Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be.

Epictetus

Both sides could thus emerge from the [Cuban missile] crisis claiming victory, but there was little doubt as to who the real winners and losers were.

John Lewis Gaddis

This article uses the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate the criteria by which victory and defeat are assessed in international crises. The evidence suggests that few objective criteria are actually used in such evaluations. Indeed, examination of the specific terms of crisis settlements can prove to be less important than a range of factors that do not conform to traditional rational actor assumptions. These include: i) prior biases in perception, ii) the experience of the crisis itself and the subsequent way in which it becomes framed, and iii) public opinion management during and after the crisis. This analysis has significant implications for policymakers who have to deal with the aftermath of a crisis, and also for the wider public and media, if governments are to be held accountable for their foreign policy.

The literature on perception and misperception is an increasingly important part of international relations scholarship, but this literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of perceptions in the decisionmaking process. In contrast, this paper examines the role of perceptions in evaluating the outcomes of crises. We are concerned primarily with evaluations by observers:

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figures including the media, certain politicians, and the general public, none of whom are directly involved in making foreign policy decisions. It is not so much perception and misperception in international politics which concerns us, but perception and misperception of international politics.

These perceptions matter a great deal because there are significant political, social and security implications contingent upon who it is that people think have won. As we will argue, the reality can be very unclear. Policymakers are especially concerned with perceptions of their success because they must deal with the international and domestic political aftermath of crises. Leaders often care about international issues to a large degree because of the conclusions that other states will draw about them, regardless of whether these conclusions are well founded. A politician’s political survival may also depend on having been perceived to win, whether or not they did, in fact, achieve significant tangible gains. For the public and the media, perceptions are also important, since they can exert pressure on policy and ultimately determine the outcome of elections. A sophisticated understanding of the basis for their, and our, evaluations would produce more accurate criteria with which to hold policymakers accountable.

UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

According to Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, crises are characterized by the perception of an increased probability of war, the existence of a threat to basic values, and an awareness of the finite time which exists to resolve matters. Although international crises sometimes escalate into armed conflict, they are often peacefully ended by informal or formal settlements including, for example, the 1923 Ruhr Crisis, the 1938 Munich Crisis, or the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Such settlements produce judgments about which side won and which side lost, or whether the result was a draw. On what basis, however, are these evaluations made?

Initially, of course, the terms of the agreement which settled each of these crises would appear to be an appropriate criterion with which to establish victory and defeat. If one was to follow this approach, such an analysis would, firstly, be based on a balance sheet of tangible gains and losses, which might include territory, other material exchanges, and future military and diplomatic commitments, as well as their resultant effects on the status of participant countries. Secondly, one could consider the relationship between these material

Figure 1

FRAMEWORK 1: INFORMATION FROM THE SETTLEMENT TERMS IS USED TO EVALUATE THE VICTOR AND THE DEFEATED ON THE BASIS OF MATERIAL GAINS AND LOSSES, AND THE SATISFACTION OF THE AIMS OF PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Material changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Satisfaction of the aims of participants</td>
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Judgment of victory and defeat

changes and the aims of participants. Did each side achieve their goals? Actors may prioritize certain outcomes over others, and may have multiple aims of varying importance. These aims can also alter as the crisis develops. We can call such an approach based on the satisfaction of aims, and the achievement of material gains, Framework 1 (summarized in Figure 1).

Both of these sets of criteria (material changes, and the satisfaction of the aims of participants) need to be separately considered. A situation where the decisionmakers of a country had achieved their principal aims in the crisis, yet emerged with substantial material losses, could only be described as an ambiguous victory. Similarly, achieving even substantial material gains, but failing to realize one’s primary aims would only, at best, represent an unclear result. Often, however, material gains and the satisfaction of aims converge to provide the same conclusions about which side has won and lost, since it is these material changes which tend to be the principal issues at stake. These different combinations of scenarios are made clear in Table 1.

Using Framework 1, for example, Hitler could be said to have won at Munich in 1938 because he was given the Sudetenland, which represented a clear material gain (and also an express aim) compared to the pre-crisis strategic position. It should be noted, however, that this type of analysis is complicated by what an objective observer might expect participants to gain. A neutral balance sheet does not account for the fact that some players may enter the game with prior advantages and therefore might reasonably expect some gains.
Table 1
THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF A CRISIS UNDER A FRAMEWORK 1 APPROACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE 1 achieves</th>
<th>STATE 2 achieves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims only</td>
<td>Aims only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains only</td>
<td>Gains only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further difficulty is that outcomes may represent absolute or relative gains. When states are concerned only about absolute gains, then both sides could win in terms of achieving positive benefits, or both lose in terms of incurring costs. States, however, are sometimes more concerned about whether the overall balance of gains or losses puts them into an advantageous or disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the opponent. This concern is compounded if incremental advantages can be translated into further exploitation of the disadvantaged state (for example, by using an improved military stance to extract further concessions later on).

It is striking that a range of alternative factors can outweigh a Framework 1 balance sheet approach, leading to interpretations that bear surprisingly little relation to the original terms of the deal. In spite of Hitler’s material gains at Munich in 1938, the settlement led to a variety of contrasting assessments and reassessments of who had won and lost. The notion that war had been averted as a result of a negotiated agreement led British prime minister Neville Chamberlain to declare the settlement a diplomatic coup, producing

6. Absolute gains are the total value of the gains to oneself, without regard to the opponent. Relative gains are the comparative gains, or lesser losses, made over and above the opponent.

“peace in our time.” Within a few weeks, however, criticism mounted that Germany had been strengthened and would soon make additional demands. In contrast, Hitler in 1945 looked back on the settlement as a defeat for Germany and suggested that he should have made war in 1938, when German military advantage was arguably at its greatest. Despite this, in the years since 1945, Munich has been widely seen as a reverse for the non-fascist states, and is commonly utilized as categorical evidence that dictators should never be appeased.8

Similarly, using a Framework 1 analysis, the victor of the 1923 Franco-German Ruhr Crisis would appear to be ambiguous. The French ultimately withdrew from the Ruhr representing the accomplishment of a clear German aim. On the other hand, German finance had been temporarily ruined, the new German government led by Gustav Stesemann called off passive resistance against the French occupation, and the subsequent Dawes Plan led to renewed (though reduced) payments of reparations to France. Despite an apparently ambiguous result, the Ruhr Crisis settlement became widely seen as a French defeat, bowing to the pressure of Britain and the United States. French prime minister Raymond Poincaré soon fell from power.9

These examples serve to show that the evaluation of victory and defeat can depend on who the observer was, and when and where they evaluated the settlement, the particular chronology of events, and how it was reported to them. In addition, though initially ambiguous, one particular view tended to become solidified over the long-term. Although as observers, we may believe ourselves to be judging the outcome fairly and objectively, we often cannot help but see such settlements through a series of subconscious lenses.10 This alternative approach to understanding perceptions of victory and defeat can be considered as Framework 2 (summarized in Figure 2).

