The wars of the 1990s confirm a basic finding from the study of civil war termination: "peacemaking is a risky business." The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers—leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. By signing a peace agreement, leaders put themselves at risk from adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, from disgruntled followers who see peace as a betrayal of key values, and from excluded parties who seek either to alter the process or to destroy it. By implementing a peace agreement, peacemakers are vulnerable to attack from those who oppose their efforts. And most important, the risks of peacemaking increase the insecurity and uncertainty of average citizens who have the most to lose if war is renewed.

When spoilers succeed, as they did in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, the results are catastrophic. In both cases, the casualties of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of war. When Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of UN-monitored elections in 1992 and plunged Angola back into civil war, approximately 300,000 people died. When Hutu extremists in Rwanda rejected the Arusha Peace Accords in 1994 and launched a campaign of genocide, over 1 million Rwandans died in less than three months.

*Stephen John Stedman is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University.*

This paper was commissioned by the Committee on International Conflict Resolution of the National Research Council. A different version will be published by the council. I would like to thank the following for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions: Howard Adelman, Cynthia Chataway, Juergen Dedring, Michael Doyle, Daniel Druckman, William Dunch, Alexander L. George, Charles L. Glaser, Robert Jervis, Stephen Low, Michael O’Hanlon, Jerrold Post, Tonya Putnam, Donald Rothchild, Timothy D. Sisk, Janice Gross Stein, Paul Stern, and Saadia Touval. I would also like to thank the current and former policymakers and diplomats who spoke with me off the record about their peacemaking experiences.

3. Until now, the most widely cited figure for deaths in the Rwandan genocide is 800,000 from Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). In a forthcoming book on the subject, Howard Adelman estimates the figure to be over 1 million.

© 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
If all spoilers succeeded, then the quest for peace in civil wars would be dangerously counterproductive. But not all spoilers do succeed. In Mozambique the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a party known as “the Khmer Rouge of Africa,” stalled in meeting its commitments to peace, and threatened to boycott elections and return to war. In the end, however, RENAMO joined parliamentary politics, accepted losing an election, and disarmed, thus ending a civil war that had taken 800,000 lives. In Cambodia the peace process was able to overcome resistance from the real Khmer Rouge, the party with the distinction of providing the sobriquet for fanatic parties elsewhere.

The crucial difference between the success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians of peace. Where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited and peace has triumphed. Where international custodians have failed to develop and implement such strategies, spoilers have succeeded at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives.

This study begins to develop a typological theory of spoiler management and pursues the following research objectives: (1) to create a typology of spoilers that can help custodians choose robust strategies for keeping peace on track; (2) to describe various strategies that custodians have used to manage spoilers; (3) to propose strategies that will be most effective for particular spoiler types; (4) to sensitize policymakers to the complexities and uncertainties of correctly diagnosing the type of spoiler; and (5) to compare several successful and failed cases of spoiler management in order to refine and elaborate my initial propositions about strategies.

This research is a first step toward understanding the spoiler problem in peace processes and evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of different strategies of spoiler management. The findings that emerge from this study are provisional. As more case studies of spoiler management emerge, as new research develops on the case studies below, and as more theoretical attention is trained on the problem, some of the findings will need to be reconsidered and revised. Moreover, this study addresses only the strategies and actions of external actors who oversee peace processes; the topic of spoiler management from the perspective of domestic parties committed to peace is beyond the scope of this study.

The article argues that spoilers differ by the goals they seek and their commitment to achieving those goals. Some spoilers have limited goals; others
see the world in all-or-nothing terms and pursue total power. Furthermore, some spoilers are willing to make reasoned judgments concerning the costs and benefits of their actions, whereas others show high insensitivity to costs and risks, and may hold immutable preferences. Custodians have a range of strategies to deal with spoilers, from ones that rely heavily on conciliation to ones that depend greatly on the use of coercion. The case studies below suggest three major findings. First, the choice of an appropriate strategy requires the correct diagnosis of the type of spoiler and thoughtful consideration of constraints posed by other parties in the peace process. Second, to make good diagnoses, policymakers must overcome organizational blinders that lead them to misread intentions and motivations. Third, the implementation of a successful strategy depends on the custodian's ability to create an external coalition for peace, the resources that the coalition brings to its responsibility, and the consensus that the coalition forms about the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of spoiler demands and behavior.

Spoilers: A Preliminary Typology

Peace processes create spoilers. This is a statement about definition and causality. In war there are combatants, who can be identified in myriad ways—for example, rebels, bandits, pariahs, rogues, or terrorists—but not as spoilers. Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if all parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often strongly disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. A negotiated peace often has losers: leaders and factions who do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties. For example, the most perfectly crafted power-sharing institutions in the world are useless if one of the parties does

---

4. For example, in South Africa prior to 1990 there was no public agreement among the antagonists to peacefully resolve their conflict. Only after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and after several public agreements were reached that committed the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African government to a process of negotiation can one speak of a South African peace process. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, even though negotiations dragged on for several years, the Cambodian peace process began only after the parties formally committed themselves to the Paris Peace Accords.
not want to share power. Even the best-designed settlements must be prepared for violence from leaders and organizations who decide that the kind of peace in question is not in their interest.

Custodians of peace processes confront several different spoiler problems that differ on the dimensions of the position of the spoiler (inside or outside of an agreement); number of spoilers; type of spoiler (limited, greedy, or total); and locus of the spoiler problem (leader or followers, or both).

POSITION OF THE SPOILER
Spoilers can be inside or outside a peace process. An inside spoiler signs a peace agreement, signals a willingness to implement a settlement, and yet fails to fulfill key obligations to the agreement. Examples include President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda, who failed to implement key measures of the Arusha Accords to end his country's internal war; the Khmer Rouge (KR) in Cambodia, which signed the Paris Peace Accords then refused to demobilize its soldiers and chose to boycott elections; and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which signed the Bicesse Accords in 1991, but returned to war in 1992 when it lost the election. Outside spoilers are parties who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves, and use violence to attack the peace process—for example, the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) in Rwanda, which committed genocide to prevent the implementation of the Arusha Accords.

Inside spoilers tend to use strategies of stealth; outside spoilers often use strategies of violence. Spoilers who have signed peace agreements for tactical reasons have an incentive to keep their threat hidden and thus minimize the amount of violence they use; they want the peace process to continue as long as it promises to advantage them against their adversary. Inside spoilers need to comply enough to convince others of their goodwill, but not so much that it weakens their offensive military capability. Outside spoilers, on the other hand, tend to use overt violence as a strategy toward undermining peace. Favorite tactics include the assassination of moderates who stand for a negotiated peace, massacres that coincide with any progress in reaching a negoti-

5. Timothy D. Sisk, in Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 1996), concludes that successful power sharing depends on "a core of moderate, integrated elites [that] has a deeply imbedded sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny," p. 117. Most recommendations for power sharing in civil wars simply assume parties are willing to share power.
ated settlement, and the creation of alliances with conservative members in the armed forces and police to sabotage any agreement.

**NUMBER OF SPOILERS**
The presence of more than one spoiler creates a compound challenge for custodians. Any strategy a custodian chooses to deal with one spoiler has implications for the strategy selected to deal with other spoilers. Actions taken to marginalize one spoiler may inadvertently strengthen another. To give an example from the case studies: in Rwanda the stability of the peace process was endangered because Habyarimana refused to fulfill his obligations to the peace agreement he had signed. The United Nations threatened to withdraw its peacekeeping operation in order to coerce him into implementing the agreement. Yet Habyarimana was only one of two spoilers. The CDR, former members of Habyarimana’s regime, rejected the peace agreement and conspired against the peace process from outside. The UN strategy succeeded in pressuring Habyarimana, but emboldened the CDR to attack the peace process.

**TYPE OF SPOILERS**
Recent work on civil war termination suffers from a flawed, attenuated portrayal of combatants and their aims. At one extreme are analyses that posit that parties are solely motivated by insecurity and only seek party survival.⁶ According to this view, the only reason for parties in civil wars to fight is their fear that if they make peace and disarm, then their adversary will take advantage and eliminate them. The lack of an overarching authority that can enforce a political settlement in civil war means that warring parties cannot credibly commit to making peace, either in the short term (through disarmament) or in the long term (through a constitution). Thus any party who violates or opposes a peace agreement does so out of fear, not some other motivation. Scholars who embrace this view believe that spoiler behavior can be addressed only by reducing the spoiler’s fears through international guarantees. Like those international relations theorists steeped in the security dilemma, these writers believe that the central theme of civil war termination “is not evil but tragedy.”⁷

---

At another extreme are those who assert that all parties in civil war seek total power. This, however, is too facile; all parties in civil war seek power, but not all parties seek total power. Some parties desire exclusive power and recognition of authority; some want dominant power; some seek a significant share of power; and some desire to exercise power subject to democratic controls. This should not be surprising; power is a means or resource to realize other goals. Some goals—for instance, the permanent subjugation or elimination of an ethnic group, race, or socioeconomic class—need more power than goals of creating a democratic political regime or gaining recognition of political equality among races or ethnic groups. That parties differ in their goals and commitment to total power can be seen by all of the parties that have accepted and lived with compromise solutions to civil wars (in Colombia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, El Salvador, South Africa, and Mozambique). Similarly, not every winner of a civil war creates a totalitarian regime or slaughters its opponents. A thought experiment makes the point: If you had to be on the losing side of a civil war, would you rather surrender to Abraham Lincoln or to Hafez al-Assad, to Nelson Mandela or to Mao Zedong?

The first step toward successful management of spoiler problems in civil wars is to recognize that parties in civil wars differ in their goals and commitment—dimensions that are crucial for understanding why some parties undermine peace agreements. Spoilers vary by type: limited, greedy, and total. These types differ primarily on the goals that the spoiler pursues and secondarily on the spoiler’s commitment to achieving its goals. At one end of the spectrum are limited spoilers, who have limited goals—for example, recognition and redress of a grievance, a share of power or the exercise of power constrained by a constitution and opposition, and basic security of followers. Limited goals do not imply limited commitment to achieving those goals, however. They can be nonnegotiable and hence subject to heavy sacrifice.

At the other end of the spectrum are total spoilers, who pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their goals are not subject to change. Total spoilers are led by individuals who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and often suffer from pathological

tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict. Total spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a means for achieving such goals as the violent transformation of society.

The greedy spoiler lies between the limited spoiler and the total spoiler.10 The greedy spoiler holds goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk. A greedy spoiler may have limited goals that expand when faced with low costs and risks; alternatively, it may have total goals that contract when faced with high costs and risks.

The spoiler type poses different problems for peace processes. Total spoilers are irreconcilably opposed to any compromise peace; any commitment to peace by a total spoiler is tactical—a move to gain advantage in a struggle to the death. Limited spoilers can conceivably be included in peace processes, if their limited nonnegotiable demands can be accommodated by other parties to the conflict. Greedy spoilers can be accommodated in peace processes if their limited goals are met and high costs constrain them from making added demands.

LOCUS OF THE SPOILER PROBLEM
A key issue concerns the possibility of change in type. For example, can a total spoiler become a limited spoiler? The answer depends on the locus of spoiler behavior—that is, whether it is the leader or the followers. If the impetus for spoiler behavior comes from the leader, then parties can alter type if their leadership changes. This seems particularly relevant for total spoilers because their total goals and commitment are so extreme. A change in leadership may be enough to transform a party from a total spoiler to a limited spoiler. For instance, a negotiated settlement to Zimbabwe’s civil war became possible only when Abel Muzorewa replaced Ian Smith as leader of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Likewise, the willingness of the South African government to implement the Namibian peace process was aided by the incapacitation and replacement of President P.W. Botha. Longtime observers of Cambodia and Sri Lanka argue that a negotiated peace remains unlikely in those countries as long as Pol Pot leads the KR, and Velupillai Prabakaran leads the Tamil Liberation Tigers.

