that would have devastating human, environmental, and economic impacts. Every major emitter must be party to the agreement for it to be effective. Developed and developing countries must partner to design imaginative solutions to sustain growth without the reliance on fossil fuels that characterized the industrial revolution.

Getting there is a massive challenge given diverse political interests: the European Union (EU) and Japan favor binding carbon emission targets, the United States does not, China and India are focused on economic growth, energy-exporting states care about their markets, and poor developing countries want both protection against the impacts of climate change and investment in modern infrastructure.

The goal must be a new agreement to arrest global warming under the auspices of the UNFCCC. An agreement must include two tracks: 1) an ‘abatement track’ that captures commitments on emissions control; and 2) an ‘investment track’ covering conservation, technology, rainforests and adaptation to the effects of climate change. Ideally both tracks of such an agreement will come together by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in December 2009. An agreement on investment is within reach and will gain support from developed and developing countries alike who desire access to technology, resources, and other incentives to control emissions. Success on the ‘abatement track’ will be far more difficult: key states remain far apart on the politics of the challenge.

Negotiations on the ‘abatement track’ could be extended through a G16 Climate Group (a ‘group of responsibility’ that included members of the G16 plus other states central to the emissions debate) that allowed for the necessary negotiation between the major emitters. The G16 Climate Group should be established as a formal “Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice” —within the UNFCCC—closing the gap between the major emitters process and the UN process. The Group would negotiate a global target for 2015–2020 and commitments to pass binding national laws to implement this target. The G16 could accept the principle of pricing carbon to promote conservation, spur innovation and adopt common standards for reporting carbon emissions. They would bring the results of their negotiations to the UNFCCC for wider discussion and buy-in, with the aim of a binding agreement on emissions by 2012 or sooner as a companion to the international agreement on investment.

Revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

We have entered a second nuclear age where proliferation is no longer only a problem of states. Terrorists have sought nuclear weapons and fissile material, while non-state actors have created proliferation rings, selling nuclear weapons technology and know-how. At the same time, a combination of environmental concerns related to global warming and the volatility of international oil and gas markets is resurrecting the demand for nuclear power, creating tensions between energy needs and proliferation concerns. In the Middle East and North Africa, 14 states either have or have declared they will pursue some form of nuclear program.

Although the NPT has been a cornerstone of collective security for more than 40 years, its foundations have eroded. Without strong engagement with the NPT and other disarmament treaties, the international community does not have the moral authority to deter states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Because the United States and Russia hold the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they play a critical role in setting the framework for nuclear security. A coalition of former cabinet secretaries, Shultz, Perry, and Kissinger, and Senator Nunn has revived U.S. bipartisan support for arms control.
Even so, nuclear reductions have become all the more difficult after the tense standoff between Russia and the West after the crisis in Georgia. Yet these tensions only reinforce the need for the U.S. and Russia to use arms control as a means to normalize relations, just as in 1983 President Reagan decided to launch the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, negotiations after the Soviets downed a Korean Airlines passenger jet.

Russia and the United States should stand down the alert status of nuclear forces, pledge no-first-use, negotiate strategic arms reductions, and extend immediately the inspection and verification provisions to the START, which expires in December 2009. They must engage at multiple levels on missile defense—at a minimum bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia Council—and thus build on the precept of regulated missile defense established under the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To establish its credibility on disarmament, the U.S. must also ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

A consensus had also begun to emerge among nuclear experts that the United States should declare a dramatic unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons not needed for deterrence or offensive purposes. While the Russia-Georgia conflict has made a unilateral reduction politically difficult, the fundamental reality has not changed that the United States can reduce its nuclear arsenal, still deter against nuclear attacks, and better advance its nonproliferation goals.

These opening steps need to be met with equal purpose from non-nuclear weapons states, who should endorse making the Additional Protocol mandatory, and work with the nuclear weapons states to develop an international fuel bank under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This bank would assure nations access to nuclear fuel as long as they observe the NPT’s provisions, and would create a means to centralize the control and storage of spent nuclear fuel.

**Sustain Commitment to a Global Trade Agreement**

Global systems of finance and trade have created unprecedented prosperity, yet the borderless nature of international markets can spread instability across countries and continents, threatening rich and poor. The world’s most powerful countries need resiliency in global financial and trade systems to sustain prosperity. The poorest countries in the world need access to global markets to combat poverty.

The shock that emanated from Doha’s collapse and the efforts made to avoid its failure reflect a latent understanding of the need to bring poor countries into the global trade regime. Some will argue that key players such as the United States and Brazil should refocus attention on regional and bilateral agreements. However, the proliferation of bilateral deals has made trade agreements harder to negotiate and enforce. Moreover, the very transnational problems on agricultural subsides and industrial protection that have thwarted a global agreement will continue to prevail bilaterally and regionally.