The three sets of influences in Framework 2 follow the formation of perceptions in chronological order. Prior biases exist before the crisis begins, and may derive from national culture, world-view, bureaucratic or organizational position, or individual belief. These biases represent the lenses through which information about the crisis is received and distorted. The crisis evolution

Figure 2

FRAMEWORK 2: BIASES INFLUENCING THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION INTO A FINAL JUDGMENT OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT

Settlement terms

(i) Material changes
(ii) Satisfaction of the aims of participants

Prior biases

E.g. national culture, world-view, organizational position, individual beliefs

Crisis evolution

The day-to-day unfolding of the crisis and the subsequent framing of key issues

Perception manipulation

The deliberate manipulation of observer's evaluations of victory and defeat

Judgment of victory and defeat
corresponds to the particular day-to-day unfolding of the crisis and the subsequent framing effects, for example, whether the crisis settlement becomes perceived as a “stand-off,” in which one side was forced to back down, or as a negotiated agreement. Finally, perception manipulation represents the deliberate attempts by governments and other groups to influence and shape observer’s perceptions of victory and defeat both during and after the crisis.

In order to test our proposition that victory and defeat in international relations are contingent upon these subjective perceptions, we examine the U.S.-Soviet settlement following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Focusing on one case allows the level of detail required to adequately demonstrate the role of multiple biases in evaluating success. As one of the most important recent crises, one of the best documented, and one which already has well-established explanations for its various aspects, the Cuban Missile Crisis represents a valuable test of our new hypothesis.11

TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The Cuban Missile Crisis has probably received more scholarly attention than any other comparable crisis.12 We will briefly relate the events salient to our paper. The Soviet missile installations in Cuba were discovered on 15 October 1962. President John F. Kennedy was briefed the following morning. By deploying missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev had broken an earlier promise, as well as several official agreements, that he would not do so.13 An executive committee (the ExComm) was quickly assembled in Washington to deal with the crisis. On Monday 22 October, Kennedy, in an address to the nation, publicly announced both the discovery of the missiles in Cuba and Washington’s imposition of a quarantine on shipments to the island. After a period of major tension, the crisis ended on 28 October when Khrushchev announced that he had ordered the weapons dismantled and returned to the

Soviet Union. Kennedy, in turn, stated that the United States would not invade Cuba. In addition, in secret talks between Attorney-General Robert Kennedy and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, the United States asserted that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be gone within five months.  

One is struck by the extent to which contemporaries on all sides were convinced that the United States had emerged victorious from the crisis, with its prestige considerably enhanced. “The applause for the President was overwhelming. Congratulations poured into the White House from all over the world, and Kennedy’s popularity at home soared.” Newsweek reported that “his total victory in the head-on clash with Khrushchev marked his greatest political triumph.” Even Richard Nixon argued: “it demonstrates again that when you stand up to Communist aggressors, they back down.” Kennedy’s approval ratings rose from 61 percent to 74 percent, and the Cuban settlement helped the Democrats in the November 1962 mid-term elections to gain four seats in the Senate and to only lose four seats in the House. In 1967 a State Department publication wrote of the crisis that “faced with a showdown . . . the Soviet Union didn’t dare to respond . . . the U.S. is today the only effective global military power in the world.”

This perception was not only held by Americans. Many important Russians came to perceive Khrushchev as having lost the crisis, and partly as a result, his political career came to a rapid end. According to Blight and Brenner: “in the Kremlin, ultimately, the outcome was seen as a U.S. victory and a Soviet humiliation.” The Soviets announced Khrushchev’s removal on 15 October 1964, charging him with “harebrained schemes” and making “rash decisions.” Dmitri Polyansky wrote a speech denouncing Khrushchev, with Cuban policy at the heart of the list of criticisms. “You insisted that we deploy our missiles on Cuba. This provoked the deepest crisis, carried the world to the brink of nuclear war, and even frightened terribly the organizer of this very danger... Not having any other way out we had to accept every demand and condition

dictated by the U.S. . . . This incident damaged the international prestige of our government, our party, our armed forces, while at the same time helping to raise the authority of the United States.\(^\text{20}\)

The Cubans similarly thought that the Soviets had backed down and been defeated in a major loss for both Moscow and Havana. Fidel Castro was outraged by the deal, feeling that he had been treated as a vassal by the Soviets.\(^\text{21}\) A recent study concluded: “Cuban leaders saw the Soviets acquiesce to virtually every U.S. demand without seriously acknowledging Cuba’s [own] perception of the threat it faced.”\(^\text{22}\) The Chinese also resented the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of the missiles and apparent weakness in the defense of communism, calling the deal “a Soviet Munich.”\(^\text{23}\) They claimed it had been “adventurism” to place missiles on Cuba in the first place, and “capitulationism” to withdraw them.\(^\text{24}\)

In the years since 1962, these same perceptions of the victor and the defeated have endured. For President Kennedy: “Most American historians have continued the applause.”\(^\text{25}\) Arthur Schlesinger, in \textit{A Thousand Days}, says of the ultimate impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis: “to the whole world it displayed the ripening of an American leadership unsurpassed in the responsible management of power.”\(^\text{26}\) According to Arthur Stein: “if the United States had capitulated to the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union would have been the big winner and the United States the big loser. In actuality, the Soviet’s decision to retreat in the face of American pressure represented a defeat for them and a victory for the United States.”\(^\text{27}\) Vladistok Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov argue: “Khrushchev, the gambler of the decade, panicked and capitulated.”\(^\text{28}\) Robert Service described Khrushchev as an “old dog” who: “far from intimidating the young pup, had to give way. The ships were turned back and the Soviet regime was humbled in the eyes of

\(\text{\textit{Notes}}\)

\(\text{\textit{22. Blight and Brenner, \textit{Sad and Luminous Days}, xv–xvi.}}\)
\(\text{\textit{23. Reeves, \textit{A Question of Character}, 391.}}\)
\(\text{\textit{25. Reeves, \textit{A Question of Character}, 392.}}\)
Khrushchev removed the missiles and in the words of William Poundstone: “asked essentially nothing from the United States in return.” In their comprehensive study of crises after 1919, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld find that the Cuban Missile Crisis had a “definitive” outcome: it was a “victory” for the United States and a “defeat” for the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Recently, revisionist historians have suggested that the settlement terms of the Cuban Missile Crisis were more of a compromise, and cannot justify claims of such an unalloyed U.S. triumph. Richard Lebow and Janice Stein, for example, argue that Kennedy was ultimately as willing to compromise as Khrushchev. Along the same lines, there were a handful of critics of U.S. policy at the time of the crisis in 1962. From the left wing came suggestions that JFK had gambled with mankind’s future. From the right wing, Nixon later argued that the administration had been too lenient. On several occasions, Khrushchev attempted to portray himself as the victor. “In what way have we retreated, one may ask. Socialist Cuba exists. Cuba remains a beacon of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the Western Hemisphere. The impact of her revolutionary example will grow.” Khrushchev also suggested that neither side had really won. “Which side triumphed, who won? In this respect one may say that it was sanity, the cause of peace and security of peoples, that won.” In his memoirs, Khrushchev similarly called the settlement a “triumph of common sense,” whilst also claiming: “It was a great victory for us, though, that we had been able to extract from Kennedy a promise that neither America nor any of her allies would invade Cuba.”