Other cases, however, suggest that there are times when followers are the locus of spoiler behavior. As one of the cases below suggests, in Rwanda in 1994, Habyarimana was reluctant to fulfill his commitments to the Arusha Accords for fear that his followers would attack him.

Strategies of Spoiler Management

Custodians of peace processes are defined here as international actors whose task is to oversee the implementation of peace agreements. Implicit in their role is the cultivation and protection of peace and the management of spoilers. International custodians can be international organizations, individual states, or formal or ad hoc groups of concerned third parties. Custodians can be tightly organized or loosely coordinated. With the exception of the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia, and the implementation of the South African peace settlement, the chief custodian of peace processes in the 1990s has been the United Nations.

Custodians of peace processes in the 1990s have pursued three major strategies to manage spoilers. In order of conciliation to coercion, the strategies are: (1) inducement, or giving the spoiler what it wants; (2) socialization, or changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms; and (3) coercion, or punishing spoiler behavior or reducing the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process. These strategies are general conceptual types; in practice, each strategy takes on a specific configuration likely to be more complex than the general version of it identified here. It should also be noted, as will be evident in some of the cases to be examined, that international actors can employ more than one strategy—either simultaneously (with different priority and emphasis) or in sequence.

Inducement
Inducement as a strategy for managing spoilers entails taking positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct peace. Custodians attempt to induce the spoiler into joining a peace process or fulfilling its obligations to an existing agreement by meeting the spoiler’s demands, which can be of several types. Spoilers may insist that their behavior is based on (1) fear, and demand greater protection; (2) fairness, and demand greater benefits; or (3) justice, and demand legitimation or recognition of their position. The custodian must assess the veracity and significance of such claims.

Inducement can be rigorously applied by meeting the costly demands made by spoilers, as the United Nations did in Mozambique in 1993–94. Or it can be
something as lax and questionable as offering a spoiler a continued role in negotiations, even when the spoiler has returned to war as in the case of Angola in 1992, or when the spoiler has engaged in genocide as in Rwanda in 1994. Indeed, the frequency of inducement attempts in peace processes suggests that it is a "default mode," that is, a convenient strategy that is applied without adequate consideration whether it is an appropriate strategy for the type of spoiler in question.

SOCIALIZATION
The strategy of socialization requires custodians to establish a set of norms for acceptable behavior by internal parties who commit to peace or external parties who seek to join a peace process. These norms then become the basis for judging the demands of the parties (are they legitimate or not?) and the behaviors of the parties (are they acceptable in the normative framework?). In turn, this strategy relies on two components to elicit normatively acceptable behavior: the material and the intellectual. The material component involves custodians carefully calibrating the supply of carrots and sticks to reward and punish the spoiler. The intellectual component emphasizes regular persuasion by custodians of the value of the desired normative behavior. Normative standards can include commitment to the rules of democratic competition and adherence to the protection of human rights. The intellectual component can be aimed at both elites (the attempt to inculcate appropriate values) and at citizens (the attempt to educate the mass of citizens into norms of good governance, democratic competition, and accountability, as a means of pressuring elites).

COERCION
A strategy of coercion relies on the use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior or reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt the peace process. This strategy has several variations. Coercive diplomacy, or the use of threat and demand, has been employed infrequently against spoilers in peace processes, the notable exception being the use of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995. Likewise, the application of force to defeat the spoiler has been attempted infrequently—most notably, in Somalia, when the United Nations decided to hold Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed

---

11. Using my definition, it is a tough call whether the Bosnian Serbs were a spoiler at that point. One could argue that the public peace process had achieved the commitment of the Bosnian and Bosnian Croat parties and therefore the Bosnian Serbs were spoilers.
responsible for an ambush by his forces against Pakistani peacekeepers, and in Sri Lanka, when an Indian peacekeeping force attempted to forcibly disarm Tamil rebels and capture their leader, Velupillai Prabakaran.12

Two more common variations of the coercion strategy are what I call the “departing train” strategy and the “withdrawal” strategy. The departing train strategy combines a judgment that the spoiler’s demands and behavior are illegitimate with the assertion that the peace process will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not. In Cambodia the strategy was linked to the holding of an election, thereby setting a deadline for joining the process and promising a change in the status quo. The departing train metaphor implies that the peace process is a train leaving the station at a predetermined time: once set in motion, anyone not on board will be left behind. The departing train strategy may require active measures to limit the ability of the spoiler to attack the peace process and to protect the parties of peace.

The withdrawal variation of the coercive strategy assumes that the spoiler wants an international presence during the peace process; the strategy aims to punish the spoiler by threatening to withdraw international support and peacekeepers from the peace process. This was the dominant strategy pursued by the United Nations in Rwanda and by the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia; it was also used in a tertiary manner in Mozambique. The strategy is a blunt instrument in that the punishment—withdrawal—promises to hurt parties who have fulfilled their obligations and rewards any spoiler who opposes international engagement.

Matching Strategies to Type of Spoiler

A correct diagnosis of spoiler type is crucial for the choice of an appropriate strategy of spoiler management. Total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace settlement; they must be defeated or so marginalized that they can do little damage. A greedy spoiler with total goals can conceivably be brought into a settlement if the costs of war are sufficiently high. A limited spoiler can be accommodated by meeting its nonnegotiable demands. A greedy limited

12. Again, it is difficult to determine whether Aideed was a spoiler by my definition. One could argue that the Addis Ababa agreements between the various clan factions in Somalia constituted a formal peace process and therefore Aideed was a spoiler. Likewise, although Indian diplomats claimed that Prabakaran provided his consent to the peace agreement in 1987, he never signed the agreement.
spoiler may be accommodated, but such accommodation may whet its appetite to demand more concessions.

A total spoiler, because it defines the war in all-or-nothing terms and holds immutable preferences, cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can it be socialized; moreover, both inducement and socialization risk strengthening the spoiler by rewarding it. Two versions of the coercive strategy are also dangerously counterproductive for managing total spoilers. Coercive diplomacy is unlikely to succeed, given the cost insensitivity of total spoilers; they call bluffs and test will. If custodians fail to carry through on threats or fail to establish escalation dominance, the spoiler's position may be strengthened. By showing the inadequacy of international force, the spoiler adds to its domestic reputation for coercive strength. The withdrawal strategy also backfires against a total spoiler, who has everything to gain if custodians abandon the peace process.

Two strategies are appropriate for managing a total spoiler: the use of force to defeat the spoiler or the departing train strategy. Because few custodians are willing to use force to defeat a total spoiler, they should strengthen the parties of peace so that they can defend themselves. The departing train strategy can do this by legitimizing the parties of peace and delegitimizing the spoiler, by depriving the spoiler of resources—both capital and weapons—that can be used to undermine peace, and by redeploying peacekeepers to protect the parties of peace.

A limited spoiler can be included in a peace process if its demands are acceptable to the conflict's other parties. This suggests that inducement is an appropriate strategy for managing a limited spoiler, but the strategy depends on the bargaining range established by the other parties who have already committed to peace. If the demands of the limited spoiler cannot be accommodated through inclusion, then the custodian may have to choose socialization or coercion. The danger is that the threat or use of force may prompt a counterescalation of violence by the limited spoiler.

The greedy spoiler requires a long-term strategy of socialization. Because the spoiler is not total, there is at least a possibility of bringing it into the peace process. In the short term, the greedy spoiler presents a serious dilemma. As inducements alone will serve only to whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler, the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be clearly distinguished. Moreover, depending on the cost insensitivity and risk-taking of the spoiler, the use of coercive sticks may be necessary to impose costs and create a strong sense of limits to the spoiler's demands. On the other hand, a reliance solely
on a coercive strategy will ignore that even the greedy spoiler has legitimate security goals that can only be met through inducements.

LIMITATIONS OF THE CUSTODIAN
Policymakers often have concerns other than a specific conflict at hand; a strategy that may be best from a perspective of solely managing the conflict may not be best for a policymaker considering a range of interests. This is certainly true when it comes to conflict resolution in small, unimportant (to U.S. national interest), and faraway countries. Even the United Nations considers its actions in particular cases in light of its corporate interest and the need to protect the reputation and institution of peacekeeping. The optimal strategy to end a conflict and manage a spoiler may be too costly or risky for external actors. As a U.S. defense official told me, "One should not confuse what is needed to end these conflicts with what the United States is prepared to do."\textsuperscript{13}

The United Nations has special limitations as a peace custodian. Although it possesses formal authority, its agent on the ground (the special representative of the secretary-general) is constrained by the direction, commitment, and will of the Security Council. Special representatives have to borrow leverage through coalition building; their ability to induce or punish, even their ability to rule credibly on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of demands, depends on the support of member states. In some cases, such as the Salvadoran and Cambodian peace processes, the United Nations has relied on groups of friends—that is, formal associations of all member states that have an interest in the peace process and therefore bring their power, energy, and attention to implementing peace. In other cases, the special representative has relied on ad hoc groupings of interested states, usually working with their diplomatic representatives on site.

The biggest potential liability (yet source of possible leverage) in managing a spoiler are member states that are patrons of the spoiler. On the one hand, such patrons, if they are sincerely interested in making peace, may supply the special representative with assets of leverage, credibility, and trust. On the other hand, such patrons may be slow to acknowledge that their client is acting as a spoiler and may be reluctant to declare their client's demands illegitimate. Within almost every patron of a spoiler are personal networks and domestic groups that support the spoiler. Pressures from these groups, as well as prior

\textsuperscript{13} Confidential interview.
policy commitments to the spoiler, can lead the patron to continue to support the spoiler, even in the face of outrageous behavior.

The Fog of Peacemaking

The typology of spoiler problems described so far reflects two fundamental attributes of peace processes: immense complexity and uncertainty. The typology suggests that custodians face numerous uncertainties that require skilled diagnosis; they include: (1) the goal of the spoiler; (2) the intent behind acts of noncooperation or aggression; (3) the degree of commitment of the spoiler; (4) the degree of leadership command and control of followers; (5) the degree of unity within the spoiler; and (6) the likely effects of custodial action on the spoiler's willingness to continue aggression, on the other parties to the peace process, and on interested external actors.

Custodians must interpret why a particular party attacks a peace process or refuses to meet its obligations to implement a peace agreement. Several interpretations are possible. A party that has signed an agreement but refuses to fulfill its obligations may be motivated by fear. It may see an agreement as desirable, but fears putting its security into the hands of its adversary. This causes it to stall on its commitments or cheat on agreements by creating a fail-safe option. A party that has signed an agreement may cheat because it is greedy and desires a better deal; it may want a negotiated settlement to succeed, but wants to increase its chances of maximizing its return in the settlement. A failure to fulfill its obligations may be a means of seeking advantage in an election that could determine partially the division of spoils and power of the settlement; alternatively, holding back from commitments may be a way to strengthen its bargaining position in the result of losing an election. Finally, a party may cheat because it has signed a peace agreement for tactical reasons; if the agreement seems as though it will bring the party to power, then it will abide by the agreement; however, if the agreement appears as if it will not bring the party to power, then it will cheat to overturn the agreement. In such a case, the spoiler is motivated by total goals and defines the stakes as all or nothing.

When a party is outside of a peace process and uses violence to attack the parties within, a custodian must judge the intention behind the violence. Is it an attempt by the spoiler to force its way into negotiations—to alter a process so that its demands are included in a settlement? Or is it an attempt to weaken the commitment of the internal parties as a means to destroy a negotiated
settlement? Again, the action must be connected to a judgment about the spoiler’s motivation. Is it motivated by limited grievances that can be incorporated into an agreement? Or is it motivated by total goals that are unalterably opposed to agreement? Custodians of peace processes must make judgments about the commitment of a spoiler to its preference. Spoilers may vary in their sensitivity to costs and risks; greedy parties may seek only limited opportunities to maximize their goals, or they may be willing to incur high costs and take large risks to improve their position.