The progress made in the 2008 negotiations should not be lost. Pascal Lamy, Director General of the WTO, should publish the 18 (out of 20) agreed trade areas from the negotiations. Even if they have no formal legal standing, these 18 points should be the starting point for new negotiations rather than retreading old ground.

The principle trading partners—starting with a G16 subgroup of trade ministers from the United States, the European Union, India, Brazil and China—must make clear that they expect new trade negotiations by 2010 and not leave room for speculation. These countries will shape the nature of the trading regime. They must pre-negotiate on the most contentious points, and commission research on complex issues that have blocked consensus. This research and pre-negotiation on the margins of the G16 would form the basis for WTO convened revival talks on the Doha round in late 2010 (following elections in the United States and for the European Commission).
The Center would present points of consensus; identify causal trends on poverty eradication; assess interrelationships among trade, finance and development measures in specific countries; investigate pressures and remedies for protectionism; and consolidate indicators of both donor and recipient performance. The Center would also consolidate the vast array of existing performance reports on MDGs and financing into a poverty clock, a tool to show how overall poverty rates change over time within individual countries and regions.16

The Center’s work would be debated at the annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank. G16 leaders would also charge their development, finance and trade ministers with completing a comprehensive picture of progress and problems. Findings would form the basis of the Millenium + 10 (2010) and Millenium + 15 (2015) Summits.

Address the Security Challenges of the Biological Century. While we are entering a second nuclear age, we are at the beginning of what some are already calling the “Biological Century.” Discoveries in the life sciences have the potential to reshape the worlds of health, food production, energy, and climate change, leading to new fuels, heat and drought resistant food crops, and eradication of deadly diseases. But biotechnology’s discoveries also have a dark side—potential immense harm through accidental or intentional release of designer pathogens.

We also face myriad natural biological threats. Fifteen million people die each year from deadly infectious diseases, and every year new ones emerge, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian Flu. In a world of 700 million international air passengers yearly, and almost all on flights shorter than the incubation times of infectious diseases, national health is only as good as global health.

The challenge for biological security is two-fold. First, developed and developing countries alike benefit from a strong global public health regime that controls disease outbreaks and builds local capacity to sustain the health of citizens. Effective public health is also crucial against the threat of bioterrorism. Given the global diffusion of dangerous techniques and substances, prevention will be difficult and therefore defenses—global and local public health systems—must be robust.

The World Heath Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) lay out state responsibilities to strengthen national and global disease surveillance and response. What is needed now is full implementation of the regulations and building local health capacity in the developing world. A G16 initiative, in conjunction with key leaders from the private sector, can ensure that when deadly infectious disease occurs, global reaction is swift and supports local capability. This is a win-win opportunity for development and security.

Second, there is the need to promote the bright side of biotechnology and protect against its dark side. In the long run, a new regime for biotechnology safety and security needs to be created. The existing international regime to stop biological weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, is too slow and state-
centric to address the dark-side uses of biotechnology. With individuals working in tens of thousands of industry, research, and university labs in every part of the world, such a regime must engage industry, science, and the public. Intermediate steps can help create scientific consensus and international trust in order to spur collective action. An Intergovernmental Panel on Safety of Biotechnology, akin to the body that generated international scientific consensus around climate change (the IPCC), could bring scientists from around the world to forge consensus about the trajectory of biotechnology risks.

**Increase International Investments in Conflict Management.** Fragile and conflict-ridden states that cannot maintain rule of law or provide for the well-being of their citizens undermine international order and magnify the risk of other transnational threats such as terrorism and deadly infectious disease. Civil violence often crosses borders and draws regional and international actors into its vortex.

With a rise in attention to internal conflict in the post Cold War period, the international architecture for conflict prevention and management grew by leaps and bounds, with international institutions such as the UN, regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union, and individual states, including the United States, UK, Canada, and India developing capabilities for conflict response. Nearly 200,000 international peacekeepers are deployed around the world, about 100,000 of these under the United Nations. However, the performance of international institutions has been mixed and capabilities still fall short of the challenge. If the U.S. military had comparable limitations in resources, support, unified doctrine and training as UN-designated peacekeepers, the United States would never deploy its forces. If existing responsibilities are to be fulfilled and new crises to be met with adequate response, national and multilateral capabilities will have to be streamlined and strengthened.