Yet the voices of discontent on the American left and right, as well as the ambiguous view of victory espoused by Khrushchev, were largely drowned out in the quickly established consensus that 1962 had witnessed a major U.S. triumph. Richard Ned Lebow finds that in addition to the traditional interpretation which “views Cuba as a notable American victory with long-term

32. Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 140–45.
beneficial consequences for Soviet-American relations,” even the revisionist writers on the Cuban Missile Crisis: “agree that Kennedy imposed his will on Khrushchev.”38

FRAMEWORK 1: VICTORY, DEFEAT AND THE SETTLEMENT TERMS OF 1962

W HAT CRITERIA PRODUCED these evaluations of who had won and lost the Cuban Missile Crisis? Here, we test the extent to which Framework 1, the settlement terms themselves, can explain the perceptions of victory and defeat in 1962. This can be done in two ways. First, we can examine the alterations in the relative security position of the superpowers. This allows us to ascertain the material gains and losses which were effectively traded in the final settlement. Second, we can identify how these security alterations related to the aims of participants. This will confirm whether the material gains were genuine goals of each side that, as a result of the settlement, they were able to achieve, or whether they were incidental by-products.

Any Framework 1 analysis is inherently problematic. The aims of decision-makers are difficult to discern from archival and other sources, and may change during the crisis itself. Following a settlement, politicians tend to claim that any material gains made represented the achievement of primary aims, and any potential gains which were not made had always been secondary objectives. In addition, once we have constructed our balance sheet of material gains and aims achieved, it is difficult to judge whether these are directly comparable, for example, whether one aim achieved versus one material gain conceded to an opponent necessarily constitutes a “draw.” Comparing different numbers of material gains and aims achieved (the usual result of a complex crisis settlement) also presents a major hurdle, since the value of each may vary considerably. Do three material gains always beat the achievement of one aim? These criteria, and the relationship between them, are therefore inherently subjective. This fact makes our study more difficult, but it also reinforces the main argument that subjective perceptions or misperceptions shape evaluations of victory rather than an objective reading of the settlement terms. With this in mind, we try to offer a judicious summary of material gains and aims based on the evidence. The following suggests that Framework 1 does not support the widespread perceptions of a major U.S. victory, nor of a major Soviet defeat.

CHANGING SECURITY POSITIONS

In some ways the U.S. security position became stronger as a result of the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Kennedy achieved the removal of the Cuban missiles, which would have had a shorter flight time, and possibly greater accuracy, to targets in the south and east of the United States. The overall strategic effect of their deployment has been questioned, however, for two reasons. First, because a number of nuclear weapons were already available for launch from Soviet soil, and (in theory at least) from Soviet long-range bombers and submarines. Second, because it was understood to be only a matter of time before the Soviets developed a comprehensive arsenal of ICBMs in the Soviet Union. Initially, McNamara saw little point in risking war over a nuclear threat that the United States would soon face in any case.\(^\text{39}\) Nevertheless, the Cuban missiles were removed and Khrushchev accepted that the Soviet Union would never again place nuclear missiles in Cuba. To do so would invite an immediate U.S. military response. One Soviet option thus no longer existed.

In return, the Soviets gained a public non-invasion pledge. At the time, Castro and Khrushchev fully anticipated a second U.S.-backed invasion following the Bay of Pigs landings in 1961.\(^\text{40}\) In 1962, the United States again appeared to be signaling an intention to remove Castro by force, for example, through the huge military exercise off the coast of Puerto Rico designed to liberate an imaginary Caribbean republic, controlled by a dictator named Ortsac (“Castro” backwards).\(^\text{41}\) After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States made deliberate efforts to keep the nature of the non-invasion pledge ambiguous, tying it to Cuban good behavior. Kennedy made clear that the pledge did not ban covert action, or an economic blockade. “We can’t give the impression that Castro is home free.”\(^\text{42}\) Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the pledge was regarded by the United States as a de facto binding agreement, and the political and military costs of a second invasion had been raised considerably. In February 1963 Castro told the Soviets that as a result of the Cuban Missile


\(^{40}\) The Soviet Union repeatedly demanded that America did not attack Cuba in the months before the crisis, for example on 11 September 1962. Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 79.


settlement, the likelihood of a U.S. attack in the next two years had disappeared. If Kennedy were reelected, there would not be another invasion until at least 1969. Overall, the menu of U.S. options for Cuban policy had become more constrained.

The United States had also agreed to the removal of strategic missiles from Turkey. The significance of the Turkish missiles has been criticized because they were widely seen as obsolete within the U.S. administration and were due to be replaced in the near future. The missiles, however, appeared far from obsolete in the eyes of the Turks, other NATO allies, and especially the Soviet Union. Kennedy was well aware that Turkey was averse to losing the missiles, yet they would now have to be removed whatever the Turks thought about the matter. As Philip Nash has recently argued, the concern for American credibility with respect to its allies explains why this part of the Cuban settlement remained a secret known only to a small group within the ExComm.

To illustrate the point about changes in relative superpower security, imagine for a moment that in this dawn of the space age, an astronaut had gone into space in 1962 and returned for Christmas without observing the Cuban Missile Crisis. In his absence, some things had not changed. For example, there were no nuclear missiles in Cuba. The United States, however, would appear to have sharply altered its policy toward Cuba. After sponsoring an invasion in 1961, planning a new one, and having never accepted the validity of the communist regime, they had now made a public non-invasion pledge. If the astronaut were aware of the deal to remove missiles in Turkey as well, that would add to his surprise. To suggest that the Russians had been defeated might appear baffling. It is not that the astronaut’s evaluation would be fairer than that of another observer; rather it is that his view, based solely on material changes, might well be strikingly different from that of contemporaries who, crucially, observed the crisis unfolding.

A balance sheet approach based on material changes resulting from the settlement terms cannot, it seems, justify the virtually unanimous view that the United States won a major victory in 1962. How did these terms, however, correspond to the aims of participants? Did the final elements of the deal match the intentions of key decisionmakers, or were they incidental tokens used to ensure an agreement in an urgent situation?

43. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 327. For the argument that Kennedy might have attempted an invasion of Cuba without the Cuban Missile Crisis, but never seriously considered this option following the crisis settlement, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 279.
46. Nash, The Other Missiles of October.
THE AIMS OF PARTICIPANTS

Nuclear war was, of course, averted in 1962, thus avoiding the mutual worst-case scenario. Although this condition was necessary for any meaningful victory to be achieved, it was not in itself sufficient because both sides sought goals beyond simply peace. Recent literature emphasizes the American focus on credibility, and a range of Soviet motives, including defending against a U.S. attack on Cuba, strategic parity, facilitating détente and bargaining for gains in Europe. The aims of both sides are considered in detail below.

Aims of the Soviets. Khrushchev’s aims in the Cuban Missile Crisis have been widely disputed and there appear to have been a “multiplicity of motives.” Certainly, he did not want a war in the Caribbean, where the Soviets were in no position to fight. Missiles in Cuba would offer a qualified increase in Soviet strategic power and make more problematic any American first strike. However, the evidence is that Khrushchev was after something more than just installation of missiles in Cuba. Bruce Kuklick argues that the Cuban missiles were a gamble to resolve the U.S.-Soviet diplomatic deadlock over Germany. Khrushchev’s missile move may well have been a gamble to extract the maximum possible gains from the United States. Once the crisis had broken, however, Khrushchev did not raise the stakes with a move in Berlin: instead attention was focused on Cuba, and to a lesser extent Turkey. In addition, as the crisis escalated, Khrushchev was increasingly fearful that events were getting out of control, and it became one of his aims simply to defuse the crisis.

