Domestic Politics of U.S.-South Korea Relations:

With Emphasis on “Anti-Americanism” in South Korea *

by

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I. Introduction

“Anti-Americanism” has been one of the most seriously debated subjects not only in the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea but also in the United States of America since the 1980s, when “anti-Americanism” began to be expressed extensively in the traditionally pro-United States country. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of research on the subject.\(^1\) Certainly they largely contributed to the understanding of the subject. However, with a few exceptional cases,\(^2\) they tended to assume that “anti-Americanism” in the South was a recent trend, involving military issues such as the North Korean nuclear issue, the wartime operational control (OPCON) issues and the military base relocation issue as well as economic issues such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) issue. This paper challenges this popular assumption by demonstrating that “anti-Americanism” has a deep-rooted history with sophisticated ideological arguments, thus constituting a kind of belief system.

Then, what is “anti-Americanism”? In 1996, Professor Shin Gi-wook suggested ‘three faces of anti-Americanism”: 1) a cultural critique of American society and values primarily evident in Western Europe; 2) a resentment against American political and economic dominance; 3) an ideological rejection of the United States as the “Great Satan.”\(^3\) In 2003, Professor Kim Sung-han classified “anti-Americanism” into three kinds: 1) ideological anti-Americanism which is ideology-bound and represented by radical student organizations, leftist scholars and journalists; 2) pragmatic anti-Americanism which is represented by moderate Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)s and concerned with specific issues such as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), environmental damage, OPCON, etc. rather than denying the United States itself; 3) popular anti-Americanism which is episodic and responsive to certain incidents in an emotional manner.\(^4\)

Their classifications clearly influenced the subsequent debates on the meaning of “anti-Americanism.” In 2003, Professor Ryoo Jae-kap classified “anti-Americanism” into two kinds: 1) ideologically bound anti-Americanism, and 2) anti-American sentiments. He elaborated that “anti-Americanism takes its roots in ideological-bound and radical student organizations and among leftist scholars and journalist, who are known to have a pro-North Korean orientation anti-American sentiments arise from more pragmatic and moderate people or groups as well as people in general who are episodic and responsive to certain incidents or special issues in pragmatic or emotional manners.”\(^5\) In 2004, Kim Won-soo,
a South Korean senior diplomat, also suggested “three types of anti-American sentiment”: 1) ideological anti-Americanism; 2) policy-oriented anti-American sentiment; and 3) emotional anti-American sentiment.\(^6\)

The most detailed analysis of “anti-Americanism” in South Korea from a comparative perspective on “anti-Americanism” in other countries has been suggested in 2005 by Professor Meredith Woo-Cumings.\(^7\) Above all, she argued that “the charge of ‘anti-Americanism’ is false, misleading, and dangerous for several reasons.”\(^8\) Then, she made a critical distinction between “anti-Americanism” and “anti-American sentiment,” with the former denying a whole society, people, and culture, which is not the usual Korean response, while the latter may involve praise for some aspects of the society while condemning another’s.\(^9\)

Then, what is this writer’s definition of “anti-Americanism”? Irrespective of a difference among three kinds of “anti-Americanism,” or two kinds of “anti-Americanism,” it belongs to the category of political opposition, which may be divided into orthodox dissent and unorthodox dissent. According to Samuel P. Huntington and Zbigniew F. Brzezinski, orthodox dissent involves “efforts to improve the existing system in keeping with its underlying ideological values,” while unorthodox dissent involves questioning the underlying ideological values themselves. In the same vein, orthodox dissent may be an equivalent of “nonstructural opposition” in Robert A. Dahl’s terms. It is concerned mainly with the change in the personnel and/or specific policies of government and not concerned with the change in political structure or socioeconomic structure. It is opposed to revolutionary movements. In contrast, unorthodox dissent may be a synonym of “major structural opposition,” which is concerned mainly with the change in political structure and socioeconomic structure. Sometimes it includes revolutionary movements.\(^10\)

Then, one may argue that, in the South Korean context, orthodox dissent is the conservative-rightist, while unorthodox dissent is the progressive-leftist. The former distrusts communism in general and the North Korean regime in particular. Since unification means the maintenance or the continuation of the southern hegemony over the whole Korean peninsula, on the North’s future, the former tends to be a “collapsist.” While sometimes criticizing the United States on selected issues, the former regards cooperation with the United States crucial for keeping the North from provoking militarily against the South. On the other hand, the latter regards the North Korean regime a partner to live together and
unification with the North the most valuable, transcending ideologies and systems, thus taking a “non-collapsist” stance. Despite the collapse of socialist regimes in Europe, the latter still envision a unified socialist Korea and regard the United States a major drag in that direction. The latter naturally regards “dependence” on the United States being against national autonomy, and in the extreme, the United States an obstacle to unification. Instead of solidifying an alliance with America, the South is advised to seek reconciliation with the North in earnest. This paper would bring its focus on “anti-Americanism” derived from the progressive-leftist or unorthodox dissenting argument and its influence on the ROK-U.S. relations.

II. The Origins of “Anti-Americanism” in the Pre-Liberation Period

“Anti-Americanism” may be traced to the initial phase of relations between Korea and the United States. The first contact between the two countries occurred when a number of shipwrecked American merchants drifted ashore on the east coast of Korea in 1855; they were repatriated via the Chinese court. A similar incident occurred in 1865. These events marked the first real encounter between Korea and the United States.11 A more serious incident took place in August 1866, when an American trading vessel, the General Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang. When its crew abducted a Korean lieutenant commander and killed many people, local officials and people launched a fire-boat attack, destroyed the ship and killed all its crew. North Korean historians have portrayed this incident as the start of the U.S. “aggression” of Korea. Moreover, they have alleged that Kim Il Sung’s great-grandfather had led the attack against the ship.12 One hundred and twenty years later, the North Korean regime erected a stone monument in commemoration of the attack upon the ship, stressing that Kim Il Sung’s great-grandfather led the attack.13

The American response to the incident was the dispatch of the Asiatic Fleet to Korea in 1871. The result was the outbreak of the war between the two countries. Although the war lasted only for forty-three days, Korean enmity toward the United States reached its zenith when the entire fort at the Kanghwa Island near Soul was annihilated by the United States Marines. The sudden departure of American warships was conveniently interpreted as the victory of Korea, and the “defeat” of Americans made the Korean court solidify its hitherto
policy of total seclusion.\textsuperscript{14}

Korea’s isolationist posture could not last long, and the turning point came when Korea, under considerable Japanese pressure, opened its ports to Japan in 1876.\textsuperscript{15} Korea was forced to give much more serious thought to its foreign relations thereafter. One book in particular, My Recommendations for a Strategy for Korea (in Chinese), authored by a counselor of the Chinese legation in Japan, profoundly influenced the thought of Korea’s ruling elites. This book described the United States as a peace-loving country but pointed with alarm to Russia’s advance southward. It recommended a close alignment between Korea and the United States to curb Russian incursions. In sum, it reiterated China’s basic policy of bringing American influence into Korea as a counterbalance to the Russians. Soon Li Hung-chang, the Chinese high bureaucrat with primary responsibility for Korean affairs, sought both to neutralize Japanese influence and forestall Russian incursions into Korea by using the strength of the United States. In Li’s estimate, the United States had no territorial design and was the most reliable of the Western powers.\textsuperscript{16}

