“The Shadow of History and Sino-Japanese Relations”

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Transcript

Daniel Sneider: Good afternoon. And at the risk of, I know there's a few people still coming in. I am not surprised we have a packed house today. I'm Dan Sneider. I'm the Associate Director for Research here at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. And this is the last in a series of lectures which we've had under the theme of the, looking at the Sino-Japanese rivalry. And when we conceived of this series, I think it's fair to say that the first name on our list was Ezra Vogel. Although he is appearing last in the series, probably I think appropriately so to wrap everything up, I can't think of anybody, and we've talked about this, who really is more able to speak to this really, I think, important question as we look at the contemporary situation in Northeast Asia than Ezra Vogel. There's no other academic who has been able to master the study of both Japan and China and their relationship more than Ezra Vogel. And I can't actually really think of anybody who can match his credentials in this regard. And I am going to give you just the brief rendition of the Ezra Vogel resume here because the full version we would just take up all the time. I can't do that. I have to leave some for Ezra to speak. Ezra Vogel is the Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences Emeritus as Harvard after graduating from Ohio Wesleyan in 1950 and serving in the U.S. Army. He studied sociology at Harvard and received his PhD there. And he embarked upon a very important study in Japan on the Japanese middle class, which yielded his first book, "Japan's New Middle Class," in 1963. And he went on to match that depth of research on Japan with his research on China. And he succeeded John Fairbank as the second director of Harvard's East Asian Research Center in 1972, and basically chaired the East Asia studies program at Harvard for many, many years and became the director of the Fairbanks Center and the Asia Center later on. And he managed to squeeze in a couple years as the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council in Washington in the early 1990s. So his expertise has ranged across both academic research as well as policymaking.

But I want to give you just a little sense of the books he has written over the years because I think that it's really a magnificent set of issues that he has taken on over a long period of time. And after his book on Japan's new middle class, he then looked at Canton under communism in 1969. In a book for which he perhaps is most famous, but one in which he may least want to claim as his own, he wrote "Japan as Number One: Lessons for America." It was a bible – when I was a younger man as a journalist in Tokyo, that was the book we all have to read in order to get ourselves started. But it remains I think the all time best seller in Japan for non-fiction by a Western author. He went back to Guangdong to look at the process of reform in China, "One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform." He came back from his infamous title to look

at the question of, "Is Japan Still Number One?" in 2001. We could probably write that book a third time I think [Laughter]. And most recently a really just tremendous piece of work that I think has had a lot of impact on the study of modern China, the book "Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China," which was published two years ago, three years ago and which he came here and delivered a lecture on among other places. It is almost required reading these days.

In recent period, I know that Ezra has been talking a lot about the issue of Japan and China relations. I've seen several pieces that he has written in newspapers and elsewhere. And I heard him fairly recently in Philadelphia at the Association of Asian Studies talking about this. So I know it's very much on his mind. And I am sure that he is going to have not only profound but provocative things to say on this subject. So he prefers to sit while he's talking, which doesn't matter. Standing or sitting, we're happy to have him with us. And so, as usual, he will speak for 30 or 40 minutes, and there will be time for questions. And please when you do ask your question, please do identify yourself so he knows who is asking the question. So without further ado, we're really proud and honored to have Ezra Vogel with us.

[Applause]

>> Thank you very much.

Ezra Vogel: OK. Thank you very much Dan for that very warm welcome. I appreciate your tolerance for a senior citizen who has a little more trouble standing up than he used to. So I will be more comfortable by sitting down. It is such a pleasure to be here and to see so many good friends whom I knew as colleagues at Harvard and also in my very brief time the couple years that I spent working in Washington. And it's, I greatly admire these scholars, and I know that this is a great center, and I always enjoy coming here. My friend Andy Walder, Jean's husband, says that he has become a historian by procrastination – tried to write things about contemporary life and then waited. All right. I wouldn't say it's by procrastination. I seem to keep turning out something or other. But I've become a historian simply by living a long time [Laughter]. So I used to think to myself as one who works on contemporary society, but because today I will be talking about things that I've, in a way, I've lived through over the last 34 years of things that have changed over the time, not as a person who has had any professional training history, but simply as one who has survived that long. I thought what I would do is trace some of these difficult problems between China and Japan historically starting around the time of the late-'60s, early 1970s when the United States and China began to have relations from that period up to the present. And then after tracing that history, talk about some of the problems of interpreting history and why that has become such a big issue. I think we all know that Sino-Japanese relations now are as bad as they have ever been. The people in China, something like 93% in the public opinion poll have bad images of Japan. Over 90% of the Japanese now have bad images of China. The problems in the Senkakus and the Diaoyutai, something you see every day in the press. And there's a real danger of collision that could make the relationship bad for an even longer period of time. And Chinese are beginning to erect museums and statues that seem to me to make that even longer-term, the issues even more difficult to resolve. It will make the issues even more difficult to resolve.