Although his precise motivations are unclear, the two specific aims that Khrushchev himself outlined were both satisfied in the 1962 deal: (i) a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and, (ii) the removal of the American missiles from Turkey. The first was conceded publicly, the second privately. The view that the defense of Cuba was an important reason for installation of the missiles is

47. White, “New Scholarship on the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 147–53; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chaps. 2 and 3.
48. Lebow, Between Peace and War, 82; Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision.
50. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 171–73, 223.
51. In the Friday letter, which was sent privately to Kennedy on 26 October 1962, Khrushchev said: “Give us a pledge not to invade Cuba, and we will remove the missiles,” Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 257–58; Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 349. The Turkish missile proposal was made by Khrushchev publicly on 27 October 1962, without having heard a response from the Friday letter.
not new, and has been corroborated with recent work in the Soviet archives.\textsuperscript{52} Khrushchev saw Cuba as a potential model for Third World revolution, strategically crucial for communist advancement in Latin America.\textsuperscript{53}

As for the Turkish missiles, in his second letter to JFK on 26 October, Khrushchev wrote: “You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries you because it lies at a distance of ninety miles across the sea from the shores of the United States. However, Turkey lies next to us.”\textsuperscript{54} Khrushchev perceived the linkage between Cuban missiles and Jupiter missiles in Turkey as a step toward “psychological equality” with the United States.\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, Khrushchev himself told the Presidium that, if they could get the removal of the Jupiter missiles as part of the deal, “we would win.”\textsuperscript{56} The secrecy over the Jupiter deal not only helped Kennedy save face amongst his domestic constituents and international allies, it also helped Khrushchev maintain relations with Castro, who was angered by the prospect that Cuba could be a pawn traded for Soviet gains in Turkey (and was indeed furious when he found out about the arrangement in 1963).\textsuperscript{57}

\textit{Aims of the United States.} Kennedy’s core political aim in the crisis was to remove the missiles from Cuba and this aim was successfully achieved. The literature has traditionally focused overwhelmingly on this fact. The political status of Cuba, however, was considered to be a significant criterion for evaluating success in wider Latin American policy, and indeed in the global struggle against communism. In his election campaign, Kennedy had focused on the Republican Party’s failure to prevent a communist regime from taking power ninety miles off the U.S. coastline in Cuba.\textsuperscript{58} Kennedy described the ultimate objective of U.S. policy as “the overthrow of the Castro regime” and sought throughout his time in office to find an acceptable way to change the regime, involving covert operations and secret projects.\textsuperscript{59} Although U.S. decisionmakers tended to perceive Soviet aims in the crisis as being a rectification

\begin{itemize}
  \item[53.] Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{One Hell of a Gamble}, 355.
  \item[54.] Letter available in Kennedy, \textit{Thirteen Days}, 162.
  \item[55.] Lebow and Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War}, 141. When vacationing on the Black Sea, Khrushchev would gaze out over the waters towards Turkey, telling his guest that what he saw were “U.S. missiles in Turkey aimed at my dacha.” Gaddis, \textit{We Now Know}, 264.
  \item[56.] Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{One Hell of a Gamble}, 272.
  \item[57.] Lebow and Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War}, 123–40.
  \item[58.] Lebow, “Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis”; Hilsman, \textit{To Move a Nation}.
  \item[59.] Freedman, \textit{Kennedy’s Wars}, 225; Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{One Hell of a Gamble}, 355.
\end{itemize}
of the strategic imbalance and an attempt to gain concessions elsewhere, especially in Berlin, there was also recognition of Moscow’s desire to protect the Cuban regime. On 19 September the Office of National Estimates published its view of the (then conventional) Soviet build up on Cuba. “The main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the United States may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.”

The non-invasion pledge can, therefore, be seen as a genuine Soviet gain. JFK was personally reluctant to support a second invasion and in early 1962, he told Cuban exiles that he would not back a revolt against Castro with troops. Nevertheless, detailed plans existed for such a contingency and important figures were in favor of direct military action. On 3 October Congress passed a joint resolution sanctioning the use of force against Cuba if this was required.

In 1989, McNamara argued that there had been no intention to invade Cuba, but he admitted that the evidence at the time (to outside observers) pointed strongly toward such an invasion. McGeorge Bundy recalled: “The president initially resisted a direct assurance against invasion, for he knew that influential forces favored such an invasion. The editors of Time among others had been pressing for it even before the crisis.” The United States sought the removal of Castro, but after the crisis ended, the Cuban communist regime had never been more secure. In 1963 the United States did renew its secret campaign to assassinate Castro, and Kennedy sometimes talked tough, but U.S. policy in regard to Cuba was subsequently much more cautious, authorizing a ransom payment of $53m in food and medicines, for example, for the release of those captured during the Bay of Pigs operation.

There was considerable skepticism within the U.S. administration over the worth of the Turkish missiles. As mentioned before, however, the fact that the United States agreed to the terms for their removal on the strict condition they remained secret, both within the inner ExComm and the Kremlin, betrays the fact that a public trade would have been considered by elements in the White House (not to mention the Department of Defense, Turkey and other NATO

60. Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars*, 166.
63. Raymond L. Garthoff, “Documenting the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 312.
allies) as a significant loss. "Any hint of a trade with the Soviets would prompt Republicans to scream appeasement, rattle NATO allies, and cause fury in the Pentagon and among militant ExComm members." Robert Kennedy was unwilling to write anything down about the missile deal for fear that it would wreck his future political career. The president was personally more open to an explicit trade. Aware that the choice could be a missile swap or air strikes, he preferred the former. Rusk recalled later that Kennedy would have been receptive to a UN brokered public missile trade, but this never became necessary.

A FRAMEWORK 1 ANALYSIS is insufficient to explain the perceptions of victory and defeat in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In terms of aims, the United States achieved its core objective of removing the missiles, whilst to some extent narrowing its room for maneuver in the pursuance of its wider Latin American policy. Khrushchev’s aims in the crisis are disputed: he achieved those goals which he publicly stated, although he may have failed to maximize other intended gains elsewhere. The Soviet leader would later claim that the preservation of Cuba only cost the equivalent of the round-trip expenses for the missiles and troops. This is true up to a point, although Khrushchev did not originally intend such a quick entry and exit. Examining the material changes to the security environment suggests an even more ambiguous outcome. A “before” and “after” snapshot of the crisis reveals a neutral settlement or even changes favorable for the Soviets.

If the settlement terms were ambiguous, however, how do we explain the near-consensus of opinion amongst widely differing voices that the United States won a substantial victory in 1962? In the following sections, we argue that a more convincing answer is offered by a Framework 2 approach, which incorporates the role of prior perceptions, crisis evolution and the deliberate manipulation of opinion.

