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### ***Cross-coupling of International and National Law: Labour Market Nondiscrimination Legislation for Women, 1958-2005***

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### **About the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)**

CDDRL was founded by a generous grant from the Bill and Flora Hewlett Foundation in October in 2002 as part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The Center supports analytic studies, policy relevant research, training and outreach activities to assist developing countries in the design and implementation of policies to foster growth, democracy, and the rule of law.

***Abstract***

*When and why do nation states pass labour market non-discrimination legislation for women? Using world society and social movement theory, this paper examines the effect of international and domestic influences on domestic legislation via an event history analysis from 1958 to 2005. Special attention is paid to the conventions and declarations of the United Nation's (UN) agency for work, the International Labour Organization (ILO). World society mechanisms significantly influence ratification behavior, which in turn is a strong predictor of subsequent discrimination-targeted legislative reform. An active domestic mobilization base and a permeable political opportunity structure provide further catalytic effects for passing national statutes improving the rights of women in the labor market. In developing these arguments, the research links macro-sociological world society theory with micro-level social movement theory and argues that legislative improvements for women are pushed forward in a field affirming the rights of individuals.*

*To account for endogenous effects between ratification and legislation, this paper also examines whether countries with non-discrimination legislation are more likely to ratify the corresponding ILO non-discrimination convention. The findings show significant cross-coupling between non-discrimination legislation and ratifying the ILO's non-discrimination convention. World society effects are stronger on ratification than legislation, suggesting that world societal leverage is more pronounced on externally rather than on internally oriented outcomes.*

Over a hundred countries, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, have passed non-discrimination legislation regarding women in the labor force during the last five decades (see graph 1). Many of these nations have neither strong civil rights, nor women's movements, nor progressive neighbors, nor any other domestic institutional features that are commonly featured in explanations of progressive gender legislation in the West. What drives these profound world-wide changes in national law that begun occurring in the late 1950's?

World society literature implies that part of what drives world-wide non-discrimination legislation is a "global system of expanding organizations, social movements, conferences, rules, and discourse promoting the human rights of individuals" (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008: 206). In this so-called human rights regime the rights of women increasingly are a central feature: "At the international level, the United Nations system is replete with programs, specialized agencies, regional commissions, and international instruments aimed at addressing a plethora of women's issues" (ibid). International non-governmental organizations complement international governmental efforts in pressuring nation states to uphold the rights of women (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Abu Sharkh 2002).

World society scholars have extensively examined the effects of these exogenous mechanisms on nation's ratification behavior, showing that large numbers of nations symbolically acknowledge international norms laid out in UN treaties by signing them (Frank 1999, Abu Sharkh 2002). Regarding the rights of women, Wotipka and Ramirez (2008) show that the national ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was nearly universal and strongly driven by exogenous, world-level shocks such as international women's conferences.

However, ratification without legal implementation remains largely meaningless. Though ratification signals an acknowledgment of international norms, treaties typically lack domestic legal clout without a reform of national legislation in accordance with signed treaties. Domestic claimants cannot reliably draw on rights stipulated in ratified conventions unless they are legally implemented into national law. This paper

thus examines the global spread of women's rights legislation and the relative impact of global versus domestic factors on legislative reform.

The paradigmatic case is non-discrimination legislation regarding women in the labor market. Few rights are as crucial for the realization of women's emancipatory possibilities as the equal access to the monetary and identity resources the labor market bestows. The key United Nations' convention regulating labor market issues is the C111 of the International Labor Organization (ILO). The convention defines "discrimination" very broadly as any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation. The definition includes that the consequences not rest on the assumption that intent is necessary.

With its establishment in 1919 as part of the League of Nations, the ILO constituted the first international organization to deal with labor issues. After World War II, it was integrated into the United Nations (UN) system and designated to be the specialized agency for work. It has henceforth issued almost 200 conventions.

The ratification and reporting on these conventions is voluntary except for the eight, so-called fundamental conventions dealing with child and involuntary labor as well as unionization and non-discrimination rights. This reflects a consensus among international organizations such as the World Bank (Weltbank 1995) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1995) that these are core rights accruing to every worker regardless of the development level of the country. For the purposes of this paper, the mandatory reporting yields the advantage that all countries, not merely the ratifiers, must report on the timing and status of their non-discrimination legislation. As the ILO is tripartite, the reports of the government on the status of non-discrimination stipulations are subject to the verification by employer and worker organizations. This minimizes the possibilities of governments to misrepresent its legislation.

Despite the limited practical relevance of treaties that are not incorporated into national law, there is very little systematic quantitative, cross-national legal compliance scholarship involving countries of the South as well as North on what drives the passing of gender equality legislation.<sup>1</sup> Do the same international factors drive passing non-discrimination legislation that affect treaty ratification according to world society research? Do treaties have the desired effects? Or do nations sign treaties only at zero cost after they have already instituted the provisions due to domestic pressures?

To take account of endogeneity effects regarding the global spread of governmental non-discrimination commitments, two separate analyses are run: the dependent variable of the main event history analyses is 'time to non-discrimination legislation'. The secondary analysis features 'time to ratification of the corresponding international treaty (the non-discrimination convention [ILO Convention 111])' as the dependent variable. This approach bows to both arguments in the extant literature on implementation. Legal relations scholars have generally presumed that *pacta sunt servanda* while much of political science and international relations scholarship posits that treaty effects are mere "reflections of underlying state preferences" (Simmons and Hopkins 2005:623).

This paper argues that both schools of thought have merit. Domestic legislation is strongly impacted by treaty ratification as suggested by legal relations scholars. However, as argued by international relations scholarship domestic factors such as a political ideology aligned with individual rights and an active mobilization base also strongly increase the likelihood of non-discrimination legislation. Weaker linkages to the world society through organizational memberships or conferences have no direct bearing on domestic legislation. They do, however, influence ratification behavior, which in turn impacts legislation as suggested by the world society.

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<sup>1</sup> Case studies on the impact of the European Union form a notable exception (Linos 2007).