Well it started back in the late-‘60s. If you look at the background of why the United States sent Henry Kissinger to China in '71, I think you could understand this point of view from the Chinese side and the American side quite easily. On the Chinese side after the 1969 border wars with the Soviet Union, they sided with the advice of four senior generals that now was asked to report on this issue that they should begin to open up to the West. And so after '69, there were events and some relations with Canada, with [Inaudible], with other parts of the world. And they truly felt that with the Soviet Union so powerful they needed some more contact with the outside world that could help them restrain the Soviet Union in case of a dangerous split. On the American side, I think there are two overriding issues that made us change. One was that sooner or later we had to recognize that China was the mainland not in Taiwan. That in the early 1950s it was conceivable that Chiang Kai-shek might somehow go back to the mainland, which he claimed he was going to do. And so our alliance with the government of China, which was led by Chiang Kai-shek continued after he was sent to Taiwan. But sooner or later we had to adjust to that track. And by 1969 and 1970 it was becoming clear that the United Nations, there were voices that get China elected to a seat in the United Nations and replace Taiwan, and after that it was going to be very awkward if we tried to still stick with Taiwan and had to deal with the United Nations dealing with China’s president. So sooner or later, and that was an appropriate time, and secondly considering the tension with the Soviet Union, we thought it was an opportunity to pull China away from the Soviet Union, I think we had been slow as a nation to realize how serious this split was on the Soviet block although [Inaudible] scholars had pointed that out in the years earlier. And it was clear that he had that opportunity.

So Kissinger goes to Beijing. And then what does Japan do in response to this? Japan reigned in the 1950s had been wanting to have more contact with the mainland of China and the United States was willing support. They had lost their colonies of course and raw materials in the industrial capacity that they had built up in northeast China, which they called Manchuria. And the retail sales industry that they had built up all along the east coast of China was very basically the Japanese economy. And they had wanted to move in throughout the 1950s and '60s. And the United States was so concerned about Communist power, urged Japan to stay away from Chinese created investment, and so it really restrained them. So once the United States was willing to open discussions with mainland China and consider moving toward open contact, Japan felt they had to move very quickly. You recall at that time it was very serious trade negotiations. At the time, Japan was a rather strong economic power or becoming one. And at that time because of those trade issues we were very tense in our relationship with Japan. And many Japanese felt that “ahh” the reason Kissinger didn't let Japan know, not because of the importance of the secrecy but because America wanted to get the head start in the economy on the mainland, and Japan had to move very fast. And so Japan decided at that moment they moved very quick and Tanaka Kakuei was selected as Prime Minister and very briefly moved to negotiation with China. He went to China all within a few months. And while in Beijing in a few days, normalized relations extremely fast. They hadn't really developed all the protocols that they need since they have close relations, but they wanted to move very quickly so they can have access to all the markets that they have been hoping to have ever since the end of World War II. Well, that was the situation in the early 1970s.

I think in the 1960s at the time, the nature of Japanese relations with China were very limited, but you had in position then a number of senior people on both sides who new each other quite

well and had been in long contact with each other. Not only was Chiang Kai-shek somebody who had studied in Japan for a couple years, but [Inaudible] had spent time in Japan in the early 1920s and knew it quite well. But there was another man, [Inaudible] who had studied at Waseda University. His father [Inaudible] leader in the [Inaudible] who had later been shot, and he had been in Japan for a long period of time. And therefore his son had grown up in Japan. It was just natural in his Japanese. And he was very much beloved and respected by Japanese. He knew them extremely well. And so at the time of 1960s already that small group who knew each other quite well could have some contact with each other. Takasaki on the Japanese side. So they work it out. Even though they had very limited arrangements, they worked out a trade memoranda in the early 1960s where they had limited trade. In those days, the large, both Taiwan and mainland would not accept business if the Japanese company worked with the other side. So what Mitsubishi and Mitsui and so forth did is had a dummy company, using a dummy company that would deal with the mainland while the main company, which was then the bigger business would deal with Taiwan. And, of course, a few years later the dummy companies became the main companies, and they had new dummy companies for Taiwan. And the, even though the Chinese tried to keep out affiliates, they had no way of tracking all the changes. The ingenious Japanese companies could find new little subsidiaries or companies so China really couldn't track it. So, in fact, the large Japanese companies really had trade with both sides. But in the early 1960s it was still mainly with Taiwan. But they had a basis of relations. I recall that during this period, some of these Japanese companies were very true in already thinking about their future. There was one Japanese guy who after World War II stayed on and became a physician in the Peoples Liberation Army and worked under [Inaudible] very closely.

He had been there and known him. And he, for some reason he decided to come out to Japan around that time. And Mitsubishi hired him, there was no job at the moment, but the other job was to get ready to have contact. So when they were to deal the mainland he would provide an in. So they were already thinking ahead. And I met several other Japanese who had stayed on in China after 1945 who had been hired by Japanese [Inaudible] in the '70s and kept up those contacts. So they were already preparing and thinking. So all right, we move now into the 1970s and relations begin to resume. But there were so many protocols and there were so many obstacles to moving ahead in Sino-Japanese relations. That it really wasn't until about 1978 when Deng Xiaoping was coming to power, he was in charge already of foreign relations even though [Inaudible] was then the titular leader of the Chinese Communist Party. And at that time he had negotiations with Japan trying to negotiate a new treaty of peace and friendship. And at that time, trying to negotiate that treaty of peace and friendship, he was stopped by the problems of the anti-indemnity clause that China insisted on that, and Japan wouldn't sign that because, you know, they hated the Soviet Union. They thought that would be too provocative and Russia would over respond. But then suddenly under Deng Xiaoping they found a nice new [Inaudible] that said in a little appendix, this is not aimed at any third parties. And the Japanese sensed that would, you know, get the Soviets upset, sullen but not mutinous. They would not fight too much. And so suddenly in the summer of 1978 you get that agreement, and then Deng Xiaoping goes to Japan to celebrate that a few months later. So he comes to Japan in 1978 in October, and at that time he decides to take a very strong stance in getting better relations with Japan. He was, you know, we say that Nixon was able politically to manage open China because he had been so clearly anti-Communist. Deng had fought the Japanese from 1937 to 1945. And so he was in a strong political position to be able to do that in a way that many other Chinese leaders were not.

