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Europeanization without Decommunization: A case of elite conversion

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

After its spectacular 1989 'televised Revolution', Romania has spent most of its political transition struggling with its own past. For political scientists, these confusing times only confirmed what they had already labelled as Romanian 'exceptionalism',¹ a pattern dissimilar from Central European countries. However, in the early 1990s, Romania's ways were not so exceptional when compared to Belarus or Albania – it was just another case where the exit path from a totalitarian regime did not lead to democracy, but instead to some form of mild authoritarian populism. With the benefit of hindsight, what is exceptional and needs some explanation in Romania's case is not her difficult separation with its communist past, but the final positive outcome: the signing of the Accession Treaty with the European Union (EU) in April 2005. Despite important similarities with countries such as Belarus and Albania at the beginning of its transition, why has Romania done so well by comparison? In McFaul's classification, Romania is the only post-communist country which succeeded in becoming a consolidated democracy with a balance of power clearly in favour of the former communist elites.² This invites some explanation.

Any account of Romania's political transition has to answer two basic questions. The first is why did a country barely liberated from Ceausescu endorse socialism and prefer former communists as leaders in the initial years of its transition when its Central European neighbours were rapidly advancing with the deep and complex transformation of their societies? The second, and closely related one, is what brought about the disenchantment with this Romanian 'Third Way' and led to the emergence of pro-reform, pro-European, and more pragmatically oriented governments? This chapter will address these questions in turn.

Conjectural explanations or original sins

Romania's politics after its 1989 'entangled revolution'³ can be roughly divided into two phases. The first was a phase of democratization, following the only 'revolution' in Central and Eastern Europe which did not bring about a victory of anti-communists in elections. Ion Iliescu, a former communist leader, and his populist National Salvation Front, which campaigned with slogans against party politics and Western capitalism, won an overwhelming victory after free but unfair elections in May 1990. The second was the phase of consolidation, which started with the peaceful departure from power of Iliescu in 1996, after he lost elections to a coalition formed by anti-communists and deserters from his own party. He returned to the Presidency in 2000, but this did nothing to change what was then Romania's EU accession course.

By the Thirteenth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) in November 1989, Romania had only a few, isolated dissidents. In fact, some were actually former communists. However, political mobilization had attained unprecedented levels: by 1989, Romania had 4 million party members, a third of the adult population, more than double the average percentage in the Soviet bloc. While in the Universities of Ljubljana or Warsaw many faculty members were not party members, not one student could register for a PhD program in Romania by the late 1980s without a PCR membership card. The entire faculty were party members. Clearly, party membership card had become a sort of driving license, a convenience tool. The 1980s brought a tremendous deterioration in life standards, with the collapse of heating systems and shortages of basic goods, putting Romania in a specific situation: no organized opposition, a huge party, but widespread hatred of Ceausescu's regime, even among its own party members. Listening to Radio Free Europe, which was forbidden, was the only, but generally widespread, act of opposition.

The uprising of December 1989 seemed anarchical. It would not have started at all had Ceausescu not come up with the bad idea of gathering a demonstration in his support against the rebellion in Timisoara. There might have been, as hypothesized later, some agents to

prompt protests who worked for some foreign intelligence agency, as well as some secret police – *Securitate* – officers who acted as revolutionaries and got themselves elected in the provisional 'national salvation' bodies. An ad-hoc structure was created in the overrun central office of the PCR. This included a few dissidents, among which was Iliescu, a well-known opponent of Ceausescu from within the Party. This body announced that very same evening its first decree, granting the people every freedom – travel, association, protest and speech – as well as free elections.