A primary obstacle in assessing what drives legislation has so far been the scarcity of cross-nationally comparable data on domestic policies. This article draws on newly available data by Abu Sharkh (2007) coding the wealth of information available via in-house country files stored by the ILO since the late 1950s.<sup>2</sup>

The files suggest considerable cross-country variation. The USA, despite mandating equal treatment in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, never ratified C111. Bangladesh instituted a gender non-discrimination clause into its Constitution, the same year it ratified the ILO's non-discrimination convention.<sup>3</sup> However, Afghanistan signed in 1968, almost a decade before adding a corresponding clause into the constitution. Saudi Arabia, despite ratifying three decades ago in 1978, never followed-up with appropriate legal provisions. In other cases, such as Bolivia, a constitutional non-discrimination provision preceded ratification by 10 years. The findings mandated more systematic assessments of why countries outlaw discrimination against women in the labor market.

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2 The questionnaire spans topics such as: Are the grounds of the Convention consecrated in the Constitution, in statutes

(Laws and Regulations), in Courts of Law or Other discrimination? If yes, does this specific machinery have the power to:

Award remedies? Impose sanctions? If yes, are the comments critical with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex?

Has the Government requested technical assistance with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex? Has the Committee

expressed interest/satisfaction with respect to discrimination on the basis of sex? Has the Government enacted legislation

or adopted a policy prohibiting sexual harassment, when did it do so?

3 Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation declared in 1958 is the most binding and comprehensive

treaty on labour market discrimination by the ILO.

## **THEORETICAL BACKDROP**

In exploring why nations pass labor non-discrimination legislation for women this article tests three routes of influence: first, world society scholars argue for direct world society influences; second, there is a literature on mediated effects of world social forces, most notably through treaties, in sociological and legal scholarship; and third, international relations as well as gender as well as social movement literature points to the clout of domestic influences.

World society theory would suggest strong normative, norm influences. Meyer et al. (1997:144) argue that “many features of the contemporary nation state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes”. Despite vast economic and cultural differences between states, nation states “tend towards isomorphism with each other and with the rules of the wider system—surprisingly similar institutions of modernity (e.g., state forms, state services, educational systems) appear in all sorts of societies” (Meyer 1987:42). To adequately conceptualize the field of interlinked economic, strategic and normative influences on nation states, neo-institutionalists have coined the term “world society”, a partially integrated collection of world-level organizations, understandings, and assumptions that specify legitimate ways for nation states to handle domestic and international issues (see Meyer et al. 1997, Meyer et al. 1997a, Wobbe 2000, Lechner and Boli 2005, Drori 2008).

World society theory researchers were able to demonstrate the increasing leverage of extra-national factors on women’s share of higher education (Bradley and Ramirez. 1996), mass schooling and structuring of school systems (Meyer et al. 1992), women’s suffrage (Ramirez 2000, Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997), welfare policy and land reform (Thomas and Lauderdale 1988), creation of pieces of state machinery including science policy organizations and environmental/ecology ministries (Finnemore 1993, Finnemore 1996, Frank, Hironaka and Schofer et al. 2000), and constitutions (Boli 1987). Non-

discrimination surfaced as a world societal norm in the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Boyle 2002, Berkovitch 2001, Heintz 2001, Heintz et al. 2001, Ramirez and Meyer 1998).

In short, nations mimic their peers (Simmons et al. 2007). Like many formal organizational structures, these isomorphisms<sup>4</sup> often do not reflect the most efficient way to coordinate activity but and thus reflect the “logic of appropriateness” (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). They function as myths to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

Signing international treaties is particularly susceptible to international trends. Human rights treaties and Conventions, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, is largely propelled by world organizational linkages (Wotipka and Tsutsui, forthcoming, Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). Wotipka and Ramirez (ibid.) also show the sensitivity of global ratification rates to external shocks in the form of world level conferences and regional diffusion.

However, while world society scholars have demonstrated international clout successfully for ratification behavior, there is little evidence in this line of scholarship if the same external mechanisms impact legislation. Motivated by the international prestige that such a progressive act conveys, Saudi Arabia may have signed C111 despite *Sharia* law exerting moral supremacy among the populace. However, due to domestic institutional constellations, it may never pass a non-discrimination clause.

Nations may be more malleable at different points of their institutional development to pass world norms. World society research has taken up the liability-of-newness idea by arguing that a country is most susceptible to instituting international norms shortly after its acquisition of sovereignty. In this phase, nation state actors may be more likely to seek orienting advice from established countries or international law

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4 Isomorphism pertains to the quality of being identical or similar structure despite a different history and functional requirements (isomorphism: the quality of being isomorphic).

because they are under great pressure to legitimize themselves in the international arena (Ramirez et al. 1997).<sup>5</sup> As non-discrimination legislation was established as an international principle during the time period studied here, new countries should hasten to ratify the non-discrimination convention and legislate non-discrimination laws.

The second route of influence on national legislation would be indirect. Rather than world societal influences having the same direct impact on legislation as they do on ratification, world influences could be mediated through treaties. The strategy of most UN-organizations follows this logic; an enormous amount of resources is spent on passing conventions, much moral suasion is exerted to pressure countries to sign treaties outlining world norms, and various oversight mechanisms closely scrutinize countries' treaty observance.

The literature on the coupling between treaties and their implementation is ambiguous. Sociological scholarship points to a significant degree of decoupling between stated goals of any organization and their implementation (Weick 1976).<sup>6</sup> Jackson and Rosenberg (1982) also argue for the extrovert orientation of many African nations leading to a great degree of formal conformity with very little on-the-ground

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<sup>5</sup> Stinchcombe (1965) argues that one of the reasons new organizations bear a higher risk to decrease are their low levels of legitimacy. Subsequent organizational research on organizational legitimacy and the liability of newness has supported the argument, showing that forms of external legitimacy significantly depressed death rates (Singh et al. 19896).