So he could open up contacts with Japan. And he decided, as you know from those of you who have glanced at my book, I have great respect for his international skills, Deng Xiaoping's international skills that he was moving ahead to get really good relationships with Japan in a very skillful way. And he decided strategically that it was important to have good relationship. He's in Japan for one week and he meets the emperor. In all of 25 years of contact between Japanese and Chinese, no Chinese leader had ever gone to Japan. No Chinese leader had ever met the emperor. The first time that happened was October 1978. And they met for two hours. And the Japanese don't keep a record of Imperial contacts, but Deng later said that the relationship went well. They had a very good meeting. That the emperor in his own right dealt with the history issue and expressed sadness and remorse for all the troubles that Japan had caused China and said that we must now live in peace and work together.

And Deng at the same time that he met the emperor, he met the [Inaudible] businessmen. He visited Nippon Steel, which at that time was as modern a steel plant as you could find and which contained the basis for the Baoshan [Assumed Spelling] steel plant in Shanghai. He had visited Matsushita, the leader of the national electronic industry. He visited the Nissan plant near Tokyo, which was already using robots in their assembly line. And he made a deal with the Japanese that they would help it in the modernization, and they would begin to open the country and all Japanese companies into China. And in the 1980s, therefore, Japan gave more aid to China than any other country by far. And their industries taught new technology in various places. And Deng's visit was received extremely well. His press conference was marked by sustained applause at the end by the Japanese. And many Japanese felt, "Wow, I wish we had a leader like that. [Laughter]" In 1980, when you said, what percentage of Japanese had favorable views toward China, it was 78%. Now it's 90% negative. It reached a peak after Deng's visit of 78% had position feelings about China. And all kinds of Japanese groups started going to China that then made their contacts with local areas, and these groups did apologize for the horrible things that Japan had done. So the relationship was really moving in a very positive way.

And Deng felt that to put the relationship on a stable, long-term basis, it had to be more than just utilitarian. He wanted Japanese culture to be introduced. So he had Japanese movies, Japanese *oshin* was introduced in China. It was extremely popular in television serial. They have a good feeling about daily life in *amagata* [Phonetic]. And was very well received by the Chinese public. Japanese novels. All kinds of popular Japanese popular culture was introduced in China at that time and went fairly smoothly. He wanted to promote youthful exchanges. And of course a lot of these were later carried out under the direction of [Inaudible] who unfortunately [Inaudible] when [Inaudible] fell in 1987, one of the things for which he was criticized was trying to get too many Japanese youth into China and without adequate depuration. So in '87 when [Inaudible] fell, that put a little damper on youthful exchanges. But that great progress throughout the 1980s, and of course there were problems and there were issues, but compared to what had happened afterwards, that was kind of a golden age. And why did that fall apart? It fell apart after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the night when the whole world of popular opinion in Western countries who was very critical of the Chinese leadership. But from 1989 to 1992, it was a special era in which China maintained good relations with Japan even though it wasn't as such good relations with the rest of the world.

In 1992, relations were good enough so that the Emperor of Japan for the first time in history visited China. Why did they maintain good relations from '89 to '92 after foreign countries imposed so many sanctions? Because of all the countries imposing sanctions, the one that was most willing to break through the sanctions and continue economic relations to resume normal economic relations was Japan. And so during that special period, the Chinese strategy was to try to have good relations with Japan. And so from '89 to '92, as relations began to resume with Japan, relations continued well and good. After 1992, the Western countries began to weaken their sanctions toward China, and there was no longer any special reason for China to court Japan and try to keep good relations the way it had during that special period. And then in the '90s, relations began to fall apart between China and Japan. I think there's several reasons why they began to fall apart. One, of course, was that during the 1980s it is a strategic reason. The anti-Soviet nature of the cooperation between the United States and Japan and China, and after the Soviet Union collapsed there was no longer that broad, strategic reason. Another reason had to do with the growth of Taiwan independence movement because as the Taiwan independence movement began to grow and Lee Teng-hui spoke better Japanese than Chinese and was ready to work with Japan. And China was afraid that the Japanese connection with Taiwan, very close, still left over from the colonial days, would interfere with absorption and demand. The Japanese were supporting independence, and so they tried to attack all those areas that Japan had any kind of connection with Taiwan.