Although clear proof is missing of a plot between Iliescu and Ceausescu's repressive structures, the following days had a marked resemblance with Lenin's teachings on how to organize a *coup d'état*. First, Iliescu was elected president of the *ad hoc* revolutionary body, the National Salvation Front (FSN), and started to sign decrees in his own name. Second, to avoid 'anarchy', he encouraged people to elect management bodies throughout the country to replace the old PCR ones. All of these hierarchical structures of the FSN he turned overnight into a political party and announced his intention to compete in forthcoming elections against the other parties, which were just beginning to form. Protesting in the streets became impossible in those crucial days due to sniper fire, which kept Bucharest's people indoors for over ten days. Ceausescu was arrested fast and executed after a summary trial on December 25, allegedly in order to discourage the snipers from continuing resistance. As no snipers have ever been tried, and no serious investigation has been performed to find out who shot during those days, killing hundreds in Bucharest only, the most anti-communist section of the population has become convinced that this diversion was organized by Iliescu himself to allow him to control the popular movement. The hard fact remains that Iliescu consolidated his position after 22 December with the support of former repressive agencies (the Army and the *Securitate*), which badly needed to find a moderate leader able to channel the popular anger directed against them. He also controlled the state TV, and won the popular vote in May 1990 despite continuous street protests. To control the Bucharest opposition that remained in the streets even after the elections, Iliescu resorted to vigilante groups, such as the coal miners, who in

June 1990 beat protesters in University Square, destroyed part of the University of Bucharest and the offices of opposition parties and the free media, all with the tacit endorsement of the police.

The FSN was initially a mix of spontaneous elements and *Securitate* agents. After the May 1990 elections, however, three former nomenklatura members managed to secure the Presidency and the presidencies of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The FSN did not start as the typical communist successor party, claiming instead a revolutionary birth. Yet its nature was fully revealed after the May 1990 elections, as the ad-hoc, revolutionary elements lost all important positions – they later split and formed the Democratic Party (PD) – and many conservative communist elements were rehabilitated. This process was completed fully after a new round of elections in 1992. Iliescu's party (FSN, then FDSN, then PDSR, and finally PSD) had the upper hand over opposition parties in the first years of the transition by exposing their opponents as allies to the allegedly secessionist Hungarian Alliance (UDMR). However, not all the 'successors' of the PCR joined the FSN. Hardline communists and the hard core nationalist propagandists of Ceausescu formed their own parties – the Socialist Workers Party (PSM) and the Greater Romania Party (PRM) respectively – and came together as a coalition with the PDSR in 1994-1996. The PSM then merged with the PDSR after 2000. The PRM remained a separate entity, providing passive support to all governments during the Iliescu presidencies.

As it took the small anti-communist parties, mostly based on inter-war historical parties, many years to become fully organized, Romania had its first genuine alternation of power only in 1996, when together with the UDMR and PD they managed to secure a majority as the Romanian Democratic Convention. Despite fears to the contrary, Iliescu left power peacefully and so ended the Romanian political transition. Educated in Moscow in his youth, then marginalized by the West for his initial harsh treatment of political opponents, Iliescu had nevertheless become convinced by 1996 that Romania should join the EU and NATO, and in 1996 he tried to build a national consensus around this idea. When he returned to power in

2000 he wanted European recognition more than anything else, so he asked the UDMR to remain as part of a new government coalition.⁴

The Romanian political transition therefore shares few features with Central Europe. Rather, it follows a different 'Balkan' pattern, which still greatly impacts current Romanian politics, and which has three essential features:

Low political institutionalization. Popular mobilization mattered enormously for achieving Romania's democratization, as alternative elites did not exist, and the commitment of former communists to liberalization was lower than in Central Europe. Once the armed repression ceased, widespread discontent started to manifest itself as open opposition, unorganized and street-based at first, then more and more structured later. Romanians were strongly encouraged and motivated by changes in Central Europe and tried to imitate anti-communist movements in that region. Gradually, a more organized, civilized and peaceful civil society developed. It is the media and the civil society, rather than the parties, which can be found behind the best policies in Romania. Parties have never attained the professionalism of Central European ones, and have never succeeded in providing a good quality of governance, which showed greatly during EU accession negotiations.