This development coincided with a new attitude of the United States toward Korea. After Korea opened its ports, the United States became aware of the need to establish diplomatic relations with Korea, if only to deter Russia from advancing into the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, the United States began negotiations with Korea through the good offices of Li Hung-chang, and succeeded in concluding a treaty of amity and commerce with Korea on May 22, 1882.\textsuperscript{17}

Impressive to the Korean court was a stipulation in the first article of the treaty: “If another power deals unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.”\textsuperscript{18} Compared with the English-language version of the treaty, the Korean version, written in Chinese, used the much more emphatic p’il\textsuperscript{su} sangjo (“shall surely render mutual aid”), and the Koreans took this as a firm commitment on the part of the United States to come to Korea’s assistance of Korean sovereignty and independence were they threatened.\textsuperscript{19}

Soon American missionaries arrived at Seoul and Pyongyang to open churches, schools, and hospitals. Their activities were favorable to the Korean court and people contributed to the enhancement of the latters’ expectation that the United States would be a sincere and effective protector.\textsuperscript{20} However, North
Korean historians would allege that they were “cunning imperialists under the mask of a Christian missionary evangelist.” Amid the increasing expectation, Yu Kil-jun, the first Korean to study in the United States (Governor Dummer Academy in Massachusetts in 1885), warned as early as 1885. Pointing out that “there are some people who believe that our country can expect to get the necessary help and support from the United States, since we have established friendly relations with her,” he made it clear that he disagreed to such a belief. He elaborated the reason for his disagreement:

The United States is far away from us, separated by the Pacific Ocean; her relationship with us is not so deep, not special. She has been reluctant to interfere with European, as well as Asian, affairs ever since the inauguration of the Monroe Doctrine. Therefore, when our security is threatened, the United States may give us moral support, but will not send her troops to rescue us. [...] The United States may become a good trade partner with us, but not a military defense ally.

As Yu correctly noted, Korea’s euphoric expectation that the United States would assume an active role in preserving Korean independence and territorial integrity was short lived. Confronted by an intensifying tug-of-war between China and Japan for control of Korea, the Korean king requested American support. The United States “spoke with two voices, not one:” Plainly speaking, “official American policy was decidedly equivocal at least toward Korea’s fate.” It was because the United States government had already decided that it was beyond its capacity to intervene actively in a big-power scramble for influence over an already internally weak Korea. In this sense, as Professor Hahm Pyong-choon aptly noted, Article 1 in the Korea-United States treaty “proved a dead letter.”

Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War that broke out in 1894 strengthened Japanese influence in Korea. Japan’s victory in the Russ-Japanese War that broke out in 1905 solidified Japanese influence in Korea further. The United States reacted by supporting Japan’s efforts to gain control of Korea. Its President Theodore Roosevelt stated that “realism demanded the sacrifice of Korean independence” and that “a Korea controlled by Japan was preferable to a Korea controlled by Russia.” A secret United States-Japan accord was signed in 1905 by William H. Taft, the United States Secretary of War, and Count Katsura Taro, the Japanese Prime Minister. In this accord, the United States
endorsed Japan’s “suzerainty over Korea” in exchange for an assurance that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever against the Philippines.” To most Koreans, this agreement was seen as an attempt by the United States “to secure her own imperial Asiatic possessions elsewhere.”

Assuming the role of mediator between Russia and Japan, Roosevelt proceeded to have Russia sign the Treaty of Portsmouth with Japan on September 5, 1905. This accord was tantamount to an admission by Russia that Japan controlled the Korean peninsula. Then weeks later, Korea became a Japanese protectorate. Five years later, Korea was forcibly annexed into the Japanese Empire. Two American historians commented: “That the Koreans tended to depend upon the wrong signals – in this case the written word of the treaty and the unofficial voices of American diplomats, to the detriment of official American policy – was tragic.”

As noted above, Korea’s attempts to preserve its independence with the help of the United States came to naught. Nonetheless, Korea had little choice but to turn again to the United States for help. Many leaders of the Korean independence movement, including Syngman Rhee and Kim Kiu-sik, went to the United States, where they attempted to generate American public support for the movement. However, their pleas to the United States fell on deaf ears. Still, they did not give up their expectation. When the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (also known as the Pacific Conference) was held from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, they appealed that the Korean independence issue would be formally included in the agenda. However, the conference disregarded the Korean appeal completely: The problem of Korean independence was not even mentioned at the conference. Moreover, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed to preserve the status quo in the Pacific through the Four-Power Pacific Treaty.

Disillusioned and outraged by the indifference of the United States to the independence of Korea, fifty-two Korean independence activists attended the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East held in Moscow under the auspices of the Comintern in January 1922 and denounced the “four powers,” beginning with the United States. After the end of the conference, Kim Kiu-sik contributed an article titled “The Asiatic Revolutionary Movement and Imperialism” to the Communist Review. In the introduction to this article, he placed the United States on par with the other “bloodsucker nations” in the Four-Power Pacific Treaty and denounced it as follows:
We often speak of the necessity of a “united front” and “cooperative action” in connection with the revolutionary undertakings of the Far East. Recently we have come to realize this more than ever, since we have seen how the capitalistic powers of Western Europe and America have combined themselves to jointly exploit the whole of eastern Asia. Even the great republic of America, which has made so much ado about its “altruistic” pretenses and its world-wide “democratic principles,” threw off its mask at the Washington Conference when it formed the hideous Quadruple Agreement with the three notorious bloodsucker nations – England, France, and Japan.\(^{32}\)

Professor Young-ick Lew commented as follows:

In the above passage we can see that to some extent Kim Kiuk-sik’s perception of America resembled Lenin’s theory of imperialism which states that capitalism at the stage of monopoly capitalism develops a global system of imperialism as a result of the close relationship between economic expansion and political control. In this way, the view of America as an imperialist nation that oppressed and exploited small and weak countries became widely accepted among Korean Communist activists during the 1920s and gradually became further developed.\(^{33}\)

III. Suppressed “Anti-Americanism” under Authoritarianism

"Anti-Americanism” began under the United States of America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), which was established in September 1945, three weeks after the liberation of Korea from Japan and the subsequent division of Korea into the North and the South. When the USAMGIK refused to recognize the Korean People’s Republic, which had been founded after liberation by anti-Japanese leftists and communists, friction arose between the two. The latter criticized that the USAMGIK, in cooperation with pro-Japanese collaborators, attempted to maintain the status quo instead of helping South Koreans develop a “socialist revolution” based on the land reform and the purge of “national traitors.” Since July 1946, with the evolution of the cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the USAMGIK suppressed the leftists
and the communists in earnest. On the other hand, the Soviet occupation forces suppressed the landlords, Christians and “bourgeois rightists” in the North. Accordingly, they took refuge in the South and became strong supporters of anti-communism and pro-Americanism.