A low-cost first step is investing in capacities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at the UN and regional organizations to help forestall crises or respond rapidly to them. But diplomatic methods will frequently lead to demand for new peacekeeping operations, and capacity there must be expanded. As a critical step, each G16 member could designate a part of its armed forces and police force for international peacekeeping, which could be made available directly to the UN or through regional organizations. The goal would be 50,000 reserves supplemented by 20,000 police. The UN would be responsible for designating performance standards and qualifying training programs.

In parallel, steps must be taken to strengthen international peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is a complicated endeavor that requires the integration of traditional military peacekeeping with civilian initiatives to address humanitarian need, increase local capacity to administer the rule of law, promote reconciliation, and re-build state functions. The G16 should support an initiative to develop a civilian reserve at the UN of at least 1,000 specialists to undertake key peacebuilding tasks, rather than relying on ad hoc deployment through contracts and multiple agencies and departments. The G16 and additional states with interest and funds to devote to peacebuilding should also commit two billion in replenishable funds for peacebuilding to support rapid start-up of operations. Finally, the UN Peacebuilding Commission role in coordinating strategic plans and the contributions of diverse donors should be strengthened. Between headquarters staff of the Peacebuilding Support Office, and in-country strategy teams in up to five concurrent missions, this will require approximately 150 full-time staff members.

**Establish a UN High-Commission for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building.** The deep unpopularity of the war in Iraq, which was inappropriately connected to the campaign against Al Qaeda, has created a political context in many countries where combating terrorism is equated with supporting
unpopular U.S. goals. Although many governments continue to cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism objectives, they frequently encounter significant domestic opposition. Yet, all nations share an interest in preventing terrorist attacks on their own soil and internationally. The world’s leading economies would bear the burden if a major terrorist attack disrupted international trade or destabilized key financial markets.

Having been the victim of the largest terrorist attack in history and because of its global reach, the United States should be the natural leader in cooperative efforts to combat terrorism. But to re-claim a credible lead, the United States must shift strategy and rhetoric away from a general ‘War Against Terror’ and toward a specific war against al Qaeda and its affiliates. This will involve continuing offensive operations in Afghanistan, including devoting the necessary resources and attention to that operation, as well as sanctioning individuals and states that support al Qaeda elsewhere.

Since 9/11, the international community has mobilized to establish new standards and principles for combating terrorism, notably through the UN Security Council, the OECD, and Interpol. Yet, despite widespread recognition in principle that states remain the front line of any counter-terrorism strategy, there is no dedicated international capacity to help weaker states build the capacity to combat terrorism. A new G16 should play a catalytic role in designing and generating support for a UN High-Commission for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building, modeled on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), that would fill a critical gap in counter-terrorism efforts.

Following the UNHCR model, the Commission’s board would be politically and regionally diverse, and treaty based. States seeking membership on the board of the High Commission would have to be in compliance with UN counter-terrorism treaties and law, creating an important lobby for continued improvement in the counter-terrorism regime. As a UN body, its policies and capacities could command substantial legitimacy, especially within states uncomfortable with the legacy of U.S.-backed strategies.
Global leaders must have confidence that a 21st century international security system will produce better outcomes on the crises at the top of their national security agendas. Otherwise, they will not invest the necessary resources and political effort to cultivate global partnerships and effective international institutions.

The broader Middle East is the most unstable region in the world, and a vortex of transnational threats and interlocking crises from Lebanon to Iran and Afghanistan. Unless crisis response in the region is internationalized, regional stability, global energy supplies, and key security arrangements such as the NPT are threatened.

The United States is neither solely responsible for, nor solely capable of, managing or resolving the several interlocking crises in the broader Middle East. Many states point to the U.S. role in stoking regional instability, civil war within Iraq, rising anti-Western sentiment, and volatility of international energy markets. However, each of the G16 countries and much of the world share an overriding interest in a stable Middle East. All will be worse off if crises in the Middle East escalate, if terrorism spreads further, if energy prices swing out of control, if Iraq falls into permanent chaos, or if tensions between the Muslim world and the West fester or escalate. The complexity of the challenge will require a truly international response.

A unilateral U.S. approach has been inadequate in the face of the region’s complexities. Meanwhile, international tools such as UN peacekeeping and the IAEA’s inspections system have played important roles in containing the region’s crises. However, even the most ambitious agenda for international institutions would recognize serious limits in this hardest of hard cases. Neither U.S. unilateral policy nor multilateralism as usual will suffice. The Middle East illustrates the need to combine U.S. leadership, the engagement of the traditional and rising powers, and effective institutions if crises are to be overcome.