Predatory elites in charge. The former communist power establishment was stronger and more determined to protect its advantage in Romania than in Central Europe, where it had less to fear, as the worst of communism could be conveniently blamed on the Soviets. While the PCR itself was more of a loose catch-all structure, networks of real influence linked various sectors of society with the *Securitate*, with the goal of generating profit for themselves. These networks worked hard to save their influence and convert it into wealth, even if that meant sacrificing the PCR itself, and creating an opportunistic replacement. As elections have rarely touched anything other than Parliament and

government, these structures of influence within secret services, military and business (such as banks) retained their power and succeeded in controlling the initial phase of privatization and generating immense wealth for themselves. Romania's much discussed corruption is mostly due to the existence of this 'predatory elite',⁵ which engaged in rent-seeking behaviour, practically capturing the state and 'privatizing' government. These groups cannot be described as business oligarchs capturing the state, as the statesmen were also the oligarchs. On the political integrity list published by a Coalition for a Clean Parliament in 2005, several PSD politicians were featured with huge personal fortunes, despite having no registered businesses and having been on the (modest) state payroll for the entirety of Romania's transition.⁶ Iliescu's loss of power, both in 1996 and in 2004, despite the absence of a popular challenger was due to the disappointment of blue collar voters with his indulgence towards what was perceived as Romania's corrupt PDSR/PSD oligarchy.

Red-brown alliance strategy. In multiethnic Romania, as well as the rest of the Balkans, the combination of nationalism and socialism proved to have a stronger appeal than socialism alone, providing former communist elites with a remarkable surviving tool. To reinforce their mass appeal, the PCR's successors in Romania turned more and more nationalistic, which proved to be to their electoral advantage.⁷ They also repeatedly allied themselves with chauvinistic right-wing parties. Nationalism decreased after 1996, when a treaty signed with Hungary finally settled Romania's current borders. Due to Romania's EU accession bid, it has also become too politically costly for any party to govern with the chauvinistic PRM, although informal alliances have survived to this day.

Societal explanations

The answer to the crucial question of 'Who governs' was therefore clear in Romania's transition. Out of the fifteen years of the Romanian political transition, one man, Iliescu, a former

communist apparatchik, and the parties he supported have governed for twice as long as their opponents. When governing during the first six years of Romania's transition, they allowed several former communist organizations to maintain and consolidate their positions. So incomplete was the Romanian victory against such forces that by 2005, the year Romania signed its Accession Treaty with the EU, the army still defended officers who had shot on anti-Ceausescu protesters and refused to transfer the PCR archives to a civilian authority. The 2004 Regular Report of the European Commission on the progress of Romania's preparedness for accession also complains of the existence within the Ministry of Justice of a full fledged surveillance service.⁸ This service (SIPA), fully staffed by former Securitate officers, was still spying on judges in 2004. It had its powers trimmed only in 2005.

Despite his skilful manipulation of circumstances, Iliescu would never have succeeded in dominating Romania's transition had he not enjoyed popular support. Ten years after his election victory in May 1990, when he gathered 83% of the vote, in the 2000 elections trust in Iliescu still accounted for most of the variance in explanatory models of the vote for the PDSR. The reasons for this tremendous popularity lay behind his successful capitalization on the December 1989 events. His profile as a more moderate and humane Ceausescu and a 'good' apparatchik was appealing for a population high on residual communist attitudes. By 1999, two-thirds of Romanians still thought that communism had been a good idea badly put into practice, and Ceausescu was still seen as embodying essential leadership qualities, especially in the countryside.

The urban-rural divide was especially salient in the first rounds of elections, with cities voting for anti-communists, and peasants for socialists. Romania preserved, due to its historical underdevelopment, the largest share of rural population in Europe (except Moldova and Albania) consisting of subsistence farmers or pensioners from the collective socialist farms. This is a captive constituency for local communist 'gatekeepers', people who control local resources, from firewood to cash subsidies and who have always sided with the FSN and its successors,

simply because they do not want a countryside with prosperous and autonomous farmers to emerge. This poor and barely literate part of the population has also found it more natural that a strong leader, rather than Parliament, should make the government.