Another reason, which the Japanese gave great emphasis too and I think with considerable reason, it is that the Chinese leaders after 1989 were really worried that they had lost the youth. There was so many youth after demonstrating in 1989 that they felt they needed some way to make sure that the youth gave more support to the government. And so they started a patriotic education campaign. And in the patriotic education campaign after 1992, of course as it began to blossom, what works best in China for patriotic education? Nothing works better than anti-Japanese attitudes. Now they've drawn very heavily on that in World War II and had given a lot of anti-Japanese propaganda, and we Chinese must cooperate against Japan. And so in the 1990s for that patriot education campaign, the propaganda department allowed anti-Japanese movies to continue. And the whole efforts that Deng had had of having ordinary popular culture come in from Japan to China began to be phased out. And World War II movies, just like in America when I was a kid, cowboy and Indian movies were very popular. And the Indians were really always fighting the Indians before that became politically incorrect to do it that way. But at the time since the 1990s, the World War II movies in Japan and the horrible Japanese and all the crimes that they had committed. And they continue to play up until the present time. And those who, you go to China have no difficulty switching the TV on and finding a lot of anti-Japanese movies and tremendous popular protests. I know Joanna Weiss when she was here, talked of how the Chinese restrained the students and so forth from the Japanese, anti-Japanese attitudes gets out of hand. And I think she's a fine scholar, and I have no quarrel with she says. But I think one also has to understand that the propaganda department at the same time is getting a lot of anti-Japanese propaganda, making a lot to ordinary culture so that the antagonisms in Japan were very strong. So, I think all these changes during the 1990s created the mood for anti-Japanese attitudes. And then of course we had various incidents and misunderstanding. I think that Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998 was a big escalation in the tension between the two countries. Kim Dae-Jung had just visited Japan. And of course it's a paradox because Jiang Zemin was scheduled to go to Japan before Kim Dae-Jung. But he had to postpone the visit. Kim Dae-Jung

went first. Kim Dae-Jung apologized deeply and ended up with very good relations with Japan. And then Jiang Zemin was not willing to go the same way in trying to talk about those things and the demanding that Koizumi not visit the Yasukuni Shrine and so forth. And Koizumi was the populous politician decided to go. As I recall, he never visited before that time. But, you know, the Chinese [Inaudible], so they visited. And so their visit ended in great tension, and Koizumi kept visiting. He was very popular in Japan. And so those tensions continued to escalate. And then, of course, many of them began to center on the Diaoyutai area, and that just continued in escalating in a way I think that all of you are familiar with. So I think that's continued right up to the present day. And there has been no real improvement.

And the Chinese find it very popular to express anti-Japanese feelings. And the Japanese leader is tempted to respond in the same way towards China. In my view, these issues cannot be fundamentally resolved in a better way until they deal more broadly with the history issue. And the history, you know, from Deng Xiaoping's point of view, after the Cultural Revolution, the way for China to get back to business was not to dwell too much on past hostility. He felt that, you know, don't fight about it, [Inaudible] don't argue about these things. And you should make some kind of reparations, but don't get into deep arguments. And he felt the same way about Korea and Japan, that the way to deal with World War II was don't go back and, just accept many our apologies and don't go into it too deeply. And I think that left unresolved in China the question of how you deal with history. China has not it domestically either. They haven't really dealt with the Cultural Revolution and the failing in bringing it forward. And in the same way, Japan has not really dealt with their history, and the Japanese haven't. And I think the feeling of China of course goes back to the feeling that they were after all this furious civilization in Asia. Japan is a pipsqueak country that learned from them, and that the rightful order of East Asia is China as the one in charge. And the hostility that came from Japanese winning in 1895, 1895 and then the second World War was not only horrible and killed so many people and did so much damage and cause so much cruelty, but it deeply offended the psyche of the Chinese who felt that it's humiliating to have that little pipsqueak of a country, an island telling us what to do. And I think that from Chinese point of view there is a very deep sentiment there among a lot of people that now that China is growing stronger, we can make greater demands on Japan.

And I think the growing military power of China has given more confidence that they can make greater demands of Japan. And I think that Japan has been very vulnerable. If anything, China has been winning the international public opinion battle with Japan by stressing that the Japanese did not do enough in World War II. And certainly compared to Europe, they have not apologized. And they have not talked about their own history in the detailed kind of way that the Germans have. Of course in Germany right after World War II, France was right next door. You had common economic problems you had to deal with. In Germany, the German people every day had to deal with people from France, England and other countries. And they had to deal with [Inaudible]. In Japan because after 1949 China and Japan were separate, they had almost no contact. There was no natural pressure from China at that point. So that generation of Japanese didn't feel deal with the issue. And so the Japanese have never done enough to deal with World War II, and therefore they are very vulnerable as the Chinese charges that the real problem now is the Japanese failure to deal with history. And it's a way of not dealing with their own domestic issues of putting so much military pressure on Japan. And of course now you have a situation where Abe is determined that he doesn't want to be like Finland was with Russia. And that any

effort to show weakness, to solve problems by showing weakness would be a terrible precedent. And so he feels compelled to [Inaudible], hang in tough. Some people have speculated that maybe Xi Jinping is personally anti-Japanese. I don't believe that's true. I talked for example to [Inaudible] who was the Japanese ambassador in China years ago, and he said he often met Xi Jinping and that he didn't sense any anti-"Japaneseness." And he said that Xi Jinping, which he was in Putian actually met a sister relation with Japanese from Okinawa and Nagasaki, which were sister relation with [Inaudible], and they had no personal problem. So I think with Xi Jinping it's not a personal issue, but it's an issue that he stands for that against Japan.