<sup>6</sup> While there have been attempts on the part of world society scholarship to code legislative texts, most markedly constitutions, coding constitutions exclusively has been critiqued on the grounds that "their indicators is suspect, because they failed to satisfactorily resolve major problems in deciding which legal documents to code, in developing their coding rules, and in interpreting their results" (Ratner and Burnstein 1980: 522).

implementation. Worse, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) argue, in what they term the paradox of empty promises, that “governments often ratify human rights treaties as a matter of window dressing” with the worst offenders often being the first to sign.<sup>7</sup> However, human rights ratings are not optimally specified to operationalize state compliance. Instead, they may indicate a failing state plagued by guerrilla warfare. A negative human rights record may stem from systematic state perpetuated abuses as in Chile under Pinochet or they may reflect a tenuous state hold on monopoly of violence within its formal geographic boundaries, as in Colombia.

The line of scholarship with the “mandate” to investigate legal compliance issues, the international law and international relations scholarship, has neglected coupling.<sup>8</sup> As Hathaway (2002:1942) argues: “Until fairly recently, the question of international law compliance fell by the wayside of both international law and international relations scholarship. Legal scholars examined and explicated the rules of state international behavior, generally taking as a given that the rules would have impact. International relations scholars, for their part, had little interest in international law”.<sup>9</sup> Legal relations scholars have generally presumed that *pacta sunt servanda* while much of political science and international relations scholarship posits that treaty effects are mere “reflections of underlying state preferences” (Simmons 2005:623, see also Krasner 2000).

The burgeoning legal literature on treaty observance focuses on structural changes (Hathaway 2002) and does not differentiate between the different coercive implementation potential of treaties

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<sup>9</sup> See also Krasner on the relationship of international law and international relations

(Simmons 2005).<sup>10</sup> The punitive consequences incurred for defecting from binding international agreements constitute easily explained deterrence for realist thinking. ILO conventions however have no “teeth”: non-observance is not punishable. Realists would thus predict importance while legal scholars would assume moral suasion. Examining the effect of ILO conventions is thus an intriguing test of the moral suasion of international law.

The third influential factor on national legislation is likely to be domestic, both in its interaction with international forces and independently. Paxton et al. (2006) argue that variation in the alignment of domestic factors with international standards predisposes countries to react differently to external pressures. Arguably an active mobilization base could provide fertile ground for world norms. Resource mobilization theory suggests that greater mobilization potential can elevate demands from the streets to the political decision-making rooms (Eisinger 1973, McCarthy and Zald 1976, Oberschall

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<sup>10</sup> Regarding ratification-compliance-nexus, there are several competing hypotheses, few of them tested empirically.

Some hypotheses may be more applicable to certain types of treaties. To give a short overview, countries only ratify if they can deliver since non-compliance can carry “reputational costs” in game-theory terminology (Guzman 2001); they can do so in lieu of doing “something real”, as a first step to institute real change and so forth, there is no enforcement in case they cannot deliver; the treaties are very vague so no one can tell whether they deliver or not; they want to “express” reform measures—especially after a regime change when the previous regime has had a bad human rights record; regimes want to cement democratic advances; signing serves to propagate a country’s sidelined ideology i.e., the Soviet Union’s signing because they wanted to express that ILO conventions on workers parallel their core ideology etc.

1973, Oberschall 1994, Jenkins 1983, Jenkins and Perrow 1997) particularly with an open political opportunity structure (Charles 1992, Rucht 1994).<sup>11</sup>

World level norms can provide the legitimacy frames for these movements. The line of literature that has most extensively taken-up the issue of framing is the political process model. This theory examines how subjective interpretations within a discourse, so-called framing of events, decisively influences mobilization. Snow et al. (1997), Gamson (1997, 1997a), McAdam (1992, 1986), Klandermans (1992, 1986), Melucci (1989), Moore (1978), Tarrow (1983), and Tilly (1992). Snow et al. (1997), drawing on Moore (1978) and Goffman (1974), argue that the mobilization of actors is partly contingent on the generation of a cognitive frame or schema for the perception of injustice. Grievances need to be legitimized within a recognized discourse defining both the worthiness and the course of action (McAdam 1986). Sikkink (2005) and Tarrow (2007) argue that feminist and indigenous people tend to find the world societal arena more receptive to their demands than are domestic institutions (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 on the so-called "boomerang effect"). Conventions are used as "resonance frames" to mobilize on behalf of different disenfranchised groups (Tsutsui 2004, 2002, Abu Sharkh 2002). Abu Sharkh (1998) shows how the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women provided a crucial orienting frame not only for feminists but all for social justice oriented activists in Southern Africa.

Lastly, mainstream social science explanations point to domestic forces independent from world societal influence; they highlight the effect of culture and modernity as endogenous societal properties when explaining women's status. Cultural factors feature prominently as explanations, both on the national (Brown 1996, Pfau-Effinger 1996, 1998) and regional level (Duncan 1998), either as real forces (ibid.) or as

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<sup>11</sup> In his study of public protest, Eisinger (1973: 25) defines the political opportunity structure as "a function of the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system."

rhetorical legitimization (Magdi 1993, Narayan 1997). The degree of economic development, either as linked with cultural or political properties of modernity or as an independent generator of equality, arguably determines women's position. See Skocpol (1991), Wright and Baxter (1995) for OECD nations, Kueppers (1994) and Molyneaux (1985) for examples from Latin America, Danjana (1994) for Arabic countries, Sadi and Aardt (1995) and Steyn (1998) for accounts from Africa. These lines of research often do not explain disjunctures in women's social, economic and legal position. Ostner (1987), Gottschall (1998) and Nickel et al. (1999) argue that they also tend to neglect research on impact-intensive areas such as labor market policies or laws.

## **HYPOTHESES**

Three hypotheses follow regarding the relationship between ratifying the ILO's non-discrimination convention and passing non-discrimination legislation for women in the labor market during a period in which gender equity is enshrined in the international codex of justice:

*Direct world society effects (Hypothesis 1): World society effects influence both ratification and legislation behavior, with effects being more pronounced on ratification (external orientation effect). Recently sovereign countries conform to world norms more quickly (political turn-pike theorem effect).*

*Indirect world society effects (Hypothesis 2): Ratification influences legislation and legislation impacts ratification (cross-coupling effect). However, the effect on ratification is more pronounced.*

*Social movement effects (Hypothesis 3): An active mobilization base and open political opportunity structure increase legislation passage (accountability effect).*

## **DATA AND METHODS**

### **Dependent variable**

The main dependent variable is time to non-discrimination legislation and the secondary, contrasting, dependent variable is time to ratification of C111. In both cases, the clock started ticking when ILO-

Convention 111 was declared in 1958. The data used here is based on the coding of the ILO's bi-annual in-house Country Reports (see Abu Sharkh 2007).<sup>12</sup> The ILO has accrued these files in the archives of its Geneva headquarter since 1958. These "country reports" are primarily self-assessments by governments regarding the compliance of their statutes with the respective ILO convention. Due to the tri-partheid structure of the ILO, labor unions and employer organizations may submit comments on the veracity of government accounts. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), composed of 20 independent experts, meets annually at the ILO to review and comment on the government's self-assessments. Additional legal documents such as reports by Amnesty International aid their judgments.