Some of these attitudes, such as support for freedom versus equality, or for representative democracy versus authoritarianism, have gradually changed over time, with freedom as an overriding value and democracy as the best possible form of government slowly establishing themselves as the norm. The choice between equality and freedom as overriding values, as phrased in the World Values Survey,⁹ has predicted fairly well throughout Romania's transition if a person is a democrat or non-democrat, if she votes post-communist or anti-communist, nationalist or pro-European. Collectivism is closely linked with nationalism, ethnocentrism and a vote for post-communist parties in public opinion models. Residual communist attitudes seem to be strongly grounded in persisting institutional arrangements from communist times.¹⁰ Individuals who depend on the state, from workers in the state industry to pensioners, especially the poor and less educated, are considerably more collectivist than others. Collectivism is an ideology by default more than choice, since most of those who prefer equality to freedom do not place themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum at all, declaring ideology to be irrelevant to their political choice. Less than a third of Romanian voters use the left-right distinction to ground their electoral choice. For a very long time the strong appeal of Iliescu explained most of the votes on the left. Centre-right voters are more ideological, read more newspapers and are less nationalistic. They are also significantly more pro-European.

Table 1. The electoral evolution during Romania's political transition

PARTY OR COALITION	1992 elections	1996 elections	2000 elections	2004 elections
Total votes cast	10.917.716	12.287.671	10.891.910	10.231.476
Socialists	3.091.221	2.836.011	4.040.212	3.798.607
PSD (NSF, FDSN, PDSR)				
PD (originally NSF, then split)	1.133.355	1.617.384	825.437	Part of DA
PUNR (Nationalist)	887.597	518.962	154.761	56.414
CDR (1 st anticommunist)	(PNTCD) 2.204.025	3.772.084	575.706 (under threshold)	196.027 (under threshold)

coalition)	PNL	Under the threshold	-	814.381	Part of DA
DA ALIANCE (PNL-PD)		-	-	-	3.250.663
2 nd anticommunist coalition					
PRM (Nationalists)		421.042	558.026	2.288.483	1.394.698
PSM		-	-	96.636	-
UDMR (Hungarian Alliance)		830.193	837.760	751.310	637.109
APR (PDSR splinter)		-	-	465.535	-
Total vote for anticommunists		2.492.891	3.772.084	1.390.087	3.446.690
Total vote for postcommunists		5.880.873	5.530.383	8.261.063	5.249.719
Who governed		Postcommunists with support from nationalists	Anticommunists with support of Hungarians, Democrats	Postcommunist minority government	Anticommunists in coalition with Hungarians

Despite the gradual change in political culture and the disastrous economic results of the first ten years of transition – Romania was the only accession country with years of sustained inflation – support for post-communist parties throughout the transition remained higher than support for challenger parties (see Table 1). If some political change was achieved, it was due to the shifting alliances among parties, and the mobilization of the small undecided electorate. Had all PCR successor parties ran united in every election, the Romanian anti-communists would have never managed to win. They have never succeeded in getting more than a third of the vote, partly due to their incapacity to penetrate rural areas, partly due to their lack of credible and effective leaders. The first anti-communist President, Emil Constantinescu, who governed from 1996 to 2000, proved mostly a disappointment to voters. He interrupted the tradition of support for Serbia’s dictator Slobodan Milosevic, and backed the West on Kosovo. This might have helped Romania’s bid for the EU, but it certainly did not help him with a nationalistic public opinion which sided with the fellow Orthodox Serbs.