Soon the American and Soviet authorities went through due formalities for the creation of their respective protégé states in their respective occupying zones. The U.S. induced the United Nations to play a decisive role in administering elections for the creation of the separate government in the South. Asserting that to counter the Soviet Union’s attempt to communize the peninsula as a whole it is necessary to establish the southern separate government, Syngman Rhee, an anti-Japanese independence movement leader in the U.S., supported the common efforts by the U.S. and the UN. However, many southern leftists, in cooperation with the North, fought against the U.S. and the UN, denouncing that the external forces were intervening in the Korean domestic issue to create the pro-U.S. separate government. In contrast, the Soviets authorized Kim Il-sung, an anti-Japanese partisan leader under the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union, to hold a conference in Pyongyang with some eminent southern nationalists including Kim Ku for the creation of the “unified Korean government” in the North. As a result, between August and September 1948, the ROK was established with Rhee as its President and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) was established with Kim as its Premier. Against this background, the Rhee government adopted anti-communism, whose other side is pro-Americanism, as its “cardinal principle in steering or administering the state.” To institutionalize anti-communism, the Rhee government enacted the draconian National Security Law (NSL) in December 1948.

The military invasion of the South by the North under the Sino-Soviet collaboration in 1950 and the subsequent internecine war until the truce agreed in 1953 strengthened anti-communism in South Korea. In particular, the war made most South Koreans be friendly to the U.S. whose army under General Douglas MacArthur turned the tide decisively in favor of South Korea. The war also made them appreciate the importance of the ROK-U.S. military alliance concluded on October 1, 1953, and understand the ROK-U.S. agreement of July 1950 which assigned wartime command authority over all ROK forces to the supreme commander of the U.S. forces. On the other hand, the war disseminated the sense of war-weariness among many South Koreans. Moreover,
the war produced those who would become antagonistic not only to the ROK but also to the U.S., although they could not express their views freely. They included (1) the bereaved families of the executed or massacred by the ROK authorities and the U.S. forces during the war; (2) families left in the South by their other family members who went to the North during the war; and (3) those who took sides with the North during its occupation of the South. The advent of the “reformist-progressive movement,” a euphemism for the leftist movement, in the late 1950s might be read in this context. Embarrassed, the Rhee administration executed its leader under the dubious charges stipulated in the NSL.

With the fall of the Rhee administration in 1960 by the student uprising, the “ancient regime” rapidly disintegrated and its law-enforcement officers were discredited. Immediately, most unorthodox dissenters revived the reformist-progressive movement, proposing the inter Korean interchanges and cooperation, the mutual reduction of the North-South Korean armed forces and the phased withdrawal of the American troops. In February 1961, they were converged into the Consultative Committee for the Nationalist and Independent Unification of Korea (CCNIUK). It adopted three principles for Korean unification: (1) national autonomy or independence without resorting to external forces, i.e., the U.S. and the UN; (2) peace; and (3) inter-Korean reconciliation. More concretely, it argued that the South Korean society consisted of the remnants of feudalism, comprador capitalists, and reactionary bureaucrats. Since they were linked to external imperialist forces, i.e., the U.S., which were opposed to inter-Korean reconciliation, it continued, the unification movement in the South should begin with the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, anti-feudal national liberation movement led by the masses. Encouraging the leftist movement in the South, the North demanded the American troop withdrawal and proposed a federal system as a means for inter-Korean unification.

The May 1961 military coup dealt a decisive blow to the reformist-progressive movement including the anti-U.S. movement. While its leader Major General Park Chung-hee was once a communist and a general renowned for his “anti-America sentiments” within the army, the key architect of the coup, retired Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-pil, was son-in-law of an executed communist by the USAMGIK. Ironically enough, now they declared the policy of anti-communism, pro-America and pro-UN. To legalize its anti-communist posture, the military junta not only strengthened the existing NSL but added an even
more prohibitive Anti-Communist Law (ACL). It also created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the most powerful state organ over the three branches of government, to control the orthodox and unorthodox dissenters. Although the military junta turned into the civilian government with general-turned-politician Park as its President through presidential election in 1963, the Park administration still maintained the KCIA and the two laws.

Nevertheless, some southern rightists and the American Embassy in Seoul had doubts that Park and Kim were disguising their ideological characters. In 1961-64, there occurred two incidents that tested the ideological character of the Park regime. One was the North’s dispatch of its “emissary” to Park for a negotiated settlement of Korean unification. The other was Park’s confidant’s public advocacy of an inter-Korean negotiation in a third country to conclude a nonaggression pact, withdrawal of American troops from the South and introduction of a North-South federal system. Faced with harsh criticisms from both the U.S. and the southern conservative-rightists, the Park regime executed the former and imprisoned the latter.

With these incidents as a turning point, the Park administration faithfully followed the U.S. external policy as evidenced in its hasty conclusion of the ROK-Japan treaty for the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the two and dispatch of the ROK troops to South Vietnam. It also became more draconian and even arbitrary in applying the NSL and the ACL. To cite a few examples, the KCIA imprisoned Nam Chong-hyon who portrayed South Korea as an American colony in his novel Punji [The Land of Excrement], and Congressman So Min-ho who attempted to inaugurate a democratic socialist party that would cultivate its relations with the North.

Nevertheless, some former CCNIUK cadres inaugurated the clandestine Party for People’s Revolution (PPR) in 1962 and other leftists inaugurated the clandestine Party for Unification and Revolution (PUR) in 1964. Defining the U.S. the Korean nation’s “main enemy” which obstructs national unification, they adopted the program for national liberation from the U.S. “imperialism” and its “lackey” Park regime. For that purpose, the latter established contacts with the North. The KCIA imprisoned their members. Despite some exaggerations and/or even “fabrications” in the KCIA’s accounts, these two cases contributed to the strengthening of anti-North and pro-America sentiments among traditionally anti-communist South Koreans. The bellicosities that the North demonstrated towards the South in the 1960s, symbolized in its dispatch of commandos to the
presidential office in January 1968, seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo in January 1968, dispatch of guerrillas to the South in November-December 1968, and shooting down of the U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane in April 1969 also antagonized most South Koreans. A significant portion of rightists, including Park, demanded that the South and the U.S. retaliate against the North, based on the ROK-U.S. defense treaty. When the Johnson administration refused it, they criticized that Washington was adopting an “appeasement” policy towards the North.

President Richard Nixon’s state visit to China and the subsequent release of the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 directly influenced the two Koreas’ respective policies towards each other. For the communiqué suggested a peaceful settlement of the Korean question not through the UN but through inter-Korean dialogues. The result was negotiations between the two Koreas, which were culminated in the adoption of the North-South Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972. It declared the three principles for national unification: (1) national autonomy or independence without resorting to external forces; (2) peace; and (3) national reconciliation transcending ideologies and systems. They were the replica of the three principles adopted by the CCNIUK. It meant that the strict anti-communist Park administration absorbed views of “unorthodox dissenters” into its official position, at least superficially.

Encouraged, the “unorthodox dissenters” expressed their views openly. They argued that the first principle weakened the legitimacy for the stationing of the American troops in the South and the continuation of the South’s military alliance with the U.S. They also argued that the second principle, peace, cannot be kept as far as the American troops station in the South. In addition, they interpreted the third principle as a milestone for a “confederal” or “federal” arrangement with the North. The Park administration retorted that the American troops in the South and the ROK-U.S. military alliance should not be construed as “external forces” and that they help the Korean peninsula maintain peace. They also argued that a “confederal” or “federal” proposal is merely the North’s scheme to communize the South. Under these logics, the Park administration continued to penalize the “unorthodox dissenters” under the NSL and the ACL.