The above interpretations assume a unified party—that the leader’s behavior reflects a group consensus about its aims. But if uncertainty exists about the extent to which a leader can deliver his followers, then a leader may sign an agreement but be reluctant to implement it for fear that any act of compromise could prompt a rebellion by hard-liners. Alternatively, a party’s act of aggression may or may not be evidence of a leader’s willingness to make peace; it could be the act of rogue elements who are opposed to settlement and seek to wreck an agreement.

Custodians of peace face uncertainty about the effects of actions they take toward a spoiler. Will they encourage the spoiler to desist from attacking the peace process? Or will they encourage the spoiler to continue its resistance? Furthermore, if divisions between hard-liners and moderates within the spoiler become evident, there could be uncertainty about how one’s actions will affect the relative strengths of the factions. A custodian’s actions likewise will have uncertain effects on the other parties to a conflict. The development of an effective strategy is made difficult because one’s action toward a spoiler affects and is affected by the behavior of other parties in the conflict. Custodians may have to limit their use of coercion against a spoiler for fear of upsetting a fragile balance of power that could lead other internal parties to eschew a peaceful settlement. Custodians may be constrained in the use of inducements by the bargaining range permitted by the other parties to the conflict. A custodian’s failure to respond to spoiler behavior by one party may trigger a mimetic response by other parties to the conflict. If a custodian is lenient toward a spoiler, will it encourage other parties to cheat as well? If it acts aggressively toward a spoiler, might it encourage other parties to act aggressively, in the belief that they have an ally that tips the balance of power against the spoiler? All of this is to say that the strategy that custodians pursue toward a specific spoiler must take into account the positions of other internal parties to the conflict and perhaps even the need to work with those parties to coordinate action.
Case Studies of Spoiler Management

This article is a first step in developing a typological theory of spoiler management. The initial framework discussed above posits a typology of spoilers based on their intentions—limited, greedy, and total; it then describes a range of strategies available for managing spoilers—inducement, socialization, and coercion, with several variations of the latter strategy. It suggests that the general appropriateness of a strategy depends on the type of spoiler: inducement for limited spoilers, socialization for greedy spoilers, and departing train for total spoilers. The framework places a heavy burden on the ability of custodians to diagnose correctly the type of spoiler they face.

The following section examines five case studies of spoiler management in the 1990s as a way of refining, elaborating, and modifying the initial theory. The case studies serve the function of identifying complexities of various kinds that affect success or failure in dealing with spoiler problems that are not anticipated or explainable by the initial theory. Several criteria guided case selection. First, I have chosen only cases that have reached an outcome; thus ongoing peace processes where the outcome is uncertain, such as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Bosnia, have been avoided. Second, the cases include variation in outcome—successful management of the spoiler (RENAMO in Mozambique, and the KR in Cambodia) and failed management of the spoiler (the CDR in Rwanda, UNITA in Angola, and the State of Cambodia [SOC] in Cambodia). The judgment of successful and failed management of the spoiler is based on whether the spoiler has been relatively weakened or strengthened vis-à-vis its opponents. Third, the cases vary on the two principal independent variables: the mix of strategies chosen to manage the spoiler and the type of spoiler. In terms of primary strategy, Cambodia (against the KR) is an example of the departing train version of the coercion strategy. Angola and Cambodia (against SOC) are examples of inducement; Mozambique is an example of a mixed inducement and socialization strategy. Rwanda is an example of the withdrawal version of the coercive strategy. In terms of spoiler type, the KR and CDR are examples of total spoilers; UNITA and SOC are greedy spoilers; and RENAMO is a limited spoiler. My judgment of spoiler type is based on evidence of intentions at the time.

Several limitations of the cases should be pointed out. First, the cases all took place after the end of the Cold War. Although this increases the relevance of lessons for policymakers who must grapple with the difficulties of peacemak-
ing unconstrained by superpower rivalry, the findings are nonetheless bounded by historical era. Second, the primary custodian in all of the cases is the United Nations. There is variation among the cases, however, in the roles played by individual states as interested actors or subcustodians who support the peace process. Third, not all combinations of strategy and spoiler type are covered in the cases, given the relatively few cases of spoiler management in the 1990s. For instance, neither coercive diplomacy nor use of force to defeat the spoiler is included. Fourth, these cases are not completely independent of one another. Strategies for managing a particular spoiler were sometimes the result of lessons derived from another case. Some UN personnel worked on more than one case. Some spoilers themselves likely drew lessons for their strategy based on evaluating the efficacy of custodians in other cases.

Following Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison, the case studies address the following general questions:

1. What was the spoiler's behavior? What demands did the spoiler make? What was the rhetoric of the spoiler?
2. How did external parties interpret the empirically verifiable observations of the spoiler? What were the custodian's judgments about the intentions and motivations of the spoiler?
3. What evidence existed for interpreting spoiler intentions and evaluating the organizational unity of the spoiler? What evidence did the custodian have? What evidence did it cite to support its interpretations? Was other evidence ignored or disregarded?
4. What strategy did the custodian choose to manage the spoiler? What was the theory behind the strategy?
5. Did the custodian implement the strategy effectively? What was the effect of the strategy—on the spoiler and on the other parties in the conflict?
6. Did the custodian reevaluate the strategy during its implementation? Did the custodian reconsider its initial diagnosis of spoiler type?

CASE 1. RWANDA: THREATENED WITHDRAWAL
The Arusha Peace Accords, signed in August 1993 by President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and officials from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),

a rebel force composed of mostly Tutsi exiles, promised to end a three-year civil war in which approximately 10,000 people had been killed. The accords attempted to end violent conflict between the Hutu ethnic group, which formed approximately 70 percent of the population, and the Tutsi ethnic group, which comprised nearly 30 percent.\footnote{Another group, the Twa, comprises 1 percent of Rwanda's population. A common figure for the respective populations is 85 percent Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. Based on new calculations, Howard Adelman estimates that the percentage of Tutsi was greatly underreported, hence the 70 percent/30 percent figure here. Private communication, Howard Adelman, October 10, 1996.} Simultaneously, the accords sought to end Hutu political hegemony over the Tutsi, integrate thousands of Tutsi exiles into Rwandan life, and democratize the Rwandan government, which had been dominated for over twenty years by a small elite group of Hutus close to Habyarimana. The accords contained elaborate provisions for power sharing in government; integration of the two armies; a detailed plan for the return of some soldiers to civilian life; procedures for democratization of Rwandan politics; and the establishment of a coalition transition government, the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG). The accords culminated fourteen months of negotiation and mediation by the Tanzanian government, in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity and the governments of France, Belgium, and the United States. The United Nations was to oversee the accords' implementation.

The mediators of the agreement apparently foresaw that they would likely meet resistance from Hutu extremists in the army and government, who had rallied under the banner of the CDR.\footnote{Howard Adelman and Astrid Suhre, with Bruce Jones, \textit{The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 2, Early Warning and Conflict Management} (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 25.} The RPF vetoed provisions that would have given the CDR a role in a new Rwandan government, arguing that it was not an independent political party and that its extreme belief in ethnic superiority was contrary to the spirit of settlement. A further point of contention concerned representation in the army: Arusha allotted 50 percent of the officer corps and 40 percent of the rest of the army to the RPF. Although the formula alleviated RPF security fears, it was contested by the CDR. Nonetheless, the Rwandan government negotiating team reached agreement with the RPF on those terms.

The accords contained one major flaw: they lacked a strategy to deal with the CDR. The United States and France advocated inclusion of the CDR into the peace process. Instead the RPF and the government signatories to the
accords hoped for a robust UN peacekeeping force that "would neutralize the extremists."\textsuperscript{17} Chastened by its recent experience in Somalia, however, the United Nations had no intention of robust peacekeeping. Indeed, some UN diplomats foresaw implementation as a relatively easy task. The force that was deployed to Rwanda was not only less than the parties had agreed to, but also less than what the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) force commander, General Romeo Dallaire, believed necessary.

Between the signing of the peace accords in August 1993 and the full deployment of UNAMIR in February 1994, tension and uncertainty were rife in Rwanda. The accords provided room for the growth of moderate Hutu politicians who could provide an ethnic bridge to the mostly Tutsi RPF. Habyarimana's party itself was undergoing splits; the CDR, resolutely opposed to compromise with the RPF, emerged as a possible competitor to Habyarimana. In October 1993 a coup attempt in neighboring Burundi by Tutsi officers against its recently elected Hutu president triggered acts of genocide in that country. Between 50,000 and 100,000 people died, including Burundi's president. In Rwanda the coup increased Hutu extremist antipathy for the Arusha compromise, sowed suspicion and doubt among Hutu moderate politicians toward the RPF, and emboldened the Hutu extremists to advocate openly extermination of the Tutsi as a final solution to Rwanda's ethnic problem.\textsuperscript{18}

UNAMIR's top officials, Special Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh and Dallaire, confronted several challenges: Habyarimana's unwillingness to carry out his obligations to the Arusha Accords and form the BBTG, low-level political violence and ethnic killings, growing public incitement of ethnic hatred—especially by the popular radio station Radio Mille Collines—and increasing evidence of a CDR plan to commit genocide if the BBTG were installed. On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent a cable to the UN Department of Peacekeeping, which stated that a high-level government defector had told UNAMIR about the formation of specially trained militias to carry out a genocide, the creation of lists of Hutu moderates targeted for assassination, a plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers in the hope of driving the United Nations out of Rwanda, and a specific threat that the BBTG would be attacked upon installation.

\textsuperscript{17} Howard Adelman, "Preventing Post-Cold War Conflicts, What Have We Learned? The Case of Rwanda," paper presented to the International Studies Association Meeting, San Diego, California, April 17, 1996, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{18} Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 198–203.
Although Dallaire requested better equipment that would improve UNAMIR's capacity to respond in the case of crisis, his request was ignored. He also sought permission to begin independent searches for arms caches, but was told to do so only in conjunction with local authorities—some of whom were implicated in the January 11 warning. In the words of the definitive account of this period, UN headquarters was only prepared to approve "what the traffic would bear." \(^{19}\)

Habyarimana’s role in the plotting and his motivations for stalling on implementing Arusha were uncertain; analysts disagreed on whether Habyarimana was himself an extremist only tactically committed to the peace process, or a pragmatic peacemaker whom ethnic extremists had boxed in. The faction that was implicated in the January warning to Dallaire included members of Habyarimana’s own elite troops, the Presidential Guard, several close presidential advisers, and the president’s wife. Habyarimana’s behavior could be construed as supporting either interpretation. His prevarication might have been evidence that he hoped events would provide the extremists with an opportunity to return to war in a stronger position. Alternatively, it was possible that he feared for his life if he implemented the accords, and therefore "buying time, without knowing exactly for what purpose, became a kind of survival reflex." \(^{20}\) U.S. officials close to the implementation process believed that there was no split between Habyarimana and the extremists; therefore, the key to dealing with the extremists was to get Habyarimana to install the BBTG. They assumed that he would deliver his followers to the peace process. \(^{21}\)

No coordinated, unified international approach was taken vis-à-vis the extremists. Booḥ-Booḥ adamantly opposed CDR demands for inclusion in the peace process, only to reverse himself and argue for their participation. France continued to have cordial relations with both Habyarimana and officials implicated in the January warning. Arms supplies from France arrived in Rwanda in January 1994 in violation of the Arusha Accords, and, according to UNAMIR officials, again in April after the beginning of the genocide. Representatives of donor nations in Kigali failed to send a clear, consistent message regarding

\(^{19}\) Adelman, Suhrke, with Jones, *The International Response*, p. 68.