So in my view, while we may try some diplomatic issues and United States pressure may help bring the two countries together to get over the worst situation. I think that many long-term solution, there's going to have to be some of the history issue. And what I tell my Japanese friends is I think they have to do more to teach their own students about World War II. When Japanese go to China, and the Chinese say what about what about Nanking, and the Japanese doesn't know much about it. Then the Chinese immediately form a very bad impression. I think the Japanese are going to have to do more to teach their students. They do say that they committed crimes in World War II. But they don't go into the details necessary to deepen that understanding. And I think that in the under the Abe period, they are not going to find it easy to get textbooks approved, but you can still publish ordinary books that talk about the difficulties of World War II and some of the horrors that Japan committed and I think the same way with Korea. On the Chinese side, I think that they are going to have to slow down on the anti-Japanese propaganda, which is really so extreme and so much World War II movies and the slander on the news that always has the anti-Japanese tilt to it. And I think they get some kind of that deeper meaning of World War II, we're not going to make much progress. In short, I wish, I tend to be optimistic, most of my friends think I’m simple in proposing happy solutions. But I honestly don't see any short-term solutions. I think we are in for a period now where the issues are going to be very tough. Relations are going to be very tough. And I think that in a long-term solution, both sides are going to have to have a different approach to the historical issue. It's a very quick overview of what I think, thanks.

[Applause]

>> Somewhere there is a microphone. I don't know where it is. So I will direct traffic here.

>> Way in back.

>> Thank you for a very insightful excerpt. My name is Ton Hero [Assumed Spelling]. I'm a first year Masters student in Center for East Asian Studies, and I am also currently working for the Japanese government. I have a question about, so you mentioned a lot of changes over the past 40 years since normalizations, and I think one of the things that you didn't necessarily mention is how China has seen Japan and U.S. security relationships, a security alliance. Back in the '70s, I think China relatively saw Japan and U.S. security relation as a more positive one. However, in contrast, currently I believe China sees Japan and U.S. security alliances more of a negative one where China at least worries about it as a way to contain themselves. What do you think are the causes of this shift in terms of China's perception of Japan and U.S. security relationship? Thank you.

Ezra Vogel: Well, in the days of Kissinger and Chou En-lai discussions, one of the ways that Kissinger explained it to him, and in fact was a cork in the bottle. That the security alliance is a way of containing the militaristic pressure from Japan. And that that's the key issue. I think now as China wants to regain Taiwan, which I think is a very key goal in that part of the world. The cooperation of Taiwan, of the Japanese, and America over the Taiwan issue is seen as the real obstacle. So it's a puzzle to me that the Chinese, they say that they fear Japanese militarism and the revival, are doing things which, obviously are doing a lot to provoke Japanese militarism. And it's hard for me to explain this any other way than to say that they are trying to solve internal political differences by having outside enemies because if you think of an appropriate strategy for China, they are really concerned about preventing the rise of militarism in Japan. I think they have behaved to Japan in quite a different way.

>> Yeah?

>> Thank you. As always, that was terrific. I'd like to follow up with a similar specific question from your general characterization, and that has to do with the decision by Beijing to characterize the sale of the islands from the individual Japanese to the Japanese government as changing the agreement to not make this an issue. It seems to me that China didn't have to do that because Japanese owned it and Japan owns it are the same thing, but they elected to make this a cause-célèbre, the elected to start and sustain this process of intensified hostility. Do you have thoughts on why beyond the internal dynamics?

Ezra Vogel: I think that immediately before that, the Chinese had begun to put more pressure on the Senkaku/Daoiyus. And it was useful, I think, for international public opinion so that the issue got framed not in terms of China putting more pressure on those islands, but the real problem is that Japan is nationalizing that. And that makes a real difference. I think on the problem of nationalization there was a real communication problem, which I think has broader structural features. I think that the Japanese foreign ministry and the democratic party did not work very well together. It had a bureaucracy that was so close in a little bit of Liberal Democratic Party, that it didn't have the independence that a bureaucracy has in most countries. It could, they could still adapt to a different political party. And therefore, the democratic party didn't quite trust the foreign minister. And there was a real communication problem. And when Noda was prime minister around that time in Beijing, I don't think the foreign minister was having very good communication with Noda. And they also didn't have very good communication with the Chinese. I think both the Chinese and the Japanese can be faulted for not signifying the pressure, how unhappy the Chinese would be with what they call the nationalization.

I think the Japanese, there's a new book out in Japan describing the Japanese side before that decision. And what they stress is that on the Japanese side they were concerned about how to deal with Ishihara. It wasn't so much a foreign relations problem as how do we get Ishihara under control who wanted to buy the islands. And they didn't emphasize sufficiently the importance of international [Inaudible]. In Beijing, some of my Japanese friends who are extremely well informed said the foreign ministry officials in Beijing at the time did not have a good grasp on the mood in Beijing. And some of them reported back that they thought, to Tokyo, that they thought the issue the Chinese were complaining, that they would get over it. And the Japanese

who really had better contact in Beijing mood understood that the Chinese were really much more upset. So I think that there really was a failure on the Chinese side to have direct communication. I think there was a real communication gap in Beijing. And then there was also the gap between foreign minister and keeping notice, the democratic party well informed. So I think all that was, you know, behind the context. And, as I say, I think in some that the Chinese side were advancing on Senkaku/Diaoyutai. And that by stressing the so-called nationalization of the islands, they were avoiding international public attention and their role in escalating the pressure on those islands.

>> I wonder if I can take the prerogative of asking you a question. So on this issue of why did things change from the early '90s, and I really liked your description of the reasons, but I, it felt to me that's very much the way it looks somewhat from Beijing. And I am wondering from the Tokyo side, if you think about it from the Japanese perspective as kind of a mirror to that to some degree, you know, up through the late 1980s, the Japanese were triumphant. They were bathing in the sense that they represented the superior economic model, number one, taking over the world. And then comes not only the end of the Cold War, but also the collapse of the Japanese bubble, the beginning of the years of economic downturns and stagnation. And a sense of unease about Japan's own future, its relationship with the U.S., as well as all of the turmoil within Japan politically, I mean the end of the LDP automatic monopoly on power and so on. In all of that, I am wondering how, what's, how does China then sort of represent in the Japanese mind from your point of view a kind of, in other words, the view of China in some ways is a little bit of a Rorschach test for Japanese as well in their thinking about themselves and about their place in the world and particularly as you point out this little brother, big brother relationship that has been rather complicated, one over a long period of time? The Chinese are always the other for Japan over many, many centuries. So what is, sort of from your point of view, what is China in the Japanese mind in this period?

