Donald K. Emmerson, "What Is Indonesia?"
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The Great Transition

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John Bresnan

Abbreviations

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
BCA Bank Central Asia
Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (Bureau for Logistical Affairs)
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiya Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching)
DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Council of Provincial Representatives)
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Council of People’s Representatives)
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)
Inpres Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Directive)
KKN korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme (corruption, collusion, nepotism)
LSM Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Self-supporting Social Agency)
MPR Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat (Assembly of People’s Representatives)
NU Nahdlatul Ulama (Renaissance of Muslim Clergy)
OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party)
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
POLRI Polisi Republic Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Police)
Abbreviations

PPKI  Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee to Prepare Indonesian Independence)
PPP  Partai Pembangunan Persatuan (United Development Party)
PT  Perusahaan Terbatas (Limited Company)
SARA  suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan (ethnic group, religion, race, intergroup relations)
SBY  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SESKOAD  Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Staff and Command School)
TNI  Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)
What Is Indonesia?

Donald K. Emmerson

Indonesia is likely the worst of the nations now limping toward greater control of their own destiny... Will the disastrous national disintegration that we have had for the past few years ever be mended...? What should we do to rebuild optimism in an acutely pessimistic country?

—Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif, “Can Indonesia Survive until 2050?”

We must begin again from zero.

—Semar, a character in Republik Bagong, a satirical play

I’m a kid and I need to go to school. I have nothing now. I’m working for the future.

—Fifteen-year-old Syarita, on the day her school reopened following the deaths of five of her relatives and more than 150,000 others in an earthquake and tsunami that struck the province of Aceh on December 26, 2004

Indonesia is a country that has been through a lot. In 1997–1998, its forests were blazing, its currency was sinking, its economy was shrinking, and its president resigned. In 1999–2000, democratic elections were held for the first time since 1955, a referendum in East Timor overwhelmingly rejected Indonesian rule, and the presidency changed hands again. In 2001–2002, the president was impeached, the speaker of the house was found guilty of corruption, and Islamist terrorists killed more than 200 people on Bali. In 2003–2004, terrorists struck again in Jakarta, Indonesians went back to the polls three times, including a first-ever presidential election, and on December
26, 2004, the northwestern tip of Sumatra took the brunt of an earthquake plus tsunami that killed in lives lost than any natural disaster to strike the archipelago since 1815.

Capital flight, a lagging economy, widespread corruption, political demonstration, communal violence, secessionist movements. Constitutional innovation, radical decentralization, five presidents in seven years. These challenges and changes render understandable the question of whether to go on. This chapter—Syafii Maarif’s cry of despair and Riantiarno’s back-to-zero-ism, but also the hope of a better future in Syarita’s determination to start her life again.

This chapter explores aspects of Indonesia’s identity—some of the ways in which Indonesia has been, remains, and will continue to be more than zero. The qualifier “some” is crucial. Indonesia’s identities are vast and plural, whereas the scope of this chapter is necessarily limited. In selecting certain ways of seeing Indonesia for a brief treatment here, I did not try for comprehensiveness. I decided instead to highlight four broad aspects of identity: a spatial Indonesia visualized along physical, social, and political lines; a centrifugal Indonesia that could someday disintegrate, as Syafii Maarif and others have feared; a historical Indonesia whose influence is perceived as pre-colonial, colonial, and nationalist past; and a personal Indonesia as imagined or experienced by individual Indonesians. In addition to a critical review of Indonesia’s current status, this understanding of Indonesia will, I hope, complement the discussions of religion, politics, economy, and foreign affairs in the rest of this book.

In a volume on contemporary affairs, history typically comes first. Especially in a book that contemplates a country’s future, the first author might want to fill in the history, freeing the other authors to focus on the present and the future. But these contemporary concerns make the past too important to assign to a single chapter. Today and tomorrow cannot possibly be understood without first comprehending yesterday. However, I failed to mention the years, decades, centuries that have gone before. Necessarily, therefore, from their various perspectives, the contributors take Indonesian history richly into account. They do so, it has been shown me, not to ignore history but to approach my subject, Indonesian identity, from a point of view that visualization Indonesia in space rather than tracing it over time. The decline of geography as a discipline in the United States and the corresponding distance of spatial approaches to Indonesia in American writing also influenced my choice of geography over history as a principal (although hardly exclusive) lens.

That said, two main arguments I make toward the end of this chapter are unapologetically historical in nature. First, Indonesia was a state before it became a nation. In consequence, rather than the nation straightforwardly growing a state through which to organize itself, the Indonesian nation has been called into being by—and substantially for—a preexisting state. “Self-determination” in this context is therefore only a partial truth. Certainly the idea of Indonesia has proven its resilience against considerable odds. The country is not about to break into pieces. But in only one of Indonesia’s multiple possible futures does the state-nation finally and fully become the nation-state.

The second argument stems from the first: If the state matters so much, it also matters greatly who controls the state. The modern political history of Indonesia can be simplified as a prolonged struggle for control over the state and hence for possession of a major basis for shaping the identity of the nation. Seeing and, when it suited them, exaggerating these stakeholder elite actors at key moments have made sudden moves to forestall the feared actions of others. Some of these preemptive moves have had great, even devastating consequences. As a historical legacy, the sheerly efficacious of elite preemption amounts to a lingering temptation away from the rule of law.

A crucial element in building immunity against this temptation was the constitutional and other reforms accomplished in 1999–2004, including the elections of 1999 and 2004 and the experiment in decentralization that began in 2001. These reforms held out the hope of constraining the autonomy and impunity of elite actors so that they could no longer, in the name of forestalling a hypothetical future disaster, create a real one now. In this respect, it was not merely the benign or malign content of Indonesia’s futures that mattered as the country tested its reforms in national, regional, and local elections in 2004 and its meeting in 2005 coping with the tsunami’s aftermath in Aceh. There was also a need to reduce the sheer number of futures for the country that observers, accustomed to the arbitrariness of unaccountable elites, could plausibly entertain.

This chapter does not begin with such large—and debatable—ideas. It starts with rocks—geophysical Indonesia. The country is introduced spatially in terms of its coherence, distinctiveness, and commonality. Topics covered include geographic and linguistic patterns of identity, and the status of borders historically and now. Treated next are decentralization and pressures for secession in Aceh and Papua as they may affect Indonesian identity. Indonesia as a Javanese empire, a Dutch legacy, and a nationalist artifact are considered next, followed by a glimpse of images of Indonesia in the minds and lives of a small and unrepresentative but thought-provoking group of younger Indonesians. Throughout, tying these otherwise disparate materials together, is the question: What is Indonesia?

Among some readers already familiar with Indonesia, the question may seem too obvious to bother asking. Indonesia is a country. End of story.

Cognoscenti, on the other hand, may consider the question misconceived. They may fear it invites a would-be definitive summation of the “true” reality
of Indonesia. As if a notion so varied and complex in its meanings as “Indonesia” could be reduced to the limits of a singular noun, as in “Indonesia is a country.” End of story? Hardly. Beginning of an endless story.

If I thought Indonesia were banal, I would not have written this chapter. And asking a deceptively simple question hardly precludes—I hope it invites—the discovery of just how many, diverse, and debatable are the identities that have been and could be attributed to Indonesia. My purpose is not to single out among these images and possibilities the one “real” Indonesia. But neither are they all equally proven or plausible. Complexity is not a synonym for “anything goes.”

How much does go? Is enough already known and agreed about Indonesia for its multiple identities to have been culled to the point where only the most factual survive? Not at all. Identities are not testable propositions; they embody belief. And even if they were, the stock of certain and detailed knowledge about Indonesia still leaves much to be desired.

Compared with that of the United States, the surface of Indonesia is less well mapped, and its history since 1945, when its existence as an independent state was first declared, has been documented in less detail. To this extent, it is easier to imagine Indonesia. One is less restrained by what is known beyond dispute. Observers vary in how much they know. Errors about Indonesia’s most basic characteristics can persist among educated Americans and Europeans because of the greater incidence in such populations of ignorance about Indonesia than about the United States, say, or the United Kingdom.

To illustrate the latter point, look up “Indonesia” in the 2002 edition of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. There is no entry for “Indonesia,” but “Indonesian” is defined as a native inhabitant of “Indonesia, a large island group in SE Asia, and now esp. of the federal republic of Indonesia, comprising Java, Sumatra, southern Borneo, western New Guinea, the Moluccas, Sulawesi, and many other smaller islands.” Far from being true “now,” this statement was never true. During the few and only months when Indonesia was a federal republic—from December 27, 1949, until the formal abrogation of that arrangement on August 17, 1950—authority over western New Guinea remained in Dutch hands. It is hard to imagine such a basic factual error in the OED’s entry for, say, “Britain.”

Indonesia’s huge size makes the extent of the literature on it seem paltry by comparison. Much about the country remains unclear, including matters that one might expect to have been settled long ago. Consider what happens, for example, if we “simply” count the islands and part islands inside the boundaries of Indonesia in search of a total figure that can stand as an empirically fixed and lasting physical answer to the question that entitles this chapter.

According to Robert Cribb in his invaluable Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (1992), “The country . . . consists of approximately 13,669 islands the size of a tennis court or larger; the exact number changes frequently due to siltation and volcanic eruptions.” Eight years later, in his no less useful Historical Atlas of Indonesia, Cribb updated his earlier estimate while further emphasizing its mutability. Indonesia, he wrote,

is formally considered to consist of 17,508 islands. (With the recent loss of East Timor’s two offshore islands, Atauro [Kambing] and Jaco, the official figure is presumably 17,506.) This figure was decided in 1994 and replaced the earlier official figure of 13,667, set in 1963. Only about 3,000 of these islands, however, are said to be inhabited and only about 6,000 are officially named, though many more certainly have unrecognized local names. In reality the number of islands—however an island is defined—is in constant flux.

Cribb noted, for example, how siltation at the mouths of rivers could form new offshore islands or join old ones to the mainland, and how coral islands could be submerged through mining and erosion. Had he been writing in 2005 he might have added to this map-changing list the creative destruction of the massive earthquake and tsunami that shook and battered northwestern Sumatra in 2004. Two years before, in December 2002, the International Court of Justice adjudicated Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s claims to Sabah and Ligitan in the western Celebes Sea by awarding both islands to Malaysia. Two months later, however, new satellite photographs of all pieces of land at least 30 square meters large suddenly boosted Indonesia’s total to 18,108.5

Uncertainty, flux, and therefore subjectivity thus compromise even this most tangible embodiment of Indonesia. Perfect bedrock—exactly known, forever fixed—is a holy grail. There is no single, nontrivial, debate-silencing answer to the question, What is Indonesia?

INDONESIA IN THREE DIMENSIONS

What is Indonesia? is a question about identity. But what is identity?

Coherence, distinctiveness, and commonality are three spatial dimensions that help one observer compare and assess assertions of identity. Coherence is the extent to which the contents of a phenomenon are patterned rather than random. Distinctiveness is the extent to which the phenomenon stands out against the environment around it. Commonality is the extent to which the contents of the phenomenon are similar rather than disparate. By these criteria, the extent to which a phenomenon has an identity depends on the extent to which it meets them.
Arguing Coherence

However many islands Indonesia has, on a summary map they form no consistent pattern. The country’s shape is not, for example, symmetrical. But one way of arranging the jumble of islands has endured: the perception of Java (including Madura and typically Bali as well) as an “inner” or “core” island compared with the “outer” or “peripheral” ones—in Dutch colonial parlance, the Buitengewesten, or outer territories—that make up the rest of the country.

The suitability of these designations cannot be judged without reference to history, demography, political economy, and culture. Readers may, nevertheless, wish to glance at the map of Indonesia in this book to see for themselves, simplified on a flat page, how convincing or far-fetched this pattern of core and periphery appears to be. To my eyes, in purely cartographic terms, the case for an inner–outer pattern that puts Java at its core is imaginable but not compelling.

The spatial salience of core and periphery depends on their being easily distinguished. This would be true, for example, if the core were the largest island and the peripheral islands were all markedly smaller. But that is not the case. Java is only the fifth largest island or part-island inside Indonesia. The biggest such feature in the country is Kalimantan, the Indonesian bulk of Borneo.

For such a pattern to be complete, the periphery should entirely surround the core. That too is not the case. Would-be peripheral islands circumscribe Java only from its northwest clockwise around to its east. Java itself is too far west to be literally central. Nor is there much to be gained by searching for a core island of any consequence at the geographic center of Indonesia; the candidates are mere specks.

Not far away from that exact center are the million-plus inhabitants of Makassar, the largest Indonesian city east of Surabaya. Could Indonesians sometime in this century counterbalance the superiority of Jakarta by moving their capital to Makassar, closer to the physical midpoint of the country? In 2003 this prospect remained wildly unlikely. But in the long run it is not impossible. As the largest country in Southeast Asia by area and population, Indonesia is comparable wholly or partly to Brazil in Latin America or Nigeria in Africa. It may not be frivolous to recall the migration of the capitals of these states, respectively, from coastal Rio de Janeiro to central Brasilia and from coastal Lagos to central Abuja.

One might also look for a center and fringe pattern in the extent to which Jakarta dwarfs the rest of Indonesia’s urban areas. The larger a metropolitan core and the thinner its urban periphery, one could argue, the greater the chance that the latter will depend on and be dominated by the former—a case of inegalitarian coherence. With a year 2000 population officially estimated at 84 million, greater Jakarta is by far the most populous urban zone in Indonesia. Yet the share of all city dwellers who live in the capital area may not be much over 10 percent. The only country in Southeast Asia with a lower rate of urban primacy is Malaysia, and Malaysia is also the region’s only federation. In this comparative light, one could interpret Indonesia’s recent and radical experiment with decentralization as a belated political acknowledgment of a demographic fact.