IV. Ignited “Anti-Americanism” under Repression

Notwithstanding, the repressive Park regime based on anti-communism seemed
to be shaking. Faced with the strengthened opposition as expressed in increased number of urban demonstration or riot, in October 1972, Park staged the palace coup for the adoption of the “Revitalization (Yushin) constitution,” which made him the life-long president. In the similar period, the North also adopted the “socialist constitution” which further concentrated the power into “President Kim Il-sung.”

In its first year, the Yushin regime could silence the opposition, both orthodox and unorthodox, and continue the inter-Korean negotiations. Interpreting that the North-South Joint Communiqué semi-officially recognized the existence of the two Koreas on the peninsula, in June 1973, President Park declared that his government would seek the de facto two-Korea policy. The declaration immediately invited the reproach from the North, which argued that the South was seeking the consolidation of division. Then, the North suggested the establishment of the Confederal Republic of Korea – later, the Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea (DCRK) – through a North-South “grand national congress” on the preconditions, i.e., the withdrawal of the American military forces and the abolition of the NSL as well as the ACL. In March 1974, the North went one step further. Terminating its meetings with the South, it proposed bilateral talks with the U.S. to replace the present armistice with a peace agreement. Washington retorted that it should be negotiated between the two Koreas.

In the South, too, both the orthodox and unorthodox dissenters contended that, since the declaration was oriented towards the consolidation of national division, the Joint Communiqué of 1972 became a wastepaper. In particular, the unorthodox dissenters charged that the present ruling circle was the anti-national kinship, anti-democratic, and anti-unification forces. When both the orthodox and unorthodox dissenters initiated a nationwide anti-Yushin movement, in April 1974, the KCIA stunned the nation with the announcement that “some university students, under the instigation of the PPR, formed the underground All-Nation General Federation of Democratic Youths and Students (Minch’ŏng) to initiate the people’s revolution with the ultimate goal of unifying the Korean peninsula under communism.”

Despite their denial and Christian leaders’ defense, the Park regime executed seven defendants belonging to the PPR case and sentenced heavy imprisonment terms to students related to the Minch’ŏng case. In retrospect, the case became the start of the combined struggle of university students and Christian leaders.
against the regime, producing the “Min’chŏng generation” that would play a major role in the South Korean politics since the mid-1990’s. The regime responded with the imprisonment and the expulsion of the opposition activists from their respective offices, schools and churches. While kidnapping and imprisoning Kim Dae-jung, who began to represent not only the orthodox dissenters but also the unorthodox dissenters, it deprived the National Assembly membership of Kim Young-sam, the typical political representative of the orthodox dissenters. Since the mid-1970s, they naturally formed their own “world” or “sphere,” which was usually dubbed “wundongkwon,” becoming an important source of protest as well as opposition, to the Yushin regime.  

Also serious to the Yushin regime was the replacement of the Republican administration under President Gerald Ford with the Democratic administration under President Jimmy Carter in January 1977. In contrast with Ford, Carter demanded to Park the democratization of the South. He also attempted first to withdraw, then to reduce the U.S. military forces from the South. If realized, it would hurt the image of Park as the president with specialty of national security. In the ensuing debates on South Korea’s security after the U.S. troops withdrawal, some political scientists and politicians argued that it was time for the South to study the nuclear development. In actuality, Park was developing his own nuclear project. Washington successfully pressured him to abandon it.

On the other hand, the unorthodox dissenters developed their own views on the U.S. They blamed that Park was attempting to solidify the national division, while giving up the supreme goal of unification, in order to protect the “vested interest” of the South’s ruling circle and the U.S. benefiting from the inter-Korean military confrontation. In this vein, the U.S. under the Ford administration began to be seen as the supporter of the Yushin regime against “the will of the Korean masses.”  

_Hwangguŭi pimyŏng_ [An Outcry of a Yellow Dog], a novel by Ch’ŏn Sŏng-se published in 1974, represented this trend. Held down by an American soldier, a Korean woman, portrayed as a yellow dog in this prize-winning novel, screamed. When North Vietnam communized South Vietnam in 1975, they interpreted it as the defeat of U.S. “imperialism” and its “lackeys” by the Vietnamese nationalist forces. The more radical leftist revolutionaries developed the “Vietnam analogy” to Korea, comparing Pyongyang and Seoul to Hanoi and Seoul respectively. In actuality, one year later, those who had joined the PPR or the PUR secretly founded the Preparatory Committee of the South Korean Front for National Liberation (Namminjŏn). Defining the
South as a neo-colony of “international imperialism led by the U.S.,” and the *Yushin* regime as its “fascist tool,” they resolved that *Namminjon* should carry out the anti-U.S., anti-imperialist, anti-fascist, democratic revolution in the South. In 1979, the police made public their arrest, terming them “autogenous communists.”

Under a series of combined struggles against the Park regime by the orthodox and the unorthodox oppositionists, the KCIA director assassinated Park in October 1979. Soon there spread a rumor that the U.S., in cooperation with the KCIA, killed him to eradicate his nuclear project for good. This myth has contributed to an attempt to portray him as an anti-U.S. nationalist and become a basis for the conservative-rightist version of “anti-Americanism.”

With the fall of the *Yushin* regime, the democratization movement led by Kim Young-sam representing the orthodox dissenters and Kim Dae-jung representing the unorthodox dissenters gained strength. Kim Jong-pil, former Prime Minister under President Park, reorganized the DRP into the New Democratic Republican Party and attempted to join the democratization movement. Accordingly, the era of “three Kims” started. But the “new military junta” led by Major Generals Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo staged the coup. When the citizens in the Kwangju City, a stronghold of Kim Dae-jung, protested it in late May 1980, they massacred the demonstrators. With the blessing of the Republican administration led by President Ronald Reagan, the “new military junta” inaugurated the “Fifth Republic” with Chun as its President in February 1981. However, the “Kwangju Incident” left serious repercussions upon the ROK-U.S. relations. The belief that the moving of the South Korean troops to Kwangju was done under the approval of the American military command in South Korea made critical South Koreans believe that ROK-U.S. alliance is a tool for the U.S. “imperialists” and their “fascist ruling circle in the South” to suppress the South Korean masses. As a result, it provided a decisive moment for unorthodox dissenters and some orthodox dissenters to stage struggles against the Chun regime and the U.S. In such trends, in March 1982, a few theology students set fire to the American Cultural Center building in Pusan. The Chun regime, while integrating the notorious ACL into the NSL, resorted to the NSL frequently and arbitrary to cope with them.

The *de facto* victory of the opposition forces in the 1985 National Assembly election encouraged the opposition forces in general and the unorthodox activists
in particular. Soon the latter inaugurated the National Coalition of the Movements by the Masses for Democracy and Unification (Mint’ongryŏn). It declared that it would fight against the military dictatorship and its supporter, the U.S. At the same time, about two thousand student representatives from sixty-two universities across the country organized the National Federation of University Student Unions – which would be changed into the Council of All University Students’ Representatives (Chŏndaehyŏp) –, declaring their struggle against the “fascist Chun regime” and its supporter, the U.S. It established as its branch the Committee for the Struggle for Three-min-ism (samminjuŭi), which was abbreviated to Sammintu. By samminjuŭi was meant a combination of minjung (the masses), minjujuŭi (democracy), and minjokhyŏkmyŏng (national revolution). It should be noted that it included “national revolution,” which meant “the revolution based on the struggle against the external forces, including the U.S. imperialists, the monopoly capitalism and the military dictatorship, which are ruling the South.” Since they believed that the U.S. was at the back of the “new military junta,” they intruded into the Cultural Center of the American Embassy at Seoul, demanding the apology for its “support” or “acquiescence” of the Kwangju massacre.