The European factor

Politics changed importantly after Romania applied for EU membership, and furthermore, after it was granted 'candidate' status in 1999. This meant that tutorship from Brussels had become acceptable even for the PDSR, who had spent the first years of transition denying the right of the Council of Europe to intervene in Romania's affairs. It meant that every government had to accept the standards that Iliescu had deliberately criticized at the beginning of transition – when he was a promoter of a Romanian 'original democracy', without political parties. By 1996 the PDSR and its supporters had achieved firm control over many crucial areas, granting tenure in the superior courts to all their people, so they had less to fear than in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the prospect of accession to the EU opened the door for a new type of political change, a change pushed from below but taking advantage of external conditionality, necessary in a society where powerful people remained above the law. From 1996 on, democratization progressed slowly but irreversibly in nearly every field (see Table 2), although overall performance remained below Central European levels.¹¹ Although Europeanization has remained largely formal and superficial in many areas, in practically every area where the top-down approach only was tried, it worked each time when domestic promoters pushed for it.¹² The EU was especially concerned with the state of corruption, a largely misunderstood phenomenon that Brussels thought it could fight by legal prosecution alone. Asking the state captors to fight corruption has predictably brought no positive results, and Romanian's Freedom House corruption scores during the last PDSR/PSD government tenure (2000-2004) reflect this adequately.¹³ The Transparency International scores for Romania also improved during this period of unprecedented Brussels-driven 'anti-corruption'.¹⁴ The fall from power of the PSD in 2004 was in part due to a domestic anti-corruption campaign and dealt a serious blow to the predatory elite and generated new opportunities to build an economy based on fair competition. While encouraging, there is still much work that remains to be done.

Table 2. Romania's evolution after 1997 in Freedom House scores

Freedom House Nations in Transit Democracy Scores (0-7, with 7 the poorest performance)	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Electoral Process	3.25	3.25	2.75	3.00	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
Civil Society	3.75	3.75	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.75	2.50	2.25	2.25

Independent Media	4.25	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.50
Governance	4.25	4.00	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	n/a	
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.50	3.50
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.00	3.00
Judicial Framework and Independence	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.00	3.75
Corruption	.na	.na	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.00

The policy distance between incumbent and challenger elites was initially far greater in Romania than in Central Europe. The more elites agree on essential issues, such as privatization, the smoother and faster the transition from communism to capitalism. In the case of Central Europe there was a consensus for capitalism from the onset of transition, simply because the communist parties there had already exhausted the possibilities of reforming the socialist economy prior to 1989. In Romania, Iliescu tried an in-between approach in the first years of the transition and failed. The attempt only managed to create over one million property-related lawsuits, generate hyperinflation which impoverished millions, prevent the emergence of a land market until 1999, and shape an entrepreneurial class closer to the Russian oligarchic model than the Central European one. Policy changed only after 2000, with the PDSR/PSD agreeing to keep the economy open to competition and foreign investment, in other words, to continue the policy of the previous CDR government (1996-2000).

The obvious failure to create a more equitable social market economy, Iliescu's pet project, was not solely responsible for the PDSR converting to the market. Europe mattered greatly. The public, more than in any Central European country, wanted Romania to join 'Europe' and compared the country's performance with that of the Central European countries. The laggard status with which Romania was labelled throughout most of its transition was bitterly resented and was made a source of constant media criticism. The PDSR/PSD needed the Romanian economy to become successfully integrated with the European one, and after securing their domestic domination, seeking European recognition was their next important objective. Romania's former communists have been genuinely convinced of the EU and its advantages.

Political parties started being concerned with linking to the European Parliament groups. Even the PRM sought to change from an anti-Semitic party to an acceptable European one.

The existence of a European option prevented Romania from staying as Albania or regressing to become a new Belarus. The incentive of European integration lured even the successors of communism and encouraged the pro-change constituency. More than any constitution or electoral law, European integration and the prospect of accession to the EU have shaped Romanian politics, and it is in this challenging environment that Europe achieved its largest success to-date.

European enlargement is seen by some scholars through the lens of a 'gravity model', 'according to which fast and deep democratization is explained to a significant degree by the proximity and possibility of anchorage and integration with a major world centre of democracy'¹. Transitions with a European perspective seem indeed the best: they lead to democracy and prosperity faster and with reduced uncertainties and risks.

The question arises, however, if it is just Europe as an incentive which works, or is the process of enlargement itself helping the deepening of democracy? There are some paradoxical effects here, as we discover by checking the Freedom House *Nations in Transit* project, which rates democracy across the postcommunist world (see Table 3). In this table we had summarized democracy scores in various areas, comparing the performance of given countries at the beginning of negotiations compared to the year when accession treaty was signed. Albania was added as a witness country, although they do not negotiate with EU.