Indonesia’s major coastal and near coastal cities, considered clockwise from west to east, do form a flat and foreshortened circle that runs from Palembang northeast to Banjarmasin, continues farther east to Makassar, then halts and turns southwest to Denpasar, farther west through Surabaya and Semarang to Jakarta, and finally northwest back to Palembang. The resulting oval circumscribes the Java Sea, but stops well short of the Flores and Banda Seas—the vast eastern extension of Indonesia’s ostensible maritime core.

With a single exception, the Indonesian islands and part islands to the east of Sulawesi or Java are all much smaller than the big four that lie in the center or to the west: Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Java, and Sumatra. The exception is Papua, the huge and mountainous island that traditionally has been Indonesia’s most sparsely populated province.

Will Indonesia develop these eastern towns and hinterlands enough to pull its urban oval eastward, beyond Sulawesi and Bali, toward a more symmetrical identity for the country? It is hard to say. The eastern zone has long been considered the main frontier for demographic, economic, and infrastructural expansion. Developing the eastern islands was a priority for President Suharto in the 1990s. In 2000–2004 eastern Indonesia was the only region with its own cabinet post—first junior and then state minister to accelerate the development of Eastern Indonesia. But it was one thing to acknowledge the center’s previous neglect of the east, and quite another to remedy it.

If the zone’s potential is fulfilled, some eastern coastal towns could become thriving cities. If that happens, the urban–littoral oval around the Java Sea will expand to include the Banda Sea as well, improving the symmetry and possibly also the cohesion of a sea-centered identity for Indonesia. The historical lagging of the east behind the center west may not be reversed, however. And a failure to tie these eastern lands and peoples more dynamically and equitably to the rest of Indonesia could have significant long-term consequences. These could even include a further shrinkage of Indonesia’s eastern border—“further” in relation to East Timor’s already having left the republic in 1999 and gained its own independence, as Timor Lorosa’e (or Timor Leste), in May 2002.
In strictly spatial terms, then, Indonesia does not obviously cohere. And even if the centrality of the Java and Banda Seas implies a maritime heart, where does the periphery of Indonesia stop and its external environment begin? Water is a continuous field, unlike the coast of an island. Separated only by the narrow Sunda Strait, Sumatra and Java clearly delimit much of southern Indonesia and place the Indian Ocean outside the country. But where are the boundaries of Indonesia to be drawn? Along the northern semicircle from west to east, in the Andaman Sea, the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, the Celebes Sea, the Philippine Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Arafura Sea, and the Timor Sea? Visualized in core sea terms, Indonesia may gain internal coherence at the expense of its distinctiveness.

Arguing Distinctiveness

The designation of islands as inside or outside Indonesia seems arbitrary. Why should Sipadan and Ligitan, off the northeast coast of Borneo, be Malaysian despite their proximity to Indonesian Kalimantan, while Miangas, northeast across the Celebes Sea, is Indonesian notwithstanding its proximity to Philippine Mindanao? Small wonder that Indonesia contested Malaysian sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan, while the Philippines claims the waters around Indonesian Miangas. These are tiny bits of land. But purely in terms of proximity—ignoring the Spanish and Dutch colonial histories that conditioned the demarcation of the Philippines from Indonesia—why should the second largest of all the Philippine islands, Mindanao, not be Indonesian? More anomalous still is the inclusion of the Natuna-Anambas islands inside Indonesia, given their location between western and eastern Malaysia and north of a straight line drawn from the Malaysian capital (Kuala Lumpur) to the capital of Malaysian Sarawak (Kuching).

Opinions vary as to how many of Indonesia’s outermost islands and islets could become sites of territorial dispute with neighboring states. An Indonesian journalist has estimated that Miangas is only one of some eighty such potentially controversial features. Ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan became an issue between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur only in 1969, after President Suharto succeeded President Sukarno and cooperation replaced confrontation in Indonesian–Malaysian relations. Those relations remained amicable enough to keep the matter on a back burner until 1997 and finally to yield, in that year, an agreement between the two governments to submit the dispute for arbitration by the International Court of Justice. In December 2002, when the Court awarded sovereignty over both islands to Malaysia, Indonesia’s foreign minister accepted “as final and binding” the rejection of his country’s claim.

Such equanimity is not assured when it comes to resolving disagreements elsewhere along the fringe of Indonesia. More influential as a precedent could be the court’s prior reasoning, not only regarding Sipadan and Ligitan but also, more than half a century earlier, its approval of Dutch rather than American sovereignty over Miangas. Critical on both occasions was the criterion of effectivité—the actual and effective exercise of state authority over a disputed territory by any one claimant. If there is a lesson here for Jakarta, it may be that Indonesia’s borders are best shored up not by relying on maps displaying contiguity or treaties showing cession, but by expanding and activating archipelago wide, the presence of the state.

As for the differentiating power of Indonesia’s four land borders, none of them consistently separates what is distinctively Indonesian from what is not. The line between Indonesian and Malaysian Borneo, the two that delimit Indonesian West Timor from the enclave and half island that make up independent East Timor, and the one between Indonesian Papua and independent Papua New Guinea (PNG) are definitively clear on standard political maps of Southeast Asia. In the absence of patterns representing other variables, these borders seem definitively clear-cut. But this need not be true—and it can be spectacularly untrue—of other displays.

Consider, for example, what happens to these four demarcations when they appear on ethno-linguistic maps. Large areas of similarity representing broad classifications of indigenous languages surround the political lines on both sides. So do the smaller areas where those languages are spoken. This “double erasure” of sovereignty by speech is most evident in Borneo, where the Indonesian–Malaysian border runs through a broad zone of “Austronesian” languages and through specific subzones as well, including “Malayan,” “Land Dayak,” “Kayan–Kenyah,” and “Apo Duat.” But the case for speech over sovereignty holds as well for Indonesia’s eastern land borders. Farthest to the east, for example, the aptly named Trans–New Guinea phylum of local tongues overwhelms the distinction between Indonesia and PNG, although some much smaller phyla are unique to one side or the other.

How, then, is sovereignty related to speech? Data on where languages are located were gathered some time ago, and subsequent migration may have moved a linguistic frontier closer to a political one. More importantly, detailed ethno-linguistic maps of the sort cited here locate “indigenous” languages, omitting the products of language mixing (pigdings) and the secondary languages (lingua franca) that make communication possible among people whose first languages differ. Often spread by trade, pigdings and lingua franca may be widely spoken, sometimes widely enough to qualify as “national” languages. Taking such instances into account will tend more closely to align political with linguistic borders.
But not if the same mixed or secondary language is widely used on both sides of the border. The Malay language spoken in Malaysia and the Indonesian one spoken by Indonesians (Bahasa Indonesia) are not identical. Their respective lexicons differ more than those of American and British English, for example. Yet the divergence of Indonesian and Malay falls well short of mutual incomprehension. Nor have the governments in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur tried to increase the linguistic distance between them. On the contrary, the two sides agreed in 1972 to use the same spelling rules—a “decolonizing” convergence in which Indonesian was purged of orthographic conventions held over from Dutch days. These transnational consistencies reduce, in effect, the linguistic sharpness of Indonesia’s western political rim.

If Indonesian distinctiveness is attenuated in the west by the overlapping of Indonesian and Malay, circumstances along the farthest eastern perimeter of Indonesia are very different. In the southeast, notwithstanding Jakarta’s imposition of Bahasa Indonesia on East Timor before the latter’s independence, the zone in which Tetum is spoken does roughly distinguish that country from its Indonesian neighbor. Farther east, the interlinguistic boundaries between New Guinea Pidgin and Bahasa Indonesia roughly coincide with the PNG-Indonesian border. Likely to strengthen this correlation is the implementation of the decision by East Timor’s constitutional convention to enshrine Tetum and Portuguese, but not Indonesian, as official languages of the new country.

In modern times—the heyday of the nation-state—sovereign borders probably have reinforced differences in speech at least as often as similarities in speech have weakened sovereign borders. Such a pattern is especially likely to hold true for a nascent country that has just escaped the long and brutal embrace of a much larger neighbor. Indonesian domination of East Timor has, nevertheless, left its imprint on local discourse.

Prior to its invasion and occupation by Indonesia beginning in 1975, East Timor had been part of Portugal’s empire. By the time independence was finally achieved, after nearly a quarter century of rule from Jakarta, the Indonesian language had become far more widely known than Portuguese. A survey in 2001 found Tetum, Indonesian, and Portuguese spoken, respectively, by 82, 43, and merely 5 percent of East Timorese households. Unlike Portuguese, Tetum lacks a diverse modern vocabulary and long-standardized rules of spelling and usage. Independence meant that official documents, formerly written in Indonesian, would now be couched in Portuguese, ensuring their incomprehensibility without translation in the eyes of virtually the entire population. Younger citizens of the new state, schooled in Indonesian and ignorant of Portuguese, felt especially disadvantaged.

Future good relations with Jakarta could erode in Timor Lorosa’e the opprobrium associated with Bahasa Indonesia as the language of a recent oppressor. Indonesian, along with English, is already considered a “working language.”12 Bad relations, however, could further downgrade Indonesian over time while upgrading Tetum, or expanding English, reinforcing in discourse the political separation of the two countries. Most probably, the usage of Indonesian will fade but not disappear.

“One nation, one people, one language” announced the nationalist authors of the Youth Oath in Batavia (later Jakarta) in 1928, although the italics are mine. As an assertion of Indonesian identity, the phrase would become famous—almost a mantra. Measured by the extent to which its boundaries distinguish it linguistically from its environment, however, Indonesia is not compellingly singular. Especially in the west, speakers of the same language, or of languages in the same group, tend to flank the sides of its sovereign borders.

It will not be easy to nationalize discourse in Timor Lorosa’e. Tetum, Portuguese, English, Indonesian… One nation, one people, four languages. And this in a microstate with a population one-third of 1 percent the size of Indonesia’s.23 Can East Timor afford to acknowledge multiple tongues without risking an identity made solid by decades of Indonesian repression? Or does its legal concession to pluralism reflect real schisms—historical, generational, social, political—whose exacerbation by the “victory” of a single language would threaten the nascent state? Decades from now, will its linguistically eclectic but Portuguese-privileging first constitution be praised as tolerant, or faulted as divisive?

I raise these questions not to answer them but to underscore how fortunate Indonesia has been to avoid them. Bahasa Indonesia as a nationalist choice may not have rescued Indonesia from otherwise certain ruin. But it is hard to picture the republic having survived this long in Javanese. Indonesians were also able to strengthen their identity by virtue of having a consensus in favor of Indonesian well prior to independence.

**Movable Borders?**

In spatially vast countries such as the United States and Indonesia, pride can be taken in the breadth of national space. A vocal example occurs when American and Indonesian pupils on patriotic occasions sing of their countries’ respective widths, “from sea to shining sea” and “from Sabang to Merauke.” The latter pair names an island off the northwestern tip of the westernmost province of Indonesia (Aceh) and a town in the southeastern corner of its easternmost counterpart (Papua).

The connotations of these phrases differ, however. Even though it had been part of the Netherlands East Indies, Papua was formally attached to Indonesia
only in 1963. By then, a unitary Indonesian republic spanning the rest of the former Indies had been independent for more than a decade. The reference to Merauke in the national anthem thus connotes a nationalist struggle to enlarge the new state. The revolution more or less led by Sukarno in 1945–1949 was, of course, anticolonial. In cartographic terms, however, Sukarno’s later campaign to push the country’s eastern border farther east had a neocolonial goal: to return that border to its original, colonial location.

One might argue that “Polynesian Hawaii,” a small archipelago, has been to core-continental-Caucasian America what “Melanesian Papua,” a large landmass, has been to core-maritime-Malay Indonesia—a peripheral and thus also potentially member of a different sphere of meaning and belonging. Compared with the Papuan independence movement, however, Hawaii’s nativist movement is modest in purpose, method, and size. Unlike native Hawaiians, who form a minority in their home state, Papuans are still a majority in their home province.

Exactly how much of a majority is not clear. Migration from the rest of Indonesia appears to have enlarged the proportion of Papua’s residents who were born outside the province from only 4 percent in 1971 to about 20 percent by 1990 and 33 percent by 2001. At this rate of acceleration, Papuans could become a minority in their homeland by 2006.24 Straight-line extrapolations that depend on so many variables are almost always wrong. But the fear of becoming outnumbered in their own home province is all too credible among Papuan nationalists.

As already noted, Papuans are Melanesians. A family of ethnic groups scattered widely across the southern Pacific Ocean, Melanesians tend to differ from Malays in skin color, facial features, and hair—not to mention the churches that further differentiate Indonesia’s Christian-majority Papuans from its majority-Muslim Malays.

Barriers to Papuan identity remain formidable, however. New Guinea’s mountainous, communication-impeding terrain and corresponding language diversity have worked to inhibit the growth of broadly “Melanesian” solidarity both within the province of Papua and across the decades-old international border between Papua and PNG. In this context, the Free Papua Organization has focused on national independence for the Indonesian province of Papua within its existing borders. Nor have the authorities in Port Moresby, PNG’s capital, been willing to risk the consequences of laying a claim to their huge neighbor’s eastern flank. In 2005 it was still fanciful to think that the vertical line bisecting New Guinea could be erased on behalf of a “greater Melanesian” state combining Papua and PNG.

On a map, the western extension of Papua vaguely resembles the head of a bird. In 2003 Jakarta drew a new line down the bird’s neck, declared the head a new province, and named it Irian Jaya Barat—West Irian Jaya. The Indonesian part of New Guinea, formerly one province, became two: West Irian Jaya and Papua, respectively the head and body of the bird. (“Papua” in this chapter refers to the territory occupied by the one province before 2003 and by the two provinces afterward.) This development will be discussed below. Suffice it now to acknowledge the split as a possible further impediment to pan-Papuan identity.

Indonesian nationalists inclined to scan the eastern fringes of their unitary republic for pieces that might someday break off, as East Timor did, may take some comfort in the view to the far west. There, where another zone of rough (Malay-Muslim) resemblance straddles an international boundary (with Malaysia), can the sharp clarity of Sumatra’s northern coastline be said to help “keep” Aceh inside Indonesia, notwithstanding that province’s secessionist challenge to Jakarta?