Ezra Vogel: One of the key issues for Japan at this time was how much to reduce aid to China because as the Chinese economy began to grow, then a lot of Japanese said, "Why do we have to give so much aid?" And some of the Japanese felt that China was using that pressure, saying anti-Japanese pressure as a way of getting continuing aid. So that was one of the key issues in the Japanese mind at the time. How do we, now that China is getting stronger, how do we in a way reduce our aid and special support? They were also, I think, beginning to get uneasy. If you think about stability in East Asia as a key goal as underpinned growth, I think there was a real instability beginning in say the mid-1990s about China perhaps some days are passing Japan. And after the Japanese bubble burst in '89, I think around the world most people thought, "Well, within two or three years it will be back." But by about '93, '94, a lot of Japanese were beginning to wonder and Chinese were beginning to think, “ah-ha” their economy is growing so fast. And in 1992, Deng made his famous southern tour. And then immediately after that, the Chinese growth rates spurt way high, 13%, 14% a year for two or three years just at that time. So I think there was real uncertainty created because some day China might overcome Japan. And I think there's a lot of nervousness in Tokyo about the rise of China and the increased assertiveness and the tax on Japan. And, as you know, in Japan on historical issues the response in Japan was, "Look, our guys have already apologized." And Murayama of course when he was in power in 1993 issued a very apologetic statement. And they have got that, well, we've done it. We've apologized. And that should resolve things. From the Chinese side they should continue to

apologize and continue to behave like the Germans do. So I think a lot of, as you know, the Japanese felt our young people were not even born in World War II. Why should they have to apologize for what somebody else has done? I mean, that's I think the typical response. So from the Japanese psyche I think in those days, it was China that was the problem and not us.

>> Thank you. I'm a physician, and I served in the Army. I was with the command group, Schofield Barracks, 25 Infantry Division. And I recall well that one evening we had an intelligence briefing by Pacific Command.

>> About what year?

>> This was in the early 1990s, around circa '91, '92. And my question reflects the concern about our join security agreement with Japan and of course President Obama's stated shift that we are going to pay more attention in the Pacific area. But I attended this intelligence briefing that focused uniquely on China. And I was shocked. I was astounded by the very distorted presentation. I am not a historian. I mean, I have an interest in history, but my background is in medicine. So I raised a faint protest of what was being said at the end. And of course it didn't carry much weight because I was amongst those who were real soldiers, and I was just a doc in the crowd. But I later found out that this intelligence briefing actually reflected apparently the wisdom of the State Department. And so my concern now, 20 some years later, is who is advising the Army, Navy, and Air Force about China? What is their, what is the impression do you think they have of China? And how would you explain that? I assume individuals in the State Department were taught by individuals like you who would have an enlightened or at least a balanced view, a little bit more objectivity.

Ezra Vogel: I am sure that people like Mike Armacost and Tom Fingar who know more about that than I do, but I'll give you my impression since it's my turn to be up here. I was in the U.S. Government. I was the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in '93, '95. And I worked with Tom at that time. And what I experienced at that time was really quite a range of views. You can understand why after the Cold War, people in the Pentagon who wanted more military budget might emphasize the problem of China. And I think even later after 9/11, to deal with terrorism doesn't rely a base for enough investment the way the rise of China does. I mean to deal with terrorism could never have the kind of military equipment and the heavy expenses and the large, so I think there is a group, you know, some genuinely concerned about the enemy, some who are concerned about America being strong who emphasize that side. But I think there were also, I encountered a lot of thoughtful people in the intelligence community who were very serious. My impression was a lot of them were working on specific issues, a lot of the day-to-day workers. And somebody had to follow how many widgets or gadgets, you know, China produced which year. And there were not many who had kind of an overall view. A lot of the workers in the intelligence community. And I think it felt to the people in the think tanks or top of the high ranking who put their particular spin. I felt that when I was there, the dominant spin that Joe Nye, who was head of the National Intelligence Council, and I and Tom Fingar and others put on it was that, you know, this is a place we can still work with. They are not an evil empire and that there are a lot of different trends within China. I think that was the dominant view. But other times people can put a different spin on all the information they gathered from the detailed hard work [Inaudible]. I found individual workers in the intelligence community quite serious and

quite active. I mean, I think that they have been taught to be precise and to pass on information. I think the issue comes at the higher levels and who puts the spin on it.

>> Sounds right to me.

>> Yeah. I'm happy that Tom agrees with me because he knows more about it than I do.

>> Joliette Latch [Assumed Spelling]. I'm a retired San Jose State member, faculty member. I would be interested in hearing your comments on Xi Jinping's change in strategy since he rose to power and is claiming most of the South China Sea. You can see some of the relations with Japan in light of the things that are going on also in Southeast Asia. Why is Xi Jinping doing this? And what are the advantages for him?