\(^{21}\) Anthony Marley, U.S. Department of State, presentation at the Fourteenth Annual Africa Conference, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1995. Lieutenant Colonel Marley (retired) was the U.S. military attaché to the Arusha process.
their concerns about the government’s violence and human rights violations. Even the radio broadcast of genocidal threats did not yield a consensus toward the extremists. The failure of international actors to assert unified, minimal standards of human rights “probably succeeded only in eroding the credibility of diplomatic suasion.”

In late March 1994, a strategy emerged for dealing with the stalled implementation that proved completely counterproductive. The United Nations threatened to withdraw its peacekeeping mission unless the warring parties committed to fulfilling their obligations to the peace plan. Pushed by the United States and endorsed by the United Nations, the strategy bore little connection to any of the problems in Rwanda: the presence of extremists who had pledged to attack the parties of peace, the uncertainty about whether Habyarimana was allied to the extremists, or Habyarimana’s reluctance to carry out Arusha. Although the U.S. government clearly saw the Rwandan government as the main culprit, the strategy threatened to punish all of the parties for its obstruction. On April 5 the UN Security Council announced that the mandate for UNAMIR would be extended, but warned that its patience had worn out; if the parties did not comply with Arusha, the United Nations would leave.

On April 6 the strategy, combined with growing diplomatic pressure, wrested from Habyarimana a commitment to install the BBTG. In a meeting in Arusha with the regional mediators and representatives of France and the United States, he agreed to implement the accords, only to be assassinated on his return to Kigali later that night. Immediately, the Presidential Guard and CDR assassinated almost all of the Hutu moderates, and their militias began killing Tutsi throughout the country. In addition to assassinating the Hutu moderate prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the Presidential Guard killed ten Belgian peacekeepers who were attempting to protect her.

In the ensuing two months of genocide, the United Nations and its member states reduced the number of peacekeepers in Rwanda. The essence of its approach became appeasement by inaction. For two months, the United Nations and the United States urged the RPF and the Presidential Guard to establish a cease-fire and return to negotiations. In so doing, they conveyed a

clear message: committing genocide was not enough to disqualify a party in Rwanda from a legitimate place at the bargaining table.

The United Nations’ failure to manage the spoiler problem in Rwanda resulted from poor diagnosis, which was caused in part by organizational blinders. The poor diagnosis was threefold: incorrect assessment of the number of spoilers, their types, and the locus of the spoiler problem. The United Nations targeted Habyarimana, who was a spoiler, but a limited spoiler, whose hesitations stemmed from fear of his former followers. Habyarimana did not control the CDR, a total spoiler that sought to destroy the entire process. The threat of withdrawal forced Habyarimana to reveal that he was a limited spoiler who preferred peace. But the same threat had no leverage on the CDR; in fact, the threat signaled to it a basic lack of international commitment to the implementation.

The only strategy that might have avoided the cataclysm of April 1994 would have been one that combined protection for the parties of peace—the moderate Hutu parties, the RPF, and Habyarimana—through a larger, more proactive peacekeeping force, clear credible threats against the use of violence by extremists, and the defanging of the extremists by reducing their capability to attack the peace process. The international community would have had to diagnose that there were two spoilers, not one, that the CDR was a total spoiler, and that the locus of the spoiler problem resided with Habyarimana’s followers. The goal then would have been to protect the coalition for peace, marginalize the extremist Hutus, and create the opportunity for Habyarimana to distance himself from the extremes to join the middle.

That such a strategy was not articulated and attempted was overdetermined. Beyond the obvious intelligence failure in detecting Habyarimana’s position, there were myriad reasons that led to an absence of critical judgment. Right from the planning for implementation, the United Nations and its member states were only minimally committed to the peace process. The choice of the withdrawal strategy stemmed from the Clinton administration’s desire to show Congress that the United Nations had the discipline to say no to peacekeeping operations that seemed troubled.24 Organizational politics and the frailty of individual decision making combined to ignore the warnings of spoilers committed to genocide. Mediators could not overcome the basic contradiction in their analysis: on the one hand, Arusha excluded Hutu extremists who threatened the peace process, but on the other hand, those same extremists would

not really act when the peace process was implemented. The United Nations and its member states did not want to face up to the implications of an accurate diagnosis of the problem and failed to even create a unified, disciplined message of disapproval to the extremists.

**CASE 2. CAMBODIA I: THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE DEPARTING TRAIN**

The Paris Peace Accords, signed on October 23, 1991, culminated four years of negotiations aimed at ending Cambodia's civil war. Several factors contributed to the settlement. The war had reached a stalemate among the major combatants—the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the royalist party of Prince Norodom Sihanouk; the Khmer Rouge (KR); the State of Cambodia (SOC); and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The external patrons of the warring parties (China, Russia, Vietnam, and the United States) had tired of the stalemate and wished to divest themselves of their clients. The countries of the region coalesced around a framework that called for multiparty elections, demobilization and disarmament of the parties, and UN implementation of the agreement. The warring parties consented to the agreement as a result of their sponsors' coercion, and remained deeply suspicious of one another, as well as distrustful of the international consortium—the Core Group, consisting of the permanent five of the UN Security Council and interested regional states, including Japan and Australia—that brokered the agreement.

The party to the settlement that commanded the most scrutiny was the KR. Responsible for the deaths of nearly 2 million Cambodian citizens during their three years in power, the KR survived because of its military prowess, support from China, and diplomatic recognition from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States. The inclusion of the KR in the peace process evolved from the recognition by the United States and others that the KR could not be defeated militarily and the hope that peace would marginalize it.²⁵

Between November 1991 and May 1992, the KR complied sporadically with the Paris settlement. Immediately after the accords were signed, but before the deployment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), a KR spokesman, Khieu Samphan, attempted to open a political office in Phnom Penh, only to be attacked by SOC-inspired rioters. Samphan retreated to

---

Bangkok, and the KR demanded 1,000 peacekeepers to provide security in Phnom Penh. At about the same time, Sihanouk proposed a SOC-FUNCINPEC coalition government as a means of isolating the KR, which was a violation of the spirit and law of the Paris Accords. As a result of these two incidents, a lobby was created that argued the KR was ready to implement the accords but was frightened into noncompliance by its antagonists. Some experts suggested there were two Khmer Rouges: “moderate” KR who wanted peace, and “hard-line” KR who wanted war. Other analysts argued that KR commitment to the accords was always tactical and the belligerence of their adversaries provided them with a convenient excuse for their spoiler behavior. Evidence of KR intentions, based on interviews of their top officials and lowly foot soldiers, suggests that the party was committed to the peace process insofar as it promised to return it to power. The KR interpreted the Paris Accords as giving UNTAC the right to dismantle SOC’s administration and expel all ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia. If UNTAC carried out such a program, then the KR would benefit from the crisis that would ensue for SOC.

The KR’s inconsistent behavior between November 1991 and May 1992 provided evidence for different interpretations about its intentions. The KR frequently violated the cease-fire, restricted UN mobility in its areas, boycotted joint military consultations, and attacked a UN helicopter in February 1992, wounding a peacekeeper. When UNTAC began in March 1992, the KR “adopted a posture of cautious cooperation, despite engaging in numerous ceasefire violations.” On the positive side, it allowed some UNTAC civilians in its areas. Samphan actively represented the KR on the Supreme National Council (SNC), a transitional body composed of representatives of the warring parties, and cooperated on several humanitarian initiatives with the United Nations. On the negative side, the few military observers allowed into KR


27. Although the Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991, the operational plan for UNTAC was not presented to the Security Council for approval until February 19, 1992. On February 28 the Security Council approved the mission, and on March 15 the secretary-general’s special representative to Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, arrived in Phnom Penh. A small UN holding operation was deployed as a bridge between the signing of the Paris Accords and the arrival of UNTAC.


29. Ibid.
territory were so limited in their activities that "at times they seemed more hostages than monitors." 30

The issue of KR noncompliance surfaced publicly in May and June 1992. On May 30, 1992, a group of KR soldiers refused to allow a UN armed convoy, accompanied by the secretary-general's special representative, Yasushi Akashi, and his force commander, General John Sanderson, to enter KR territory in western Cambodia. Instead of insisting on UNTAC's right of passage and challenging the soldiers, Akashi retreated. When cantonment, demobilization, and disarmament of all of the warring parties began in June, the KR stalled. It insisted that it would not canton its soldiers, because Vietnamese forces were still present in Cambodia in violation of the Paris Accords and because UNTAC had not established effective control over SOC. The KR insisted that it would comply with demobilization only if UNTAC dismantled existing SOC administrative structures and vested the SNC with the power to run the country.

UNTAC officials debated the use of force to gain KR compliance. French general Michel Loridon, UNTAC's deputy military commander, believed that a show of strength would compel the KR to meet its obligations and would establish a reputation among the other factions that the United Nations would enforce compliance. If the United Nations did not act, Loridon maintained, it would lose credibility with the KR and the other parties. He asserted that UNTAC had the legal authority to enforce compliance, and did not need to seek a Chapter 7 mandate to do so. 31 Human rights organizations and non-governmental humanitarian organizations in Cambodia supported Loridon's call for toughness against the KR. 32

Akashi and Sanderson opposed the use or threat of force against the KR for several reasons. First, Sanderson drew no distinction between threatening the KR with force to gain compliance and going to war with the KR. 33 This dovetailed with Akashi's assessment that the troop contributors to the mission, as well as the Core Group, would oppose fighting a war. Second, Sanderson

31. Under the UN Charter, a Chapter 7 operation permits enforcement against identified threats to peace and does not require the warring parties' consent.
felt that UNTAC was not organized for offensive operations and would thus prove ineffective. Third, both Akashi and Sanderson argued that any attempt to use force would destroy the Core Group's consensus; it was unlikely that the group would immediately agree to condemn KR behavior and condone the use or threat of force. Fourth, they believed that if the Core Group disintegrated, the operation would collapse. Fifth, they thought that any use of force would undermine the attempt to negotiate compliance, which was Akashi's preferred approach and which meshed with Sanderson's belief in the "good Khmer Rouge–bad Khmer Rouge" line; as long as there were good KR, there was a possibility of earning their voluntary compliance. Sixth, Akashi feared that using force against the KR would upset the balance of the peace process. FUNCINPEC and KPNLF derived some of their power from the KR counterbalance to SOC; to weaken the KR might tempt SOC to seek an outright victory.

Akashi chose to eschew force and instead sought to discuss with the KR its noncompliance. He quickly realized that the KR interpreted two key components of the Paris Accords in ways counter to their spirit. First, the KR believed that an injunction for the removal of all "foreign forces" meant all foreigners, regardless of their status as combatants. At stake was the political status of non-Khmer Cambodians, especially ethnic Vietnamese who lived in Cambodia. Second, the KR insisted that the accords required the complete destruction of SOC administrative structures. Akashi realized that meeting the first demand would violate human rights and pander to ethnic extremism, and that meeting the second demand was impossible: UNTAC did not have the administrative personnel or know-how to replace SOC. The likely result would be chaos, which, although satisfying KR aspirations, would destroy the peace process.34 Akashi chose not to appease KR demands and began to build a strategy for managing the party's spoiler behavior. He met with local representatives of KR patrons—Thailand and China—to create a unified approach to the problem, privately condemned KR noncompliance at SNC meetings, and warned then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that pressure would likely have to be applied in the future.