Certainly, on a geophysical map, Indonesia’s westernmost border appears far less arbitrary than its easternmost one. Aceh is land’s end and ocean’s beginning, despite belonging to the ethnically Malay world that spans the Malacca Strait and being called “the front porch of Mecca” for its long-standing Muslim identity and, relative to the rest of Indonesia, least distance from the hub of global Islam.

Yet the maritime passageway separating Indonesia from Malaysia is not a barrier to air and sea travel and does not prevent Acehnese and Malaysians from communicating by phone, fax, mail, or e-mail. What keeps Aceh from declaring and pursuing a “greater Malay” identity in common with Malaysia is much less the province’s coastline than a host of other factors. These include Aceh’s history as an independent sultanate in its own right; its record of resistance to outside rule; its willing participation in the Indonesian revolution; its troubled but long-standing incorporation into the rest of independent Indonesia; the very different colonial and postcolonial experience of what is now peninsular Malaysia; and the consistent unwillingness of Malaysian governments to claim Aceh as theirs, given not only the risk of war with Indonesia but also the likelihood that Acehnese themselves would reject such an imperial presumption. The devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck the province in December 2004 may have made it even more dependent on aid through and from, and thus its ties to, Jakarta. Whatever Aceh may be, it is not the front porch of Kuala Lumpur.

Nor is geography destiny. The politically centrifugal forces at work in Papua and Aceh should not be underestimated. But if the arbitrariness of Indonesia’s border with PNG has not fostered a “greater Papuan” project, neither does the geophysical clarity of the Sumatran coast and the Malacca Strait explain why Acehnese secessionists lack Malaysian horizons.
As for the chances of a narrower independence for Papua and Aceh proper, in 2005 these prospects seemed less realistic than they had just a few years before when financial collapse, political conflict, and communal violence had threatened to derail Indonesia’s "great transition" from authoritarian rule.

A Borderless World?

The case being made here for the importance and durability of Indonesia's sovereign borders is necessarily cursory. But it cannot be left without taking into account one particularly bold and sweeping argument against it: that a boundary-indifferent model of the polity held sway in precolonial Southeast Asia and has been reintroduced (or at any rate refurbished) by globalization in the postcolonial era. From this standpoint, the Dutch, British, and German officials who drew an almost ruler-straight line down the middle of New Guinea in agreements reached around the turn of the twentieth century were not only violating the geophysical integrity of that island. They were also transgressing the border blindness of a much earlier and authentically "Indonesian" conception of the polity. In this view, as the globe has been increasingly crisscrossed by flows of people, goods, and information—globalization—the bounded state as a colonial legacy in Southeast Asia is being superseded by postmodern versions of this originally borderless polity. Thus reconsidered, the idea of Indonesia as the physical and social space inside a delimited frame could in future turn out to have been a Western conceit whose time came and is now going, soon to be gone.25

The precolonial polity at issue here is called a mandala. Not Southeast Asian but Indian in origin, a mandala is at once a pattern and a metaphor. In the first of these meanings, it is a concentric diagram—in Sanskrit, mandala meant circular or round—with spiritual and ritual significance for followers of certain Hindu and Buddhist traditions. Its shape appears to have been reflected in the architecture of the circular Buddhist shrine known as a stupa; and in the religio-political practice whereby a ruler circumambulated such a shrine, as if to encircle the universe and thus reaffirm his power over it. (Leave aside the ambiguity implicit in physically tracing a manifest boundary while laying claim to limitless space.) This identification of a microcosmic structure with a macrocosmic realm seems also to have symbolized the totality of existence and thus the erasure of any distinction between “inner” and “outer” being.

Arguably the best known and visually most impressive Buddhist shrine anywhere is Borobudur, located northwest of the court city of Yogyakarta in central Java. Built in the eighth and ninth centuries C.E. under the aegis of the Sailendra dynasty then ruling the area, Borobudur proceeds upward from a square base through a five-level stepped pyramid to a set of seventy-two Buddha-enclosing stupas arranged on three concentrically circular levels that sustain, at the top, a central stupa enclosing empty space. The original meaning of the monument remains obscure. Enhancing a mandala-based impression, however, is the resemblance of Borobudur to a sacred mountain. Given the volcanic character of Java's landscape, making a mountain stand for power and its concentration may predate even the arrival of the Indic mandala.

It is difficult to fix unambiguously the defining features of the mandala in its second meaning: as a metaphor for the kind of polity that existed in precolonial times in what is now Indonesia and which could someday succeed the Indonesian nation-state—or state-nation—in a form at least vaguely reminiscent of the ancient original. As it has been reconstructed and reinterpreted backward over the intervening centuries on the basis of limited archeological and mythological evidence, a precolonial mandala polity is a loose system of rule. The system is not demarcated territorially in space. Nor is it regularized dynamically over time. It is based instead on the contingent ability of a particular ruler to display, project, and maintain religio-personal primacy in a larger and unbordered realm in which the unconditional claims of other rulers overlap and conflict.26 The farther one travels from the exemplary center of such a mandala, the less influential its ruler is likely to be.

Present-day Indonesia has not been modeled on a mandala, at least not overtly. The Western-derived project of the nation-state has been the leitmotiv of modern Indonesian political history: to constitute and emancipate from colonial control a colonially demarcated country, to configure it on maps not as a radiant center, whose light fades with distance, but as an evenly and uniformly sovereign entity clear "from Sabang to Merauke"; and to embody such sovereignty not in the personality of a god-king (however self-legitimizing the pretensions of Sukarno or Suharto may have been) but in abstractions (characteristically, though not always, "the nation" for Sukarno and, for Suharto, "the state").

Mandala-style polities have nevertheless played roles in the rhetorical construction of Indonesian identity. The early history of Indonesia's islands included, by the surviving evidence, many instances of apparently mandala-like polities whose fragility limited their longevity. There were, however, two exceptions to the short shelf life of the archipelago's precolonial polities. Srivijaya, ostensibly a mandala polity centered in what is now the city of Palembang in southeastern Sumatra, endured for several centuries prior to its eleventh-century decline. Majapahit, based in eastern Java and debatably also a mandala polity, lasted some three centuries, shining brightest in the fourteenth century before its own long if uneven dwindling into the sixteenth. These two empires of sorts (and especially Majapahit) were notable too for the
spatially greater extent of their influence, however difficult it is to infer from fragmentary and often indirect evidence just how far their presences were felt.

Claims to national identity are often transhistorical, seeking in history a prefiguring of the nation and a validation of the struggle on its behalf. In this context Srivijaya and Majapahit have afforded Indonesian nationalists in the twentieth century a grand, enduring, and therefore usable prototypical past.

What recommended these examples was not their content, mandala-like or otherwise, but their breadth in space and their durability over time. That said, however, it is worth asking why, in this mythologizing, Majapahit upstaged Srivijaya. The reasons include the greater accumulation of evidence regarding Majapahit compared with the earlier Srivijayan polity. But it also matters that Majapahit was a Javanese realm centered on Java.

Whether modern Indonesia resembles a Javanese empire is a topic treated later in this chapter. Here I merely want to note the affinity between a core and periphery understanding of Indonesian identity that appreciates the core and a mandala that sanctifies it. In this context, compared with Javanese Majapahit, the Sumatran focus of Srivijaya would have reduced its eligibility in the eyes of nationalists nonsacking history in search of a proto-Indonesia. Both Srivijaya and Majapahit offered mythological Indonesia a welcome distinctiveness for which the Dutch could never claim credit. But only Java-focused Majapahit supplied core island coherence as well.

This brings me to commonality, the third and last of my suggested dimensions of identity.

Arguing Commonality

Is Indonesia the most diverse country on earth? Not necessarily. It is, however, among the most diverse countries on many dimensions.

Especially striking is the variety of fauna and flora. If the numbers of different species of mammals, birds, marine life, and flowering plants known to exist in data-available countries as of the late 1990s are compared, Indonesia emerges with the highest average ranking. Notable in this respect is the broad zone of biotic transition that groups the islands between Kalimantan and Bali to the west and Papua to the east. Known as Wallacea, this longitudinal swath combines the Asian animals and plants of western Indonesia with the Australian forms typical of the archipelago’s easternmost end—a legacy geologically traceable to the collision of eastern and western continental plates some 19 million years ago.

Indonesia is no less famous for its human diversity, and in a chapter on national identity, linguistic variety is an especially relevant case in point. Estimates of the number of languages presently spoken in Indonesia vary greatly, for lack of adequate information on a complex and changing situation, and due to ambiguities as to exactly what a language is and how to distinguish one from another. Nevertheless, according to a comprehensive, detailed, and reasonably up-to-date survey by the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a total of 726 indigenous languages were spoken in the 1980s and early 1990s as mother tongues—first languages—in Indonesia.

But this impression of Babel needs qualification. Comparatively, as an instance of language variety in the world, Indonesia is not the most diverse country. Far from it. The late linguist Joseph Greenberg developed a method of calculating the probability that in a given country two randomly selected individuals will have different mother tongues. The index runs from 0 (no diversity) to 1 (maximum diversity). By this measure, according to SIL, twenty-seven countries are linguistically more varied than Indonesia, whose Greenberg score is “only” .

The most language-diverse country in the world by this method turns out to be Indonesia’s immediate eastern neighbor, Papua New Guinea, whose Greenberg rating is an almost perfectly heterogeneous. With a population of barely more than 5 million, PNG has more spoken first languages— than Indonesia with its 227 million-plus people. Nor is PNG exceptional in this respect within the Melanesian sphere. Second most diverse are Vanuatu (97) and the Solomon Islands (97), while New Caledonia (84) is polylingual as well. Variety is evident too in East Timor (88).

Also intriguing is the distribution of linguistic diversity inside Indonesia. If the country is divided into seven zones and these are listed in declining order of linguistic differentiation, the sequence is Papua (94), Maluku (94), Suluwesi (87), Sumatra (86), Nusa Tenggara (85), Kalimantan (78), and finally Java and Bali (66). Indonesia as a whole is linguistically various, but the variegation is spatially peripheral. Relative to the core, it inhabits the rim. If Java and Bali form that “inner” core, and the other six zones just listed are “outer” islands, the imbalance is striking. With less than 40 percent of the total population, the outer islands nevertheless originated and today mainly locate 97 percent of the country’s indigenous languages. Java and Bali, where more than 60 percent of Indonesians live, account for merely 3 percent of the indigenous languages. Furthermore, diversity by this measure is concentrated in the sparsely populated east. Less than 2 percent of Indonesians live in Papua or Maluku, yet more than half—54 percent—of the country’s autochthonous languages are based there.

The extent of exclusivity or overlap (e.g., in vocabulary) among the 726 “different” languages identified by SIL is not clear. And even in the extremely unlikely event that all of them are mutually unintelligible, one cannot infer incoherence in general from first-language incompatibility. Two randomly
chosen individuals may speak wholly different first languages while conversing for years in a second language, such as Bahasa Indonesia.

Also unclear is the extent to which these data take recent migration into account. Were they updated to incorporate fully the arrival of non-Javanese speakers on Java, would that island’s diversity score be higher? What of the countrend whereby Javanese speakers “transmigrate” to the outer islands? Would the effects of this two-way traffic on linguistic diversity be self-canceling? Not necessarily, and surely not exactly.

Nevertheless, for the present purpose of large-scale spatial comparison, better evidence almost surely would not overthrow the conclusion reached here: that the rim of non-Javanese outer islands and Melanesian eastern islands is more first-language diverse than the core of Java and Bali. Corroborating the latter conclusion is another, far more summary estimate, which halves the number of “languages” thought by SIL to be found in Indonesia but, in effect, restates the greater concentration of diversity per capita and per square kilometer in Melanesian Indonesia.32

Identity through Language

What do these findings imply for national identity? The mere existence of variety does not foretell conflict. Complementary diversity can, on the contrary, imply cohesion, especially if it is also legitimate in the eyes of those involved. Within the life experience of an individual Indonesian there can indeed be a kind of “fit” between a first language and the lingua franca, Indonesian, used by that person to bypass first-language barriers. The development of Malay-based Bahasa Indonesia, from the premodern facilitation of coastal trade, linking ports, to the modern expression of national sentiments, linking citizens, has reinforced its essentially public role. First languages, which for most Indonesians were not Malay, were over this same period increasingly used for discourse in private.

Now consider the dynamic possibilities that could affect this relationship. The first, though not necessarily the most plausible, is stable complementarity. By that I mean the long-acclimated and unproblematic habit of allocating one’s “mother tongue” mainly for use among first-language-sharing kin or neighbors, while reserving Bahasa Indonesia for less intimate settings and more formal occasions, including school, work, the media, and public gatherings. Bilingualism need not imply schizophrenia. One can be no less “Indonesian” for speaking Javanese or Batak or something else at home, and no less “Javanese” or “Batak” for using Indonesian at work or in school. In conditions of stable complementarity, the usage of any given language, national or local, can expand or contract over time without provoking controversy.

The second possibility is unstable complementarity, which could in theory intensify tension in either of two directions: animosity toward the national language as, say, a mechanism of exploitation and repression in the name of “Indonesian” unity; or alienation from one’s childhood language as lexically inadequate and socially rustic or even “feudal”—the latter a charge sometimes leveled at the status-linked levels of Javanese. Language choices in this context could be zero-sum: One could, for instance, cultivate an “authentically” local language against Jakarta’s apparently self-serving imposition of “artificial” Indonesian—or, for “patriotic” reasons, actively prefer and promote Indonesian over a divisively “parochial” local tongue.

What does in fact seem to be evolving is not a pattern of hostility at all, but a broadly stable complementarity in which the knowledge and use of Bahasa Indonesia has expanded rapidly while, by and large, the vernaculars have grown in usage more slowly, or remained more or less stationary, or lost ground.