A peaceful, prosperous and more stable Middle East requires both reforming national governance, and resolving the Arab Israeli conflict. Ending Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories and establishing a sovereign Palestinian state, should enable sustainable Arab Israeli reconciliation. Reform based on an overall strategic vision articulated by Arabs themselves should move their societies towards more inclusive systems based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. But for peace and reform to succeed, regional efforts must be reinforced with strong and even-handed US involvement, international partnerships, and effective global institutions.

— Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation; Former Assistant Secretary-General and Director, Regional Bureau for Arab States, UN Development Program; MGI Advisory Group Member
OPENING ACTIONS:
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East

Convene a Friends Group and Plan for an International Peacebuilding Mission to Support the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The Bush Administration’s decision in November 2007 to convene a wider range of interested and influential parties in Annapolis, helped breathe life into a moribund Middle East peace process. Keeping the process moving forward, against the constant temptation to move away from diplomacy in the face of renewed violence, will be critical to stabilizing the region.

All parties recognize that U.S. leadership of the Middle East peace process is necessary, but U.S. actions alone will not suffice. The United States should establish a “Friends Group” on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that broadens the existing Quartet to include key members of the G16, including Turkey. The Friends Group could help bring Middle East peace closer by providing encouragement, support, and occasional pressure to move forward the peace process. Arab and Muslim majority members of a Friends Group could help to ensure that Hamas accepts, or does not obstruct, the negotiations on an agreement.

Forward movement on an Israeli-Palestinian agreement will take place in the context of a drastically weakened governing capacity on the Palestinian side and likely spoilers from both sides. The potential exists for a credible, international, transitional administrative and peacekeeping operation, mandated (though not necessarily commanded) by the United Nations, to be deployed to help implement a peace agreement. The Friends Group, perhaps under a joint U.S.-Turkish lead, could begin fostering operational plans for such a presence. The group could help ensure the necessary political authorization from the United Nations, as well as the support of the League of Arab States, and galvanize the necessary commitments of troops and financial resources.

Improve International Strategy and Increase Investments for Afghanistan

With implications for counter-terrorism efforts, regional stability, and the viability of international peacebuilding support efforts, the global stakes in the success of Afghanistan’s recovery are enormous. For the Afghan people, this is a moment to rebuild after almost thirty years of war. Failure would signal that the international community does not have the capacity to help a fledgling democracy overcome a legacy of poverty and terror. It would recreate a haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, further erode stability in Pakistan, and generate a massive crisis in confidence in core international security instruments.

As of mid-2008, a stronger and more effective international force and civilian presence are needed in Afghanistan to break a cycle of continued conflict and instability in the south and east. A first prerequisite will be a combination of adequate forces to give reconstruction a chance, and a commitment to sustain those forces until local capacity is stronger. After multiple appeals, NATO countries are not likely to increase forces further. The U.S. may be able to redeploy some troops from Iraq. Several European and Asian nations have participated at low levels and are not likely to contribute more. Moreover, many NATO and non-NATO contributors to ISAF—with notable exceptions like the UK and Canada—have placed serious restrictions on the deployment of their troops—damaging NATO’s credibility as a fighting force. Nations will need to reconsider these “caveats.” NATO should also pursue unprecedented cooperation with China, perhaps first in the area of police training, to add depth both in numbers and in political relationships in the sub-region. Success there could lead to wider Chinese deployments in Afghanistan, which could potentially free up NATO troops to redeploy to more insecure parts of the country.

The United Nations, with unequivocal backing from the United States and the major European and Asian donors, must also engage Afghan leaders on corruption. The UN and NATO Secretaries General could together appoint an “eminent persons group” staffed by national and international security, governance, and development experts to recommend a shared Afghan international framework to tackle corruption and narcotics, while addressing the need for alternative livelihoods.

Civilian capacity also needs to be radically increased. The dearth of capacity in Afghan structures requires skilled international civilians deployed municipally to train and support local Afghans. It means that governments will have to hire and deploy more civilians. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General could convene a national planning exercise in Kabul with key Afghan stakeholders and donors. Donors will need to fund a civilian planning team comparable to what they would expect for a military operation.

A Political Settlement and Civilian Surge for Iraq

Most nations want nothing to do with U.S. policy in Iraq. They see it as an American quagmire. Yet the entire Middle East and much of the world would live with the consequences of a meltdown in Iraq that would spark a wider Sunni-Shi’a struggle, entrench Iraq as a failed state and recruiting ground for terrorism, exacerbate the displacement of 4.5 million people, and further destabilize energy markets. The meeting point between American and international concern is regional stability, and here there is scope for cooperation.