In diagnosing the problem in a letter to Boutros-Ghali on July 27, 1992, Akashi describes the KR rejection of UNTAC's efforts to address its concerns and states that KR behavior had demonstrated that it was not sincerely committed to the peace process. He attributes KR noncompliance to its attempt "to gain what it could not get either in the battlefield or in the Paris negotiations,

that is, to improve its political and military power to such an extent that the other parties will be placed at a distinct disadvantage when UNTAC leaves.\textsuperscript{35} Akashi then chronicles KR acts of bad faith and asserts that Samphan “is little more than a glorified mouthpiece of . . . Pol Pot,” who “seems to be dedicated to the doctrine of simultaneously ‘talk and fight.’”\textsuperscript{36} He argues that the circumstances dictate a strategy of “patient persuasion” and “sustained pressure,” and insists that UNTAC “will adhere to an impartial stand, while criticizing any acts in violation of the Paris Agreement.” Although doubting KR good faith, Akashi asserts that keeping an open door to its participation will prevent turning its followers into a “permanent disgruntled minority.”\textsuperscript{37}

Akashi points out that leverage over the KR could come from Thailand and China. He expresses skepticism about the former because of the Thai government’s unwillingness to control several army generals who collaborated with the KR in illegal timber and gem trading across the Thai border. Akashi also argues that China’s influence over the KR waned after the signing of the peace accords and its cessation of assistance to the KR. He requests that if KR noncompliance continues, then Boutros-Ghali should mobilize economic pressure against the KR: “This should not, however, involve any spectacular action, but rather a steady strengthening of our border checkpoints adjacent to the DK [KR] zones, in order to control the inflow of arms and petroleum and the outflow of gems and logs, a major source of DK’s [KR’s] income.”\textsuperscript{38}

By leaving open the door to the KR to rejoin the peace process, Akashi hoped to contain its dispute with UNTAC and to limit its hostility to the peace process. An aggressive stance toward the KR would make targets of all UNTAC’s personnel. If KR opposition could be contained, UNTAC could redeploy its peacekeepers to protect the election, which would go forward without the KR. The Australian foreign ministry promoted Akashi’s strategy in a September 1992 policy paper that became the basis of the international response to the KR.\textsuperscript{39} It sought a concerted response from the Core Group,


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 207.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

based on the judgment that KR “demands are not in strict accord with the actual terms of the Paris Agreements.”\textsuperscript{40}

Although Sanderson was loathe to try to enforce KR compliance with the peace process, he reconfigured the peacekeepers to protect the strategic objective of holding the elections. He redeployed his battalions in ways that could contain KR attacks and reinterpreted the traditional peacekeeping doctrine of neutrality and impartiality, going so far as to use military units of all of the factions (save the KR) to assist UNTAC in providing security during the election. Sanderson justified using soldiers from the other parties by insisting that these armies were not deployed against the KR per se, but rather against any force determined to disrupt the election. In a rather ingenious formulation, he described the changed military mission as “an interposition strategy, but not between opposing forces. Rather, it was between a highly moral act sanctioned under international law and supported by international consensus, and any person or group which might threaten it.”\textsuperscript{41}

To help establish an atmosphere where civilians would feel secure in participating in an election, UNTAC created a radio station in December 1992. Although its purpose was to convince voters of ballot secrecy and to explain UNTAC’s mission and activities, it also aimed to neutralize KR propaganda. The establishment of Radio UNTAC overcame objections of the UN Secretariat, among others, that an independent media outlet would endanger UNTAC’s perceived neutrality.

From September 1992 to May 1993, the scheduled month for elections, UNTAC held firm in its strategy. The Core Group clearly signaled that the peace process would go forward without KR participation. China and Thailand acceded to a nonbinding Security Council resolution to impose economic sanctions on the KR. And as the election date drew near, both China and Thailand explicitly supported the elections. Although the KR increased its attacks against UNTAC during March and April 1993, it did not unleash a military offensive against the elections, which were held as planned.

UNTAC’s strategy for dealing with the KR was imaginative and effective, and serves as the prototype of the departing train strategy for managing spoilers. When faced with KR attempts to undermine peace, UNTAC emphasized that the peace process would not exclude the KR, nor would it be held

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

hostage by it. UNTAC tried first to address the KR’s specific demands, but
when such demands threatened the core agreement of the peace process, 
UNTAC sought international consensus to delegitimize KR demands and to
approve the strategy of continuing the peace process in its absence. UNTAC
reconfigured itself militarily to protect the electoral process from KR attack,
but left open the door to the KR if it wanted to reengage the peace process.

CASE 3. CAMBODIA II: SOC AND INDUCEMENT
The motivation of the Khmer Rouge was difficult to gauge because its griev-
ance toward UNTAC’s lack of control over SOC had some merit. UNTAC faced
an ongoing problem of SOC obstruction of its mandate; and it never estab-
lished control of SOC’s administrative structures, given the lack of qualified
personnel in the numbers that were needed, SOC’s tendency to ignore and
sabotage UNTAC directives, and UNTAC’s unwillingness to assert its admin-
istrative prerogatives as outlined in the Paris Accords. An equally pressing
matter of control concerned SOC’s police and security forces. Throughout
UNTAC’s life span, SOC police intimidated civil society organizations and
physically assaulted and assassinated members of the opposition. While UN-
TAC reconfigured its military mission to protect the election from KR attack,
SOC security personnel waged a low-level reign of terror against its party’s
electoral competition.

Despite warnings and protest by some UNTAC human rights officials,
Akashi did not perceive SOC as a potential spoiler and was unprepared when
it attempted to undermine the peace process immediately after the May 1993
election. The election results devastated SOC; despite SOC’s use of intimidat-
ion, assassination, and fraud, FUNCINPEC beat SOC’s political party, the
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which disputed the election results and
attempted to grab power. The president of SOC, Hun Sen, charged that the
election was fraudulent; some CPP officials declared secession for one region
of the country; and SOC-orchestrated riots throughout Cambodia threatened
UNTAC officials. At the very moment that UNTAC had seemingly achieved
success, SOC threatened to tear down the whole edifice of peace in Cambodia.

From the beginning of the implementation of the Paris Accords, Akashi, the
United Nations, and the Core Group focused mostly on the KR as a threat to
peace and ignored the potential for SOC to be a spoiler. Moreover, KR spoiler
behavior created incentives and excuses for SOC to undermine the peace
process. Unless both spoilers carried out their commitments to the peace
process, each could claim that their behavior was a function of the other.
Witnessing violence or lack of commitment by their opponent, they asserted that playing by the rules would leave them vulnerable. This rationale can become a barrier for peacemakers who seek to determine the real motivation behind acts of violence and subversion. In cases of mimetic spoilers, peacemakers tend to accept a situational explanation for spoiler behavior—an explanation that may be correct and will seem reasonable—and overlook the possibility that such an explanation may also be a facade for a party already committed to tactical subversion of the peace process.

The departing train strategy toward the KR increased Akashi’s perception that UNTAC was dependent on SOC and was thus limited in its options for controlling it. That UNTAC was dependent on SOC is not in doubt; if SOC left the peace process, there would be no elections and the parties would return to war. But Akashi failed to comprehend SOC’s dependence on UNTAC. UNTAC had greatly strengthened SOC, which had a stake in holding the election and gaining international legitimacy and support. If SOC had to wage another war against the KR, it would do so from a stronger position with international support and FUNCINPEC’s abandonment of its former coalition partner. Akashi also misread command-and-control relations within SOC. He told aides of his fear that Hun Sen had only tenuous control over hard-liners, who if pushed too far would rebel against Hun Sen and return to war. Akashi’s staff, however, believed Hun Sen to be firmly in control of his followers.

Although the accords contained numerous references to administrative control, the United Nations interpreted UNTAC’s mandate in a limited way. UNTAC was “urged to rely on ‘codes of conduct and guidelines for management’” and to eschew issuing binding directives.42 Akashi, under the advice of Boutros-Ghali, envisioned UNTAC exerting control through monitoring and supervising existing administrative structures.43 Moreover, Akashi worried about UNTAC’s lack of domestic legitimacy; he envisioned the SNC as a governing body that could make hard decisions, referee the peace process, and therefore provide domestic legitimacy for actions against spoilers. Although the SNC did assist the strategy against the KR by ruling that its demands were illegitimate, it proved much less effective toward SOC.

For the most part, UNTAC restrained from attempting to enforce compliance with its administrative directives. Akashi did not want to use the prerogative of replacing or repositioning SOC bureaucrats. His restraint in the face of SOC

42. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, p. 37.
43. Ibid.
obstruction prompted the head of UNTAC administration, Gerald Porcell, to resign in February 1993. At the time, Porcell lamented that as long as UNTAC did not “have the political will to apply the peace accords, its control cannot but be ineffective.”

UNTAC was also lax in holding SOC accountable for human rights violations. Although UNTAC’s mandate for creating an environment conducive to human rights was the most ambitious ever for a UN peacekeeping operation, its enforcement of violations was “dilatory, sporadic, and improvised.” Akashi interpreted UNTAC’s human rights mandate narrowly. He believed that rigorous action to enforce human rights would endanger UNTAC’s neutrality; moreover, he felt that a broad interpretation of human rights “seemed to be based on unrealistically high standards in the context of Cambodia’s reality.”

As violence increased and the political climate deteriorated at the end of 1992, Akashi acceded to the establishment of a special prosecutor’s office. But as William Shawcross notes, “the office languished as Akashi, Sanderson, and other UNTAC officials began to fear that prosecutorial zeal might destroy the entire mission’s fragile links with the Phnom Penh regime.” Akashi was indirectly supported in this in February 1993 when ASEAN and China exerted pressure to limit the human rights component of UNTAC to education and training.

Between May 1992 and May 1993, UNTAC pursued a de facto policy of inducement against SOC. It usually did not act against SOC violations; when it did, it sought to deter SOC obstruction through private persuasion. Akashi asserted that the parties need not adhere strictly to all of their commitments. As he later wrote, “too rigid, legalistic interpretations of the agreements would have hindered my work.” He believed that although the accords were “based on the concepts of Western democracy, Asian methods and procedures should be used in the negotiations.”

Such methods found public reprimand (or acknowledgment of violation of agreements) distasteful.

44. Gerald Porcell, as quoted in Findlay, Cambodia, p. 63.
45. Ibid., p. 64.
46. Ibid., p. 66.
48. Ibid., pp. 59–60.
50. Ibid., p. 13.
In May 1993 UNTAC’s tacit strategy of inducement became explicit in its response to SOC’s attacks immediately after the election. UNTAC’s support of the election results was less than steadfast. Within the first forty-eight hours, Akashi attempted to console Hun Sen and promised to investigate fully his charges of electoral fraud. He also sought out the leader of FUNCINPEC, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, to urge him to be conciliatory toward the CPP.

In the two weeks after the election, the CPP resorted to violence “to blackmail both FUNCINPEC and UNTAC in an attempt to reverse the election results.” As Shawcross writes, the CPP attempt at blackmail was largely successful. Fearing a return to open civil war, the United Nations acceded to a power-sharing arrangement mediated by Sihanouk that provided SOC with more power and cabinet positions than its electoral performance deserved. Akashi acknowledged that the deal was “unorthodox by universal democratic principles,” but he defended it on the basis of the “practical wisdom” of combining FUNCINPEC’s political appeal with the administrative experience and power of the CPP.

Akashi believed that compliance on most of the dimensions of the peace process, including demobilization and disarmament, and human rights protection, was secondary to compliance with holding an election. The election became a “holy grail” for UNTAC; Akashi defined the mission’s success solely on the basis of achieving it, and the myriad goals of UNTAC’s mandate—promotion and protection of human rights, disarmament and demobilization, and administrative control during the transition—were made subservient to this quest. In the end, this even included rejecting a “strict adherence” to the results of the election; Akashi and UNTAC did not insist that the political outcome of the election accurately reflect the electoral outcome, for fear that it would undermine the triumph of holding the election.