PRIOR BIASES

Observers, including the media, politicians, and the public, may have prior biases in perceptions of their leaders or of foreign nations, which can lead to systematic prejudice in the interpretation of crises. This category of explanation

66. Not everyone was skeptical: the U.S. air force favored keeping the missiles. Lebow and Stein, *We all Lost the Cold War*, 123.
69. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 278.
includes a range of predispositions, world-views and belief systems that represent the “lenses” through which individuals perceive events. It is outside the scope of this paper to offer a comprehensive analysis of the world-views of audiences in 1962, but we suggest some key individual and societal biases prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis which influenced the evaluation of victory and defeat.\(^70\)

In the case of several important observers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, prior biases appear to have predisposed them toward evaluating events as a Soviet defeat. The Chinese, for example, perceived the Cuban missile agreement from a viewpoint heavily influenced by the developing Sino-Soviet split and tended to show particular sensitivity toward evidence that the Soviets were selling out to the capitalist states. By 1962 China had become isolated from the Soviet Union. The Soviets refused to back Chinese attempts to force a favorable resolution of the Taiwan issue, and the Chinese strongly opposed the notion of peaceful coexistence with capitalism. In this context, Mao Zedong interpreted Khrushchev’s actions in 1962 as validation of China’s anti-Soviet stance and the removal of the missiles led to a new low in relations between the two countries.\(^71\)

Castro and the Cuban regime also approached the crisis with a set of prior biases which predisposed them to a critical view of the settlement. James Blight and Philip Brenner’s detailed research on the history of Cuba’s relations with the two superpowers highlights the crucial role of cultural differences. “Each country brought its own interests, goals, and fears into the crisis, and the distinctive personalities of the officials and the operation of key organizations in the three countries influenced the perspective of each.”\(^72\) The Cuban perspective in 1962 tended to emphasize several elements: idealistic hopes

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\(^72\) Blight and Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days*, 1.
for an immediate world revolution based on the Cuban model; the belief that
Khrushchev had made the protection of Cuba equivalent to the defense of
the Soviet motherland; and a view of the perceived impending invasion by the
United States as the equivalent of a nuclear holocaust—in the sense that it
would have devastated the country—and therefore “more palプy fright-
ning than the abstraction of being a nuclear target.” Given these prior biases,
it is unsurprising that the Cuban regime were incensed that the Soviets had
apparently backed down, that Havana had not even been informed before-
hand, that Moscow had made, in effect, a “cowardly, undignified surrender to
the United States at Cuba’s expense.”

The Soviet domestic political context also shaped interpretations of the
Cuban Missile Crisis settlement, producing similarly negative evaluations to
those of the Chinese and the Cubans, but from a very different set of prior
biases. By 1962, Khrushchev’s prestige had fallen amongst military elites as
well as the wider public, and he was suffering from a “crisis of the Kremlin’s
legitimacy.” This stemmed, amongst other things, from rifts with the military
over drastic defense cuts in 1960, and rapid rises in food prices. All of these
facts predisposed many important Soviets toward a critical reaction to the
1962 settlement.

Not all viewpoints, however, were predisposed to see Khrushchev as de-
feated. For example, it is not clear whether observers within the United States
itself held any systematic biases that may have predisposed them to inter-
pret events as an American victory. Among non-aligned nations, the missile
withdrawal was initially popular, although many later became critical of why
the Soviets had apparently yielded so quickly. The European reaction to the
Cuban Missile Crisis strongly reflected its position at the front line of the Cold
War. All the major European leaders backed a firm stance and were deeply
skeptical of any missile trade at the expense of European security. Adenauer,
for example, regarded the Russian missiles in Cuba as a major challenge to

73. Ibid. 20–22, 75.
74. “Literally overnight, the Cuban perception of the Soviets shifted from that of savior to
traitor . . . stunned at what they saw in the crisis as Soviet ineptitude, spinelessness, and callous
disregard for the fate of the Cubans and their revolution. . . . The shock to the Cubans can hardly
be overemphasized. This cut went very deep; the Cubans would never fully trust the Soviets
again for the security of their island. This was the first psychological scar left in Cuban memory
by the missile crisis. The second was that the outcome of the crisis crushed their idealistic hopes
for the success of an immediate world revolution, along the lines of the Cuban revolution.”
Castro said that it was “as if we were deprived of not only the missiles, but of the very symbol
of solidarity.” Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days, 74–78.
75. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 262–68; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost
the Cold War, 58–59.
76. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 557.
the Western world. De Gaulle similarly firmly backed a military response. De Gaulle similarly firmly backed a military response. European vulnerability did increase caution about a U.S. invasion of Cuba or extensive air strikes to remove the missiles. The Europeans tended to see the avoidance of general war as overwhelmingly the most important result of the crisis and were therefore less likely to perceive one superpower as the decisive victor and another as defeated. Indeed, perceived Soviet restraint arguably proved beneficial to future European-Soviet relations.

**CRISIS EVOLUTION**

Perceptions of victory and defeat are also dependent upon what we have termed the “crisis evolution,” which represents the particular way in which crisis events and the subsequent settlement unfold, and the resulting impact on the framing of the crisis. The importance of framing effects is well established theoretically, and has acquired growing support from empirical research. Crisis evolution can influence the framing of a settlement in a wide number of ways. Two examples from the Cuban Missile Crisis include the categorization of the crisis as a stand-off with the Soviets blinking first, and the comparative time points used to produce the before and after evaluation of victory. We expand on these two sources of bias below. Since the crisis evolution in reality only happens in one particular way, it is helpful for understanding its effects to consider alternative frames which would be encouraged or generated by a counterfactual crisis evolution.

*The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Stand-Off.* Crises tend to be simplified by observers into basic types, for example, a negotiated settlement model, or a stand-off model in which one actor blinks first. These simplifications are important because the negotiated settlement model predisposes observers to see outcomes as a draw, whilst the stand-off model predisposes observers to see whoever it is that backs down first as the defeated party, without necessarily basing this evaluation on the actual settlement terms. The material settlement could be similar in both cases; the only variable that changes is the particular crisis evolution by which the deal comes about.

77. Ibid. 492–93.
In the case of Cuba, the crisis became widely visualized as a stand-off, in which one superpower would ultimately back down. Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis is traditionally seen as a game of Chicken.\(^{81}\) As Soviet ships sailed toward the U.S. naval blockade, one side apparently had to yield or there would be war. After a period of extreme tension, on 23 October orders finally went out from Moscow to the Soviet ships to change course, and fourteen eventually turned back.\(^{82}\) As the relief sank in, Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented: “We’re eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked.”\(^{83}\) To both government and public, the fact that the Soviet ships physically turned around appeared categorical evidence that Khrushchev had retreated, and by implication had lost the crisis, a framing effect reinforced when the Soviets later pulled out the missiles. Historians, for example, have tended to frame the crisis in these stand-off terms.\(^{84}\) According to Lebow and Stein, most Americans believe that the Cuban crisis ended because the Soviets retreated.\(^{85}\) It became very difficult to divorce this mental picture of the crisis as a stand-off, with the Soviets blinking first, from the actual terms of the deal, carefully negotiated behind closed doors in Washington and Moscow.