The suppression of Sammintu gave birth to the even more radical and militant organizations in 1986. While the more leftist group inaugurated the Committee for the Struggle for National Liberation and Democracy Based on Anti-U.S. and Anti-Fascist Movement (Chamint’u), the less leftist group launched the Committee for the Struggle by the People for the Nation and Democracy Based on Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Fascist Movement (Minmint’u). In the meantime, the Constituent Assembly (CA) group was formed within Minmint’u, demanding that the Constituent Assembly be convened by the masses to establish a new republic. Encouraged by the expansion of unorthodox opposition forces, Chamint’u finally accepted Kim Il-sung’s “thoughts of national identity (Chuch’esasang),” which advocated a “South Korean people’s revolution based on anti-U.S. imperialists.”

Under such circumstances, among some critical intellectuals including students, a new trend was not only rapidly and openly expanding but also taking firm root. It was the revisionist scholarship on the modern history of Korea. They tended to believe that: (1) The U.S. divided Korea immediately after the end of World War II and established the ROK based on pro-Japanese collaborators during the colonial period in order to prevent a socialist revolution; (2) While
Syngman Rhee contributed to the perpetuation of division by establishing the ROK in cooperation with the U.S., Kim Ku sought inter-Korean unification by participating in the North-South negotiations; (3) Kim Il-sung was not a Soviet puppet but an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader and the DPRK was not a pure Soviet creature; (4) the Korean War should be seen as a revolutionary civil war between the legitimate DPRK and the illegitimate ROK and the UN had no room in the Korean domestic affairs; (5) the leftists in the South were the anti-Japanese activities during the colonial period, but they were suppressed by the “rightists,” who were largely pro-Japanese, under the ROK; (6) the U.S. always supported the dictators and the division of Korea, since they were in accordance with the U.S. interest.; and (7) federalism may be considered for peaceful unification of the two Koreas. In such a way, a theoretical basis of pro-Americanism as well as anti-communism and the raison d’être of the ROK was eroding. Faced with strong and persistent struggles by the orthodox and unorthodox oppositionists, which were culminated in the “citizen uprising,” Roh Tae-woo declared the democratization program in June 1987. The ensuing popular presidential election inaugurated the Roh Tae-woo administration, thanks to the separate candidacies by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung.

V. Easened “Anti-Americanism” under Democratization

With the inauguration of the Roh Tae-woo government in February 1988, the initial process of democratization, albeit not substantial, began. The international environment as expressed in the unfolding U.S.-U.S.S.R. détente and cooperation was also favorable for the South to seek democratization. Under these situations, the unorthodox and/or semi-unorthodox dissenters, in cooperation with other anti-authoritarianism forces, inaugurated the Hankyoreh Sinmun [One Nation Newspaper], the Association of the Attorneys-at-Law for the Democratic Society (Minpyŏn), the Korean Council of Academic Associations, the National Teachers’ Labor Union (Chŏnkyojo), and the National Coalition of Movements for the National-kinship and Democracy (Chŏnminryŏn). Criticizing the traditionalist interpretation of Korea’s modern history, anti-communism, the ROK-U.S. relations, and the South Korean society as a whole from the revisionist point of view, they became the vanguards in the anti-NSL campaign and supporters of the policy of rapprochement with the North. In parallel with those organizations, student leaders belonging to the “wundongkwon” in general and Chondaehyop in
particular concentrated their activities upon unification movement based on anti-Americanism. Soon some radical socialist intellectuals and workers inaugurated the clandestine Socialist Labor League, pledging “a South Korean revolution for the liberation of workers based on the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in the South.”

However, public opinion criticized unorthodox views on the ROK-U.S. relations. A *Dong-A Ilbo* poll published on June 11, 1988 showed that only 3.8 percent of the respondents agreed to the idea of immediate withdraw of the U.S. forces and that about 53.3 percent agreed to the disposition of U.S. nuclear weapons in the South. It seemed that the initiation of democratization under the popularly elected government easened anti-Americanism among some sectors of the South Korean society. With confidence on the ROK’s hitherto orthodox position on North Korea and the U.S., Roh accepted some ideas which had been proposed by the unorthodox opposition forces. In July, 1988, he announced that under the Northern Policies he would seek interchanges and cooperation with all socialist countries, including the North, in earnest.

Not only all three major opposition parties in the South but also the North responded positively. In the New Year message of 1989, Kim II-sung proposed to hold a conference among political parties, including the South’s governing party, and social organizations by the two Koreas in Pyongyang. Since its central agenda would be Kim’s DCRK scheme, most South Korean leaders rejected it. However, most unorthodox dissenters agreed to it. In actuality, their leaders visited Pyongyang separately without the government permit to demonstrate “the Korean will to solve the unification issue not by external forces but by the Koreans themselves.” Upon their return to home, they were arrested under the NSL. Although Kim Young-sam criticized their “unauthorized” visit to the North, Kim Dae-jung defended them. The latter advocated the substantial revision of the NSL and the free exchanges of civilians between the two Koreas.

Unorthodox dissenters’ theories and activities brought about the right-wing backlash. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as all East European socialist regimes, the South Korean establishment of diplomatic relations with them and the West Germany’s absorption of East Germany between late 1989 and late 1991 expedited the trend toward conservatism. It was evidenced in the sharp decline of participants in the meetings and demonstrations led by the wundongkwon. Although some radical university
student activists burned the American flag during American Vice President Dan Quayle’s visit to Seoul to put pressure upon the Roh Tae-woo government to open up Korea’s beef market in 1989, the response from the students was not so hot. In addition, some domestic and foreign observers began to talk about the possibility of the South’s absorption of the North. Accordingly, a significant portion of unorthodox opposition activists had to seek an “ideologically diluted line.” Inaugurating the Masses Party in November 1990, they declared that they would act within the framework of the parliamentary system rather than pursuing a revolutionary method. Still, the other unorthodox opposition activists established the Pannational Coalition for Fatherland Unification (Pŏminryŏn), demanding the American troop withdrawal.

The North, recognizing the seriousness of new international trend, agreed to the South’s proposal to hold an inter-Korean high-level political conference. From September 1990 to September 1992, the two Koreas held their prime ministerial meetings eight times in Seoul and Pyongyang alternatively. The result was the adoption of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and South in December 1991 and the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in January 1992. Since the two documents absorbed many ideas the unorthodox dissenters had proposed, they tended to express their approval. In contrast, some rightists criticized that some clauses in the Nonnuclearization Declaration deprived the South of its “nuclear sovereignty” under the Bush administration’s pressure. In the meantime, under the southern initiative, the North, which had opposed a simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the UN on the ground that it would perpetuate the Korean division, and the South were admitted into the UN in September 1991. In terms of “state capability,” the South seemed to have prevailed over the North, which was showing symptoms of economic collapse. When the PRC established its diplomatic relations with the South in 1992, such a sentiment strengthened. Now the collapsists gained strength, expanding the “unification euphoria” and easing anti-Americanism. In such a socio-psychological milieu, Kim Young-sam of the governing party representing the conservative-rightists defeated Kim Dae-jung representing the non-conservatives in the 1992 presidential election.