Regarding the national language, the statistical evidence is striking. Census figures show a dramatic gain, during President Suharto’s “New Order” regime, in the proportion of Indonesians able to speak Indonesian—from 40.5 percent in 1971 to 60.8 percent in 1980 to 82.8 percent in 1990.33 The first of these figures is low enough to seem shocking. How could a country as large and as multiply varied as Indonesia have remained intact if in 1971, some two decades after its recognition as a republic, three-fifths of its citizens did not even speak its language?

In terms once popularized by Marshall McLuhan, the medium affects the message.34 The medium provides vocabulary and grammar, supplies denotations, and evokes connotations. It preselects the potential audience to which the message can be intelligibly addressed. But form does not magically drive content toward behavior. A separatist can use the “national” language to denounce Indonesia and incite separation, just as a nationalist can express and mobilize loyalty to Indonesia in a “local”—or a foreign—tongue.

Movements for independence in Aceh and Papua illustrate the use of Indonesian against Indonesia. The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM) today deploy in their own Indonesian-language names a word, merdeka, meaning “free,” that Indonesians associate with their own earlier struggle for freedom from Dutch rule.

Linguistic form need not limit political content. The New Order’s priority on expanding fluency and literacy in Indonesian and its concomitant neglect of local languages did have a politically limiting purpose: to help inoculate the population against appeals to racial, ethnic, religious, and class-based chauvinisms presumed to endanger national unity, state security, and, not
coincidentally, the position of the strongman in charge of the state, general-turner-president Suharto. But if simply knowing Bahasa Indonesia had been powerfully and lastingly centripetal in its political effects, the New Order’s success in spreading knowledge of the national language should have precluded what, in fact, unfolded after Suharto resigned in 1998 and his regime unraveled: waves of resentment expressed against Jakarta, including one that swept East Timor out of the republic in 1999 and others strong enough to suggest domino effects that threatened, in the eyes of some at the time, to doom the republic.

THE END OF INDONESIA?

Here is how historian Robert Cribb began the published version of a paper he gave at a conference convened in Australia in 2000, at the height of uncertainty about Indonesia’s future:

“East Timor is no longer a part of Indonesia. Aceh and Papua are seething with secessionist tension. The resource-rich provinces of Riau and East Kalimantan have put in ambit claims for independence, and talk has even been heard of independence demands from Bali and Sulawesi. The Indonesian experiment, a multiethnic state stretching more than 5,000 kilometres from east to west, is under challenge today as never before, and all over the Asia-Pacific region defense analysts are pondering the question of whether the early 21st century will see the disintegration of Indonesia in the way that the late 20th century saw the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For the first time since the Second World War, there is a serious possibility that the extended archipelago to Australia’s north [roughly from PNG through Malaysia] could be divided not into five or six states as at present, but into a dozen or more.”

Four years later, in 2004, Indonesia’s prospects appeared to be much less dire, but the conditions in Aceh and Papua were anything but improved. In Aceh, a ceasefire brokered by a Swiss organization in December 2002 had collapsed in the face of mutual mistrust and charges of failure to honor commitments. In May 2003 Jakarta had declared martial law in the province and launched a massive air, sea, and land offensive to destroy GAM. In Papua, where repression also continued, the Indonesian military had been implicated in the November 2001 killing of Papuan leader Theys Eluay and the August 2002 killing of two Americans working in an international school. Meanwhile, the global “war on terrorism”—triggered by Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in September 2001 and sustained by subsequent incidents, including the bombing on Bali in October 2002 that took more than 200 lives—stretched Jakarta’s hand by tending to reinforce international antipathy toward violence in the service of self-determination.

In 2000–2004 no serious impetus toward independence developed in Riau, East Kalimantan, Bali, and Sulawesi, all mentioned by Cribb as sites of conceivable future fracture. Most of the autonomist stirrings in these diverse settings were better understood as political entrepreneurship meant to maximize local advantage within Indonesia. Extracting such benefits required a continuing domestic relationship with the national capital from which they could be obtained. Enhancing such opportunism was the potentially far-reaching experiment in decentralization that accompanied the democratization of Indonesia, as politicians rushed to dismantle Suharto’s center-out, top-down, one-way legacy of rule.

Linguistic Stability

With so much to contest in such a turbulent transition, it is remarkable that Indonesians did not also bicker over language. Such conflicts were strikingly absent from the multiple crises—economic, political, environmental—that struck Indonesia more or less simultaneously at the close of the twentieth century. Nor, in the opening years of the twenty-first, did linguistic concessions or impositions figure among the factors working to lessen or contain the centrifugal forces that had so recently seemed to be tearing the country apart.

In 2001 the People’s Representative Council (the national legislature) that Indonesians had elected in 1999 adopted a new law on Aceh. It granted expanded autonomy to what it called the Province of the Country of Aceh, Abode of Peace (Propinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam). If the name was confusing, the ambivalence behind it was clear. While Aceh would, for example, be allowed to embody its unique character in a logo or flag of its own choosing, the law warned that such a device did not constitute an expression of sovereignty.

At the eastern extremity of Indonesia, renaming also took place. What Jakarta had once referred to as Irian Barat (West Irian) and then Irian Jaya (Great Irian) would now be called Papua. The shift was not toward an etymologically more indigenous term. It was Portuguese travelers who had bestowed the name that evolved into “Papua.” But because the long use of “Irian” in the Indonesian language by Indonesian governments, politicians, and media had tainted that term among so-called Irianese, Jakarta’s shift to “Papua” was seen as a concession to autonomist local sensibilities. Yet even as anti-Jakarta concerns rose in the regions, the Indonesian language itself remained unproblematic.

Remarkable too is the fact that in the seventy-five years since it was first proclaimed in the Youth Oath of 1928 as the unifying “one language” of
Indonesia, Bahasa Indonesia has remained the mother tongue—as opposed to the second language—of a small minority of Indonesians. In 1928, by one estimate, Indonesian was the first language of only some 10 percent of all Indonesians, compared with nearly 40 percent whose first language was Javaneese. More than half a century later, in 1980, when census takers counted the number of Indonesians who spoke Indonesian at home, that figure equaled only 12 percent of the total population. Ten years later, in 1990, census data showed only 15 percent of the population using Indonesian at home, a proportion still far less than the 38 percent reported to be speaking Javaneese in that private setting.

This is not to suggest that the proclaimers of the Youth Oath failed. They were not so naive as to expect Indonesia, with its myriad mother tongues, to become monolingual. As a national project, Bahasa Indonesia was not intended to replace different first languages; it was an overlay to allow communication among people who would retain opportunities to speak them. The suitability of Indonesian as the material from which such a connective network could be made—its potential importance as a second language—depended in part on its actual unimportance as a first language: on its not having been, and not becoming, the private property of any major ethnic group.

In 1928 the future of Bahasa Indonesia and the country to which it referred could not be foreseen. Fortunately for Indonesian unity, over the rest of the century the national language was publicized but not privatized, and thus remained distinctively national.

Vernaculars can, of course, be heard or read in public settings. Speakers at public gatherings in a given place flavor their Indonesian with vernacular phrases. Locally written and circulated Indonesian-language newspapers carry occasional pages or columns in a local language. Nor is the national language absent from private life. Especially in urban areas or among educated younger-generation Indonesians, Bahasa Indonesia may be used alongside or instead of a mother tongue. In addition to those in originally Malay-speaking areas, some urban Indonesians may have been raised hearing the national language consistently enough for it to have become their "mother tongue."

Yet the stable complementarity of first and second languages in Indonesia has been well established and seems assured. There is no serious prospect that any of Indonesia's first—mainly private—languages, including the most popular of these, Javaneese, will dislodge or even rival Indonesian as the country's second—mainly public—means of expression. President Suharto flavored his Indonesian-language discourse with homilies in Javaneese. In 2003 President Megawati Sukarnoputri was criticized for her use of Javanisms in speeches she gave in Indonesian. But neither leader was so foolish—or so parochial—as to try displacing Indonesian with Javaneese in the public arena. The country's history had made that a preposterous endeavor. When Javaneese

writers commented on the state of the Javaneese-language press, far from lauding its expansion, they lamented its shrinkage and feared its extinction. As for possibly destabilizing future movement in the other direction, the still small proportion of Indonesians who speak Indonesian at home, and whose children might thus be expected to hear that language first, could continue to increase. But that is most likely to occur in urban settings among households of diverse linguistic backgrounds. The slow expansion of Indonesian from second- to first-language status therefore, if it continues, will tend not to be concentrated in any one ethnic group.

I have already noted that Indonesia's periphery is linguistically more diverse than its core. From this one might be tempted to infer that Indonesian is less widely spoken in the outer islands compared with Java and Bali, and therefore that national unity is endangered, inasmuch as the fringe, less socialized into using the national language, should be more inclined to break away. But the evidence is not there, and the reasoning is wrong.

If knowledge of Indonesian in 1990 is mapped across all twenty-seven provinces then in existence, the extremes were East Timor, where 54 percent spoke the language, and greater Jakarta, where 100 percent did. East Timor, located far from Jakarta on the definitely "outer" island of Timor, became independent a decade later, while the capital city's political and economic centrality made it the most "Indonesian" place in the country and the least likely to secede. By this comparison, language resembles destiny.

The extremes are misleading, however. Comparing the twenty-five provinces on this spectrum between East Timor and greater Jakarta, the outer island jurisdictions turn out to have been, on the whole, proportionally more able to use Indonesian than the core provinces of West and Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Bali.

The two places with secessionist movements, Papua (then still called Irian Jaya) and Aceh, were among the relatively less Indonesian-speaking provinces. Papua and Aceh had the same rates, respectively, as Central and West Java. Yet on a scale from 0 to 100 percent, these "low" rates were remarkably high: 79 for Papua and 84 for Aceh. These numbers suggest nothing even approaching a rejection of the Indonesian language.

Quite the contrary. The spectacular linguistic diversity of Papua, already noted in this chapter, makes Indonesian worth embracing as a useful lingua franca, and one that is no less usable in rallying and expressing sentiment against Indonesian than for it. Growing knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia in Papua during the New Order may also reflect the arrival of migrants from other provinces who were more likely to speak it than indigenous Papuans were. Aceh is different. But because of its historic location within the Malay world, a rejection of Indonesian has been less plausible in Aceh as well. And again, using the Indonesian language need not mean accepting Indonesia the
country, which many or most Acehnese have mixed to critical feelings about and some would indeed reject if given the chance.

This chapter has argued that space is not destiny in any simple sense. Neither is speech. Without belittling the language optimism of the Youth Oath in 1928, or the role of Indonesian in creating Indonesia, the country’s fate in this century will involve a great deal more than who speaks what. The spatial distribution of first and second languages, including the ability to speak the national language, suggests if anything a relatively stable complementarity. A failure of national linguistic identity is a highly unlikely basis for expecting Indonesia to unravel.

Decentralization

In this seemingly stable political language game, however, there is a wild card—decentralization—and it has been played, for better or worse, by the central government in Jakarta, beginning in 2001 with the implementation of laws meant to boost regional autonomy. The experiment is a bold propositional gamble that in addition to improving governance, granting more power to local authorities will increase their motivation to remain inside Indonesia, rather than whetting their appetite for exit. Four years later, in 2005, it was still too early to confirm this argument in any definitive way.

A short-term judgment was entirely possible, however. The circumstances and aftermath of Suharto’s downfall reflected a wholesale delegitimization of his centralized regime. Impressions of economic collapse, political collapse, moral collapse—the latter signaled by sometimes horrifically violent mobs—made it easy to understand why one might wish to quit such an obviously failing state. Meanwhile the means to act on such alienation appeared in the form of free media, where regional resentments could be voiced, and in the championing of democratic rights, including the right to vote in competitive national elections in June 1999 and, for East Timorese, the right to vote themselves, in effect, out of the republic a few months later.

Yet in early 2005 there were still only two real independence movements inside the country: the already familiar ones in Aceh and Papua. Also familiar but considerably less significant were the occasional reexpressions of residual sentiment in favor of the sovereign republic that had been championed by some Christians in southern Maluku in the 1950s. Considering all that Indonesia had so recently been through, including an estimated 13 percent shrinkage of its economy in 1998, the lack of new separatist campaigns was surprising, even amazing.

It would be wrong to attribute this lack of new moves to leave Indonesia solely to cooptation, that is, to the power of autonomy, including financial transfers, to tempt the regions back from the brink of independence. That would overstate the proximity of the brink to begin with, by underestimating the staying power of the idea of Indonesia and by exaggerating the extent to which East Timor’s departure was seen elsewhere in the republic at the time as a chance to follow suit.

That said, however, decentralization did become a reason for staying put, especially in places well endowed with natural resources and thus with elites hoping for the income from those resources, formerly transferred to Jakarta, to be rerouted in their direction. Thirty percent of central government spending was devolved to the governments of cities and regencies or districts. A district endowed with natural resources—oil and gas, hard minerals, tropical forest—was assured of a major share of the revenue accruing to the central government from their exploitation. Regional protests and expressions of regional identity against Jakarta in this context were not demands to break away from the center so much as acts of leverage on it.

The downside of decentralization has been fractionation: a proliferation of bounded units within the same space. This aspect of the process has received much less attention than the rules of transfer have, even though it could wind up draining resources, magnifying corruption, and reducing efficiency at the local level.

The Indonesian government is a building with five floors. At the top is the national administration headquartered in Jakarta. Provincial, district, subdistrict, and village levels of authority complete the hierarchy. The decentralization laws that were adopted in 1999 more or less bypassed the provincial level. Authority was instead transferred mainly to the next lower floor—the districts.

Apparent this choice was made to avoid the risk of giving too much power to units as large and therefore potentially as dangerous as provinces. That centrifugal concern could be spun patriotically as a laudable desire to empower people closer to the ground while denying larger-scale constituencies and resources to future warlords bent on splitting the nation. But the decision could also be read cynically as an effort by Jakarta to claim generosity while retaining primacy, knowing that the country’s districts were too many and too small ever to coalesce successfully against central domination. Common to both explanations was the idea that the centrifugal thrust of decentralization could be limited by checking the provinces from below.