In a counterfactual, one can imagine the Cuban crisis having been settled with the exact same terms, but by negotiated agreement at an international conference. In contrast to the dramatic apparent retreat by the Soviets, had JFK and Khrushchev flown to Geneva to hammer out the very same deal, the immediate impression would have been a balanced agreement. Observers would then have been much more likely to emerge from 1962 thinking back on the same terms as a negotiated draw rather than as an American victory.\(^{86}\)

**Comparative Time Points.** Evaluations of crisis settlements require a before and after comparison to identify what has been gained or lost, and by whom, over the relevant period. The choice of time points between which to make this

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85. Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 144.
86. Harold Macmillan was aware of the dangers of a negotiated settlement. “If Khrushchev comes to a conference hall he will of course try to trade his Cuban position against his ambitions in Berlin and elsewhere. This we must avoid at all costs, as it will endanger the unity of the Alliance.” The Americans similarly saw a summit meeting as a potential trap. Despite this, a UN sponsored negotiation remained a very real possibility given the involvement of Secretary-General U Thant in the crisis. Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars*, 194, 203.
evaluation is substantially dependent upon the crisis evolution. With regard
to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the first comparative time point tends to be the
Cuba of October 1962, with missile sites already under preparation. When this
is compared to a second time point—Cuba without missiles—one naturally
inclines toward perceiving a U.S. victory. Why, however, do observers not
compare the post-crisis situation with the state of affairs before Khrushchev
decided to put missiles in Cuba? This latter comparison would suggest, instead,
that Khrushchev gambled aggressively and won a concession in return for a
promise never again to place missiles in Cuba. The Soviets moved missiles in
and then out of Cuba, but not before extracting something in return. Therefore,
decisions about which date represents the first comparative time point are

Once again, a counter-factual shows that a different crisis evolution would
very likely have produced different comparative time-points with which to
evaluate victory. In reality, the United States discovered the plan to place
missiles in Cuba by revealing the existence of missile bases already in an
advanced state of readiness on the island. Imagine, however, that the discovery
had been earlier, with the United States finding offensive missiles on Russian
ships sailing westwards across the Atlantic, with no evidence that any weapons
had already reached Cuba. In this latter case, the likely U.S. response would
have been a quarantine against these ships, and it is very unlikely that Kennedy
would have been willing to offer any concessions in return for the ships turning
around. In reality, with the first point of reference including missile sites already
being constructed in Cuba, the missile’s removal appeared to be a gain. In the
counter-factual, their placement on Cuba would be a loss. In the first case,
concessions may be an acceptable means of achieving a successful outcome,
whilst in the second case, a return to the status quo demands that the ships
turn around without any quid pro quo.

In part, the decision to make October 1962 the first reference point of the
crisis resulted from the timing of the missile’s discovery, thus being due to the
crisis evolution. This perception, however, also reflected part of a deliberate
strategy by the U.S. administration to exploit the timing of events in order to
frame the crisis in such a way that the removal of the missiles would appear to
be a major gain. This introduces the final type of bias influencing perceptions,
which we consider in the following section.

PERCEPTION MANIPULATION

In addition to prior biases and the effects of crisis evolution, certain actors,
including politicians and the media, can consciously manipulate perceptions
of victory and defeat by shaping the information available in the public domain, either by managing known facts or by keeping certain facts secret. This can be demonstrated by comparing public and private pronouncements. For example, the secret tapes of the ExComm meetings reveal that during the crisis itself, Kennedy was comparatively dovish and cautious. Kennedy and his political associates, however, assiduously nurtured the image of a cool president under pressure, strong but gracious, determined to take whatever action was necessary to remove the missiles from Cuba. The president’s dovishness was, in turn, downplayed. JFK’s image was in part protected by labeling Adlai Stevenson as the appeaser within the U.S. administration. Two of President Kennedy’s journalist friends, Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop, wrote an article in the Saturday Evening Post which claimed that Adlai Stevenson had sought to appease the Soviets, that he “wanted a Munich,” involving a deal over Turkish missiles, which the president had rejected. Kennedy did not remove this statement when asked to correct a draft. As Graham Allison suggested, Stevenson may have been very usefully “sacrificed to the hawks.”

Lebow argues that Kennedy also deftly manipulated the ExComm itself for political ends. From the start the president set the ExComm agenda: to find a way to remove the missiles, not to find a resolution to the crisis. Kennedy deliberately gave policymaking responsibility to bipartisan officials in order to engender the strong support he would need for his choice of a risky showdown with Khrushchev.

Kennedy’s adroit if not fully conscious manipulation of group dynamics helped to create that political backing. Allowing the ExCom to debate the pros and cons of the major action-oriented options encouraged them to believe that they were instrumental in making policy, as indeed to a certain extent they were. The group solidarity that developed in the course of these proceedings helped to transform individuals with different political outlooks and bureaucratic loyalties into staunch supporters of the blockade and the other initiatives that accompanied it. The united front they presented impressed other government officials and congressmen and helped to widen the scope of support for the president.

During the crisis, Kennedy successfully framed the issue as being solely a matter of the status of the Soviet missiles and almost entirely avoided the issue of Castro’s survival, whose removal had previously so preoccupied the administration. The importance of the non-invasion pledge was minimized by describing it as a mere gesture to allow Khrushchev to save face among his own constituencies. Framed in this way, Kennedy was able to make the non-invasion pledge a politically acceptable means to realize Soviet withdrawal. In another context, the same actions could easily have been branded as appeasement.

Consciously or not, the public may have assimilated a way of seeing the crisis that was fed to them. As Jack Levy asked: “In emphasizing the zero-reference point in the Cuban missile crisis, was Kennedy expressing his true frame or was he behaving strategically to shape others’ reference points in a way that would support [his] policy preferences?” The ExComm transcripts show that the problem of handling public perceptions of the crisis was deemed to be extremely important. During October “the Administration sought to use the press as an instrument of national policy.” The media largely accepted the notion that during the crisis, the administration had the right to control information. Kennedy’s decision making “was praised repeatedly by all newspapers, including the Republican ones.” Once JFK announced a national emergency, there was virtually unanimous press compliance, and an acceptance at face value of the administration line.

One clear example of perception manipulation was the secrecy attached to the Turkish missile agreement. The deal was reached privately in a conversation between Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin. Even several members of the ExComm were deliberately kept unaware of the deal and the inner circle “agreed without hesitation that no one not in the room was to be informed of this additional message.” The Americans made this concession on the condition that Khrushchev would not announce it publicly. Khrushchev stuck to his promise despite the obvious propaganda value to him should the arrangement become widely known. Khrushchev’s motives in keeping it secret were apparently to avoid Cuban anger at a superpower deal behind

92. Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering, The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency and Foreign Policy (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), pt. 4. Kennedy regularly used the tactic of combining a major concession, for example ending his demand for on-site inspections of missile sites in Cuba, with a hard line ultimatum, for example in regard to removing IL-28 bomber aircraft, to give the impression of firm leadership. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 221.
Havana’s back, and also to boost Kennedy’s chances of staying in power and thereby improving Soviet relations with the United States. Robert Kennedy and John F. Kennedy both benefited politically from this secrecy. McGeorge Bundy wrote: “We . . . encouraged the conclusion that it had been enough to stand firm on that Saturday.” Ironically, the Turkish government offered profuse thanks for the U.S. refusal to do a cozy superpower deal. McNamara, despite being aware of the Jupiter arrangement, assured the Pentagon shortly after the crisis: “There is no Cuba-Turkey deal at present.” Bundy later admitted: “We misled our colleagues, our countrymen, our successors and our allies in order to protect Western security.” Secret contacts between Washington and Moscow were a common Cold War phenomenon, and “the Kennedy administration often used these private channels to promote a more conciliatory approach than was evident in its public policies.” In the Cuban Missile Crisis in particular, JFK felt compelled to carefully spin the public perception of the settlement. “Apparently obsessed with a need to present a public image of toughness, convinced that it was essential to his political success, Kennedy chose to have the American people believe he had won in a man-to-man showdown with the Soviet premier.”