In hindsight, it is possible to hazard a tentative judgment about the effectiveness of UNTAC’s strategies for managing the spoiler problems in the Cambodian peace process. The strategy it chose to deal with the KR has been vindicated. The KR’s power declined; in the summer of 1996, a severe factional split decimated the party; and in June 1997 an internal rebellion by soldiers

52. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
who wanted to end the war deposed Pol Pot. Time has not been so kind in evaluating UNTAC’s strategy toward SOC. For instance, SOC’s steadily increasing grip on power since 1993 caused several experts on Cambodia in 1996 to warn of a “creeping coup.” Such warring turned prophetic in July 1997 when Hun Sen and SOC attacked FUNCINPEC, sent Prince Ranariddh into exile, and assassinated FUNCINPEC officials and pro-democracy advocates. As the United States, the United Nations, and ASEAN engaged in collective hand-wringing, SOC skillfully manipulated an internationally negotiated and implemented peace process to triumph in a war that it could not win on the battlefield.

CASE 4. ANGOLA: UNITA AND THE FAILURE OF INDUCEMENT
In May 1991 the two main antagonists in the Angolan civil war, the government of Angola and UNITA, signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal. The agreement, mediated by Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union, called for an eighteen-month transition period during which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. At the end of this period, elections would determine the presidency and composition of a national assembly. The agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the election’s loser to receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure. Although each party had been urged to consider various power-sharing options, both vetoed them in the belief that they would win the elections.

The government of Angola reluctantly accepted a role for the United Nations to monitor and assist implementation of the peace agreement. The role and size of the UN presence was the result of hard bargaining between UNITA, which wanted a large UN force with an active mandate to implement the agreement, and the government of Angola, which perceived a large UN presence as an infringement of its sovereignty.

The UN operation in Angola was done on a small budget with little independent latitude. The parties themselves were left to carry out the demobilization, and they failed. By May 1992 about 70 percent of the estimated 160,000 soldiers had been processed at assembly points, but only 6,000 had been demobilized. By the elections on September 29–30, substantially more govern-

ment troops had demobilized than had UNITA soldiers; nonetheless, both sides had intact armies. Between January and September 1992, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least sixteen skirmishes could have escalated into major combat between the parties. That they did not was attributed to the parties' determination to see the process through to elections and their command and control over their armed forces.

Until late summer 1992, the United States and the United Nations were more apprehensive about the Angolan government's willingness to abide by the peace process than they were about UNITA's. The biggest worry for U.S. policymakers on Angola was that the government might not accept an electoral defeat and would throw the peace process into crisis. Nonetheless, UNITA's president, Jonas Savimbi, provided a sign that he might be the obstacle to ending the war. Under cover of the agreement, UNITA stationed soldiers throughout the country—especially in areas it had previously not engaged—and it cached arms for quick access. In addition, rumors suggested that UNITA was holding back armed battalions across the Zaire border. A top Savimbi aide defected and informed the United States of UNITA's plan for a quick-strike offensive to take the country by force.

The transition period had upset the balance of power between the two militaries. The cantonment process had worked decisively in UNITA's favor; UNITA's army maintained its discipline and remained a unified force that could be mobilized quickly for fighting purposes. The government's army, on the other hand, suffered from poor morale; desertion and drunkenness were rife. Savimbi's generals informed him that Angola could be taken by a military surprise attack—a sentiment that Savimbi relayed to officials in Washington in August, two months before the elections.

As elections drew near, U.S. policymakers grew alarmed about Savimbi's potential as a spoiler. Reports circulated that his standing among Angolan voters was in decline, raising the possibility that Savimbi would lose the election. Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen and his Portuguese counterpart traveled to Angola at the beginning of September to persuade Savimbi and Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos to share

56. Confidential interview.
57. Confidential interview.
power after the elections. While Savimbi responded enthusiastically to the plan, dos Santos privately expressed interest but felt he could not publicly commit to such a deal. In the end, no contingency plan was formed in case Savimbi lost the election.

The elections were peaceful. The United Nations took multiple, intricate precautions to prevent fraud: representatives of the competing parties were present at the 5,800 polling stations and at every municipal, provincial, and national electoral center. Party representatives signed off on results sheets at each level, a process that added days to the vote counting. There were numerous logistical foul-ups, but international observers judged the elections to be free from intimidation and fraud. The results jibed with the UN electoral unit’s quick count, thus confirming that fraud did not occur.\(^5\) In the legislative elections, the ruling Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) outpolled UNITA by a five to three margin. Dos Santos received about 49 percent to Savimbi’s 40 percent for the presidency; as no candidate received 50 percent of the vote, a runoff election would have to be held in thirty days.

Problems emerged as soon as the preliminary results were reported. The first results came from Luanda, an MPLA stronghold; not surprisingly, they showed the MPLA and dos Santos with a large majority. Savimbi and UNITA immediately cried foul and issued a bombastic five-page memo (in English) declaring that the MPLA was engaged in massive fraud and warning in veiled terms that UNITA would resume the war if it lost the election. When returns from the central provinces (UNITA’s stronghold) did not offset MPLA’s early lead, UNITA withdrew its generals from the joint command of the newly established united Angolan army. Savimbi retreated to a redoubt, refused to meet any foreign officials or take a phone call from Cohen, denounced the United Nations, and repeatedly ignored international calls for reasonableness. His army then launched attacks throughout the Angolan countryside, quickly seizing large amounts of territory and destroying government arms depots.

The international response to Savimbi was scattershot. The United Nations at first insisted on the primacy of the elections and condemned Savimbi for obstructing them. The United States initially urged Savimbi to use the established mechanisms for investigating his electoral grievances, making its appeal over Voice of America because Savimbi would not speak with U.S. officials. As the United Nations attempted to press Savimbi to honor the election results and participate in a presidential runoff election, South Africa’s foreign minister,

Pik Botha, visited Savimbi and unilaterally put forward a plan to shelve new elections and to provide for a government of national unity. Policymakers in Washington quickly chose a similar option: to press the MPLA into a power-sharing agreement to appease Savimbi.

The U.S. response established the international strategy toward Savimbi. By initially equivocating, the United States failed to challenge him; then, by interpreting his actions as understandable and reasonable, it chose a strategy of inducement, which served only to encourage further aggression. Savimbi continued his attempts to defeat the Angolan government and to avoid serious negotiations. A year later in November 1993, Savimbi returned to negotiations, but only after the rearmed Angolan military had rolled back UNITA's gains, the United States had granted diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, the United Nations had imposed sanctions against UNITA, and 300,000 Angolans had been killed.

Washington's strategy of inducement toward Savimbi was disputed by U.S. officials in Angola, including Ambassador-designate Edmund De Jarnette. From the beginning of the crisis, he and others stationed in Luanda diagnosed the problem as stemming from Savimbi's personality and ambitions. They believed he was motivated by a desire to win complete power in Angola. These officials counseled giving Savimbi an ultimatum to return to the peace process, backed by a threat of use of U.S. military force. From the onset of the crisis through 1993, De Jarnette argued that an inducement strategy toward Savimbi would fail.

U.S. officials in Washington, however, believed that Savimbi did not want to overturn the peace process, but simply desired a better deal. Long-standing ties between Savimbi and the Defense Department and intelligence agencies were part of the problem; individuals who knew Savimbi and had been romanced by him could not bring themselves to find him at fault. Likewise, negotiators who had worked hard to get an agreement could not believe that one of the signatories was rejecting a compromise solution outright. And those in Washington who were swayed by the analysis of the U.S. diplomats in Luanda were stymied by the tight connections between Savimbi's Washington lobbyists and the Bush administration.

In retrospect, a top U.S. policymaker admits that the strategy of inducement toward Savimbi was "clutching at straws," but insists that a tougher policy was out of the question.59 The Bush administration was preoccupied with the November 1992 presidential election and then with the humanitarian crisis and

59. Confidential interview.
intervention in Somalia in December. Moreover, Savimbi’s Washington connections precluded any use of the stick. Inducement failed in Angola because U.S. policymakers erroneously believed that limited incentives would satisfy Savimbi. Furthermore, they were not prepared when inducement emboldened Savimbi to continue his spoiler behavior. In part, Savimbi’s personality defined the conflict in all-or-nothing terms; a combination of racism, paranoia, and megalomania led him to believe that the MPLA had stolen the election from him and that he had the right to rule all of Angola. In October 1992, at the time that he rejected the elections, anything less than an absolute firm stand against his pursuit of war and a credible threat of force and sanctions against UNITA had little chance of persuading him to return to the peace process. The initial choice of inducement convinced Savimbi that the international community would likely defer to his return to war. Inducement proved that the U.S. and South African governments saw Savimbi’s demands and actions as legitimate. There was little international support for rallying behind the sanctity of the Bicesse process.

The change in power positions of the two main players, the MPLA and UNITA, also worked against the inducement strategy. By October 1992 the peace process had greatly strengthened UNITA; Savimbi was confident that UNITA could win the war and he underestimated the resolve and capability of the MPLA to fight. It is possible that if Savimbi had been in a position of military weakness in October 1992, and the international community held a monopoly of rewards, inducement might have brought him back into the fold. Savimbi, however, continued to have uninterrupted sources of revenue through UNITA’s control of diamond mines and support from some of his neighbors—Mobutu in Zaire and rogue elements in the South African defense forces—who would continue to supply him with arms, ammunition, and fuel to aggressively fight the war.

CASE 5. MOZAMBIQUE: RENAMO AND SUCCESSFUL INDUCEMENT
In October 1992 the government of Mozambique signed a peace agreement with RENAMO, a South African–trained and assisted guerrilla movement. Although RENAMO was unable to defeat the Mozambican government, it had rendered much of the country ungovernable. RENAMO’s use of terror, indiscriminate killing of civilians, press-ganging of child soldiers, and its destructive capacity had earned it the appellation “the Khmer Rouge of Africa.” Upon assuming the task of implementing the peace accords, the United Nations, having witnessed Savimbi’s return to war in Angola and being concerned
about the character of RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, doubted the sincerity of RENAMO's commitment to the negotiated settlement.60

The tardy deployment of UN peacekeepers and establishment of an administrative capacity to oversee cantonment and demobilization of troops provided RENAMO and the government an excuse to stall on their obligations under the peace treaty.61 But as the necessary UN units and personnel arrived in Mozambique and eliminated the excuse, UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello found himself stymied by the warring parties' continuing noncooperation—especially RENAMO, which embarked on a three-month boycott of the implementation process.62

To bring RENAMO back into the fold, Ajello pursued two policies. First, the peace accord's mediators stressed that Dhlakama, in addition to searching for security assurances, placed a high priority on the issue of legitimacy—that his movement had fought for a just cause, had domestic roots, and was not simply a puppet of South Africa—and hungered for recognition as a Mozambican nationalist who had fought for democracy.63 Much of RENAMO's behavior belied such a self-image, and Dhlakama's vision of democracy was not multiparty pluralism where parties do not return to war if they lose, or eliminate their adversary if they win. A key task for Ajello therefore was to socialize RENAMO into the rules of democratic competition, and to make its legitimacy contingent on fulfilling its commitment to peace. The subcustodians of the peace process—the representatives of the countries supporting the UN Observation Mission in Mozambique—assisted Ajello by continuously reinforcing Dhlakama's desire for legitimacy. Leaders of neighboring countries overcame their distaste for RENAMO, met with Dhlakama, and treated him as a legitimate national leader.