Regionalism and Religion

Whatever the exact rationale for empowering the districts, doing so greatly amplified their value. Under the terms of Laws no. 22 and 25 of 1999, districts
were authorized to assume and fund responsibilities previously discharged by the central government in all sectors save foreign relations, national defense and security, national monetary and fiscal policy, and religious affairs. The laws did allow for the central government to adopt and implement policies as needed with regard to development planning, national state administration, training and manpower issues, the exploitation of natural energy resources, advanced technologies of a "strategic" nature, environmental conservation, and national standards. But that did not necessarily imply a central usurping of district authority over those subjects.

Presumably to implement their new responsibilities, districts were empowered to exercise governmental authority over potentially lucrative matters such as capital investment, industry and trade, public works, agriculture, manpower, and education, among other topics. Districts were also entitled to manage national energy resources located within their borders. And they were assured—on paper—of financing, infrastructure, and personnel sufficient to discharge their newly enlarged responsibilities. Suddenly, from jurisdictions with little clout under Suharto's centralized regime, Indonesia's districts had become valued assets—and estimable prizes in political competition.48

In 1999 Indonesia held democratic elections to local councils in 306 districts. The autonomy laws were implemented beginning in 2001. The number of districts rose above 350 by 2002, to around 430 in 2004. The formation of each new district created a new set of executive, administrative, and legislative positions to be filled and implied an additional budget to be spent. More districts meant more jobs, patronage, and influence—turf—for local politicians and for national ones seeking local support. Local businesses reportedly experienced 10–15 percent increases in the cost of doing business, especially in the transport of goods on local roads. Members of the national legislature in Jakarta were happy to approve subdividing the political map. And they were willing as well to enlarge the number of fully recognized provinces from twenty-six in 1999 (after East Timor's departure) to thirty-two in 2004.49

In a country with hundreds of local ethno-linguistic identities, would political subdivision wind up creating hundreds of little platforms to match—platforms where minorities could become majorities and cease having to compromise for the sake of consensus within larger frames, including the national one? Would these new roosts be used by petty rulers to refurbish, for political and economic gain, nativisms and atavisms inimical to the growth of civil society? Would subdivision as the underside of decentralization thus breed conflict and undermine democracy?

The carving of new subdistricts, districts, and provinces from 1999 onward sparked or fueled conflicts along ethnic or religious lines in several outer islands. Viewed overall, however, drawing more and more lines on political maps seemed more likely to spawn wastage than warfare. In years to come one could imagine the entrenching, in some parts of the country, of an illiberal kind of democracy in which elections rotated power and money through more or less self-serving local oligarchies. If it is not slowed or checked, such a trend could spread through Indonesia the sort of decentralized bossism that has tended to characterize politics next door in the Philippines.50

But localism need not always be regressive. Decentralization in Indonesia has been driven by forethought as well as backlash. Alongside the negative case for dismantling Suharto's top-down, center-out regime lies a positive hope—that bringing government closer to society will make politicians more accountable, more informed, and more effective. Early evidence of conflict and corruption to the contrary notwithstanding, in 2005 it was still too early to label that hope entirely naive.

Responsibility for religious affairs was not decentralized. Matters of faith were too sensitive for Jakarta to relinquish authority over them. But keeping them within Jakarta's ambit for purposes of policy and administration hardly settled their relationship to Indonesian identity. That relationship need not bear extensive scrutiny here; religion is thoroughly treated elsewhere in this book. I will, however, introduce the subject in relation to identity, summarize the geography of belief, and question the implications of religion for the territorial integrity of Indonesia, including the political importance of faith in majority-Muslim Aceh and majority-Christian Papua.

Room for Religion

Islam in Indonesia has enjoyed a cultural efflorescence for some time now. Arguably the seeds for this revival were sown in the later 1970s, when a buoyantly oil-driven economy enabled the New Order to support Islam as a religion in a range of ways, including building mosques and religious schools and subsidizing pilgrimages to Mecca. By the 1980s, an Islamic religious revival was under way, and in the second half of that decade it was strengthened as President Suharto grew more interested in Islam and less wary of Muslim organizations, or at least those he thought he could control. In the 1990s it became conventional to think of Indonesia as having taken an "Islamic turn."51

In 1971, according to that year's census, 88 percent of Indonesians were Muslims. In view of the subsequent invigoration of Islam as a religion, one would have expected this figure to grow. It did not. Census data for 2000 show the proportion unchanged—still 88 percent. The continuity suggests that the revival of Islam in Indonesia has involved quality more than quantity, internal
substantiation more than external conversion. Religious minorities are in no demographic danger. Christians, not Muslims, were the fastest-growing religious community in the country between 1971 and 2000.\footnote{52}

If Indonesia remains democratic, its national identity could become more Islamic. That shift, if it happens, will reflect the religion's overwhelming majority status. Translating majorities into governments is what democracies do. More interesting, however, will be the content of that more Islamic identity, as it may have been shaped over decades by the increasing manifestation of Islam in the private and public lives of Muslims. A “civil Islam” in which piety is not a political project will have markedly different effects on Indonesian identity compared with an “uncivil Islamism” that demands a strictly and legalistically Islamic state.

The traditional moderation of Islam as practiced in Indonesia favors the milder outcome. In the legislative elections of 2004, compared with those held in 1999, Islamist parties did better, but they remained a fairly modest minority. In the country’s first-ever direct presidential elections in 2004, candidates identified with Islam did not fare well. The winner, retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and his second-round opponent, incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri, were Muslims with secular backgrounds, outlooks, and styles. Isolated acts of Islamist violence have appalled most Indonesians. Moderate Muslims and non-Muslim minorities will continue to provide a national constituency for tolerance.

That constituency is, however, unevenly distributed across the archipelago. Followers of different faiths can be found throughout the country, but their concentrations are not random. Christianity, for example, has a distinctly eastern cast. In 2000 the most Christian provinces (and the proportions living there who reported being Christian) were all in eastern Indonesia: East Nusa Tenggara (88 percent), Papua (76 percent), North Sulawesi (69 percent), and Maluku (50 percent).\footnote{53}

On a map, Indonesia extends horizontally from 95° to 141° longitude. The country is bisected longitudinally at 118°. Back in 1971, with one exception, Christians were an absolute or near majority in every province wholly located east of a north–south line drawn just two degrees east of that midline, at 120° longitude. Conversely, in that year, with one exception, Muslims were an absolute majority in every province wholly located west of that same near middle meridian. (The exceptions were, respectively, Muslim-majority Southeast Sulawesi and Hindu-majority Bali.)\footnote{54} But these statistical differences lacked political force. The ensuing three and a half decades proved that Indonesia was not about to split nearly in half along religious lines. Economic expansion, social moderation, and the centralized institutions and antisectarian vigilance of the New Order all contributed to that proof.

Since the end of Suharto’s rule and the onset of democratization, however, fractionation has tended to undermine religious diversity—not by deepening the national contrast between east and west but by creating, throughout the country, new and smaller jurisdictions whose internal pluralism, religious or ethnic, is less than that of the units they replace.

After 1998, for example, two new provinces were established in eastern Indonesia. Gorontalo was carved out of North Sulawesi; North Maluku was subtracted from Maluku. The effect on intraprovincial religious diversity was dramatic. North Sulawesi, immediately prior to its division, had been 50 percent Muslim and 49 percent Christian. In its place stood Gorontalo with a 98 percent Muslim majority and a truncated North Sulawesi with a 69 percent Christian majority. Maluku had been 62 percent Muslim, 37 percent Christian. Its division yielded North Maluku with an 85 percent Muslim majority and a reduced Maluku almost evenly split between Muslims at 49 percent and Christians at 50 percent. From two provinces, each shared by a larger Muslim population and an also large Christian one, four provinces had been gerrymandered—two largely Muslim, one largely Christian, and only one in which the two communities were evenly balanced.\footnote{55}

The great majority of instances of factionation did not result in violence, and when violence did occur, it sometimes preceded factionation. Nor did a demographic balance between religious communities necessarily guarantee provincial security. The intercommunal bloodshed that flared in parts of the Maluku archipelago in 1999, when the islands were still one province, became a reason to divide it. The migration of Muslims into formerly Christian-majority southern Maluku, far from heralding a stable parity, stoked Christian fears. Also, religion was but one ingredient in the mixtures of ethnic, economic, and political identifications and resentments that set off and helped to sustain these and other seemingly faith-driven clashes.

So in 2005, the question remained: Would factionation weaken or strengthen Indonesian national identity, or leave it unchanged? Particularly worth watching in this respect will be what Jakarta does or does not do when a given province or district relies on its religious or ethnic majority to enact laws and engage in practices that cater to that majority, including the introduction of discriminatory laws.

In the case of Aceh, renowned for its Islamic character, Jakarta did not wait for the Acehnese to erect a scaffolding of Islamic rules to challenge national ones. The central authorities moved instead to offer to satisfy what they assumed was an Acehnese thirst for Islamic law. A concessionary gesture catering to that thirst, they hoped, would stimulate badly needed Acehnese loyalty toward Indonesia. Arguably, however, they misread the importance of religion in that long-suffering province.
Aceh and Indonesia

Aceh's location has greatly affected its history. Its westernmost position at the northwest entrance to the Malacca Strait and the farther western (Arabian) provenance of Islam made Aceh the logical first landfall of that religion in the archipelago—although the earliest known physical evidence of a Muslim presence comes from an eleventh-century headstone in eastern Java. The first recognizably Muslim polity was Pasai on Aceh's north coast not far from present-day Lhokseumawe. Upon his conversion to Islam in 1297, Pasai's Sultan Malek Saleh became the first Muslim ruler in what is now Indonesia. A succession of sultanates continuing into the twentieth century made Aceh unique among the components of Indonesia in having the longest unbroken record of statehood. That record included fierce resistance against the "infidel" Dutch in the Aceh War (1873–1903).

Islam has become an integral part of what it means to be an Acehnese. Religion and ethnicity are intimately linked in two sides of a coin pattern that is not unlike the coincidence of being Muslim with being Malay that prevails across the strait in peninsular Malaysia. That said, however, it is important to keep in mind that while Muslims account for an estimated 97 percent of the total population in Aceh, only half of that total are thought to be ethnically Acehnese. And the society is much more than merely Muslim. Historically its indigenous elites have included teachers of Islam who were identified strongly with their religion. But they have interacted, sometimes violently, with inland aristocrats, who have themselves been distinguished from coastal traders, not to mention the further differentiation of Acehnese society that has taken place over the course of Indonesian independence. Even on "Mecca's front porch" there are differences when it comes to understanding Islam, interpreting its laws, and projecting its political role.

Official Indonesian perceptions of Aceh have not always taken these subtleties into account. In 1998–2000, in the tumultuous and democratizing aftermath of the New Order, which included East Timor's long-delayed self-determination, Aceh's independence became less unimaginable than it had been under Suharto. In Jakarta, opinions differed as to what to do. Some of the politicians I interviewed thought of the Acehnese as so single-mindedly Muslim that allowing them to enact Islamic law for themselves might be enough to keep the province inside Indonesia. Reflecting that hope, the autonomy law for Aceh adopted by the national legislature in 2001 provided for a Court of Islamic Law with authority over Muslims.

If Aceh could be essentialized as homogeneously, single-mindedly Muslim by some Indonesians in Jakarta, it was even easier for Americans to do so from the other side of the Pacific Ocean. This was especially so in the more Manichean atmosphere of suspicion toward Islam that followed al-Qaeda's calamitous strikes against the United States on September 11, 2001, and the gruesome success of Indonesian jihadists in Bali a year and a month later. But in seeking justice if not freedom from Jakarta, the Acehnese were not monolithically counterposing against Indonesia a radically Islamist vision of the world. Nor were they about to launch a war against Christians in Indonesia or elsewhere. Arguably, Islam had so imbued Acehnese society, and for so long, that it was taken for granted in a way quite alien to the obsessions of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan or the insecurities of jihadists on Java.

Had Aceh's elite been Muslim exclusively, nothing else would have mattered. Instead, the diversity of Acehnese society sustained diverse vantage points and arguments. Some university students would tolerate no option save independence. Other students wanted self-determination as a democratic right whose exercise Suharto's fall had made possible. In this latter group, the means mattered as much as the end. If (against all expectations) a genuine referendum in Aceh endorsed the prolongation of provincial status quo, so be it. Members of the Acehnese business community who had prospered during the New Order thanks in no small part to their connections to that regime were inclined to see in the movement for independence a means of persuading the central government to make profitable concessions, including redirecting rents from Jakarta toward Aceh and thus prospectively into their own hands. Among the ulamas there were differences regarding the Islamic legal frame to be administered under special autonomy, between those who rejected Jakarta's offer as an insincere bribe and those who saw it as an opportunity for employment and influence.

Ramizard's Rule

Violence in Aceh did not necessarily accelerate momentum toward separation. Responding to widespread brutality by Indonesian police and soldiers, many Acehnese probably wanted the removal of Indonesian forces from Aceh at least as much as that of Aceh from Indonesia. Ten thousand or more, mostly civilians, had died since the rebels' declaration of Acehnese independence in 1976. GAM's tendency to perpetrate brutalities of its own had left some Acehnese unable to reserve their scorn for Jakarta alone. In these eyes, mounting noncombatant deaths and damages made freedom less inevitable than it made peace desirable. If Aceh does remain within the republic, future historians may review this period for evidence as to why. One conclusion they may draw is that, along with cooptation, repression worked.