The decline in violence in Iraq in 2008 creates a critical opportunity for political stability. A starting point is endorsing a “diplomatic surge,” undertaken through cooperation between the United Nations and the United States and with backing from the G16, to reach a political settlement...
in Iraq. President Bush made evident in his final State of the Union speech that the United States will likely retain 130,000 to 150,000 troops in Iraq by the end of 2008. Remove the U.S. force presence and the chances for a conflagration and backlash against the United States are high. The emerging lesson for the United States has been documented repeatedly in other conflicts: eventually there must be a political agreement to end internal conflicts and provide a foundation for sustainable peace.

The G16 and other key states could exert their influence with Iraq’s neighbors to support, or at least not disrupt, the search for a negotiated settlement. The United States would need to coordinate its bilateral military and diplomatic strategy to support a wider peace agenda. If, by exploring a deal among Iraqis, the UN were to call for a peace conference such as the Bonn negotiations for Afghanistan, the G16 states would need to commit to provide tangible support for a settlement. If the G16 states signal that a settlement in Iraq is a matter of international concern, this will create a better climate for compromise.

**Regional and International Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Program**

G16 states’ support to regional diplomacy on Iraq would have an additional benefit of engaging Iran, which could create a more productive framework for negotiations over its nuclear program. Although it is evident that resolution of the current stand-off between Iran and the Security Council will require increased U.S. engagement in negotiations, G16 states’ backing for a proposal to Iran that includes civilian nuclear power, fuel guarantees, and reprocessing of spent fuel would underscore that such an alternative is credible, not just a Westernploy to deny Iran an enrichment capacity.

If Iran should continue to prove recalcitrant in the face of UN Security Council and G16 efforts, the exercise of having worked diplomatically through those mechanisms would help to ensure a broad-based effort to contain Iranian ambitions and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

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**A Continuing Agenda: Internationalizing Crisis Response**

**Building Momentum Toward a Regional Architecture for the Middle East.** The Annapolis Process and Friends Group convened for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process could serve as the foundation for a future regional security mechanism for the Middle East that would provide a venue to create patterns of cooperation among states, reinforce borders, manage crises and transnational threats and eventually promote regional norms on political reform and economic development.

Those G16 members that are part of the Annapolis process could, with concerted U.S. engagement, support the diplomacy required to move forward a regional structure. Its mandate and structure could be based on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which focused on three categories of issues relevant to the broader Middle East: border stability, economic cooperation, and human rights and political reform. In addition to tackling contemporary crises, the organization could help address broader tensions that have arisen between the West and the Muslim World.¹⁷

Progress towards a regional security mechanism would depend on prior progress on the Israeli-Palestinian, Iraqi and Iranian crises—but pre-negotiations towards that mechanism could constitute a significant inducement towards settlement on these fronts, aiding crisis-specific diplomacy. To be effective, the effort would need to be supported by the UN Security Council, which could also task the Secretary General with supporting a regional mechanism, either through an envoy or a regional diplomatic office. Economic incentives from the leading Gulf economies, Japan and

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*The international community has simply been unable to address failed states effectively. Afghanistan exemplifies the lack of political will and sufficient capacity to deal with areas of conflict … There is little question that building a more peaceful Afghanistan is crucial to global security—the only doubt is whether the international community can surmount political obstacles and summon the resources to take on this daunting task.*

— Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State Effectiveness; Former Minister of Finance for Afghanistan; MGI Advisory Group Member
the European Union would add to the prospect of success.

**Improve Relations Between Islam and the West.** Misunderstanding and distrust between Muslims and non-Muslims have already created a divide along religious and ethnic lines that could dangerously split parts of the world that desperately need to cooperate on issues ranging from economic stability to counterterrorism. Yet a legacy of authoritarianism in the Middle East, and the success of Islamist parties in competing with the state to provide social services, makes it likely that competitive politics will bring Islamists to power in the short run. Conversely, American abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, along with phrases such as Islamic terrorism, have created a perception that the United States is hostile to Islam and sees Islam as a driver of terrorism.

Consultations in the Middle East underscored that there is a potential for a new U.S. President to build bridges. Muslim-majority states increasingly see that they have an interest in a rule-based international order. Western leaders understand they must cooperate with the Muslim majority states to achieve their goals on counterterrorism and regional security. Even with the U.S. military surge in Iraq, success has depended on the cooperation of local leaders. In some cases simple vocabulary will make a difference—for example avoiding phrases such as Islamic terrorism—but policy changes are also needed, including actions MGI has highlighted: promoting peace in the Middle East, demonstrating respect for international law, and avoiding double standards on democratic principles.