It is the only available data set of its kind as efforts to establish indicators to assess country-compliance are relatively recent, see Kucera (2007), the National Research Council (2004) Cuyvers and Van den Bulcke (2007), Zarka-Martres and Guichard-Kelly (2007). As soon as a country institutes a non-

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<sup>12</sup> For so-called "fundamental conventions" the reporting cycle is every two years since the 1998 Declaration for all countries; for non-fundamental conventions it is every four years and only of the country has ratified. Adopted in 1998, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work consecrates a commitment by governments, employers' and workers' organizations to these basic values. Fundamental, also referred to as "core", labour standards refer to the four labour standards that the ILO declared to be the most fundamental dimensions among its almost 200 conventions adopted after 1919 (Kellerson 1998). These are: Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of forced and compulsory labour; the abolition of child labour, and the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.

discrimination clause either in the Constitution or in its national statutes, the two are seen as functional equivalents and the dummy variable for non-discrimination legislation switches from zero to one.

Deciding when countries institute a non-discrimination clause is not always as black and white as it may seem. States cannot put reservations on ratified ILO-conventions, in contrast to other UN-treaties, but legislative loopholes constitute a means to undermine the spirit of the convention. For instance, Egypt in Article 11 of the constitution states: “The State shall guarantee the proper coordination between the duties of woman towards the family and her work in the society, considering her equal with man in the fields of political, social, cultural and economic life *without violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence*” (emphasis added by author). Sharia law clearly violates equal treatment for women. Cases such as these, where exemption clauses clearly undermine the convention, were not counted as legislation passed.

Ratification is more straightforward to measure, as it is officially recorded by the ILO. The source for ratification is the ILO’s public ILOLEX-database. Only ILO members are included but this does not limit the sample as virtually all nations except for tiny island states or some contested areas belong to the ILO.

### **Independent variables**

The four world society factors are operationalized as follows: as explicated above, the non-discrimination convention and non-discrimination legislation, to test coupling, are coded as dummies. The need for legitimacy for countries new to the world level arena is measured by a five year window after independence. Independence dates were taken from the CIA World Factbook.<sup>13</sup> External shock effect is measured by a dummy for the year of and the year after the ILO 1998 declaration. The real or imagined threat of a downward spiral in labour standards through intensified economic globalization sparked violent

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<sup>13</sup> Regime duration was also employed and yield consistent results: the longer a regime is in duration the less open it is to innovation. Years since independence is a control variable. I use regime duration from the Polity IV data.

protests such as in Seattle, counter world summits such as Puerto Alegre (della Porta et al. 2006) and large governmental initiatives (Abu Sharkh 2002). The most pertinent regarding labor discrimination was the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998 (ILO 1997, Abu Sharkh 2000).

Mobilization potential is operationalized by number of general strikes, defined as any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and is aimed at national government policies or authority. Protest is a particularly defining and effective social movement resource (Gamson 1997, 1997a). To ascertain that the results were not driven by a coding bias or error, I consulted both Ted Gurr's Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset and Arthur Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Ultimately, the variable utilized drew on Arthur S. Banks cross-national time series made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research because it yielded the same results as the MAR variables while allowing to retain more cases. The variable is logged to account for reporting biases.

The political opportunity is operationalized by the degree of democracy. As political opportunity structure is composed of options or of restraints that the state and/or its elites impose, degree of democracy can be conceptualized as a decisive element. Although it is a much richer concept, democracy is a common operationalization in the literature. The minimalist definition of democracy encompasses free and fair elections; a wider definition implies that all population groups have freedom of assembly and bargaining, so that "contending interests and values may be expressed" in decision-making forums (Diamond 1999:10). The variables draw on the Polity data series, designed by Ted Robert Gurr. Polity IV, containing "coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total population) in the global state system and covers the years 1800-2003."<sup>14</sup> To deal with biases in democracy ratings in this data bank, I also explored the effects of civil and political rights, the

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#data>

composites of democracy from a different data bank, from the Banks data set. The results were very comparable. Another way I dealt with the bias was to explore various transformations, logging and squaring, of the variable that are discussed in the results sections.

Upon request, the operationalization of the other variables used to test domestic factors can be supplied by the author.

### **Control variables**

In development literature, a prominently cited reason for the core labor standards is low-level of development (Weltbank 1995). I control for economic development indicator using GDP per capita, logged, drawing on the World Development Indicators database.

### **Model**

The unit of analysis is the nation state. The sample is not random. In the strict sense, it is not even a sample since almost all nation states are included provided they report data or let the UN or World Bank "guestimate" data in negotiations with the country. Which countries are covered thus becomes a question of why certain countries fail to collect, report or acknowledge data on certain topics.

The hypotheses are tested via an event history model to identify factors that accelerate or decelerate the rate of an event,<sup>15</sup> such as ratification. The dependent variable is thus the rate at which an event occurs. Parallel to other regression types, standard errors allow distinguishing between random and significant variation in the data (see Hannan and Tuma 1979, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2003, Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002 for a methodological discussions, see Hironaka et al. 1997 or Frank et al. 2000 as examples).

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<sup>15</sup> The event is a change in the value of a discrete random variable,  $Y(t)$ .