President Kim Young-sam started his presidency in February 1993 with the pledge that his administration would seek rapprochement with the North. He maintained his stance even after the North declared its intention to withdraw
from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993. However, when the Democratic administration led by President Bill Clinton started its bilateral talks with the North at the exclusion of the South, the southern rightists began to heighten their critical voices against the U.S. Some “ultra-rightists” denounced Presidents Clinton and Kim for their “timidity” and advised them to have the courage to prepare people for war against the North. Reflecting their views, Kim changed his stance. Between June and July 1993, he repeated that North Korea, while preparing its people for war, was manipulating the talks to buy time to finish their nuclear project. He demanded to the Clinton administration not to make any further concessions to North Korea. In some sectors of the South Korean society, the thesis that the South should secure “nuclear sovereignty” seemed to gain strength. The myth that the U.S. assassinated President Park to eradicate his nuclear project for good revived. When Kim Chin-myŏng published Mukunghwakkotipiotssumnida [The Rose of Sharon Is in Full Blossom], based on the myth, in the summer of 1993, the three-volume fiction became a million-seller by the end of that year. [Note that the Rose of Sharon is the national flower of the ROK.] Many readers commented that this novel awakened them to accept the thesis of “nuclear sovereignty.” Now the U.S. was seen as the main obstacle for the South to secure its own “nuclear sovereignty.”

Former U.S. President Carter’s mediation in June 1994 made the U.S. and the North continue the talks in Geneva. Three weeks after, Kim Il-sung died and his heir-apparent Kim Jung-il assumed the full reigns of the North. The Hanchongryon, the successor to Chondaehyop, staged demonstrations demanding the dispatch of condolence envoys to late Kim and shouting the anti-U.S. slogans. To tarnish his image, President Kim Young-sam released the Soviet documents, which he had received from Russian President Boris Yeltsin a month earlier, showing Stalin and Kim Il-sung played active roles in the initiation of the Korean War. With the opening of the documents, anti-Americanism based on the assumption that the U.S. instigated the Rhee government to start the war became weakened.

Kim Il-sung’s death naturally stirred debates on the future of the North. Amid the debates, President Kim Young-sam voiced the collapsist view. His speeches frequently referred to the “possibility of abrupt unification” and the South’s “preparedness for any kind of future situation.” [His collapsist view would be strengthened after the defection of KWP Secretary Hwang Chang-yŏp,
the highest-ranking North Korean official to defect to the South, in 1997. From this premise, he objected the U.S.-North Korea agreement nearing completion. In his interview with the New York Times on October 7, 1994, he warned that “Compromises might prolong the life of the North Korean government and would send the wrong signal to its leaders.” Clinton barely persuaded him that it was in the South’s national interest to approve the deal. Finally, on the 21st in Geneva, the U.S. and the North concluded the Basic Agreement on the North’s nuclear issue. The South Korean conservative-rightists criticized that its provisions were to the benefit of the North and that the U.S. yielded much. They also expressed worries that the agreement failed to freeze completely the past nuclear activities and that the North could be able to reactivate nuclear project in the future. In contrast, the progressive-leftists agreed to it.

The trends in the post-Geneva accord deepened concerns that most South Korean conservative-rightists embraced. To them, the U.S. was moving fast to improve its relations with the North. Then, in September 1996, it was discovered that a North Korean submarine ran aground off the Kangnun port in eastern coast of the South. President Kim called it a deliberate act of provocation and authorized the defense ministry’s plan to attack military bases in the North without prior consultation with the U.S. in case of recurrence. In return for Clinton’s repeated firm assurances for the defense of the South, Kim agreed to cancel it.

In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung, the opposition party’s candidate, advocated the “sunshine policy” to the North. Quoting the Aesop’s fables in which sunshine not storm takes off one’s clothes, he contended that a policy of benevolence could reduce the North’s fears and mitigate its mistrust towards the South. On the basis of the mutual confidence, which would be restored through phased cooperation, he argued, the two Koreas would move toward replacement of the present armistice agreement with a permanent peace agreement. Then the two Koreas would enter a period of North-South confederation, which would lead first to a North-South federation then ultimately to one unified Korea. On Kim Jung-il and North Korea, he differed from Kim Young-sam. He argued that there was no other serious contender for Kim Jung-il’s leadership, and that the North was peculiarly durable and would not collapse easily. Most progressives including unorthodox activists supported him, even contending that the northern economy was doomed to collapse due mainly to its
struggle against the U.S. “imperialists” without receiving any sort of foreign aids, and that the economically weakened North could not initiate war against the South. The financial crisis occurred during the election campaign gave some voters an anti-U.S. edge in the midst of the rapidly circulating rumor that the U.S. was at its back and that it was an inevitable result of U.S.-led globalization.

Lee Hoi-chang, the governing party candidate, retorted that Kim Dae-jung was so naive and might be dangerous to become the president. Some conservative-rightists even recalled Kim’s leftist career in 1945-1946 and close contacts with the Korean “pro-North leftists” in Japan in 1972-1973. However, the support of Kim Jong-pil, whom Kim Dae-jung promised to appoint the prime minister if elected, and his conservative-rightist United Liberal Democrats was effective in diluting “leftist” part in Kim Dae-jung’s image. In December 1997, Kim defeated Lee by a slim margin.

VI. Deepened “Anti-Americanism” under Rapprochement

The inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration in February 1998 meant the birth of the “joint regime” based on a coalition between the “progressive-leftist force” and the “archconservative force.” It also meant a significant portion of the hitherto unorthodox opposition forces led by the “Minchong generation” came to assume the reigns of the government. Critical and/or unorthodox views on ROK-U.S. relations seemed to have gained popular endorsement. Occasional disclosures since 1999 of massacres of innocent South Koreans by the U.S. troops during the Korean War reinforced anti-Americanism. The de facto nullification of the NSL by the Kim Dae-jung administration meant the no-use of the coercive power by state organs against leftists, including anti-American activists.

The Clinton administration, expecting Kim’s “sunshine policy” would resonate with its policy of engagement with North Korea, supported it. In 1999, William J. Perry, Clinton’s North Korea policy coordinator, recommended to the White House the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations in return for a freeze on the North’s programs to develop and export weapons of mass destruction. The North responded with the declaration of missile test suspension by 2003. Encouraged, Kim announced in March 2000 that he would help the North recover its wrecked economy through an inter-Korean summit. The result was
the holding of the first-ever inter-Korean summit in June 2000 in Pyongyang and the subsequent adoption of the Pyongyang Declaration. It pledged to pursue national unification based on the principle of “national autonomy” and suggested a federal or confederal arrangement for a unified Korea. While further heightening national pride and confidence, it weakened both the South Korean perception of the North Korean military threat and the rationale for the stationing of the U.S. troops in the South.