That, at any rate, was the calculation behind the Indonesian effort to wipe out GAM that began, as noted, in May 2003—one of the largest, if not the
largest, military operations undertaken by Jakarta since invading East Timor in 1975. In declaring martial law in the province, the central government swept aside any pretense of civilian rule. With it went the niceties of cooptation through autonomy sweetened by Islamic laws. In the words of the hardline army staff chief, General Ryamizard Ryacudu,

*No region can be allowed to break away.* That includes Aceh and Papua. Even if those making noises [for independence] number up to a million, this is a country of more than 220 million people. Our job is to safeguard unity. Our job is to destroy GAM’s military capability. Issues of justice, religion, autonomy, social welfare, education — those are not the Indonesian military’s problems.69

Neither, it seemed, did the military have to worry about public opinion opposing the decision to storm GAM. Among Indonesians outside Aceh, support for using force to suppress separatism there ran between 70 and 80 percent in some polls.61 Seen from the United States, it was tempting to picture the war becoming, for Jakarta, a domestic “Vietnam” where mounting casualties among civilians and government troops would in time shrink and reverse the popularity of a military solution to the point of Indonesian withdrawal and acquiescence to independence.

Don’t bet on it. During Indonesia’s transition from New Order rule, the conflict in Aceh has fluctuated along three parallel tracks—suppression, cooption, and negotiation—in ways imical to success on any one of them. Like strong wind pushing a kite higher, abuses associated with suppression tend to fortify the opposition to be suppressed. But GAM cannot defeat Jakarta militarily, and probably never will. Cooption might work if peace is assured. But violent methods, mainly by Jakarta but also by GAM, assure that it is not. Successful negotiations presuppose trust. But trust is sapped by the abuses that accompany insurgency and repression, and by bad faith—Jakarta’s when it tries to buy better than earn Aceh’s fealty, GAM’s when it burns the schools that Jakarta builds and Aceh needs, and both sides when they use negotiated pauses in the fighting to prepare for more of it. Megawati’s Aceh is more like Vladimir Putin’s Chechnya than it is like Lyndon Johnson’s or Richard Nixon’s Vietnam.

The interlocking stalemates that have thwarted a resolution of the conflict in Aceh might be broken. In theory, by democratization and internationalization. A thriving Indonesian democracy should foster military reform and thus break the vicious zigzag from harm to hatred as a rationale for additional harm. A fully democratic Indonesia should honor the democratic right of self-determination and thus permit a referendum to take place. Sufficiently concerned foreigners should be able to entice and pressure both sides toward peace and compromise.

Against the grain of such hopeful logic, however, stands the capacity of democracy not to moderate but to express and intensify Indonesian nationalism. In the years of transition from Suharto’s rule, especially after the pride-wounding “loss” of East Timor, what might be called “Ryamizard’s rule” would have made a popular campaign slogan: No region can be allowed to break away. It is not clear how many Indonesians would have noted the deficiency of a national identity that had to forbid by fiat what it should have made unnecessary, even inconceivable, by success. Self-reflective or not, the appeal and the intransigence of Ryamizard’s rule showed how determined Indonesian nationalism could be.

The devastation of much of Aceh’s coastline on December 26, 2004, by a Richter scale 9.0 earthquake and the tsunami that it triggered was much too recent in January 2005 to allow an observer to know how the aftermath would affect GAM’s prospects and Aceh’s relations with Jakarta. In the short run, the central government’s hand was strengthened. By wiping out lives and infrastructure in the province, the disaster suddenly made the province far more dependent on Jakarta than it had been before. The channeling of emergency aid through the national authorities greatly empowered them. In contrast, GAM’s ability to gain credit by helping with relief and reconstruction was hampered by small numbers, few resources, and enemy status in the eyes of some 50,000 government troops, including many brought in to respond to the calamity and, not least, to prevent the rebels from using it to their own ends. But it was also clear that, over time, Jakarta’s advantage could be frittered away in red tape, corruption, and renewed brutality against Acehnese suspected of favoring independence.

Either way, the disaster was a major early test of the ability of President Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, in office only since October 2004, to perform well in a crisis. Soon after the waves struck in December, GAM offered a cease-fire, which mostly endured in the early weeks despite clashes. In January in Jakarta, the president surprised observers by consulting with foreign ambassadors on ways to resolve the conflict and by authorizing negotiations to that end under the auspices of a Finnish NGO later that month. At the same time, however, he championed an even stronger military, arguing that such a force might have crushed the rebels in Aceh long ago. Amplifying the ambiguity of such mixed messages were differences inside GAM and among non-GAM Acehnese groups and views and, in Jakarta, between Yudhoyono and his politically powerful and ambitious vice president.

Whatever the balance of promise and danger in this cauldron of possibilities, in early 2005 Aceh was not poised to leave Indonesia, and Islam was not the engine driving the Acehnese toward such a result. Grievances stemming from Jakarta’s brutality mixed with rancor over itsavarice were. For decades
Aceh had been an important source of natural gas. Nearly all of the profits from exporting that resource had been transferred out of Aceh—to the national government, its national oil company (Pertamina), and the latter’s foreign partner in the province (ExxonMobil). And this in a period when, if these “missing” returns from oil and gas were excluded from the province’s per capita economy, Aceh lagged most of the comparably reduced provincial economies in the rest of the country.62 Following Jakarta’s earlier failure to reward the province materially for helping to fight the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch, this treatment fed a deep sense of injustice among Acehnese.

The sheer scale of Aceh’s travail in the wake of the tsunami drew an outpouring of empathy and support from other Indonesians. To that extent, however perversely, the province’s suffering strengthened the country’s identity. In Jakarta, grand plans were floated: to raze and rebuild the badly damaged provincial capital, Banda Aceh, along dramatic high-modern lines, while assuring for hundreds of thousands of homeless coastal Acehnese material conditions even better than what nature had destroyed. If these plans were realized with honesty and sensitivity to local needs, perhaps the economic development of Aceh could accomplish what repression, negotiation, and offers of autonomy had not—the final, successful integration of the province into Indonesia.

But more than 98 percent of all Indonesians had not been directly affected by the disaster. Once scenes of pain and wreckage no longer filled the media, would the political will to transform the province remain, or would it too fade away? How much of an estimated $4 billion in pledges of aid by foreign governments would never be made good, or be transferred but then siphoned off, as natural gas receipts had been?65 In a country known for corruption, Aceh’s administration has been especially corrupt. When the tsunami struck, the province’s governor was being detained in Jakarta on corruption charges. Was that an encouraging sign of a national government finally willing to discipline its own? Or the tip of a national cancer too endemic to remove?

Papua and Indonesia

Acehnese and Papuans alike have resented Jakarta. But the farthest eastern and western ends of the republic differ in many other respects, including religion. In 2000 Aceh and Papua were, respectively, 98 percent Muslim and 79 percent Christian. But just as Islam alone did not explain Aceh’s revolt against Indonesian authority, neither did Christianity fully account for Papuan separatism.

The numerically dominant Protestant congregations in Papua were organizationally divided. In the transition from the New Order, no charismatic religious leader arose to evoke and rally a common Papuan identity. It would have taken someone of uncommon skills to unite a population whose largest ethnic group amounted to merely 12 percent of the province’s people and consisted not of Papuans but Javanese.64 Ethno-linguistic diversity in a population spread thinly across dispersed settlements on mountainous terrain complicated the formation and expression of a would-be Papuan nation, even one limited to the western half of New Guinea. Other such complications included the repression, intimidation, cooptation, and manipulation of “its” Papuans by Jakarta.

Historically, ethnic Papuans’ sense of being removed from Indonesian identity dates back to their nearly complete absence from the nationalist struggle to create it. The anti-Dutch revolution, a formative experience for a generation of Indonesians, including many Acehnese, passed Papuans by. They were kept under Dutch control until Indonesia threatened invasion and the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Nations arranged for the territory’s transfer to Jakarta in 1963. The deal included a proviso that Papuans themselves would eventually be consulted on the matter. In 1969 the Indonesian government orchestrated an “act of free choice” whereby a thousand Papuans handpicked and coached by Jakarta ratified adherence to Indonesia—an event later ridiculed by Papuans as an “act of no choice.”65 No such history complicated the Indonesian status of Aceh.

Papua and Aceh do share a history of having their natural resources exploited lopsidedly to Jakarta’s benefit. Papuan concerns in this respect have focused on the mining of the world’s most valuable deposit of gold and third most valuable deposit of copper, near Timika not far inland from the eastern province’s west central coast. Under a generous agreement signed early in the New Order by Indonesian officials eager for foreign investment, an American firm, now called Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, dug and ran the mine and became the biggest taxpayer in Indonesia. The company also became the largest employer in the province, although skilled positions were mostly taken by non-Papuan Indonesians. In 2003 only a fourth of all Freeport employees in Papua were ethnically Papuan.66

Locally filled Freeport jobs and Freeport-funded community development projects accounted for an insignificant fraction of the profits obtained, and very little of the rest was returned to the province. Following the example already given for Aceh—subtracting the contribution of mining to Papua’s regional product per capita to reflect Jakarta’s retention of revenue from that source—Papua also badly lagged the country.67 Ranked by poverty, Papua fared even worse; an account released in 2003 judged the province the poorest in Indonesia.68

For ethnic Papuans, stigmatization based on race and culture compounded material exploitation. The Acehnese in principle shared their Malay–Muslim
character with most other Indonesians. The distinctively Melanesian features and customs and Christian beliefs of Papuans, in contrast, enhanced their vulnerability to stereotyping and disdain.

In November 2001, a few months after doing so for Aceh, President Megawati signed into effect a special autonomy law for Papua. It granted the province authority over sectors other than foreign policy, defense and security, fiscal and monetary policy, religion, justice, and "other sectors to be determined in consonance with laws or equivalent regulations"—the latter potentially a large loophole. The law granted such autonomy to Papua as a single province. If this law were implemented in ways favorable to Papuans, its provisions might go some distance toward meeting their demands. Especially generous was the promise to channel up to four-fifths of the returns from local resource extraction back into the province.

By 2001, however, decentralization for Papua had already shown its darker side as fractionation. In 1999 Indonesia's legislature had adopted a law splitting Papua into three provinces. Papua's sheer physical size—much larger than Aceh's—did make it harder to rule as one province. But the move could also be taken—among Papuan and foreign observers, it was taken—as a ploy meant to thwart secessionist Papuan unity against Jakarta.

**Three Provinces from One?**

Initially stalled by strong Papuan opposition, fractionation resurfaced as an official Indonesian priority in January 2003. One might have thought that Law no. 21 of 2001, which granted special autonomy to Papua and made no mention of its being divided, would have superseded the earlier Law no. 45 of 1999, which had authorized Papua's trisection. But not according to Presidential Instruction (Inpres) no. 1 of 2003, which ordered the implementation of the 1999 legislation. Confusion ensued in Jakarta and Papua alike. The Department of Home Affairs basically denied responsibility for the president's decision. Nevertheless, on February 6 in Manokwari, Papua, the first of three provinces intended to replace Papua was announced at a ceremony reportedly attended by thousands of local supporters of the new jurisdiction. No official from either the Papuan capital, Jayapura, or Jakarta was present, however. A few days later in Jakarta, Papuans demonstrated against Inpres no. 1 and vowed to ask Indonesia's Supreme Court to rule it illegal.

In mid-February 2003, following a closed meeting, the People's Representative Council endorsed turning Papua into three provinces. By then, Home Affairs was on board. The minister of that department and the head of the legislature explained that the 2001 law had not superseded and did not contradict the 1999 law. Prior to the 2001 law granting special autonomy, in this official view, the 1999 law had already validly established the division of Papua. Said the minister, "It's a fait accompli." It was not. In 2004 where one province had been, there were not three but two: a new province named West Irian Jaya and the large remaining part of the old one, still called Papua. West Irian Jaya includes Tangguh, a large field of natural gas being developed for export to China. The lead foreign company in this project, BP (British Petroleum), has taken steps meant to avoid the troubles that have plagued Freeport. All the same, the new military hierarchy assigned to the new province may try to tap the gas project for informal rents in ways reminiscent of Freeport's experience. That could entrench and enrich corrupt security personnel at a time when Indonesia urgently needs the opposite—military reform.

A new province means a new bureaucracy to be staffed, legislative seats to be filled, and openings for entrepreneurs to meet increased demand for goods and services. That could be good for economic growth. But it could also strengthen the dominance of ethnic non-Papuans whose resumes and connections to Jakarta make them more employable than the indigenous population, many of whom lack formal education and are not used to working for wages.

In Jakarta in May 2000, I asked a leading Indonesian official with responsibility over Indonesia's regions whether he worried more about Aceh or Papua (Irian Jaya) leaving the republic. He did not hesitate before answering, Papua. His reasoning featured religion. Aceh was Muslim. Papua was Christian. Indonesia was weak. The Christian West, and the United States especially, did not care about Muslim Acehnese. Christian Papuans were another matter. If Papua did eventually leave, it would be because foreigners had pied it loose.

Sympathy for fellow Christians does animate some Western supporters of Papuan independence. But the Indonesian violation of human rights in Papua counts for more in eliciting anger in the basically secular societies of Australia, the United States, and Europe. Gross violations in Aceh, compared with Papua, have been two-way, implicating not only Indonesian forces but, to an extent, GAM as well. Nor is there an event in Acehnese history that delegitimizes Jakarta's rule as notoriously as does the "act of [un]free choice" whereby Jakarta sealed the absorption of Papua into Indonesia. For Aceh there is nothing comparable to the Western guilt by historical association created by the involvement of the Dutch and American governments and the United Nations in that bit of realpolitik. The earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 triggered Western sympathy for the plight of the Acehnese. Nevertheless, as of early 2005, among all of Indonesia's provinces, the most susceptible—or least immune—to being "East Timorized" by rising international pressure toward a referendum on independence was not Aceh but Papua. Religion was relevant to that ranking but not decisive.
What, then, of the “end of Indonesia”? In 2005 it was ludicrous to expect the country’s outright disassembly, something comparable to the shattering of the Soviet Union into fifteen pieces in 1991. In Aceh and Papau, secession was not in sight. In the rest of Indonesia, Ryamizard’s rule—No region can be allowed to break away—was still too popular. Sometime in the future, the costs of retaining the rim could finally escalate beyond the core’s willingness or ability to pay them, or beyond the inclination of appalled foreigners to tolerate the abuse of Indonesians by Indonesia. But in 2005 that tipping point was still nowhere in sight. And if it were ever reached, Indonesia seemed more likely to lose an extremity than its identity.