To converge on a proper specification, I initially employed the semi-parametric Cox model as it has the advantage of not presupposing a particular functional form for time dependence. However, the Achilles heel of this model is its low tolerance regarding multiple ties in the same year. As I wanted to test effects of a particular world occurrence, such as the declaration, and the hypotheses is precisely that this would lead to many ratifications, i.e. ties, this model proved inappropriate. Parametric models, while bearing the disadvantages of an assumed baseline hazard rate, are also more efficient.

The next step was to decide on the appropriate parametric model with the largest log-likelihood<sup>16</sup> and the smallest Akaike information criterion (AIC). These tests suggested the Weibull model as most appropriate.

## **RESULTS**

Some nations failed to turn the promise made by ratification into legal reality or have only done so with considerable delay. By 2006, 57 nations had ratified the ILO's non-discrimination convention without providing any kind of non-discrimination protection in their legal system.<sup>17</sup> Looking at the early ratifiers,

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<sup>16</sup> The likelihood ratio is only a good indication if the models may be nested within each other such as the exponential versus the Weibull model.

<sup>17</sup> In alphabetical order these are: Angola, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay, Qatar, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Somalia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,

there are some surprising candidates. Iraq and Liberia (ratifying in 1959) and well as Guatemala and Syria (1960) may seem unlikely candidates to rush to promote women's rights and sit oddly with states like Norway (1959) and Denmark (1960). In fact, looking at the first 10 nation gives a puzzling mix of European, Arab, African and Asian countries of varying democratic pedigree. However, a closer look at the domestic legal reform gives a more familiar picture. Democratic rogues never followed-up with the mandated legal reform. To date, neither Iraq or Liberia nor Guatemala or Syria has complied legally with the convention they ratified half a century ago. However, among European countries the legal translation of treaties is not always prompt either. Norway waited many decades before enacting non-discrimination legislation via section 54 B of the Working Environment Act. Note also that some of the complying delay featured in the scatterplots may stem from "accounting oddities": the republics of the USSR chose to maintain the ratification date of the USSR (1961) but could only legally pass "domestic legislation" upon independence in 1991.

The first two figures plot ratifying the non-discrimination convention against changes in legislation (figure 1a) and the Constitution (figure 1b). Figure a suggests that not a single country passed non-discrimination legislation before the ILO's non-discrimination convention in 1958, outside of the constitution. After 1958, this scatterplot suggests interconnection between signing the non-discrimination convention and passing non-discrimination legislation. However, it also reveals that the translation is not one-to-one (see appendix A for a list of nations and ratification and the enactment times). If ratification and legislation were to coincide, the scatterplot would display all nations lined-up on an imaginary 45°-line

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Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu,

Rep. Yemen, Fed. Rep. Yugoslavia.

originating at 0. For the countries featured below this 45°-line, ratification predates changes in any of their legislative texts. For the majority of countries, ratification precedes non-discrimination legislation.

**Figure 1a: Scatterplot of ratifying the non-discrimination Convention 111 against passing non-discrimination legislation**

**ABOUT HERE**

Figure 1b plots a non-discrimination clause in the constitution against ratification. This scatterplot shows more intermittent activity. In the wake of World War II, a number of countries, responding to wartime atrocities along ethnic lines, instituted a non-discrimination clause into their Constitution that covered multiple ascriptive characteristics, including sex. Only a handful of countries passed constitutional non-discrimination stipulations before the relevant ILO convention was declared: France (1946), Italy (1947), Germany (1949) and Hungary (1949). France, Italy, and Germany were (re)established democracies aiming to lock in democratic principles (Moravcsik 2000).<sup>18</sup> After initial post-war activity, a dormant period followed. The ILO-convention had a greater impact on statutory than constitutional reform. Renewed impetus to pass non-discrimination legislation only arose in the latter half of the 70s with an accelerating international women's movement. In the 90s, there was a flurry of activity with laggards fulfilling promises made long ago (lower right-hand quadrant) and new ratifiers following-up on their obligations more conscientiously.

**Figure 1b: Scatterplot of ratifying the non-discrimination Convention 111 against inserting a constitutional non-discrimination provision**

**ABOUT HERE**

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<sup>18</sup> Iceland (1944) is a special case of a newly established democracy.

While the timing may arguably reflect a spurious connection, the many references in the country files to international law suggest otherwise. In the absolute majority, a country's laws cover all seven grounds of discrimination enumerated under the Convention (Race, Color, Sex, Religion, Political Opinion, National Extraction and Social Origin)<sup>19</sup>. In two thirds of all countries, the Committee of Experts identifies no exceptions to coverage or outstanding discriminatory provisions in law, which it considers incompatible with the non-discrimination convention suggesting country cognizance of the ILO-convention. Further multivariate analyses conveyed that non-discrimination legislation regarding women in the labor market was very highly and significantly correlated with non-discrimination statues on race.

To account for the fact that as more countries ratify, the pool of potential ratifiers shrinks, the author also analyzed the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates of passing non-discrimination legislation over time by ratification of the non-discrimination convention. The hazard of passing non-discrimination legislation increases over time for all nations. However, starting in the late 60s ratifiers exhibit consistently higher hazard rates than non-ratifiers. The difference is especially pronounced in the 90s. The log-rank test for equality of survivor functions confirms that ratification increases the hazard significantly to pass non-discrimination legislation.

So are nations with non-discrimination legislation also more likely to ratify? Yes. Examining the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates of ratifying the non-discrimination convention displays that since 1959, the year after the convention, countries with non-discrimination legislation are much more likely to ratify. The 1998-Declaration lead to a much more pronounced spike in ratifications among countries with non-discrimination legislation than among those without such legislation (figures are available by the author upon request).

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<sup>19</sup> The only exception is "color". However, its underrepresentation may be due to term having been superseded by "race".

But is the cross-coupling between ratification and legislation merely spurious? To ascertain this, we turn to multivariate models. Both tables show almost identical models with one exception. Table 1 features ratification of the non-discrimination convention as an independent variable instead of non-discrimination legislation; for table 2 it is the reverse. Parallel, the dependent variable in table 1 is non-discrimination legislation while in table 2 it is the ratification of the non-discrimination convention. Except the baseline model with the coupling variable (non-discrimination legislation and ratification of the non-discrimination convention, respectively), the order of the models is such that the variables progress from endogenous to exogenous factors. Comparing the significance and magnitude of world society effects in table 1 and 2, on legislation and ratification respectively, suggests that direct world society effects are more pronounced on ratification as the moral posturing assumption in hypothesis 1 suggests. Indirect world society effects via cross-coupling between ratification and legislation are very strong as hypothesis 2 predicts. Ratification has a more pronounced effect on legislation than vice versa as suggested by the world society.

