Larry Diamond: Okay. Thank you Jean so much, and Jennifer Choo, and the China Program, for hosting this and of course, it’s great to have Liz and Mike Lampton on campus and thank you, Gordon, as well for your willingness to participate. I will say, some people have asked why are there two events this week, so let me just explain that some time ago, we got an invitation from the China Program to participate in this panel. At the same time, we had been searching for weeks to find a time when several members of the Working Group could be present in one place to more comprehensively present the report, and it just worked out that February 14th was the time when it proved to be possible to do the latter event.

So, if you want to hear more about the report from several of the authors, including my co-editor Orville Schell and John Pomfret, the former Washington Post bureau chief, and our coordinator, Kyle Hutzler, also contributed to the writing. You’re cordially invited to join us at the Hoover Institution on Thursday afternoon. Now as Jean said, we had a number of distinguished scholars of China, of Asia, of U.S. foreign policy. Some were more policy specialists rather than scholars. No one has committed to endorsing all aspects of the report, but there was broad participation, not by everybody, but by many of the members here in the writing of the report and every chapter had more than one author. These are our summary reports and the one element of authoritarianism I endorse is in time keeping. So I may not get very far in this presentation.

But I would stress the following points. Some of them are my own and they’re not strongly stressed in the report, and they are that the People’s Republic of China is still, and I would say increasingly, a deeply authoritarian regime. It is still a Communist Party state and the fact that it is a Communist Party state with a vast united front architecture to advance its global interest is to our mind key to understanding what is happening globally. Many of us had hoped that modernization—I am kind of a modernization theorist in global engagement—would lead to political liberalization in China. I think the general view of the contributors to this report is that that hasn’t happened, although there are obviously diverse things happening in China.

China is clearly, I think, it’s not even an emerging superpower anymore. I would say it is the other superpower in the world. And it’s seeking to project power in a variety of ways including many of the soft power ways that are accepted and legitimate and that big powers do in the world, but some of what it’s doing is a different form of power—what we call sharp power. And what the former Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Turnbull, referred to as
covert, coercive, and corrupting means that threatened to compromise the integrity of many democratic institutions abroad. The relationship between the U.S. and China suffers from pervasive asymmetries and access and attitude that we think may—must be addressed.

I think most of us do not endorse the generalized trade war that the Trump administration has launched on China, but we do think there is a need for a general new approach, which we call constructive vigilance, that privileges, as you see, transparency, integrity, and reciprocity in the relationship. We stress a cautionary note. We tried very hard to stress it in the beginning. We authored, the two editors, an Afterward that is addressed to this note alone. I do my best to sincerely embrace it here, but I realize this has not been enough for some of the critics of the report.

We separate out the Chinese Communist Party-state from the Chinese people, and in particular, from Chinese people who come abroad to engage us, study here, and so on. We strongly warn against any effort to stir generalized suspicion of or retaliatory action against Chinese Americans or Chinese nationals, living in or studying in the United States. Everybody is an individual who should be evaluated on their own behavior.

And who has the right to be presumed to have honest and sincere and cooperative intent. And one of the primary concerns of our report is to ensure and protect the rights of Chinese Americans, including Chinese and the rights of Chinese students and nationals in the United States, who, we argue, are having, in some instances, their freedom of expression and their freedom of access to information, by what, dint of what has been happening to Chinese language media in the United States and in Australia and New Zealand and in other countries, constrained.

We distinguish between legitimate and improper interference and that is the distinction between soft power, which lots of countries do, that is transparent and open and seeks to persuade, and sharp power that uses wealth, stealth, deception, corruption, and coercion in an effort to sensor rather than promote debate in order to sway opinions and other countries.

This is my view now which I want to stress is an orienting perspective that I think has influenced at least some of us. China is not going in the direction we had hoped internally. It is increasingly an authoritarian regime, which has suffered at least some deinstitutionalization, of some of the distribution of power
that had encouraged some people earlier on. There is rising repression in China, including up to a million Uyghurs being held and political re-education camps in Xinjiang Province. A massive assault on human rights lawyers in China as Liz has written an article that will be coming out in the next issue of the *Journal of Democracy*. You know, there’s been about a 90 percent reduction in the presence of foreign NGOs in China. There is the—I don’t even think I need to spell out the details of this, the stunning emergence of an Orwellian surveillance state using big data and the social credit system.

And rapidly increasing Chinese projection of hard power both through the Belt and Road Initiative. And I’d say classic neo-colonial debt diplomacy and the military base construction in the South China Sea, which I think has been shown to be illegitimate under international law. We are concerned about China’s technology transfer strategy, which is targeting many key sectors of technological innovation. The better treatment of this is in the report on the right, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy” released a year ago by the Defense Innovation Unit, which I highly recommend to you, and we were influenced in terms of what oriented the report by the growing projection.

I’d say is Chinese influence real or imagined? My answer to this is it’s much more real in certain places than it is in the U.S., where we’re trying to raise concerns about processes that we think are illegitimate, but we’re not suggesting it’s had that much impact. In Australia, I think it’s had some very significant and, for Australians, alarming impact, and even more so in New Zealand and in Central and Eastern Europe and in democracies, I’d say, that are either not as physically close to China or that are closer to China physically, geographically, or more economically dependent than the United States. I’m going to skip this slide for reasons of time and just note that the report spends quite a bit of time trying to describe what is the Chinese influence bureaucracy within the Chinese Communist Party-state.

I’ll close with two sectors and then hand it over to Liz. One is the media, where we find, again, probably not as dramatic as what’s happened in Australia, but that China has all but eliminated the plethora of independent Chinese language media outlets that once served Chinese American communities. This is happening by actors from the PRC maybe claiming to be independent, but I think that’s open to question.

Buying up existing Chinese language media enterprises in the
United States both print media and broadcast media, and creating new ones, and you get to a point where there’s just not much pluralism anymore. In Australia, you just can’t drive around listening to a Chinese language radio station and find a perspective that’s really independent from the line of the Communist Party of China.

And of course there is increasing global presence of Chinese media, which you could call—in terms of its projection, really, you know, part of soft power. Look, I want to stress for the Chinese American community: our first recommendation, which is the Hippocratic Oath: do no harm.

Do not cast general aspersions on Chinese visitors or Chinese Americans. But the fact is, many Chinese Americans have been visited, have been intimidated, have been pressured to not be critical of the Chinese Communist Party-state and we’re worried about harassment of both Chinese Americans and of Chinese students studying in the United States and in other countries, and we think that American society and the American government should be proactive in defending the rights of Chinese Americans and Chinese nationals living and studying in the United States.

And, finally, it is the fact that the way the Chinese Communist Party views the Chinese diaspora abroad is as owing a kind of loose cultural or even political allegiance to the motherland. So with that, over to Liz.

[End of Audio]