As the country struggled to cope with the pangs and dilemmas of reform, on the other hand, the “end of Indonesia” in the sense of a new national purpose, a matter not of form but content, that uncertainty remained in full and urgent view.

IMAGES OF INDONESIA

In the following section I will briefly explore and evaluate three concrete answers to the question, What is Indonesia? The answers are, a Javanese empire, a Dutch legacy, and a nationalist artifact.

The pool of answers from which these particular images are drawn is large. Indonesia can be variously pictured as an endangered ecology, a fledgling democracy, a corrupt oligarchy, a cultural compromise, a communal shambles, an Islamic society, an Islamist hatchery, a civil society, an uncivil society, a lawless anarchy, a recovering economy, a laggard economy, a reforming polity, a stumbling polity, a secular state, a garrison state, a “messy state,” or a “pivotal state” for the United States, Southeast Asia, the Muslim world, and so on.

Images of Indonesia as a Javanese empire, a Dutch legacy, and a nationalist artifact are not necessarily superior to the many other possible answers to my title question. But they are more clearly historical, and in that respect may usefully complement the spatial and centrifugal Indonesias scanned earlier in this chapter and the contemporary events discussed later in this book.

Javanese Empire?

The case for this image of Indonesia runs roughly as follows. The Javanese are by far the largest ethnic group. Their homeland, Java, is the most developed island, and not by coincidence. Hypocritically, behind a nationalist facade, the Javanese have dominated and exploited the periphery on the core’s behalf, entrenching and advantaging themselves against the interests of other Indonesians. Indonesia is an internally neocolonial recreation of another Javanese empire, Majapahit. But compared with that one, this is far more intrusive and brutal. For decades, officially sponsored transmigration from Java to the outer islands proliferated colonies of Javanese, threatening the land rights and livelihoods of the resident non-Javanese. And when, as in Aceh and Papau, the non-Javanese resisted such treatment, the Javanese waged fierce war to retain their empire intact—or even to expand it, witness the invasion, annexation, and prolonged repression of East Timor.

But the movement against Dutch rule was transethnic from the outset. Nationalism superseded more parochial identifications, including Javanism. Ethnically disparate but socially elite young men from the Netherlands East Indies studying in Holland banded together, drawn by their shared status as outsiders in Europe to consider themselves insiders from Indonesia. The choice of a national language bypassed Javanese. In exhortatory speeches and writings, some nationalists invoked Majapahit as glorious proof of Indonesian greatness. But the most extravagant of these, Muhammad Yamin, was Minangkabau, not Javanese. And that precolonial empire was too ancient, too vague, too vast, and, yes, too Javanese to be taken seriously as a blueprint of the unified modern future the nationalists desired. As for the priority on improving the welfare of Java’s residents, it grew not from Javanese selfishness but from Dutch concern, however belated and superficial, to address the entwining of poverty with overpopulation on that island. Transmigration too was originally a Dutch idea.

For the cosmopolitan mixed-blood nationalist Sukarno, however much Javanese traditions might help sustain the idea of Indonesia, they could never be allowed to supersede it. His successor, Suharto, was less urbane, less educated, and “more Javanese” in genealogy and style. Among Indonesia’s six presidents, only Suharto was regularly likened to a Javanese sultan. More than any preceding regime, his army-based New Order centralized state power on Java, in the government in Jakarta, and exploited the resources of the outer islands while penetratng their societies, including the officially sponsored resettlement of mainly Javanese transmigrants.

Yet the public ideology of Suharto’s Indonesia was not Javanism. It was a transethnic and transreligious creed, Pancasila (the Five Principles), devised to encompass subnational identities, not to privilege one of them over the rest. (First articulated by Sukarno in 1945, the principles may be summarized as belief in one God, a just and civilized humanity, Indonesian unity, democracy through representative deliberation, and social justice.) Nor did the New Order limit the scope of its main preoccupations—development and security—to speakers of Javanese.
In terms of physical infrastructure, manufacturing jobs, and educational access, among other indicators, the island of Java and the metropolis of Jakarta were relatively favored over the outer islands. But in 2000 the Javanese accounted for merely one-tenth of the 44 million Indonesians in West Java (including Banten) and one-third of the 8 million in Jakarta. To be sure, nearly four-fifths of the 35 million Indonesians in East Java and almost all of the 34 million in Central Java (including Yogyakarta) were Javanese.25

These data invite comparison. If Suharto’s Indonesia had been a Javanese empire geared to putting the interests of its Javanese citizens first, Central Java (including Yogyakarta) should have done best, followed by East Java, Jakarta, and West Java (including Banten) in that order. Instead, among these four populations in 1990, after more than two decades of New Order rule, the highest per capita gross regional products (GRPs) were in Jakarta and West Java (including Banten), where the Javanese were proportionally least present. East Java and Central Java (including Yogyakarta), on the other hand, scored lowest on this economic scale despite hosting proportionally the most Javanese. As for the rest of the country, the only outer island province with a Javanese majority, Lampung, was the fourth worst off by this measure of any of the twenty-seven provinces then in existence. Nor, under Suharto, were provinces “rewarded” with more growth in gross regional product per head—or less poverty—according to how Javanese their populations were.26

Other points could be made. Proponents of the Javanese empire thesis might expect Aceh and Papua to have suffered demographic colonization in the form of large influxes of ethnic Javanese. The already cited estimates of Indonesian migration into Papua are alarming from a nativist standpoint. Yet the census in 2000 found Aceh and Papua only modestly diluted by Javanese, with minorities of 16 and 12 percent of their respective populations reporting that ethnicity.27

If Indonesia were an oppressively Javanese empire, non-Javanese Indonesians throughout the country should have rooted for the independence of Aceh and Papua. On the contrary, these outcomes have been and remain almost wholly unsupported by Indonesians, including the majority who are not Javanese. Under the New Order one might have attributed this silence to fear. But the rise of freedom of speech did not trigger a crescendo of public willingness to let Aceh and Papua go. If there was a trend outside of these places, it ran in the opposite direction: toward retaining Indonesia’s borders by whatever means, including force. Public sympathy for the victims of Aceh’s tsunami in 2005 could incubate demands for greater fairness and transparency in Jakarta’s dealings with the province without creating support for independence.

If non-Javanese Indonesians felt victimized inside a Javanese empire, they should have applauded East Timor’s bravery in voting to leave the republic and perhaps also endorsed a new presidential term for the man who had proposed the referendum and allowed it to be held at the end of August 1999. He was B. J. Habibie, the first Indonesian president from an outer island (Sumatera). Instead, in the People’s Consultative Assembly in Jakarta, wounded national pride tipped the political balance against him. Already unpopular as a former protégé and crony of Suharto’s, and now also blamed for East Timor’s disaffiliation, Habibie lost his presidential bid in the face of a backlash among nationalistic politicians who were by no means only Javanese.

Java and the Army

There are, all the same, two reasons not to dismiss out of hand the idea of Indonesia as a Javanese empire. The first is straightforward: If by Javanese we mean not the ethnic group but the ethnically various core island, there can be no doubt that Java compared with the rest of Indonesia has been a magnet—for spontaneous migration, job-creating investment in manufacturing, and a massive and ongoing influx of rents. The latter accrued in New Order days to administrative, political, and business elites on Java, especially in Jakarta, from the exploitation of natural resources along the periphery and from the willingness of the regional clients of these central elites to pay for access and favor in the country’s top-down political economy.

Perhaps the world’s largest ongoing experiment in decentralization will succeed. Perhaps Indonesia will empower its regions, including the neglected eastern islands, to the benefit of core and periphery alike. In that event, Indonesia will resemble a Java-centered empire less than at any time since independence. But decentralization could also fail, if it does no more than multiply sites for boffism, corruption, and coercion—not just a single big Suharto, from whom at least consistency might be expected, but hundreds of little ones plotting in all directions in fiefdoms around the archipelago. In that event, Jakarta-on-Java would have an incentive to recapture its former primacy, and if it did, the country might even segue from democracy back toward authoritarian rule.

Uncertainties surrounding the future role of the army are a second reason not to deny categorically the idea of Indonesia as a Javanese empire. Historically and today in Indonesia, the army has enjoyed more influence than the air force, navy, and police combined. And notwithstanding its explicitly national scope and mission, the army has had a special relationship to Java and the Javanese.

It was on Java in 1945 that the Indonesian national army was first established. Java was the epicenter of the ensuing revolution to stop the Dutch from reappropriating their former colony. The men who commanded the army
during those formative years of popular struggle (1945–1949) were Javanese. Subsequent commanders included non-Javanese, notably Abdul Haris Nasution (1950–1952; 1955–1962), and the army did nationwide recruitment. But insofar as the “1945 generation” of topmost generals in Jakarta defined their task in the 1950s and 1960s as protecting the new republic from the communist left and the Islamist right, their outlook was compatible with, and partly inspired by, an elitist Javanist ideology. That outlook was too conservative to tolerate a social revolution, but too loosely Muslim— lax, mystical, secular—to imply anything but alarm at the prospect of an Islamic state. This “extreme centrist” position became orthodox under Suharto—a Javanese general and a prime exponent of “1945 values”—from the onset of his regime.

Javanism, in this limited sense, receded as the New Order aged and Islamic consciousness grew. In the 1990s Suharto reduced the political and psychological distance he had maintained between himself and Islamist circles. In the face of mounting opposition in 1998, he could have entrusted his aging regime to another Javanese general, Try Sutrisno, whom Suharto had promoted on a fast track—from army chief in 1986–1988 to armed forces commander in 1988–1993 to vice president in 1993–1998. Instead, Suharto chose the Sulawesi-born civilian Habibie as his vice president in March 1998, only to hand him the presidency in May when escalating protests and defections finally convinced the New Order’s founder to step down.

Not one of the ensuing three civilian presidents—Habibie, Wahid, Megawati—could or would serve up again the unique dish of despotism and syncretism garnished with favorite Javanese sayings that Suharto had been known for. Of the trio, only Abdurrahman Wahid was fully Javanese by descent and childhood upbringing. And his background and specialty were Islamic; his outlook was liberal and democratic; and through study, teaching, travel, and conversation he had broadened his knowledge far beyond Suharto’s.

The Army and Megawati

If the “1945 generation” is history, however, its values are a legacy that could in future be refurbished in response to prolonged turmoil. In 2005, eight demobilizing years after the end of Suharto’s anticommunist regime, full legitimacy had still not been restored to the leftist politics he had so assiduously repressed. The officer corps remained impervious to arguments for thoroughgoing social change. And their resistance to upending the status quo could only be stiffened by what they saw as the potential for anarchy in the clashes and protests that had proliferated in Indonesia’s new climate of freedom. Not to mention the centrifugal effect of Acehnese and Papuan rebellions on military thinking already hardened by the loss of East Timor.

As for the Islamist right’s deviation from “1945-style” nationalism, by 2003 the symbols and discourses of the majority religion had become ubiquitous in public life. Beginning in the 1980s, Suharto himself had been willing to promote more (and more actually practicing) Muslim officers to leading military positions. But piety in Islam’s name was one thing, violence quite another. Indonesians did not respond to the Bali bombing of October 2002 with sympathy for the bombers. Far from auguring wider support for a jihad by extremist Muslims against their perceived enemies, the attack shocked the moderate majority into at least tacitly repudiating such acts.

Considering the militarization of Indonesia under Suharto, one might have expected the army during democratization to have become a pariah. Far from it. In 1998–2003 the army managed its own transition in a manner at once brutal and adroit. It did not launch a coup to thwart or oust the country’s new civilian leaders. It refused to be used by one of those civilians, Abdurrahman Wahid, whose liberal views in the end did not prevent him from ordering the military to implement a state of emergency that would have undermined democracy. And the army bowed to some reforms, including the elimination of its blocs of appointed seats in elected assemblies.

But the army retained its multilevel territorial commands virtually intact. It managed to escape significant punishment for the atrocities it had committed under Suharto. In East Timor in September 1999, local militias sponsored by the Indonesian army went on a rampage to protest the rejection of Indonesian rule by the Timorese people in a referendum at the end of August. Perhaps a thousand people died and most of the territory’s infrastructure, such as it was, was destroyed. Yet as of 2004, Indonesian courts had acquitted or overturned the sentence of every one of the thirteen Indonesian officers, including four generals, who had been charged in Indonesia of complicity in those atrocities.

From 1998, in any case, the relevant subject of public concern had tended to segue from the brutality of the army’s past, which had triggered angry calls for justice, toward Indonesia’s future, endangered by secession and disorder and therefore calling not for the army’s punishment but for its rekindling as the nation’s indispensable guardian and savior. No better illustration of this shift could be found than the popularity, among Indonesians outside Aceh, of Megawati’s decision to assail and destroy, once and for all, the Aceh freedom movement beginning in May 2003. For most politically aware Indonesians, keeping their country together had become more important, or at any rate more urgent, than rendering their army humane.

As for a “Java-first” backlash against the outer islands, it is hard to see how that could occur short of a steep and prolonged escalation in the central government’s losses, in blood and treasure, in Aceh, in Papua, and along the rest
of the periphery—losses sufficient to gut the willingness of the majority on Java to keep on fighting for Indonesia. Far from validating Indonesia as a Javanese empire, however, that drastic change of subject would amount to a confession of futility that its core island and largest ethnic group could keep the republic alive.

Indonesia as a Javanese empire? If by that is meant the centrality of Java, yes, notwithstanding historically rival politics off Java and the present experiment in devolution. But Javanism as ethno-ideological hegemony, no, notwithstanding Suharto’s aphorisms and how culturally Javanistic Indonesia may still appear in the eyes of some non-Javanese. Modernization, Islamization, and now democratization have, in different ways, made assertively “feudalistic” Javanism quaint.

Dutch Legacy?