This manipulation of perception remains a key instrument for actors in international politics. As Davis Bobrow wrote: “Almost all regimes, bureaus, and individual participants have stakes in the subsequent domestic perceptions of their behavior. . . . Many leaders, and their followers, are at least tempted to use behavior in an international crisis to bolster their domestic positions against critics and competitors. There are then strong motives to tailor history to secure preferred distributions of praise and blame.”

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95. Similarly Bobby Kennedy claimed that he supported the blockade from the start because “I could not accept the idea that the United States would rain bombs on Cuba, killing hundreds and thousands in a surprise attack.” However, the Kennedy tapes reveal that he favored military action at the start of the crisis and then changed his mind later. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 15; May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 68.
98. Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 123.
101. Davis B. Bobrow, “Stories Remembered and Forgotten,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33, no. 2 (June 1989): 204. Robert Jervis suggests that when actors retreat, they can utilize a range of strategies to mitigate the possibility that the adversary will perceive the retreat as indicating a lack of resolve. These include explaining the retreat as the result of special circumstances; as being the first move with an expectation of reciprocation from the other side; by downplaying the importance of the issue; or by claiming that the retreat was designed to satisfy the adversary’s final demand. Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, 194–204.
In this paper we examined two alternative frameworks which explain how observers reach evaluations of victory and defeat in international crises. Framework 1 focused on material gains, and their correspondence to the aims of participants, as criteria for evaluations. In contrast, Framework 2 examined the role of prior biases, the particular evolution of the crisis and the deliberate manipulation of opinion. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Framework 1 provides an inadequate explanation of the perceived outcome. Framework 2, however, was more effective in explaining the almost unanimous perception of U.S. victory in 1962. The reality of the Cuban Missile Crisis settlement was ambiguous, with compromises by both sides. Even if one had no knowledge of the Turkish missile deal, there was a strong case to be made that the Soviets had achieved real gains. Moreover, both leaders would apparently have been willing to offer more if pressed, suggesting that neither felt himself to be in a commanding position. Khrushchev may have been ready to accept a deal which ignored the Turkish missiles, and it has been suggested that Kennedy would have supported a public trade of the Cuban and Turkish missiles rather than risk air strikes.\footnote{Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{One Hell of a Gamble}, 284; Freedman, \textit{Kennedy's Wars}, 215; Lebow and Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War}, 127–29; Zelikow and May, \textit{The Kennedy Tapes}, 207.}

Despite this ambiguous settlement, Kennedy and the United States subsequently emerged with enhanced prestige: in many ways the factor that mattered most in the Cold War.\footnote{William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” \textit{International Security} 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 5–41.} We have aimed to show why these prestige gains emerged, what processes were at work to shape how they emerged, as well as their fundamental subjectivity and ambiguity. We have sought to demonstrate how with alternative prior biases, crisis evolutions or manipulation, there could have been radically different perceptions of victory, and radically different subsequent gains in prestige.

In the Cuban Missile Crisis at least, perception and misperception were the essence of victory. When the crisis began, the cards were already stacked against Khrushchev. Any apparent retreat would be pounced upon by critics in China, the Soviet Union and Cuba as a dramatic failure. The timing of the discovery of the missiles meant that their removal would appear to be a significant loss. The American quarantine strategy created the image of a stand-off, in which it would be difficult to avoid at least a symbolic retreat without fighting a war in the American backyard. Finally, Khrushchev was dealing with a U.S. administration skilled at managing opinion both within the
United States and amongst its allies. If Khrushchev had known all this and still sought to avoid losing, he should have invested his energy not in the details of the settlement terms, but in shaping the way in which the settlement came about, prioritizing above all the image of a negotiated balanced agreement—an image which so spectacularly failed to arise.

A meaningful definition of victory in international crises must include the longer-term consequences for participating states and policy-makers. Crucially, if a particular perception of victory and defeat becomes sufficiently widespread it can prove to be self-fulfilling, even if it bears limited relation to the original terms of the deal. This follows Thomas’s Dictum: the phenomenon that if people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.104 Such effects have also been described as the self-fulfilling prophecy, in which distortions become perpetuated because they invoke subsequent behavior that, over time, make the originally false perception come true.105 Beliefs about a U.S. victory after 1962, however unrelated to the agreement that had been reached, subsequently influenced international behavior such that a U.S. victory became the reality. The balance sheet began to acquire a whole array of negative payoffs for the Soviet Union that came to be associated with the crisis. Khrushchev was removed from office, the Chinese-Soviet split was exacerbated, and Castro’s relations with the Soviet Union were temporarily jeopardized.106 These negative effects produced a very real Soviet defeat, closing the gap, post-hoc, between perception and reality.107

In the interests of untangling the complex web of perceptions, a number of interactions can be identified between the two frameworks and also between the three elements within Framework 2. We can briefly illustrate some examples, although the list is by no means exhaustive. In terms of the interactions between the aims and gains of Framework 1 and the lenses created by Framework 2, we can postulate that prior biases, crisis evolution and deliberate manipulation are more likely to shape perceptions of the relative satisfaction

107. Similarly, should the British have lost the 1982 Falkland Island’s war, the government “could be expected to be driven from office, shamed by a costly fiasco in which the politicians would be blamed for a catalogue of failures both before and during the campaign.” Because they won, however, none of these criticisms surfaced significantly. Failure tends to engender a cascade of repercussions which reinforce the perception of defeat, but with victory, however marginal, near misses are forgotten or translated into memory as courageous leadership decisions, reinforcing the perception of a major triumph. Nigel West, *The Secret War for the Falklands: The SAS, MI6, and the War Whitehall Nearly Lost* (London: Warner, 1997), 66–67.
of actor’s aims, rather than of the material changes in the settlement. In general, whilst material gains may be subject to various errors of assessment, observers should nevertheless make broadly similar evaluations of tangible factors such as territorial alterations and future diplomatic commitments. The relative satisfaction of aims, on the other hand, is much more likely to remain highly ambiguous, being inherently open to interpretation. For example, Robert Jervis noted that in-groups tend to perceive out-groups as having devious intentions. Thus, in assessing the satisfaction of aims, prior biases may lead opponents to systematically perceive the aims of their adversary as more threatening than they really are. In addition, the deliberate manipulation of opinion is also more likely to target aims rather than material changes, because they are more susceptible to spin, whilst material gains are often self-evident.

Complex interactions also occur between the three elements of Framework 2. For example, prior biases increase or decrease the sensitivity of observers toward certain framing effects provided by the crisis evolution or deliberate manipulation. This interaction is evident with the Chinese sensitivity toward the Soviets blinking first. Similarly, the particular way in which a crisis plays itself out shapes the time-frame within which actors can manipulate opinion, as well as the nature of that manipulation. Kennedy could frame the crisis solely in terms of the missiles, in part because of the fact that the missile sites were discovered in Cuba under partial construction. Perception manipulation also influences prior biases. For example, by ensuring that relevant information is absent from the public domain, actors can compound or utilize pre-existing prejudices and alter conceptions of which actions would be appropriate.