Table 3. Progress on democracy during the negotiations process with EU

Countries	Average change	Electoral process	Civil society	Independent media	Governance	Judiciary
<i>Albania (non-accession)</i>	<i>0.85</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>0.75</i>	<i>1.00</i>
Bulgaria	0.40	0.50	1.00	0	0.25	0.25
Czech Republic	-0.60	-0.75	0	-1.00	-0.25	-1.00
Estonia	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0	0.50
Hungary	-0.30	0	0	-0.75	-0.75	0
Latvia	0.15	0	0.25	0.25	0.25	0
Lithuania	0.15	0	0.50	0	0	0.25
Poland	-0.15	-0.25	0	-0.25	-0.25	0

¹ See Emerson, M. & G. Noutcheva (2004) *Europeanization as a Gravity Model of Democratisation*, Brussels: Center for Policy Studies, working document 214/ November 2004

Romania	0.15	0	0.75	-0.5	0.25	0.25
Slovakia	0.65	1.00	1.00	0	0.75	0.50
Slovenia	0.25	0.50	0.50	0	0.50	-0.25
Average by category, accession countries only	---	0.13	0.43	-0.20	-0.08	0.05

Source: Freedom House Nations in Transit, www.freedomhouse.org/nit/.

[The table summarizes the difference in scores between the year a country embarked in the accession process and the year it concluded negotiations and signed accession treaty. Scores represent the difference between the initially granted score at moment zero (start of accession process) to the final moment (conclusion of enlargement). Freedom House NIT scores have 7 as the worst performance and 0 as the best, but to facilitate reading, signs are changed in this table, and progress is marked with plus and regress with minus-.

The results show modest progress, if not stagnation, for accession countries once negotiations start. The largest progress was recorded by Albania (despite the fact that Albania is not negotiating), followed by Slovakia (attributable to a great extent to the loss of power by Vladimir Mečiar) and Bulgaria. Slovenia and Estonia make the next group, but progress is modest, just 0.25 (FH scores evaluate by quarter points, so 0.25 is a minimal gain). Latvia, Lithuania and Romania follow with 0.15, half a unit progress, and Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with -0.15, -0.30 and -0.60 have actually regressed on democracy, not progressed, during enlargement negotiations. Since we compare progress, we choose to ignore starting points, very different in the cases of Albania and say, Poland. The starting points are more telling for the specific *historical legacy* of each country, hardships of Communist regime, transition mode and performance in the early transition included, all prior to the start of negotiations, so they are unrelated to enlargement.

Now if we look at each category of ratings we discover that Romania, argueably the most coached accession country, recorded considerably less progress than Albania in the period under study. Again, this does not mean that the Albanian justice is not inferior to that of Romania (though not by much), it just means that after the transition phase was finished and enlargement negotiations started, accession countries slow down, and that their important positive achievements date from *before the start* of negotiations with European Union. The reform pace slowed down after negotiations started, on one hand because elites already considered they had won the prize, on the other because all energy went into 'Europeanization', which is not similar to deeper reform. Rather it creates numerous empty shapes, which will linger around waiting for the substance to catch up.

It seems therefore that the enlargement process itself has little bearing or none on democracy. What works is Europe as *an incentive*, not *Europeanization*. The areas of

governance and justice reform, for instance, feature prominently during negotiations. For instance, the Regular Reports of the Commission have been tremendously important in determining the course of judicial reform in the accession states². In the period 2001-2005, under pressure from the Commission constitutional amendments were passed concerning the status of the judicial system in Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria, and major legislation was adopted in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia. The lack of a coherent theory of judicial independence, and its link to the performance of the judicial system as a whole, led the Commission to endorse some projects for reform and reject others without clear objective grounds to do so. The only comparative report to-date of judiciary reform, the EUMAP project, concludes in its final chapter:

'To date, however, the accession process has shown that the Union itself needs a more comprehensive approach to the [judicial] reform question. There are few standards on how the judiciary should be organized and how it should function, and the existing expert support system is often uncoordinated and ineffective...³