Second, Ajello understood that it was crucial to wean RENAMO from its military raison d'être. To do so, he fulfilled a promise that mediators made to Dhlakama to provide financial assistance to RENAMO to transform it into a democratic party. Italy, Ajello's home country, gave him a $15 million fund to

63. This is an ongoing theme of Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1995). Hume was the U.S. State Department delegate to the Rome peace talks.
assist RENAMO’s renovation. This fund, combined with the flexibility to use it in conjunction with gaining incremental compliance to the accords, gave Ajello enormous leverage with RENAMO. This leverage was amplified because of the unique context of the Mozambican case. Unlike Angola, where Savimbi bankrolled his spoiler behavior through the illegal diamond trade, or Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge replenished its weapons and ammunition through illicit gem and timber deals, Mozambique’s paucity of accessible valuable commodities deprived RENAMO of resources if it chose to reject peace.

Although Ajello’s use of inducements kept RENAMO engaged in the peace process, it also encouraged Dhlakama to continue voicing grievances and making demands on the United Nations. Ajello resolved several incidents involving cantonment and demobilization by acceding to RENAMO demands that were not contained in the peace accords.64 Eventually, Ajello grew frustrated with RENAMO’s tactics and threatened withdrawal. Ajello used a visit by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to Mozambique in October 1993 to convince RENAMO that the continuation of the peace process was conditional on RENAMO meeting its obligations. The withdrawal threat yielded short-term results; RENAMO pledged anew its commitment to peace, and UN officials reported progress on implementing key provisions of the agreement.

Ajello discovered, however, that the closer the peace process came to the election in October 1994, the more the United Nations’ threat of withdrawal declined in credibility. Having spent $800 million on the peace process, the United Nations could not convince RENAMO of its pledge to walk away without at least holding elections.65 Ajello therefore relied increasingly on inducement, even though the risk of whetting Dhlakama’s appetite grew more dangerous as the elections drew near. What would happen, for example, if RENAMO lost the elections and demanded that the results be annulled in the hope of being rewarded for its obstructionist behavior?

The United Nations had sought to make the actions of a post-election spoiler irrelevant by fully demobilizing both armies and creating a new unified army. Demobilization, however, was incomplete; both RENAMO and the govern-

65. Michael Doyle refers to this problem as the “obsolescing bargain of peacekeeping”: as long as few resources are committed, UN influence is high; as soon as the United Nations commits substantial resources and personnel, its influence wanes. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, pp. 82-83.
ment had armies at the time of the elections in October 1994. Neither side, however, had anything close to the amount of troops wielded by the parties in Angola in October 1992; RENAMO and the government had several thousand troops held in reserve. If the loser decided to defect from the peace process, it would still possess a destructive capacity, but not a force capable of winning the civil war in a short period.

Given the UN and U.S. experience of Savimbi’s overturn of the elections in Angola in 1992, as well as the use of violence by SOC to blackmail UNTAC after the Cambodian elections, it is remarkable that as late as June 1994, four months before the Mozambican elections, neither the United Nations nor the U.S. embassy in Maputo had contingency plans in case the loser of the election refused to accept the results. Instead of thinking strategically about the possibility, the United States unsuccessfully urged the parties to consider a power-sharing pact that would establish a South African–style government of national unity after the elections. On the other hand, the governments of states in the region, very much chastened by the experience of Savimbi in 1992, began consultations on responses if Dhlakama threatened to return to war.

RENAMO did attempt to boycott the elections and reject the results. Because the United Nations had not set a limit on how far inducement would go, diplomats from the neighboring countries of Zimbabwe and South Africa had to meet with Dhlakama and warn in no uncertain terms that they would not accept any obstruction of the elections. The United Nations and the United States followed the warning both with an appeal to Dhlakama’s desire to be a legitimate national actor and democrat and with a promise to investigate any alleged electoral fraud. RENAMO rejoined the elections, withdrew its charges of fraud, and took its seats in the newly elected Mozambican parliament.

**Spoiler Management: Evaluating Success and Failure**

The case studies suggest several general findings about managing spoilers in peace processes. First, they illustrate that spoiler type, number of spoilers, and

67. My impression from interviews with UN and U.S. officials in Maputo at the time is of the unwillingness to consider seriously the possibility that a loser might overturn the election. The refrain that I received from both UN and U.S. officials was “this is not Angola.” When pushed to describe the differences that mitigated against a Savimbi-type outcome, the same officials stated that the elections would take place in October only if both armies were fully demobilized, thus rendering moot any obstructionist behavior. In the end, this proved not to be the case.
locus of the spoiler problem are key variables that affect the robustness of strategies for managing spoilers. Second, the cases underscore the need for custodians to diagnose correctly the spoiler problem, a task made difficult by the fog of peacemaking. Third, the cases show that quite often the very rules, beliefs, and frames that custodians use to cope with the complexity of peace processes defeat them. Fourth, the cases of successful spoiler management demonstrate that spoilers need not destroy peace—if custodians create robust strategies, seek international consensus behind the strategy, and recognize the much maligned force of normative power.

DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
The case studies demonstrate that the creation of an effective strategy of spoiler management rests first on the correct diagnosis of the spoiler problem, a good diagnosis, and the selection of an appropriate strategy to treat the problem. Choice of strategy depends on judgment about the intentions of the spoiler and awareness of constraints posed by other parties to the conflict.

The failure to manage spoilers in Rwanda, Angola, and Cambodia (SOC) stemmed from poor diagnosis and the choice of a strategy that was inadequate to the problem at hand. In contrast, common to the successful cases—Cambodia (KR) and Mozambique—was early identification of a potential problem, a good diagnosis, and the selection of an appropriate strategy to treat the problem. By examining the specific strategies—withdrawal, departing train, and inducement—we can begin to understand the conditions that favor or mitigate against their effectiveness.

Withdrawal. Custodians used the threat of withdrawal as a primary strategy in Rwanda and as a secondary strategy in Mozambique. In Rwanda the strategy pressured Habyarimana, a limited spoiler, into implementing the Arusha Accords, but provided a green light for the CDR, a total spoiler, to commit genocide to stop them. In Mozambique the strategy created a short-term sense of urgency among the warring parties to fulfill their obligations to peace before the opportunity to end the war disappeared.

These two cases suggest that the withdrawal strategy's effectiveness depends in part on the type of spoiler at which it is aimed, the number of spoilers in the peace process, and the credibility of the threat. The withdrawal strategy is a coercive strategy that aims to punish recalcitrance by taking away the opportunity for peace. For the strategy to have its intended effect, the target has to view the withdrawal of international engagement as a punishment. Moreover, for the threat to be credible, the custodian must seem indifferent to the
ending of the war. Against a total spoiler like the CDR in Rwanda, the strategy cannot work, because the spoiler does not view withdrawal as punishment. Indeed, the strategy can backfire if it signals to the total spoiler that the custodian lacks a commitment to peace.

The withdrawal strategy is a blunt instrument of spoiler management. The strategy can work only if all parties to an agreement are equally culpable in failing their obligations and all spoilers are limited spoilers who want a settlement to succeed. The threat of withdrawal can then provide a test of motivation: if the parties are committed to the peace process, the possibility of losing international support might provoke them into beginning the implementation process. Where not all parties are spoilers, as in Rwanda, the strategy punishes even those parties committed to peace. Where one party is a total spoiler, as in Rwanda, the withdrawal strategy gives it a veto on the peace process.

**The Departing Train** The departing train strategy was successful in Cambodia against the KR, a total spoiler. Success derived from the ability of the custodians to learn the spoiler’s intentions; the strong degree of international consensus and unity behind a judgment that the spoiler’s demands were illegitimate; the deployment of force to protect the peace process; and the custodian’s willingness to stand firm in implementing the peace process.

The departing train strategy was developed by UNTAC in Cambodia to deal with the KR. Evidence then and now suggests that the KR was a total spoiler and that a coercive strategy was necessary, but UNTAC judged that it was constrained from using either force to defeat the KR or coercive diplomacy to threaten it. The use of force against the KR ran the risk of escalation, which could have endangered the overall UNTAC mission. Moreover, the use of force against the KR could have weakened FUNCINPEC, which used the existence of the KR as leverage against SOC. The departing train strategy held out the possibility of continuing the peace process while marginalizing the KR. UNTAC ruled that KR demands were illegitimate, continued the peace process without the KR, and established a deadline—the election—for it to join the process. UNTAC then redeployed its force to protect the election.

The departing train strategy requires that external actors take a stand on the spoiler’s demands: Are they legitimate and important enough to halt the progress at compromise that the other parties have made? For the strategy to work, external actors (including current and former patrons of the spoiler) must concur that if the spoiler’s demands are met, peace may be unattainable. Having made a decision that the peace process will go on without the spoiler, external actors must find ways to protect the parties of peace. Attempts can be
made through the spoiler’s patron to warn the spoiler of dire implications if it escalates its attacks; and the custodian can deploy military forces to protect people and processes such as elections.

The departing train strategy also depends on the custodian’s ability to convince all parties that the peace process will proceed without everyone on board. International consensus is crucial for sustaining such credibility. In Cambodia the commitment of China and Thailand to the election timetable clearly conveyed to the KR that the peace train was departing.

The Cambodian case suggests two limitations of the strategy. First, the strategy is a gamble that the parties to the peace process will be strengthened sufficiently to deal with the spoiler on their own after international disengagement from the process. The strategy’s long-term success rests on the ability of the parties favoring peace to form a strong enough front to withstand future challenges. For example, when UNTAC departed in 1993, the KR had not been eliminated, but it had been marginalized. Subsequent developments have vindicated the strategy: a major faction of the KR broke away from the party in 1996, leaving it in crisis. Second, the strategy can make the custodian dependent on the parties who get on the train. In Cambodia, for example, the strategy against the KR required that SOC be part of the peace process. UNTAC’s sense of dependence on SOC constrained it from opposing SOC’s behavior as an inside greedy spoiler.

Inducement Inducement was attempted against SOC in Cambodia, UNITA in Angola, and RENAMO in Mozambique. Although the strategy failed in the first two cases, inducement toward RENAMO largely succeeded, albeit in conjunction with a heavy emphasis on the socialization of RENAMO and an implied threat by regional actors that established the limits of inducement.

The three cases of inducement suggest that this strategy can only succeed with limited spoilers. Toward SOC, a greedy spoiler, the inducement strategy backfired by strengthening SOC and weakening FUNCINPEC. The only strategy that might have managed SOC would have been a strong socialization effort that would have established strong norms of human rights, democracy, and good governance, as well as a systematic use of carrots and sticks to gain compliance. In the case of UNITA, another greedy spoiler, inducement whetted its appetite for power. Thus, even if UN and U.S. policymakers were correct in 1992 that Savimbi was not a total spoiler, but simply greedy, the only strategy that would have managed him would have been a socialization strategy with a heavy dose of coercion. This relates to the second aspect of spoiler type: commitment to achieving goals. Savimbi’s insensitivity to risk and
cost meant that he would fulfill his obligations to the peace process only if the price of not doing so was extremely high.

The Angolan and Mozambican cases suggest that leadership personality is a key variable behind successful inducement. Unlike Savimbi, Dhlakama did not characterize his conflict in all-or-nothing terms. UN and U.S. policymakers came to believe that Dhlakama’s goal was not to achieve total power in Mozambique, but rather to gain legitimacy for his movement, for the war he waged, and for the people and region that supported him. When faced with Dhlakama’s continuous demands for money and recognition of various grievances, UN Special Representative Ajello believed that offering financial incentives would keep Dhlakama and RENAMO in the peace process. Moreover, the neighboring countries (especially Zimbabwe and South Africa), the United States, and the United Nations continued to focus on the legitimacy theme—to try to socialize Dhlakama and RENAMO into playing by the rules and transforming themselves into democratic politicians. The message was clear: Dhlakama’s newly recognized legitimacy depended on his willingness to meet his obligations. When the moment of truth came, and Dhlakama’s commitment wavered, the neighboring states, the United Nations, and the United States delivered a strong, unambiguous signal: his legitimacy would be lost and there would be a high cost to pay.