Following the “unification euphoria” influenced by the principle of “national autonomy,” the number of demonstrations against the U.S. increased. While some protesters demanded that the U.S. revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to allow the ROK greater jurisdiction over American soldiers in criminal cases and that numerous massacre cases of South Korean civilians by the U.S. forces during the Korean War be investigated thoroughly, other protesters demanded that the U.S. withdraw its troops from the South. In a nationwide poll released on August 16, 2000 by Seoul-based Naeil Sinmun [Tomorrow Newspaper], 58.3 percent of the respondents showed critical attitudes towards the U.S. troops in the South.

The expansion of anti-American sentiment was in accordance with the growing pro-China sentiment, derived from strengthened economic ties between the South and China. Indeed, the new phenomena in the South was the emerging belief among intellectuals that the two Koreas should find a peaceful road to reconciliation and ultimate unification within the framework of East Asia which China plays an important role. President Kim’s appointment of ambassador to Beijing with a heavyweight diplomat with the career of the foreign minister and ambassador to Washington with one-term congressman without any diplomatic career in August 2000 symbolized such a trend.

However, the Clinton administration soon officially endorsed the summit and sought the improvement of the U.S. relations with North Korea. As a result, on October 12, 2000, the two countries agreed to turn the hitherto hostile relations into friendly relations and to turn the armistice agreement into the “peace arrangement.” While the North declared its renunciation of terrorism and pledged not to launch long-range missiles while talks continued on American demands for a permanent freeze on missile tests, Clinton agreed to visit Pyongyang by the end of his term. To organize Clinton’s trip, State Secretary Madeleine Albright opened a historic visit to Pyongyang and met Kim Jung-il on October 23-24. The two exchanged their respective ideas to solve the North
Korean missile development project in question. The Kim administration fully supported Clinton’s decisions on North. There appeared no disagreement between the two administrations.

The election of Republican George W. Bush in December 2000 fundamentally altered ROK-U.S. relations. As the pre-inaugural Bush team made it clear it would not endorse the deal with North Korea, including the Geneva agreement and the Pyongyang Declaration, Clinton decided not to visit North Korea as his term drew to an end. From the beginning, it became evident that there exist substantive and wide disagreements on North Korea between “non-collapsist” Kim and “collapsist” Bush. The most controversial one was the North’s nuclear project. While Kim argued that Bush exaggerates its seriousness, Bush retorted that Kim neglects its danger. At their first talks in March 2001 in Washington D.C., while Kim argued that the North’s first goal is not to have nuclear weapons, but to have diplomatic relations with the U.S., Bush retorted that he does not trust Kim Jung-il. The talks ended without progress. The terror attacks upon the U.S. by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 further hardened the Bush administration’s stance on the North, which was included in its terrorist list.

Relations between South Korea and the U.S. as well as North Korea and the U.S. met a new phase on January 29, 2002 when Bush included North Korea in parallel with Iran and Iraq in his list of “an axis of evil,” arming to threaten the peace of the world, in his state of the union address. The remark was a de facto denial of Kim’s view on the North. Outraged, North Korea condemned Bush’s comments as an attempt to justify the U.S. troops in South Korea, part of a U.S. “policy of aggression against us.” While the conservative-rightists responded positively, the progressive-leftists harshly criticized him. The latter argued that Bush was seeking war against the North, thereby threatening peace and security on the Korean peninsula. More fervent progressive-leftists and/or peace-oriented activists staged a series of fierce anti-U.S. demonstrations, shouting “Yankee Go Home!” A nationwide poll released on March 7, 2002 by weekly Sisa Jonol [Journal of Current Affairs] showed that 59.7 percent of respondents disagreed with remarks by Bush and that about 49.0 percent expressed sympathy with radical students’ occupation of an American Chamber of Commerce office in Seoul.

Against this backdrop, the two presidents held the talks in February 2002 in Seoul. In a joint press conference, both leaders described the summit as “frank
and open,” indicating that differences remained over the North. About this time, it became more clear that long-delayed construction of two nuclear power reactors pushed back completion until at least 2008, five years later the agreed schedule. The delays and other conflicts led the North in March 2002 to indicate that the North stood ready to withdraw from the Geneva agreement. The Bush administration’s accusation that the North was conducting a nuclear weapons development program through the highly enriched uranium (HEU) method and the North’s categorical denial on one hand and the Kim administration’s defense of the North’s position on the other hand further deteriorated ROK-U.S. relations. In this process, not only to the progressive-leftists but to some moderate conservative-rightists, the Bush administration was seen as seeking the *casus belli* against the North, thereby expanding anti-Americanism. In January 2003, the North withdrew from the NPT, declaring that “the 1994 accord is a matter of fact becoming nullified.”

Anti-Americanism, which was also stimulated by the events following the accidental vehicular death of the two South Korean schoolgirls by two U.S. soldiers in June 2002 near Seoul, influenced the presidential election held in December 2002. It clearly solidified unorthodox opposition forces that tended to favor Roh Moo-hyun, who proudly confessed that “I have never visited the U.S.” He added “If elected, I will deal with the Bush administration with national assertiveness. I will not *kowtow* to Washington. The ROK-U.S. alliance should be transformed into horizontal relations,” *i.e.*, “equal partnership.” By a slim margin, Roh defeated Lee Hoi-chang, who was seen as representing the South Korean establishment based on “pro-Americanism.”

Roh’s victory meant that a coalition of “non-mainstream” groups including the unorthodox dissenters which grew up in the South Korean society particularly since the mid-1970s finally captured the political power by its own strength, although a significant portion of those who had opposed the consecutive authoritarian regimes in the 1960s-1980s also supported Roh. His strategists were from the “wundongkwon,” including the “Minch’ŏng generation” of the 1970s and the “three-eight-six (386) generation,” those in their thirties, who went to college in the 1980’s, and were born in the 1960s.

It should be recalled that the “three-eight-six (386) generation” experienced their college lives under the repressive, anti-communist, anti-North Korean military regime supported by the American government. Many of them served even prison terms for their struggle for democracy, independence from the U.S.,
and inter-Korean rapprochement. Naturally, they came to embrace a mixed sense of anti-establishment, anti-mainstream, anti-Americanism, nationalism, and sympathy with North Korea. Their simplified slogan, “inter-Korean cooperation rather than South Korean-American cooperation,” should be understood in this context. They also showed a strong passion for drastic reforms in the “business conglomerate-centered economy,” the government-business collusion, the politics by political parties based on the regional support, and the “pro-America diplomacy.” Some of them went one step further by advocating “democracy based on grass-root people,” which the public security authorities had branded a variation of red ideology mixed with populism in the neighborhood of North Korean communism. In sum, what they proposed in ideas, policies, and proposals were in sharp disagreement with what the establishment or the mainstream group accepted.

With the inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyun in February 2003, the government reflected their historical and ideological views on the South Korean society into official policies. Firstly, the government officialized that communists during the Japanese colonial period had made contributions to Korean independence. Secondly, the government defined numerous past national leaders, who had been called “core of conservative-rightists” while alive, “pro-Japanese collaborators during the Japanese colonial period.” It even contended that they became “pro-America and anti-North forces” in the post-liberation South Korea, exploiting the cold war environment. Thirdly, the government examined the “wrongdoings against humanity” committed by the past authoritarian regimes and officialized that the then public security authorities had extracted from orthodox and/or unorthodox dissenters the “false confessions, admitting their respective communist or pro-North activities” through tortures. While one government committee officially recognized some Namminjŏn activists as the fighters for democracy, the court is reviewing the PPR case for the retrial. All of these tarnished the image of pro-American conservative-rightist forces, while improving the image of anti-American progressive-leftist forces.