Ezra Vogel: My impression is that with Xi Jinping was coming to power, there was a general recognition among high-level people in China that they needed a strong leader. That under the days of Hu Jintao there were a lot of issues that have not been sufficiently dealt with. Corruption was one. And that he had been too passive. And so I think there was a general recognition when he came to power that we needed a stronger leader. And I think that has enabled has, you know, I think he's comfortable, people who met him, I have not met him, but people who have say he seems quite comfortable with power, and all the analysis that I see suggests that he is doing more to distance himself above the ordinary people in the Politburo than any time since Xi Jinping that he is trying to centralize power in his hands. And I think many of the things that he is doing suggest that, first of all he wants to consolidate his power in various places. If he wants to criticize certain military, he has to have some appeal to the military. Jiang Zemin could get appeal to the military, promoted a whole lot of people who were indebted to him for rising to a high place. I think Xi Jinping has to show that he still respects the toughness under Mao. And I think he is therefore, shown that he is going to hang in tough and especially dealing with the Japanese issue that he is going to be very firm and very tough. And I think that helps consolidate his military support. Beyond that I think there is a lot of speculation as to what he is going to do. Some people think that maybe by the second five years of his ten-year period as a leader, which we expect to be the case, that he might begin to move to liberalize, that he might begin to show already some efforts towards Japan.

Now what my Chinese friends say is he just last December before the Yasukuni visit, Xi Jinping was beginning to have discussions about what he can do to improve the relations. And there was the Yasukuni visit that really put that back. The Japanese explanation is that Abe had already decided not to go to Yasukuni in August. He decided not to go in October. And he had been waiting for a Chinese indication that they would soften some of their stances. And that he hadn't done anything to indicate that he was moving. And to be cooperative and trying to deal breach the way that he had. And therefore he felt that he had to hang in there tougher. So I think that's the way, you know, unfortunately we don't have a good understanding of the dynamics at the very highest level. And what I give you is sort of how I, in my understanding, of the way most people who work on that issue feel about it. Yeah.

>> My name is Chunping Han. I am a visiting assistant professor at Shorenstein APARC here. What is the hypothesis for why the Chinese [Inaudible] promoting anti-Japanese propaganda is

that this nationalist sentiment constitutes one of the sources of the legitimacy of the one-party regime in addition to economic growth. So my present question is how you would evaluate this hypothesis? If this hypothesis holds water in some sense we know that the economy cannot grow at a rapidest pace forever and actually the social inequality has been rising sharply? So do you think given this situation, that Chinese will be compelled to continue to use the anti-Japanese propaganda to consolidate it's, to consolidate the legitimacy from a strategic perspective particularly when the legitimacy is based on economic growth decline?

Ezra Vogel: I have, and I've tried to think of all the other reasons why the Chinese might be taking such a tough stance. But if you think about their broad international interests, you know Deng wanted international stability so the domestic economy could grow, the standard of living could improve, and therefore he wanted to good relations with neighbors to aid in growth and stability he can concentrate improving things in. And I find that very persuasive. I mean, I think that is basically if, you know, you had a high level advisor in China saying, "What is our long-term national interests?" That seems to me most plausible. And if that's the case, then how do you explain why they should be so anti-Japanese? And I find it hard to think of any strategic reason around the edges as much as they want to get stability inside. I really don't see how you can explain or how to understand it except that they are very concerned about instability inside. And if that's the case, I think it's quite possible over the next years as the economic growth slows down, that this problem is going to get worse not better. And I think it is going to take a lot of imagination of international leaders as to how to deal with that. And I think we have to hope that the Chinese can find some other way to keep stability. In other words, I think it's very much in all the world's interest that China be able to manage its domestic issues and it be able to get stability and keep the support of the people and avoid a collapse. I think that's very much in the global interest too.

>> This is about your last point. You know, on your last point, I believe every developed country has become politically pluralistic. So why not China? Is it going to stop developing? Or is it going to change politically?

Ezra Vogel: A lot of people have assumed looking at other countries that in the end, you know, this is Korea, Iran, etc. democratic voting system, that sooner or later China will have to. I think now we are beginning to reconsider that in the case of China and wonder whether they can find some other way to incorporate some kind of pluralism and still keep one party at the top. And I think that's the way their leaders are thinking now. And I think they are trying to be very imaginative in dealing with diverse points of view, making some concessions to local society of having, for example, in promotion of people some kind of process so that that person has to get along not only with his superiors and his peers, but with his underlings. And trying to resolve issues, staying on top of disputes around the edges, and trying to manage that process so that you provide more flexibility without going to voting. And I must say, if I were Chinese now looking at what's going on in Washington, I would wonder whether that's the kind of system we Chinese want to become. Is that something we want to risk? And from their point of view, if you want to have high speed urban transportation, if you want to have, you know, high speed transport from one city to another, if you want to have fairly rapid urban redevelopment and it's needed, is the American system a better system for accomplishing that? I think a lot of them would say no. So, you know, it’s tempting for foreigners to say it's just that the one party wants to keep in power,

and they are trying to preserve their own power. And of course there is some of that. But I think many of them who try to analyze, you know, what's good for the country as a whole feel that there might be various ways of accommodating the pluralistic society without going all the way to voting. Jean, do you want to comment on that too? Because you think about all those issues a lot.

[Laughter]

>> Um, your turn today.

>> OK. My turn. OK.