**Table 1: Event history analyses of passing non-discrimination legislation 1958 to 2005**

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In Table 1, the first model shows the effect of ratification on passing non-discrimination legislation: Being coupled to the world society via a ratification commitment more than doubles the likelihood of passing non-discrimination legislation. This large effect is evidenced without the assumption of anticipatory legislation, purporting that countries pass legislation to conform to treaties they anticipate signing, a standard practice. Even this more stringent ratification-to-legislation test confirms that there is a significant world society treaty effect on domestic legislation.

An open political opportunity structure also renders non-discrimination legislation much more likely: each additional point of democracy increases the chances of non-discrimination legislation by 6 percent. Model 2 adds the civil society clout: an active mobilization potential more than doubles the likelihood of

non-discrimination legislation.<sup>20</sup> In other words, a political field with a receptive political system, via its democratic structure, and engaged civil society is much more likely to conform to world level norm and pass non-discrimination legislation. So as hypothesis 3 suggests, an accountable government enhanced world society malleability.

Model 3 adds an indicator of legitimacy requirements via a 5-year post independence window. As hypothesis 1 suggests the considerable duress of countries to establish themselves as legitimate players in the international arena in an era of institutionalized gender equity increases the likelihood to pass non-discrimination legislation within five years of independence threefold. This confirms the political turn-pike theorem of institution short-cuts.

The first three models are all significant improvements over their predecessors. The last model is not. The external shock of the 1998-Declaration had no significant bearing on non-discrimination legislation propensity. While the results confirm strong specific world societal coupling mechanisms via ratification, they also reveal that domestic legislation is not highly attuned to more general world societal shocks.<sup>21</sup> This changes if ratification is employed as the dependent variable.

**Table 2: Event history analyses of ratifying the non-discrimination convention 1958 to 2005**  
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Turning to table 2, we find evidence for non-discrimination legislation increasing ratification likelihood: Model 1 and all subsequent models show countries with non-discrimination legislation taking the

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<sup>20</sup> This result was tested and validated employing other variables, including protest variables taken from the Minorities at Risk data base.

<sup>21</sup> The same holds true for country spill-over effects: regional or world level diffusion effects, despite paying such a prominent role in the ratification literature, had no significant impact of legislative behaviour.

time and effort to express their allegiance to this international norm by ratifying the corresponding ILO-convention. However comparing model 2 in table 1 and in table 2 we find that the magnitude of the ratification effect on non-discrimination legislation is larger than the effect non-discrimination legislation has on ratification. Together the results in table 1 and 2 confirm significant cross-coupling between the non-discrimination convention and non-discrimination legislation as suggested by hypothesis 1. Domestic factors besides non-discrimination legislation, however, show little influence on ratification propensity. The degree of democracy is insignificant. An active mobilization potential plays no significant role in predicting ratification rates, either. The finding that internal politics impact domestic legislation but not international pledges to gender equity supports the argument that dictatorships often seem to endorse human rights via ratification on the international level with little intention of domestic action.

Legitimacy needs on the other hand are paramount: new nations are almost four times as likely to ratify ILO-convention 111. Recent sovereignty, while impacting both legislation and ratification, has a much larger effect on ratification behavior. This suggests that, as world society theory posits, newly independent nations mimic their peers at the time of their, not their peers, nascence. However, comparing the hazard rates in tables 1 and 2 suggest that this moral posturing may be intended largely external oriented as it predicts ratification more strongly than legislation. Perhaps surprising, traditional measures of world societal linkage such as memberships in international (non-)governmental organizations had no significant effect.

Table 2 evidences that exogenous shocks exert tremendous influence on ratification behavior, confirming previous world society findings. The year of and the year after the ILO declaration, countries are three to four times more likely, depending on the model, to ratify the non-discrimination convention. Additional analyses also supported the familiar world society story that exogenous shocks greatly increase ratification propensity.

Taken together, the results in tables 1 and 2 give credence to hypothesis 1 that direct world society effects are stronger on externally oriented nation state action (ratification) and have less direct influence on

internally oriented action (national legislation). However, there is a significant degree of cross-coupling between ratification and legislation with ratification having a stronger influence on legislative behavior than vice versa as hypothesis two had predicted. Domestic factors bear on legislative behavior while having no impact on ratification rates.

Additional analyses suggested that none of the often cited socio-political or cultural factors have a consistently significant impact. Non-protestant cultures, whether it is the Latin machismo or Islam are often seen as impediments to women's progress. Culture may indeed have a big bearing on the status of women but, intriguingly, it seems to have make little difference in the way states handle women's issues. All the cultural variables specified below were tried as an additional variable in the final model as well as an independent variable in the a regression including only ratification and GDP/cap as to circumvent the endogeneity problem. The Protestantism dummy is insignificant regardless of model specification. The Islam dummy was always insignificant as well. Catholic countries were not significantly less likely to pass non-discrimination legislation. The catholic country variable was completely insignificant in the final model and even in the most rudimentary model is was not significant at the .05 level.

Colonial heritage was another culture-proxy I explored. Neither having been a French nor a British colony has any impact on the likelihood to pass legislation regardless of model specification. Regional dummies likewise yield no significant results. Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, Middle East and Oceania were no less likely to pass NDL than Western Europe. Eastern Europe is the only markedly different region with a much higher likelihood to pass legislation. However, this finding disappears in the final model specification as it seems to have been driven by fact that all newly independent nations in the 1990 clamored to introduce world society conforming NDL. There were no significant regional spill-over effects.