The Roh administration also reflected their historical and ideological views on the ROK-U.S. relations into official policies, albeit partially. On one hand, by May 2003, it dispatched the ROK troops to Iraq in accordance with the ROK-U.S. alliance, and in 2005 it agreed to the Bush administration’s “principle of strategic flexibility,” resisting pressure from the anti-American forces in the South. In 2005, it opened negotiations for the FTA with the U.S. despite
protests by some sectors of the South Korean society who argue that the agreement would make the South an “American economic colony.” On the other hand, it persistently differed from Bush’s North Korea policy, which it regards “collapsist.” In November 2004, immediately after Bush’s reelection, he urged Bush to soften its stance on the North Korea issue, calling military options and economic sanctions against the North unacceptable. He went one step further, saying that there was legitimate rationale in the North’s argument that its nuclear and missile programs are to deter outside threats. Adding that he does not want to see the North collapse, he opposed the Bush administration’s policy of inducing the “regime change in the North” by raising its human rights abuses. In the meantime, he proposed that his government is willing to mediate the conflict between North Korea and the U.S. In actuality, the South took the “neutral” position in the six-party talks to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue among the two Koreas, the U.S., the PRC, Russia and Japan in 2003-2005. At the chagrin of the Bush administration, Roh further increased the South’s economic assistance to the North.

In such a socio-psychological milieu, some progressive-leftists staged the campaign to eradicate MacArthur’s statue in Inchon, where the general staged the dramatic landing operation during the Korean War. They argued that the general obstructed inter-Korean unification. Roh’s response on this campaign never touched upon the heart of the matter: he merely said that the campaign would hurt the ROK-U.S. relations. When the U.S. troops in the South had to relocate its headquarters in 2006 from Seoul to a local town, they also staged fierce struggles against it demanding the complete withdrawal of the “U.S. imperialists” from the South.

For the sake of objectivity, it should be recalled that by this time South Korea witnessed the substantial growth of the intellectual circle under democratization and globalization, which contributed to the expansion of active debates and realistic assessment of external affairs, including the South Korea-U.S. relations, with sophisticated logics. Irrespective of their respective ideological tendencies, while some would argue that the U.S. is an imperialist country as exemplified in its military aggression of Iraq in 2003, others would contend that it is applying the double standard in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue as contrasted with its recognition of the Indian nuclear development in 2005.

President Roh’s policy of tolerance to the leftists and assistance to the North
and the subsequent rift in the ROK-U.S. relations brought about the conservative-rightist backlash since 2005.\(^{48}\) When he said that he would make the U.S. “return the wartime control authority from the supreme commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the supreme commander of the ROK forces,” they denounced that “his reckless decision would endanger the security of the ROK.” Led by Christians and retired military and police cadres as well as diplomats, they initiated a series of demonstrations against Roh’s “pro-North” policy and “leftist forces opposing ROK-U.S. military alliance.” Some prominent intellectuals, including converts from Kim Il-sung’s “Chuch’esasang,” inaugurated the National Coalition of “New Right” Movements, declaring their struggle against Roh’s North Korea and U.S. policies. All of them agreed that the Kim Jung-il regime should be collapsed and that for that purpose the South, in cooperation with the U.S., should discontinue its economic assistance to the North.

The North’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006 reinforced the conservative-rightist backlash. They criticized the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations’ economic assistance to the North, which enabled the Kim Jun-gil regime to develop its nuclear bombs. In contrast, a few leftist organizations defended the North arguing that the North had no choice but to test the nuclear bombs to force the bilateral talks between the North and the U.S. They even denounced the Bush administration of its refusal to hold the bilateral talks with the North. With the North’s nuclear test as a new turning point, the voices of the conservative-rightists are gaining strength within the South.

VII. The Rightist Backlash against “Anti-Americanism”

Forces embracing anti-Americanism as a progressive-leftist ideology never took the helm of state affairs before the Kim Dae-jung administration. Accordingly, the ROK-U.S. relations maintained “a firm alliance tied through blood.” However, after they came into power, the situation changed. To put it simply, the past unorthodox dissenting views became the present orthodox official policies and the ROK-U.S. relations showed friction and tensions. This was particularly true after the advent of the Roh administration in February 2003. However, the Bush administration is also responsible for the change. When it began to pursue a policy of containment and isolation towards the North, conflict with the Kim Dae-jung administration came up to the surface. This
trend made rapid progress under the Roh-Bush administrations.

Since 2005, the South Korean conservative-rightists, including the “new right movement” activists, started their joint struggle against Roh’s “pro-North Korea anti-U.S.” policies. The struggle between the conservative-rightist forces and the progressive-leftist forces became fierce in the presidential election held in December 2007. While Chŏng Tong-yŏng from the governing United Democratic Party, former Unification Minister under President Roh Moo-hyun, stressed the primacy of reconciliation and cooperation with the North, Lee Myung-bak from the opposition GNP, former CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company and Seoul Mayor, pledged that if elected he would do his best to “restore” the ROK-U.S. alliance. The result was Lee’s landslide victory. This was read as an anti-“pro-North, leftist” backlash.

VIII. Conclusion

In his inaugural speech delivered on February 25, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak repeated his pledge that he would “restore” the ROK-U.S. alliance. The Bush administration responded very favorably to his inaugural speech, while the North unleashed harsh attacks on it. In April, Lee held talks with President Bush at Camp David. They agreed to restore the relationship between their countries, which had been party strained and alienated over the past decade, and upgrade it to a forward-looking one based on strong mutual trust. When most media in Seoul praised their agreement, it seemed that the new era of close and friendly relations between Seoul and Washington has just started. But when Lee agreed to permit wholesale imports of U.S. beef, widespread protest drives were staged by cattle breeders and consumers in the South.49 These protest drives occasionally showed “anti-Americanism,”

What does it mean? It suggests that “anti-Americanism” would not be easily mitigated as far as the progressive-leftist forces were not to be weakened in the South. In 1990, Professor Taik-sup Auh predicted: “Looking to the future, one may find little hope of correcting the ‘religiously’ held anti-American attitudes of the hard-core young radicals.”50

1 For example, see Manwoo Lee, “Anti-Americanism and South Korea’s Changing Perception of


8 Ibid., p. 57.


15 For recent studies on the process leading Korea to its opening to Western powers, see Key-huik Kim, Opening of Korea: A Confucian Response to the Western Impact (Seoul: Institute for Modern Korean Studies, Yonsei University, 1999)
18 For the full text of the treaty, see “Appendix A: Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of Korea,” is included in Koo and Suh (eds.), Korea and the United States, p. 373-380. The quoted part is seen in p. 373.
21 Chosŏnrodongdang Ch’ulp’ans a (The Publishing Company of the Korean Worker’s Party), Pulkulii panihyŏkmyangi usa Kim Hyŏngjik sŏnseng (Pyongyang: Chosŏnrodongdang Ch’ulp’ans a, 1968), p. 29.
28 Taejin Yi, “Forced Treaties and Japan’s Annexation of the Great Korean Empire: An
For her recollections on her trip and talks with Kim, see Madeleine Albright, Madame Secretary: A Memoir (London: McMillan, 2003), pp.