While confusion reigns, conditionality in these areas has been getting tougher and tougher, especially for laggards, such as Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. In their cases threats were issued by EC that the whole process could be endangered due to failure of countries to comply. The same situation can be found in the fields of anticorruption or administrative reform, where the EU approach failed to grasp and therefore change the *modus operandi* of institutions on the ground, and the balance of power between reformers and conservatives. In the end, if we accept the FH scores- results are modest. The most positive achievements in the field of the judiciary, for instance were, again, achieved prior to accession, when countries moved to tenure judges, securing them from political removal, for instance. It may be argued that these reforms have still to perform and it is too early to tell, but it becomes clear that here, as in the field of the civil service reform and governance more generally, the approach of the Commission failed to change the operating mode of the state apparatus⁴.

Reform in Central Europe, and later in Romania and Bulgaria, the one captured in scores, was driven by Europe, but pushed by domestic elites. Providing a certainty that Europe will accept a country when elites have not yet done their best might be risky. Of course, elections will be held and opportunities to bring in more committed reformers can occur after

² Smilov, D. 2005 'EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Independence' Sofia: Center for Liberal Strategy, work in progress.

³ EUMAP, *Judicial Independence*, "Judicial Independence in the EU Accession Process", Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2001, pp. 20-21.

⁴ See also for a longer argument on this issue Atanasova, G. (2004): *Governance through Conditionality*, Paper Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2004.

negotiations start. However, negotiations do neither provide the best background for orange revolutions, nor for achieving transformations. One should not lose sight of *who can be plausible actors of change and who not*, and what can be the institutional incentives for deep change. The politics of Europeanization should not be given up early in favor of making the whole process just a technical one.

European enlargement has by now showed both strengths and limits. One has either to reform it strongly in view of lessons learned to use it further as a *transformation device*, which would entice nevertheless a revolution of EC structures current dealing with enlargement, or one should just use other transformation devices, from socialization to assistance and improve on those. The Commission, while improving on standards and indicators to measure standards, should give up offering also transformations tools or strategies, which proved unsuccessful in recent practice. As to domestic reformers and their foreign advisors, they should give up the dream of one size fits all solutions and embark in the tedious work of accomplishing their transformations with strategies tailored by country and by sector, seeing Europe just as a framework, not an actor.

¹ Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).

² McFaul, M. 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-Cooperative Transitions in the Post-communist world', *World Politics*, 54 (2) 2002, 212-244.

³ See Ramesh, N. *Romania: The Entangled Revolution* (Boulder Co.: Praeger Publishers, 1991).

⁴ This political history of the transition is based on Mungiu, A. *Românii după '89* (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 1996) and Mungiu, A. 'The Return of Populism. The 2000 Romanian Elections', *Government and Opposition*, 36 (2) 2001, 230-252.

⁵ The term was coined by sociologist Barrington Moore to describe a group of people who in the process of generating wealth for themselves generate large scale poverty for their society. See Moore, B., Jr. *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1978).

⁶ See Oprea, M. *Mostenitorii securitatii* (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 2004); also Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament, *A Quest for Political Integrity* (Iasi: Polirom, 2005).

⁷ For an ample discussion on this see Gallagher, T. *Romania after Ceausescu: The Politics of Intolerance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

⁸ European Commission, *Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession*, COM(2004) 657 final, Brussels, 6 October 2004, p. 21.

⁹ www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

¹⁰ All models quoted here are reported in Mungiu-Pippidi, A. *Politica dupa communism* (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 2002) and Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 'Fatalistic Political Cultures Revisited', in Klingemann, H-D. et al (eds), *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

¹¹ For an account on the narrowing down of the differences between Romania and Central Europe see Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 'Romania and Poland', in Diamond, L. and Morlino, L. (eds) *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 213-237.

¹² For successes and limits of Romania's Europeanization see Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 'EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress', in Emerson, M. (ed) *Democratization of the European Neighborhood* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005), pp. 15-37

¹³ See Freedom House, *Nations in Transit 2005: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia* (Boulder Co.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). Also: www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2005/romania.pdf

¹⁴ Compare the annual reports available at www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report.