Clockwise from top left: At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Members Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, and Vincent Maphai, Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa; Top right: Francis Deng, UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide; Middle Right: MGI Advisory Group and European Policymaker meeting at Ditchley Park, February, 2008: from left, Jeff Gutman, Vice President and Head of Network, Operations Policy and Country Service, The World Bank; Brett House, Senior Macroeconomist, Earth Institute, Columbia University; MGI Advisory Group Member Igor Ivanov, Former Russian Foreign Minister; James Kariuki, Head of Policy Planning Staff, Foreign Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom; John McArthur, Deputy Director, UN Millennium Project, Earth Institute, Columbia University; Bottom: MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member Sylvia Matthews Burwell, President, Global Development Program, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; Middle Left: MGI Consultations in Beijing, China; from left, Chu Shurong, China Foreign Affairs University; MGI Co-Director Carlos Pascual; MGI Advisory Group member Wu Jianmin, President, China Foreign Affairs University; MGI Co-Director Stephen Stedman.
This agenda for action is sweeping but unavoidable. It will require immediate and sustained attention, political momentum, and parallel action to achieve results across the diverse issues and pending crises facing global powers.

The international community will look first for signs that the United States seeks genuine global partnerships. Thus, Track 1 must begin in earnest immediately following the election of the new American President. Restored American standing in the world is the foundation for successful revitalization of the international security system. The rest of the world will not support U.S. leadership on a reform agenda if the United States does not commit to international cooperation.

The G16’s convening power, the collective weight of its economies and diplomatic and military capacities, and its combined populations would create an unparalleled platform to catalyze and mobilize effective international action: a steering mechanism to navigate the turbulence of diffuse power, transnational threats, and the changing distribution of power among key states. The formation of a G16 in 2009 would support progress on other aspects of this action agenda such as revitalizing other international institutions (Track 2), combating transnational threats (Track 3), and internationalizing crisis response (Track 4). G8 leaders must make a concerted diplomatic push with 2009 host Italy to shape the agenda of the 2009 meeting toward the goal of G16 formation.

If the G16 is not formally created in 2009, the United States and other traditional powers should act as if the body exists and use informal groupings to gain comparable effects. That will put a strain on American diplomatic capacity, but it will pay dividends in making the U.S. diplomatic efforts more effective.

The international agenda will also impose a schedule of action on transnational threats. This includes the 2009 Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference. These events offer a venue to make concrete progress on the climate change and nuclear proliferation agendas. Actions in the next two years will also determine whether the Doha round of the WTO or a successor arrangement can be concluded. An agreement is needed to produce a framework for international trade that brings poor countries into global supply chains, or else undermines the WTO’s credibility as a rule-setting global institution.

Finally, crises will continue. They will remain at the top of domestic foreign policy priorities and therefore require immediate attention. Yet, powerful states such as the United States will be much more likely to achieve a political settlement in Iraq, address the nuclear threat in Iran, and promote stability in Afghanistan, working with global partners and through effective international institutions. Progress on a wider agenda to revitalize the international security system and engage rising powers in cooperative arrangements must occur in parallel. Success on this global agenda will not only deliver on today’s crises, it will prevent tomorrow’s disasters.

The attached timeline represents the global agenda for 2009 to 2012, the first term for the next U.S. President. These events present opportunities for global leaders to move toward a revitalized international order for the 21st century. The agenda the MGI Project has presented will continue much farther into the future. The process of building international capabilities to manage transnational threats must be dynamic—just as we would never expect our national governments to stop improving their governance capacities. Yet, we cannot wait to start. The longer the delay in new approaches and new cooperation against mounting threats, the harder the challenges will become and the more trust will erode. We must chart a shared path forward now to manage the threats and capitalize on the opportunities of a changed world.
**TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2009–2010**

**TRACK 1**
**American Leadership**
- Inauguration
- State of the Union
- President's budget due

**TRACK 2**
**International Institutions**
- G8+ Summit Italy
- WB/IMF Meeting
- UN General Assembly
- NATO 60th Anniversary Summit
- Review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 64th session of the General Assembly
- Conference of the Parties 15 (COP15) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
- NATO Summit
- 5 Year Review of the United Nations Peace Building Commission

**TRACK 3**
**Shared Threats**
- NATO 60th Anniversary Summit
- Review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 64th session of the General Assembly
- Conference of the Parties 15 (COP15) UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
- NATO Summit
- 5 Year Review of the United Nations Peace Building Commission

**TRACK 4**
**Broader Middle East**
- Delayed Iraqi Provincial Elections
- Iranian Presidential Elections
- Iraqi National Elections
- Afghanistan Presidential Elections
- Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections

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<th>Jan</th>
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<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
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### 2011–2012 Timeline

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Proposed Iraqi timetable for withdrawal of U.S. combat troops</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
<td>GB+ Summit France</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>GB+ Summit U.S.</td>
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<td>Sept</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
<td>G8+ Summit U.S.</td>
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<td>Jan</td>
<td>President's budget due</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
<td>President’s budget due</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>State of the Union</td>
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### 2012 Targets

- U.S. leadership restored on international cooperation
- U.S. upholds commitments under international law
- Expanded U.S. civilian toolbox for cooperative diplomacy
- G16 to bridge effectiveness and legitimacy
- Reformed representation and mandate of the IFIs
- Expanded and more effective UN Security Council
- Accountability reforms in major UN bodies
- Strengthened regional organizations: Africa and Middle East
- New climate change agreement under UNFCCC auspices
- Revitalized nuclear non-proliferation regime
- New agreement on inclusive global trade
- Intergovernmental Panel on Biotechnology
- Increased international capacity for sustaining peace
- UN High Commissioner for Counter Terrorism Capacity Building
- Friends Group and international peacebuilding effort for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
- A stable and sustainable peace in Afghanistan
- A political settlement in Iraq
- Diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear program
- Plans underway for Middle East regional security mechanism
### TRACK 1 GOAL: America restores its standing internationally—a necessary foundation for credible U.S. leadership across this action agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opening Actions</th>
<th>Continuing Agenda</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliver Consistent and Strong Messages on International Cooperation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for Cooperative Diplomacy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• High-level consultations conducted to promote global dialogue</td>
<td>• U.S. President commits to double the size of the foreign service within ten years</td>
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<td>• Presidential speeches in the lead-up to the G8, UNGA, and in strategic international capitals; message delivered on U.S. leadership to build a 21st century international security system</td>
<td>• U.S. administration works with Congress to re-write the Foreign Assistance Act to elevate development priorities and increase the effectiveness of foreign aid delivery</td>
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<td>• U.S. shifts rhetoric away from a general GWOT and towards a specific war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates</td>
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<td><strong>Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-Based System</strong></td>
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<td>• U.S. upholds Geneva Conventions, Convention Against Torture and other laws of war</td>
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<td>• U.S. President closes Guantanamo and works with Congress on a sustainable detainee policy</td>
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### TRACK 2 GOAL: The legitimacy and effectiveness of key international institutions are enhanced by increasing representation of emerging powers and re-focusing mandates toward 21st century challenges

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<th>Opening Actions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Create a Group of 16</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reform Representation and Mandate of the International Financial Institutions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Create a new G16 to foster cooperation among the major and emerging powers; serve as a pre-negotiating forum to forge preliminary agreements on global challenges</td>
<td>• The U.S. and Europe offer a further redistribution of shares to emerging economies and cede their monopoly on choosing heads of the WB and IMF</td>
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<td>• Membership: G8 plus the Outreach 5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico), plus Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria</td>
<td>• In exchange, the IMF exercises greater surveillance over the exchange rate policies of systematically significant countries, including emerging economies; IMF leads on international negotiations to redress global imbalances</td>
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<td><strong>Restrain Use of the Veto as a Path Toward UN Security Council Reform</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expand the UN Security Council</strong></td>
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<td>• As a confidence building measure, U.S. leads on voluntary veto reform at the Council on the most serious aspect of UNSC business—authorization of the use of force, sanctions or peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>• P5 agree to expand current base of 15 to 21 seats; General Assembly elects new members for six to ten-year terms</td>
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<td>• Fixed date set for when long-term seats are reviewed for possible transformation into permanent ones</td>
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<td><strong>Strengthen Regional Organizations</strong></td>
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<td>• G16 support for a 10-year capacity building program for the AU</td>
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<td>• U.S. President invests in Asian regional security arrangements</td>
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<td>• G16 support regional security mechanism for the Middle East</td>
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<td>• U.S. continues concerted engagement with EU security arrangements, including promoting EU/NATO cooperation</td>
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### TRACK 3 GOAL: Utilize enhanced international cooperation and international institutions to tackle key global threats