The most surprising finding was that NDL was not predicted by the strength of the women's movement (measured by international nongovernmental organizations) women's economic clout (measured just by percentage of female participation in the labor force), women's political standing

(measured by percentage of women in the parliament) or any related of female empowerment such as the Gender Development Index. GDP per capita shows a positive though often insignificant effect on non-discrimination legislation while bearing negatively on ratification.<sup>22</sup>

## **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

The article casts a new light on the relative importance of internal versus external influences. World society theory sees a nation's outward poise predicted by how tightly they are enmeshed in the web of international actors orienting them toward common displays of world norm endorsement. Mainstream social science literature has argued for the impact of domestic factors on nation state agenda setting. Despite the large body of world society literature show-casing the influence of exogenous factors on externally oriented showcasing, it remained unclear how deeply international treaties and declarations penetrate into nation state structures. Recently sovereign nations are more susceptible to world level influences both regarding their ratification and their legislative behavior. Aside from this double impact, the analysis shows different factors driving the outward display of norm adherence and internal legislative reform. While ratification behavior is highly attuned to world societal occurrence, legislation is impacted by granted and asserted domestic political and civil rights. The findings suggest considerable world society effects: cross-coupling between treaties and national legislation is a mechanism by which world social forces make a credible difference in the internal legislative make-up of a society.

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<sup>22</sup> Aid dependency played an insignificant negligible role. Ironically, one of the two, core indicators of economic

globalization, dependency on exports, increased the likelihood to pass NDJ but not significantly. This effect precedes the emergence of the discourse linking trade to labour standards in the 80s and especially the 90s.

This large treaty effect addresses the recurrent question in the globalization literature of whether governmental organizations and their conventions really matter in a world in which globalization purportedly undermines the power of states. This analysis suggests that rather than merely constituting talk shops, international organizations are crucial in setting normative standards. The conventions they enact are not only formally adopted by countries but are eventually legislated into action. It also highlights the importance of a democratic system and a contentious, domestic base to provide a catalytic impetus for the institutionalization of world level norms.

Women's equal rights legislation is associated with broader principles of liberal individualism. Gender specific non-discrimination legislation was strongly correlated with passing non-discrimination measures regarding other ascriptive characteristics, most notably race. Non-discrimination legislation is driven by the broader affirmation of individual civil rights of personhood in the cross-structured political terrain of open political systems and civil society actors that can draw upon world social norms as resonance frames. This finding addresses "reverse gender mainstreaming" suggesting that promoting women's equality may be best done in unison with broader discrimination concerns.

The passing of domestic non-discrimination statutes constitutes an essential empowering first step. It sends cognitive signals illegitimizing discrimination to other actors within the state (Simmons 2005). The US Civil Rights act was pivotal for the formation of the US women's movement (Ferree 1987).<sup>23</sup> Legislation provides a "legal cornerstone" to remedy or exacerbate discrimination (Bernstein 2003:354). Frank et al.

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23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex and race in the US. Note that it was the civil rights, not the women's movement that led to this hallmark of progressive legislation. In fact, "sex" was only added to the Title because Southern legislators speculated that adding "sex" to "race" would render the act even more egregious and thus minimize its chances to pass (Ferree 1987). However, the act was passed and, moreover, encouraged the US women's movement. Equality of the sexes being legislatively enshrined had important psychological effects by sending a cognitive signal that fighting for equal rights is legitimate and tenable (ibid.).

(2007) show a strong positive association between official sex-law reforms and their everyday outcomes in practice.

However, while passing non-discrimination legislation may be a first step to ameliorate discrimination of women in the labor market, another crucial question is under which conditions such legislation best increases gender equity. Which alignment and coalition of world level and domestic statutes and factors, such as educational systems (Allmendinger 1989) is needed to give women a fairer chance to bring home the bacon or the tofu should be considered in future research.

Figures and Tables

Graph 1: Non-discrimination legislation passed world wide, cumulative numbers





Figure 1a: Scatterplot: ratification of on-discrimination Conv. 111 vs. non-discrimination legislation


Ratification of the non-discrimination convention



Passing non-discrimination legislation

Figure 1b: Scatterplot: ratification of non-discrimination Conv. 111 vs. constitutional non-discrimination provision

Ratification of the non-discrimination convention C111



Inserting a constitutional non-discrimination provision

**Table 1: Event history analyses of passing non-discrimination legislation 1958 to 2005**

	Concept	Variables	Model 1 Legislat' n	Model 2 Strike	Model 3 Sover`ty	Model 4 Declaration
World level ...	...coupling	Non-discrimination legislation ratified	2.33** (.59)	2.26** (.58)	2.39** (.62)	2.39*** (.61)
	...shock	ILO '98 Declaration				1.02 (.74)
	...legitimizing need	5yr independence window			2.77** (.98)	2.78** (.98)
	...mobilization potential	Strike (log.)		2.04* (.61)	2.19** (.66)	2.19** (.66)
Country level ...	...political opportunity structure	Democracy	1.06 ** (.02)	1.06*** (.02)	1.06** (.02)	1.06** (.02)
	...economic development	GDP pc (log.)	1.09+ (.06)	1.08 (.06)	1.12* (.06)	1.12* (.06)
		N countries	129	129	129	129
Stats. of Model		N. observations	3438	3438	3438	3438
		N. events	84	84	84	84
		Log likelihood	-114.51 ***	-112.27 *	108.76 **	-108.76

**Table 2: Event history analyses of ratifying the non-discrimination convention 1958 to 2005**

	Concept	Variables	Model 1 Legislat'n	Model 2 Strike	Model 3 Sover'ty	Model 4 Declaration
<b>World level</b>	...coupling	Non-discrimination legislation passed	1.99*** (.92)	2.01*** (.44)	2.09*** (.46)	2.01 ** (.44)
		...shock				4.29 *** (1.74)
	...legitimizing need	5yr independence window			3.75 *** (.91)	3.83 *** (.94)
	...mobilization potential	Strike (log.)		.58 (.34)	.60 (.35)	.64 (.38)
<b>Country level ...</b>	...political opportunity structure	Democracy	.99 (.01)	1.00 (.01)	.99 (.01)	.99 (.01)
	...economic development	GDP pc (log.)	.92+ (.04)	.93 (.04)+	.97 (.05)	.97 (.05)
	<b>Stats. of Model</b>	N countries	131	131	131	131
		N. observations	2010	2010	2010	2010
		N. events	123	123	123	123
		Log likelihood	-154.69 **	-154.18	-140.92 ***	-136.38 **