What is striking is the extent to which aims and material gains from crises can be obscured by biased perceptions. This is of most immediate concern for policymakers because perceived victory in international crises is likely to have a major impact on political survival. Kennedy derived great benefit from the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev quite the opposite. The ability to manipulate opinion suggests a capacity to draw victory from the jaws of defeat, particularly a political victory from a military defeat. Whilst a skilled

110. Michael Handel argues that this was true in the Vietnam War in 1968. “The Tet offensive did not come as a complete surprise to the U.S. military. In fact, it was the most significant victory the U.S. Army ever achieved over the Viet Cong in Vietnam—a victory that (had it been realized at the time) could have led to a decisive defeat of the Viet Cong. From a political point of view, however, the Tet offensive came as a surprise and was in the end a Viet Cong victory.
politician can lay a smoke screen over events, or augment and exploit existing prejudices to mask failures, for a less able politician these same phenomena can prove to be suddenly and unexpectedly disastrous. The blurred relationship between settlement terms and the subsequent perceptions of those terms could produce a number of dangers, including an unpredicted (or undeserved) collapse in political support, and difficulties in signaling the same information to all observers.

One speculative example of how an awareness of Framework 2 effects can matter for policymakers today is the case of North Korea and the development of nuclear weapons. If the issue of North Korea is ultimately settled by an international agreement, perceptions of whether the United States and other countries will have gained or lost in the settlement will likely depend on the pre-existing biases of observers (for example, China’s traditional sympathetic view of Pyongyang), the particular way in which the crisis evolves (does North Korea or Washington back down from a perceived stand-off?), and the deliberate propaganda and manipulation of concerned parties (which elements of the settlement are highlighted or downplayed by the U.S. administration?). On this latter point, the United States, for example, is likely to make great efforts to avoid any security guarantees to North Korea being seen as a major concession, a retreat by Washington, or a reward for blackmail. Tactics will probably include a framing of the guarantees in multilateral terms, as the collective will of America’s regional partners, and appeals to historical precedent. In comparison to these framing effects, the actual terms of whatever deal is reached with North Korea may be surprisingly unimportant. For example, there is disagreement in the United States over the 1994 deal between Bill Clinton and North Korea, in which the Yongbyon nuclear site was closed in exchange for two light water reactors and fuel supplies. Some Republicans have argued that this was a successful attempt by the North Koreans to blackmail Washington. Therefore, offering concessions for the cessation or removal of a nuclear threat is a strategy which can be interpreted in numerous ways: as bowing before blackmail (as in 1994); as appeasement (the charge against Adlai Stevenson in 1962); or

Indeed, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese leaders wrested a political victory from the jaws of military defeat.” Michael L. Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 26. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 can also be seen as a political victory for the Egyptians, despite a military defeat by Israel in the final Sinai campaign. Framework 2 factors could be used to explain this: perceptions that almost any Arab performance in battle would represent an improvement on the war of 1967 (prior biases); the timing of the UN resolution which ended the war, at a moment when Israel looked likely to win a decisive victory (crisis evolution); the attempts by Arab states to frame the war as a political victory (deliberate manipulation). See, for example, Baylis Thomas, How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Oxford: Lexington, 1999).
as resolute and statesmanlike behavior (the widely held view of Kennedy’s conduct in 1962).

Biased perceptions of victory and defeat matter for policymakers because the recalled history of crises can have remarkably potent effects in shaping subsequent foreign policy. As one author has noted, in future crises: “success-tinted memory may lead to underestimating risks of failure; the failure-tinted memory, to overestimating those risks.” Believing the United States to have triumphed in 1962 might suggest that nuclear crises are manageable, or inherently winnable. As Graham Allison writes, however: “No event demonstrates more clearly than the missile crisis that with respect to nuclear war there is an awesome crack between unlikelihood and impossibility.”

There are also important implications of Framework 2 biases for the media and the wider public. Observers generally believe themselves to be making judgments about settlements using fair criteria, in particular the relationship between the settlement terms and the national interest. Yet, if these judgments are substantially influenced by the biases described in this paper, one can expect a considerable degree of misperception to occur, with potentially serious political consequences. It may be difficult to avoid the influence of prior biases and crisis evolution, beyond stressing awareness of the phenomena. More problematic still, the deliberate manipulation of perception by governments requires critical thinking at precisely the time that the media and public opinion tend to rally around their leaders.

Historians evaluating victory and defeat in retrospect are in some ways most resistant to the influence of framing effects, given their relative detachment and a natural tendency toward revision of established viewpoints. Historians, however—including the present authors—approach the past with their own set of biases which may influence perceptions of victory and defeat. In addition, framing effects can linger: in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it took thirty years before the revisionists appeared.

When are we most prone to the biases of Framework 2? Most importantly: the more ambiguous the event, the greater the influence of framing effects. Where one side reaps clear material gains, or accepts a substantial material loss (for example the British during the Suez Crisis), victory and defeat are unlikely to be significantly clouded by prior biases, crisis evolution or propaganda. During ambiguous cases (for example, the 1923 Ruhr Crisis, or the Cuban Missile Crisis), these factors come progressively into play. There is

112. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, xii.
considerable evidence that ambiguous events are selectively interpreted as confirming evidence for pre-existing beliefs:

People not only assimilate incoming information to their pre-existing beliefs . . . but do not know they are doing so. Instead, they incorrectly attribute their interpretations of events to the events themselves; they do not realize that their beliefs and expectations play a dominant role. They therefore become too confident because they see many events as providing independent confirmation of their beliefs when, in fact, the events would be seen differently by someone who started with different ideas. Thus people see evidence as less ambiguous than it is, think that their views are steadily being confirmed, and so feel justified in holding to them ever more firmly. . . . Ambiguous or even discrepant information is ignored, misperceived, or reinterpreted.  

Biases in perception are also particularly likely to occur within policy domains where the public has minimal direct information flow, or where the press is under tight control, because misperceptions are less likely to be corrected by rival sources of information. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the average Soviet citizen would have had a smaller range of media sources in comparison to an American or European. Even modern western societies, however, continue to be prone to framing effects. Wolfsfeld examined the role of media generated framing of the U.S. decision to intervene in Bosnia in 1993. Following a major media focus on Serb atrocities, Wolfsfeld found that Americans perceived a very one-sided conflict. “Many Americans would be surprised to learn that the Muslims had a military force fighting the Serbs. Once the frame of genocide had been created, it was very difficult to even suggest that Bosnia had any active part in the conflict.” Furthermore, there was evidence of the self-fulfilling prophecy: “The dominant frame of Serbian aggression was even less likely to be challenged after NATO took a firm stand against Serbian actions in that part of the world. . . . The point is methodological rather than political: researchers should remember that there are always other frames available for dealing with any conflict.”

To understand the essence of victory in international crises, one needs to account for a range of factors that tend to be neglected in conventional analyses. The notion that Framework 2 is important is supported by the fact that in a number of major crises (for example, the Ruhr Crisis, the Munich Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis), perceptions of victory and defeat were only, at best, ambiguously related to the settlement terms themselves. Our analysis of the

114. Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict, 36, 51.
Cuban case plausibly establishes which factors explain this discrepancy. Conclusions drawn from a single case, however, should be qualified. For example, it is unclear to what extent the Cuban case is exceptional. There may also be additional influences which ought to be added to Framework 2. There is, therefore, a range of possible future research avenues that could explore in more detail how these effects explain variance in perceptions of rather than in international crises. Framework 2 criteria may also be useful for understanding the evaluation of settlements that follow wars as well as settlements that avoid them. Indeed, prior biases, crisis evolution and deliberate manipulation are probably relevant influences in evaluating deals and agreements in many wider cases: in politics, law, business and everyday life.

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