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opening Actions</th>
<th>Continuing Agenda</th>
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| **Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on Climate Change Under UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) auspices**  
- Track 1 is emissions abatement: major emitters agree on global 2020 and 2050 emissions targets, price carbon, and legislate/coordinate national measures  
- Track 2 is investment: investment in technology, adaptation, and rainforests to manage the impacts of climate change on the developing world  
- Negotiations led through a G16 climate group under UNFCCC auspices  | **Create a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity**  
- UN Secretary General and President of the World Bank create a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity with members appointed by heads of relevant international institutions; networks created with top research institutions globally  
- Center consolidates existing performance reports on MDGs and financing into a poverty clock to show how overall poverty rates change across countries/regions. Center’s work is debated at the annual meetings of the IMF and WB; Finding form the basis of the Millennium + 10 (2010) and + 15 (2015) Summits  |
| **Revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime**  
- Nuclear states re-pledge commitment to disarmament: initiate a joint study of reducing their nuclear weapons to zero  
- Russia and the U.S. stand down the alert status of nuclear forces, pledge no-first-use, extend inspection and verification provisions to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiate arms reductions  
- U.S. President begins efforts toward U.S. ratification of CTBT  
- Non-nuclear states endorse making the Additional Protocol mandatory  
- All states work toward an international fuel bank under the International Atomic Energy Agency  | **Strengthen Response to Biological Threats**  
- Initiate an effort to build local public health capacity to achieve full implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005)  
- Develop an intergovernmental panel on biotechnology to forge scientific consensus on the dangers and benefits of biotechnology  |
| **Sustain Commitment to Global Trade**  
- Director of the WTO publishes the 18 (out of 20) trade agreements from the latest round of Doha negotiations as a foundation for future efforts  
- The principle WTO trading partners—starting with G16 trade ministers—conclude a trade round focused on developing countries  | **Increase International Investments in Conflict Management**  
- Member states increase investments in UN capacities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at the UN and regional organizations  
- G16 designate a part of their armed forces for international peacekeeping with a goal of 50,000 reserves. This should be supplemented by 20,000 police and rule-of-law specialists  
- G16 plus key states with an interest/funds commit two billion in funding for peacebuilding to support rapid start-up at the UN; UN Peacebuilding Commission strengthened to develop strategic plans and coordinate operations  |
| **Establish a UN High Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building**  
- G16 plays a catalytic role in designing and generating support for a new High Commission for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building to focus international efforts to build counter-terrorism norms and capacity  | **Build Momentum Toward a Regional Architecture for the Middle East**  
- Friends Group convened for Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as the foundation for a future regional security mechanism for the Middle East  
- Middle East regional mechanism provides a venue to encourage cooperation, reinforce borders, manage crisis and transnational threats, and eventually promote regional norms on political reform and development  
- Regional organization development is supported by a UN envoy or regional diplomatic office and economic incentives from Gulf countries, Japan, and the European Union  |
| **Improve Relations Between Islam and the West**  
- West focuses on messages that build bridges rather than alienate, including avoiding phrases such as Islamic terrorism  
- U.S. focuses on respect for international law, and avoiding double standards on democratic principles in the Muslim world  | **Sustain Regional and International Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Program**  
- G16 backing for a proposal to Iran that includes civilian nuclear power, fuel guarantees, and reprocessing of spent fuel in exchange for negotiations on its nuclear program  |
Appendix:
Acronym List

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU    African Union
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
GWOT  Global War on Terror
EU    European Union
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
G8    Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
GEF   Global Environment Facility
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC   International Criminal Court
IFC   International Finance Corporation
IFI   International Financial Institution
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDB   Multilateral Development Bank
MDG   Millennium Development Goal
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization
NPT   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC   U.S. National Security Council
Outreach 5 Five developing nations invited by the G8 participate in selected portions of the G8 meetings: Brazil, China, India, Mexico South Africa. Also known as G8+5.
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations
ODA   Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
P5    Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council
RDB   Regional Development Bank
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN    United Nations
UNDESA The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNEP  United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNSG  United Nations Secretary General
US DOS United States Department of State
US DOE United States Department of Energy
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB    World Bank, or World Bank Group (WBG)
WFP   World Food Program, United Nations
WHO   World Health Organization
WTO   World Trade Organization
Appendix: End Notes


5. One option that has been proposed by legal experts is a National Security Court whose architecture incorporates a fair and robust due process system thereby garnering broader legitimacy than our current patchwork system. Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War (The Penguin Press, New York, 2008), 164–166.


13. This would then cover the UN’s peacekeeping operations, field-based political missions, humanitarian coordination operations—each managed from the Secretariat—and the work of the World Food Program, the UN Development Program, the UN Children’s Fund, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Relief and Works Agency, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, and the UN Environment Program—collectively, responsible for the majority of the UN’s field-oriented spending.


16. The idea of a poverty clock was first put forward by our colleague Homi Kharas, Senior Fellow in the Global Development Program at the Brookings Institution.

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