>> My name is Benjamin Phan [Assumed Spelling]. I'm a double major in political science and German and minor in East Asian history. My question for you concerns the role of the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia and the dispute between China and Japan. I know I was in China last year when President Park was in Beijing, and if I call correctly, one of the major talking points was the unified [Inaudible] China and South Korea on historical issues related to Japan. And I'm wondering if it's possible, you know, accepting your hypothesis that tensions will only continue to get worse, if it's possible for South Korea and the rest of Southeast Asia to avoid being drawn into Sino-Japanese rivalries especially with growing economic interdependence in the region?

Ezra Vogel: Well, if you look at what Kim Dae-Jung did when he went to Tokyo some years ago, he was ready to form quite good relations with Japan and let bygones be bygones. So I would assume that is one option that South Korea would still have to move more in that direction. And certainly the United States will now be trying to work with South Korea and Japan to heal their problems. If they are both allies of the United States, it is certainly very strongly in our interest to work with both sides. So on the other hand, you know, China is probably going to continue to increase in power. And South Korea, you know, has to find some way of getting along with China. I think for many of the countries in the periphery of China, there's a dilemma of the way to deal with China and you don't want them to dominate you. And if you think about the Korean peninsula over the thousand year or so history, you know, the invasions from China they cause more problems than [Inaudible]. And so you would probably want to have some kind of cooperation with countries around there, not only the United States but Japan, so that China would not be tempted to dominate in the way that, you know, say the beginning of the Khan Dynasty when they moved in to Korea. So I think in the long-run, the Korean peninsula will want to find some way, on the one hand, that accommodates to China, but at the same time keeps open the ties so that China will not be tempted to dominate. And I know there are Korean specialists here David Straub and others who know more about this situation than I do. But that's my take. Yeah.

>> Any more questions? OK.

>> Tom Fingar. I always have questions. One of the points that you made in the talk that intrigued me was that U.S. opposition to Japan improving its relationship with China. Prior to the Nixon visit. You know, it prevented in some sense the Japanese and the Chinese, but particularly

the Japanese from making the accommodation, doing those things that would be necessary. What occurs to me is why it didn't happen in the case of Korea to the extend where the U.S. would have had a position that would have encouraged the two allies to develop a relationship to get over it. And the Japanese attitude seems to be the same whether the U.S. pressed not to do it or do it.

Ezra Vogel: That's a good question [Multiple Speakers]. He always has good questions. I think in the face of Korea, of course it was South Korea and North Korea, I think the deep ambivalence in Korea about Japan. And the people would simply say South Korea hates Japan, I mean doesn't capture it. It was a very contested occupation. And a lot of Koreans knew Japan very well and had accommodated to a lot of Japanese and knew them very well. And I think Pak Chung-hee period in South Korea, after all he had been in the Manchurian Army. And he had, his model, I think anything in the 1960s after the United States was not giving a lot of aid, was he felt more comfortable in Japan. Of course his Japanese was far better than his English. And I think he felt more comfortable in dealing with Japan than with the United States and that in 1965 when he normalized relations with Japan, I think it was also the sense that for economic development he was going to get a lot more aid from Japan. And he knew how to work with that. And if you look at the Korean [Inaudible].

>> [Inaudible].

[Inaudible], they spoke very good Japanese. And they had very good Japanese friends. And so the relation, and I think those ties were far deeper, and therefore a lot of the 1960s period, you know, where the Koreans felt they could modernize with Japanese help and through connections that they had had. And my perception, my understanding is that Park Geun-hye the daughter, you know, doesn't want to be known as the Japan lever. And she's vulnerable. And she's making a special point of showing that she's different from her father and because her father was accused by many of being too close to Japan and giving in too much as well as being too much of a dictator at that time. So my understanding of South Korea is that she has to now distance herself. But I think considering the depth of contact of the South Koreans with the Japanese at very high levels, you know, that was not true on nearly as large of a scale in China. In one way, you know, thinking about the pre-‘45 period is that in Taiwan, it had been so colonized although there was fighting immediately after in 1895 when Japan moved over Taiwan, it was not contested. The occupation was really not contested. So you had a fairly peaceful period from the late-1890s right up until 1945. And so they really became very much, what some people call, and internal colonization. They became very much Japanese.

And if you think of other parts of China, in Manchuria you had some of that because in 1931 to '45 there really wasn't much loss of life in Manchuria in the northeast. And a lot of those people had learned Japanese, knew Japan, and still in Dalian today when you had the anti-Japanese riots in many cities in China, but not in Dalian. And so I think the people in the northeast or maybe somewhere in between Taiwan and say mainland, where mainland where so many Chinese were killed they are very anti-Japanese. But I think in the northeast where they have a deeper understanding of Japan, they learn more Japanese culture. And even today when I go to the Center for, the Japanese Institute as part of CAS in Beijing, maybe half the people are northeasterners, you know, come from that area. It's a tiny percent of the population. But the

people who understand Japan and are comfortable and work with it. I think Korea you had a contested occupation. And, again, Peter Duus talked about that here before. And I am sure in much more detail than I can. But I think if you put it in that broad context, Korea was a mixture where they knew the Japanese extremely well where they had worked very closely and often had Japanese friends, there was deep collaboration that now they are pulling it apart. Kim Dae-Jung was ready to overcome and try to work in a positive way, but the president wants to distance herself from her father.

>> I think we can stop here because, is there no more questions? OK. I hope that everybody will join me in really an enthusiastic thank you to Ezra for making his way out here. He has other incentives for being here, but we're glad we persuaded him to come. And we all gained a lot from it. So please join me.

[Applause]