The Mozambican case suggests several requirements for a successful inducement strategy. First, the spoiler must be a limited type. Diagnosing Dhlakama’s type was not easy, however; the view that he sought limited goals was disputed by veteran Mozambique watchers and was at odds with RENAMO’s past brutal behavior. Second, external actors must be unified in establishing the legitimacy and illegitimacy of spoiler demands and behavior. Again, this seems deceptively simple. At the time, many in the human rights community disputed the legitimacy of RENAMO as an actor. The United States, the United Nations, and the neighboring countries all had to reverse their characterization of Dhlakama both as a puppet of the former apartheid regime in South Africa and as a leader with no domestic constituency.68 Third, inducement is aided if the custodian, by acting in coordination with others, is the sole source of rewards to the spoiler. Unlike Savimbi in Angola, Dhlakama had no inde-

68. Donald Rothchild’s recent work on mediation emphasizes that the granting of legitimacy can be an effective tool in resolving internal conflicts, but that there are often high domestic and international costs for actors to declare previously rogue leaders or factions legitimate. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming 1997), chap. 9.
ependent source of capital if he chose to return to war. Fourth, in civil wars where the goal is the establishment of sustained peace, inducement is most likely best carried out in conjunction with a concerted international effort to socialize the spoiler into accepting the basic rules of good governance and democracy. Fifth, inducement must be accompanied, if necessary, by a credible threat to establish its limits, and break any cycle of grievance, reward, new grievance, reward, new grievance. Even in the case of a limited spoiler like RENAMO, inducement can encourage increased obstructionist behavior in the hope of getting more rewards. If a limited spoiler continues to undermine peace, it will run the risk of prompting its opponent to view it as a total spoiler for whom no concession will gain its commitment.

ORGANIZATIONAL BLINDERS
In addition to pointing to the crucial role of good diagnosis and choice of appropriate treatment, the case studies provide a vivid reminder of the uncertainties, complexity, and ambiguity of peace processes—what I refer to earlier as the "fog of peacemaking." But the case studies also provide evidence that several organizational rules, beliefs, and frames that custodians use to cope with uncertainty can contribute to poor diagnosis, and in extreme cases, to avoiding the spoiler problem. Such organizational blinders include: (1) prior commitments of the organization to the spoiler, (2) organizational doctrine, (3) organizational "holy grails," (4) organizational interests, and (5) organizational roles.

PRIOR COMMITMENTS. In several of the cases, prior commitments between individual states and spoilers blocked a correct interpretation of the intention and behavior of the spoiler. In the case of Angola, the U.S. government had long been a patron of Savimbi, had supplied him with arms and supplies, and had cultivated his friendship. When Savimbi rejected the election results and returned to war in late 1992, the United States' initial tendency was to believe Savimbi's versions of events, to discount interpretations that Savimbi intended to win complete power, and to emphasize that evenhandedness was still called for because the MPLA was no better than UNITA. Savimbi's impressive network of friends, supporters, and representatives in Washington buttressed the psychological commitment to him. While this commitment led U.S. policymakers to benign interpretations of Savimbi's actions, or at least to assertions that there were no good guys in the conflict, the personal networks served to constrain the influence of those who sought a more aggressive policy toward Savimbi.
The Angolan case is similar to France’s relationship to the CDR and Presidential Guard in Rwanda. First, the French military’s prior organizational commitment to the Presidential Guard led them to demonize the RPF—to see it as the all-or-nothing party, a “Khmer Noir,” an image that reinforced and legitimized the Hutu extremist version of the conflict. Second, the prior relationship between the French and the CDR caused them to ignore clear signs that the CDR was planning genocide. Third, the personal network of relationships extended high into the Mitterand government, thus paralyzing conflicting policy tendencies in the French foreign ministry.

**Doctrine.** Beyond prior ties to the spoiler, the ability of organizations to interpret the intentions and behavior of spoilers and to fashion effective responses is constrained by their doctrine. The United Nations, for example, approaches its custodial role with several assumptions. First, its representatives assume that the parties are acting in good faith when they sign a peace agreement. This leads UN personnel to downplay violations by signatories to agreements. Second, its representatives tend to be slavish in their devotion to the troika of traditional peacekeeping values: neutrality, impartiality, and consent. Such values, when followed blindly, constrain attempts to challenge spoiler behavior, as custodians fear being seen as partial to the victim. Even when spoiler behavior is recognized as such, the doctrine insists on reestablishing consent, and not forcefully challenging violations.

In the successful cases of spoiler management, custodians took a stand on the merits of issues under dispute. In Cambodia, UNTAC rejected KR grievances as illegitimate. UNCTAC’s success stemmed from its ability to garner international consensus against KR interpretations of the Paris Peace Accords. In the case of Mozambique, the regional custodians of the peace process confronted RENAMO when it attempted to withdraw from the election at the last moment and threatened to return to war.

The successful cases of spoiler management, however, do not diminish the more significant point that doctrine poses constraints; they simply show that custodians had to reinterpret their actions so as not to appear to be in conflict with their principles and had to triumph in intra-organizational battles over the doctrinal implications of their actions. For instance, in Cambodia General Sanderson succeeded in employing soldiers from the warring factions to protect the election against the KR, by redefining the meaning of impartiality and neutrality. Radio UNTAC, which earned universal praise for its role in combating KR propaganda, was established only over strenuous objections from UN headquarters that such a station would imperil UNTAC’s neutrality.
HOLY GRAILS. A third organizational blinder is the tendency of custodians when faced with complexity and uncertainty to redefine their goals and standard of success to one overriding accomplishment, that is, a "holy grail." When implementing peace, the United Nations often drops its commitments to various components of the peace agreement in order to focus on holding an election. When spoilers plunge their countries into war, the United Nations focuses on obtaining a cease-fire.

For example, when faced with KR intransigence in Cambodia, UNTAC narrowed its mission to holding an election rather than fulfilling complete implementation of the Paris Accords. This redefinition of mission was an appropriate response to a spoiler's attempt to veto the Paris agreements. Yet UNTAC became so focused on attaining the election that it ignored SOC violence and obstruction during the electoral campaign. The need to reach an election took precedence over how the parties got there. When an election finally took place, UNTAC acquiesced to SOC blackmail and encouraged its demand for a coalition deal that was disproportionate to its electoral result. UNTAC feared that SOC's threat would nullify the achievement of the election, so it compromised the quality of the election to appease SOC.

When spoilers in Rwanda and Angola attacked and plunged their countries back into civil war, the United Nations responded by insisting on a cease-fire and a return to negotiations. In both cases, spoilers were willing to kill hundreds of thousands of people to demonstrate that they did not want peace, yet the response of the United Nations was to plead with them to return to negotiations.

ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS. An overriding sense of organizational interest can also prevent custodians from recognizing and effectively managing spoilers. In Rwanda, like Angola before it, the United Nations' interpretation of the conflict and its consideration of an appropriate response was based heavily on "what the traffic would bear." Faced with information that requires costly and risky action, the United Nations and many of its member states choose to ignore the information.

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES. The conceptions that mediators and UN special representatives have of their roles can blind them to interpreting evidence of spoiler intention. Both mediators and special representatives invest enormous time and energy into negotiating and implementing peace. When faced with spoiler behavior, they tend to see spoiler motivation and behavior as negotiable, not as inferring that their function as peacemaker is irrelevant. They tend to seek out any evidence that confirms the basic willingness of the parties
to still reach agreement and to ignore compelling evidence that suggests one of the parties may reject peace completely. They tend to grab at any straw that seems to hold out the promise of a settlement; when confronted by compelling evidence of bad faith and the preference of one or more of the parties for war, they are likely to insist that there are no alternatives to negotiation. In some cases, the mediators or special representatives seem unwilling to place the responsibility for continued hostilities on the parties themselves, and instead blame their own organizations for not providing the one request that would have made the difference between war and peace. Finally, there is the perverse tendency of custodians to so value an agreement that they blame the victim rather than the spoiler.

THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND COORDINATION

A common denominator among the successful cases of spoiler management is unity and coordination among external parties in defining the problem, establishing legitimacy for the strategy, and applying the strategy. Although this is not a surprising finding, it is nonetheless a robust one and external parties to a peace process ignore it at their peril.

Spoilers often exist because external patrons provide them with guns, ammunition, capital, and sanctuary. External patrons may also help internal spoilers survive by supporting their claims to legitimacy—support that can play havoc with a strategy such as the departing train, where the key to putting pressure on the spoiler is to declare their grievances illegitimate and to insist that the peace process itself embodies the best chance for resolving the conflict. In the cases of successful spoiler management, external support for the spoiler either had dried up or had been severely curtailed. Inducement succeeded with RENAMO because its external patron, South Africa, wanted a peaceful settlement to the war. Unlike UNITA or the KR, RENAMO did not have easy access to illegal markets to finance a continuation of the war.

International unity and cooperation require cultivation, time, resources, and pressure. It is therefore better if they are institutionalized in the peace process, as with the Core Group in Cambodia.69

THE LEGITIMATING FUNCTION OF SPOILER MANAGEMENT
Another key aspect to spoiler management is the development of an international consensus about what are legitimate and illegitimate solutions to a country's civil war. The successful strategies of spoiler management all have in common a unified stance by external actors about which spoiler demands should be met and which should be rejected. For example, the departing train strategy in Cambodia depended on the willingness of international actors to define limits of accommodation for the spoiler. In Cambodia even the former patrons of the KR agreed that their client's demands were illegitimate and that the peace process could move forward without them. In Mozambique external actors agreed to legitimate RENAMO as a nationalist party, socialize it into an agreed set of rules of behavior, and establish limits on how far it would be appeased.

By contrast, in the failed cases of spoiler management, no international consensus formed about legitimate and illegitimate solutions to the civil wars. In Rwanda external actors failed to create a common stance toward the Hutu extremists and wavered about the content of the Arusha Accords. In Angola little attempt was made to rally international support against UNITA's return to war. Indeed, the strategy that emerged from the United States insisted that legitimacy was irrelevant to ending the war, and proceeded to pressure the party that had won the election.

The finding that legitimization is an integral part of spoiler management is important in two regards. First, it counters the adage that solutions to internal conflicts must come from the participants themselves. In this study successful management of internal conflict has resulted from the willingness of external actors to take sides as to which demands and grievances are legitimate and which are not. Second, it shows that when external consensus is used in conjunction with a coherent larger strategy, the setting of a normative standard can be an effective tool for conflict management. This last point is crucial. For all the lip service that they pay to the power of norm-setting, when it comes to protecting peace and managing spoilers the member states and many UN personnel seldom act like they mean it.

Conclusion
The period after a peace agreement is reached is a time of uncertainty and vulnerability for peacemakers and citizens alike. International actors who seek to bring deadly, protracted civil wars to a close must anticipate violent chal-
lenges to peace processes. Instead of thinking generally about the possible threats to peace, they must ask, "Who are the threats to peace?" The custodians of peace must constantly probe the intentions of warring parties: they must look for evidence that parties who sign peace agreements are sincere in their commitment to peace, and they must seek and make good use of intelligence about the warring parties' goals, strategies, and tactics. Custodians must also judge what is right or wrong, just or unjust, and fair or unfair in peace processes. They can do so either explicitly by creating an international consensus about what is appropriate for the warring parties or tactly by not taking action in the face of violent attacks and spoiler behavior. The research presented here strongly suggests that international consensus about norms, coordination behind a strategy of aggressive management of spoilers, and unambiguous signals to peace supporters and spoilers provide the difference between successful and failed implementation of peace agreements.