Appendix A

**Table 1: Ratification of C111 and passing of non-discrimination passage in Constitution or statute**

	Ratification of C111	Non-discrimination in Constitution	Non-discrimination in statute
Israel	1959 .		1964
Portugal	1959	1976	1979
Tunisia	1959 .		1993
Norway	1959 .		2004
Iraq	1959 .		.
Liberia	1959 .		.
Honduras	1960	1982	1959
Philippines	1960	1987	1974
Denmark	1960 .		1976
India	1960 .		1976
Guinea	1960	1984	1986
Bulgaria	1960	1991	2003
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1960	1980	2003
Guatemala	1960 .		.
Syrian Arab Republic	1960 .		.
Madagascar	1961	1992	1960
Hungary	1961	1949	1968
Mexico	1961	2001	1970
Poland	1961	1997	1974
Germany	1961	1949	1980
Ukraine	1961	1996	1991
Belarus	1961 .		1992
Russian Federation	1961	1993	1992
Cote d'Ivoire	1961	2000	1995
Switzerland	1961	1981	1996
Benin	1961	1990	1998
Gabon	1961 .		.
Ghana	1961	1992 .	.
Libya	1961 .		.
Pakistan	1961	1973 .	.
Somalia	1961 .		.
Costa Rica	1962 .		1960
Burkina Faso	1962	1971	1962
Sweden	1962	1974	1991
Ecuador	1962	1984 .	.
Niger	1962 .		.
Iceland	1963	1944	1961
Italy	1963	1947	1970

Jordan	1963	1990	1996
Morocco	1963 .		2004
Mauritania	1963 .	.	
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1964	1979	1990
Dominican Republic	1964 .		1992
Mali	1964	1992	1992
Canada	1964	1982 .	
Central African Republic	1964 .	.	
Cuba	1965	1976	1984
Brazil	1965 .		1999
Malawi	1965 .	.	
Chad	1966	1989	1996
Panama	1966	1972	1999
Ethiopia	1966	1987 .	
Kuwait	1966 .	.	
Sierra Leone	1966	1991 .	
Turkey	1967	1982	1971
Spain	1967	1978	1980
Senegal	1967	2001	1997
Nicaragua	1967 .	.	
Paraguay	1967 .	.	
Argentina	1968 .		1973
Cyprus	1968	1960	2002
Malta	1968 .	.	
Colombia	1969	1991	1961
Algeria	1969	1989	1982
Afghanistan	1969	1976	1987
Mongolia	1969	1992	1991
Yemen, Rep.	1969 .	.	
Finland	1970	1995	1986
Peru	1970	1979	1997
Sudan	1970	1998 .	
Trinidad and Tobago	1970 .	.	
Chile	1971	1999	1978
Venezuela, RB	1971	1961	1990
Bangladesh	1972	1972 .	
Romania	1973	1991	1972
Austria	1973 .		1979
Netherlands	1973	1983	1980
Australia	1973 .		1984
Nepal	1974	1990	1993
Barbados	1974 .	.	
Jamaica	1975	1962	1975
Guyana	1975	1970	1990
Angola	1976 .	.	
Haiti	1976 .	.	

Qatar	1976 .	.	
Belgium	1977 .		1978
Mozambique	1977	1990	1985
Bolivia	1977	1967	1997
Lebanon	1977 .		2000
Guinea-Bissau	1977 .	.	
Saudi Arabia	1978 .	.	
Cape Verde	1979	1992	1993
Zambia	1979	1991	1993
Rwanda	1981	1991	1967
France	1981	1946	1982
Swaziland	1981 .	.	
Sao Tome and Principe	1982 .	.	
Antigua and Barbuda	1983	1981	1975
New Zealand	1983	1990	1991
Dominica	1983 .	.	
St. Lucia	1983 .	.	
Togo	1983 .	.	
Greece	1984	1975	1984
San Marino	1986 .	.	
Cameroon	1988 .	.	
Uruguay	1989 .		1989
Croatia	1991	1990	1995
Macedonia, FYR	1991 .	.	
Uzbekistan	1992	1992	1996
Latvia	1992	1998	2002
Azerbaijan	1992	1995 .	
Kyrgyz Republic	1992	1993 .	
Slovenia	1992 .	.	
Tajikistan	1993	1994	1973
Burundi	1993	1992	1993
Georgia	1993	1995	1997
Czech Republic	1993	1992	1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993 .	.	
Slovak Republic	1993 .	.	
Lithuania	1994	1992	1991
Armenia	1994	1995 .	
El Salvador	1995 .	.	
Moldova	1996 .	.	
Botswana	1997	1984	1982
Vietnam	1997	1980	1994
Albania	1997	1991	1995
South Africa	1997	1997	1995
Turkmenistan	1997 .	.	
Korea, Rep.	1998 .		1987
Lesotho	1998 .	.	

Sri Lanka	1998	1978 .	
Ireland	1999 .		1974
United Kingdom	1999 .		1975
Zimbabwe	1999	1996	1985
Cambodia	1999	1993	1997
Indonesia	1999 .		1999
Belize	1999	1981 .	
Congo, Rep.	1999	1992 .	
Kazakhstan	1999	1993 .	
Seychelles	1999 .		
Papua New Guinea	2000	1975	1978
Bahrain	2000	2002 .	
Eritrea	2000 .		
Gambia, The	2000 .		
St. Kitts and Nevis	2000 .		
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.	2000 .		
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2001	1967	1967
Bahamas, The	2001 .		2001
Equatorial Guinea	2001 .		
Kenya	2001	1997 .	
Luxembourg	2001 .		
Namibia	2001 .		
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2001 .		
United Arab Emirates	2001 .		
Tanzania	2002 .		2004
Fiji	2002 .		
Mauritius	2002 .		
Nigeria	2002	1979 .	
Grenada	2003 .		
Comoros	2004 .		
Djibouti	2005 .		
Estonia	2005 .		
Uganda	2005 .		
China	2006 .		
Vanuatu	2006 .		
United States		1964	

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