Compared with the ambiguities of Javanism and empire, this face of Indonesia seems straightforward. Half a millennium separates the demise of Majapahit as a unified royal house (1456) from the birth of Indonesia as a sovereign unitary state (1950). As a far more recent polity, the Netherlands East Indies should have been more consequential for the republic than any pre-colonial exemplar, even if it did take the Dutch three centuries from the founding of Batavia (1619) to bring the length and breadth of the islands fully under their control. And that control was more pervasive and capacious—again, therefore, more consequential as a legacy for Indonesia—than anything Majapahit could have managed.

Compared with Majapahit and the Indies, Japan’s occupation of the islands during World War II lasted the blink of an eye. Already in 1944–1945, as the tide of war in the Pacific turned against them, the archipelago’s Japanese occupiers began considering the idea of Indonesian independence. In March 1945 they announced that all-Indonesian body would be convened to explore that prospect. In July, this body voted, in effect, to implement the maximalist vision of Indonesia championed by Muhammad Yamin. Three-fifths of the 66 delegates chose to extend the new state far beyond the Dutch East Indies. Their design for Indonesia encompassed all of the Indies plus the Malayan peninsula, northern Borneo, eastern Timor, the rest of New Guinea, and unnamed “surrounding islands.” Only one-fifth wanted to keep the proposed country to the limits of its colonial antecedent.

In this enlargement of what Indonesia might have become, one senses the triumph of a profusely reimagined Majapahit over confining Dutch colonial horizons. Decades later, following the New Order’s brutal ingestion of East Timor, the natural desire in the West to denounce that annexation reinforced a conventional view of Indonesian nationalism as the desire for sovereignty over the lands and waters that the Dutch had placed inside the Indies—no more (or less) than that. This view legitimated as authentically nationalist the campaign of arms and words led by Sukarno to “return” western New Guinea to Indonesia—the Indies, and the cession of that half island to the republic by Holland via the United Nations in 1963. Seen from this same perspective—the republican movement as an affirmation of Dutch-drawn borders—the grabbing of Portuguese East Timor was an act of imperialism that, far from implementing Indonesian nationalism, betrayed it.

The lavish dream of a nationalist majority in 1945 cannot justify what a militarist minority—Suharto and his generals—did to East Timor beginning in 1975. But the breadth of that earlier vision does offer a different point of departure for understanding Indonesian history since 1945. The more one acknowledges the genuine appeal of “greater Indonesia” to Sukarno, Yamin, and others among the founders of the republic, the harder it is to treat the persisting sense of geopolitical entitlement on the part of successive Indonesian regimes as anomalous—a regrettable deviation from a solid and confident consensus to stay within boundaries owed to the Dutch. That sense of larger entitle-ment also reflected a volatile insecurity derived from the country’s massive size and considerable resources compared with its physical fragmentation and material weakness. In this image, Indonesia was invincible and vulnerable at the same time.

Consider, in this light, the exercises pursued by Sukarno in the early 1960s against the formation of independent Malaysia west of Indonesia and for the absorption of western New Guinea far to the east. The more one accepts Indonesia as the legitimate successor to the Indies, the easier it is to treat the confrontation against Malaysia as an imperialist intervention beyond once Dutch lines and to distinguish it sharply from the nationalist restoration of Papua to its rightful place inside them. The more sensitive one is, on the other hand, to the sheer sweep of Indonesian nationalist ambition in 1945 as an illustration of entitlement, the easier it becomes to understand both campaigns as having unfolded within what were then the still not yet consolidated limits of Indonesian identity. Nationalism and imperialism are not contradictory.

The jumbo version of Indonesia envisioned by the independence body in Jakarta in July 1945 did contradict geostrategic realities. Day by day, allied battlefield successes were dismantling Japan’s ability to allow Indonesian nationalists to realize their larger dream, quite apart from Japanese willingness to do so. Nor, as Sukarno soon found, was Japan willing to entertain the independence of a “greater Indonesia.” And what if Japan were defeated and forced to relinquish once European Southeast Asia to its prewar overlords? Indonesia’s nationalists could hardly expect not just the Dutch in the Indies...
It is not that the Dutch played no role in stimulating the growth of an Indonesian society. The roads they built facilitated travel. Economic activities, even in a racially divided colony, had socially mobilizing effects. So did the educational opportunities that the colonizers made available, however belatedly and selectively, to their native subjects. By publishing or allowing the circulation of Malay-language materials—serials, books, pamphlets—the Dutch facilitated literacy in what would become Bahasa Indonesia, the “one language” so patriotically cited by the authors of the Youth Oath of 1928.

Nevertheless, in the wake of World War II, what the Dutch left to their successors was not an integrated society, let alone a democratic polity, but a colonially imposed state. Those who took charge of the independent country could not rely on the vigor and viability of a nationally self-aware and socioeconomically mobile population, or of a large and liberalizing indigenous middle class, to decolonize and democratize this inheritance. Politicians with such goals in mind had to contend with two key institutions, the bureaucracy and the military, that were in varying degrees and ways holdovers from the colonial past. Not that the politicians themselves were necessarily sincere or credible reformers. The “solidarity maker” label conventionally assigned to Sukarno is often inferred from his charismatic personality, notably his oratory.82 But it can also be understood structurally as a reflection of a real need to play a kind of sociological catch-up, fashioning the horizontal empathy and awareness—the national identity—that had for so long lagged behind the colonial emphasis on vertical control, administration, extraction.

**Indonesia as a Dutch legacy?** Definitely yes. The Dutch drew lines around a place that became a space. Through modern technologies of transport and communication, they began the process of linking the elements within that space to each other and to elements beyond it. At first inadvertently, and then a bit more consciously during their late in the game “ethical policy,” they fostered limited social mobilization, while fearing and trying to check or coopt its destabilizing political consequences. They became a common opponent against which Indonesians could rally. Most lasting, however, they bequeathed a frame and the challenge of how to administer the congeries inside it. And in this last sense, the Dutch left behind a question: Can a formation that began its sovereignty as a state-nation become a nation-state?

**Nationalist Artifact**

How does one grow a nation to fit a state? Indonesia answered that question by building its national consciousness more or less from the top down and the center out. But for that strategy to work, nationalists first had to occupy the top and the center of the ex-Dutch state in the name of their independent...
nation-to-be. Three obvious routes to this pinnacle were a revolution, a coup, and a negotiation. All three paths figured in the story of how, in 1945–1949, Indonesians took from the Japanese what the Dutch had left behind.

But a fourth and merely symbolic ascent was also possible: a declaration that henceforth an independent nation-state did, in fact, exist. And in Jakarta at the end of the Pacific War the symbolism of such a step had the virtue by necessity of avoiding the twin difficulties of physically usurping power from the Japanese or peacefully negotiating power away from it. For in August 1945, in the strange days immediately following their final defeat and surrender, the Japanese occupiers remained in charge of the ex-Indies yet were beholden to the Allies, including the very Dutch whom they had ousted or interned at the start of the war.

Timing a declaration of independence can be crucial. How can a nationalist leader, committed to making and heading a sovereign nation-state, lessen the risk of eclipse by indigenous rivals and foreign powers with competing claims to sovereignty—claims that the leader considers rebellious subnational, mistakenly national, or neocolonially antinational in character? Preemption is an obvious if preliminary answer: to promulgate “national” independence first, under one’s own leadership, before anyone else can advance an alternative sovereignty or block any sovereignty at all for the state in question.

Such a strike-first nationalist hopes to conjure citizenship by fait accompli. He (historically less often she) relies on one or both of two conjectures. Looking inward at the population his proclamation has just instantly “nationalized,” he calculates that those who support the new identity, or at least cannot be mobilized to oppose it, will so outnumber or outweigh proponents of rival identities as to make the “national” one stick, at least until it can be furnished with specific and attractive content. Comparably, looking outward at the world, he figures that his independence by manifesto will elicit foreign support and deter foreign opposition, or at least be treated by outsiders as a fact on the ground—a circumstance that has to be taken into account. In the longer run, such a preemptive nationalist hopes to influence, ideally to control, the terms of ensuing action and discourse.

Japan surrendered to the Allies on August 15, 1945, Indonesian independence was announced by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta two days later, on August 17, 1945. The next day, a Japanese-sponsored Committee to Prepare the Independence of Indonesia (PPKI) at its inaugural meeting named the two men president and vice president, respectively, of the barely proclaimed republic.

What made this timing so urgent was not the fear of being upstaged from within by a subnational competitor for loyalty but the fear of being sidelined from without by the imminent closure of a unique window of opportunity opened by the denouement of the war in the Pacific—the lag in time between Japan’s defeat and Holland’s return. In June 1945 in South Sulawesi, the Japanese allowed the formation of a National Party under the aegis of the Sultan of Bone. In July the Japanese set up a version of the PPKI in Sumatra. But the occupiers constrained the Sumatran body and soon changed their minds about the Bone initiative and suppressed it entirely. Nor is there reason to believe that the leaders involved in either instance, had they been free to forge subnational sovereignties, would have done so.

If Indonesia makers in Jakarta in August 1945 were not bothered by indigenous competitors with smaller sovereignties in mind, however, their own priorities differed. A group of younger nationalists urged revolutionary struggle to forge the nation in the act of inspiring it from within. Some of their elders stressed instead the need for international support to consolidate the state through diplomatic recognition by other states. In the end, Sukarno and Hatta signed a two-sentence declaration: “We the Indonesian people hereby declare the independence of Indonesia. All matters concerning the transfer of power etc., will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time.”

The first sentence validated the “nation” from the bottom up as a unilateral act of avowal by a preexisting Indonesian people. The second sentence reflected a top-down desire to accomplish the transition of the state from Japanese to Indonesian auspices with sufficient discipline to forestall anarchy, yet speedily enough to greet the victorious Allies on their arrival with a display of sovereignty too convincing to be denied, let alone reversed.

On the afternoon of August 17, revolutionary youths seized the Japanese radio facility in Jakarta and announced the proclamation of independence to “the Indonesian people” in whose name it had, that same morning, been made. Responses from listeners were enthusiastic, especially on Java. By month’s end, buildings and even arms had been wrested from Japanese control in all the major cities on that central island. Java became the epicenter of the revolution, in contrast to those outer islands where the returning Dutch were able to regain some influence, however temporarily. All the more reason for Sukarno to have insisted, as he publicly and repeatedly did, on the transinsular, transethnic, transreligious breadth of the Indonesian identity he and his fellow nationalists were trying to create. And, yes, their nationalism was meant to preempt rivals before they could emerge.

Eventually they did emerge. Against first-strike nationalism, other identities struck back. In subsequent years and decades, clear into the twenty-first century, multiple movements with diverse agendas arose to challenge the originally declared republic. Notable nonetheless is how long it took for the two most formidable and enduring territorial challenges, in Aceh and Papua, to acquire fully secessionist form. That occurred not on Sukarno’s presidential
watch (1945–1967) but during Suharto’s (1967–1998). And although the republican facts on the ground created by the nationalists of 1945 were not enough to prevent a Dutch return, they encouraged U.S. pressure on Holland to accommodate Indonesian sovereignty, as finally happened in December 1949. By then, the sheer drama of the revolution against the Dutch had generated ample material for later use in elaborating a heroic national mythology—grist for civics textbooks, holiday speeches, postage stamps, and other sites of celebration.

Struggling over the State

One who strikes first tries to create an advantage in conditions that (in the attacker’s eyes) combine danger with uncertainty. In predawn darkness on October 1, 1965, in Jakarta, squads apparently under the command of an ostensibly leftist lieutenant colonel in the army, Untung, went to the homes of seven leading and more or less anticommunist army generals, killed three (including the army chief of staff), and kidnapped three more who were killed soon after. The conspirators also took and killed an adjutant of the seventh targeted general, having mistaken the junior officer for his boss. Shortly afterward a radio announcement informed listeners that Untung’s troops had moved to forestall a coup that was being planned by a “council of generals” sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Several hours later the Untung group announced the formation of a revolutionary council with ultimate authority over the country pending elections.

Omitted from the cabal’s list of foes was General Suharto, who took control of the decapitated army, used circumstantial evidence and propaganda to blame the killings on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and sponsored the destruction of the PKI within a broader antileftist purge that took hundreds of thousands of lives. The number who died may have reached half a million—perhaps more, possibly fewer. By 1968 Suharto was fully enshrined in the presidency. Sukarno, kept under house arrest, died of natural causes two years later.

The exact causes, actors, and motives behind this conspiracy remain controversial. They may never be fully known. But preemptive calculation certainly played a role. In an atmosphere of rising political tension in the capital, supposedly impending conspiracies were increasingly the subject of rumor and speculation. By mid-1965 there were communists who feared a strike against them by an anticommunist “council of generals.” Conversely, there were anticommunists who feared becoming the victims of treachery at the hands of Indonesia’s large and increasingly militant left. In early August when President Sukarno collapsed briefly in public, doubts as to his ability to stop such plots made them seem more likely. Whether these conspiracies about were real or not, anxieties about them were real enough to motivate preemptive moves.85

The kidnappers and killers of October 1 meant, or were meant to, create powerful facts on the ground, in the expectation that establishing those facts would oblige key actors to adapt to them. Not least among such facts was an army ostensibly rendered egalitarian by decapitation. The conspirators thought they were ridding their country of a top layer of corrupt, high-living generals poised to sabotage the Indonesian revolution in secret concert with its American and British enemies. Arguably, in the conspirators’ view, these foreign enemies were poised to divide and reconstitute the republic in a manner not unlike what the Dutch had been so deviously up to in the 1940s—and what August 17 as a fact on the ground had been meant to prevent.

It may seem odd, even repugnant, to compare what Lieutenant Colonel Untung and his men did in Jakarta with the patriotic sentences that Sukarno and Hatta had signed and proclaimed two decades before. The two episodes differed greatly in empirical terms; and morally, in 1965, there was nothing to applaud. But both of these otherwise different cases showed the importance and persistence, alongside Indonesia as an imagined community, of Indonesia as an improvised response to imagined contingency. Twenty years after the assertion of their independence, Indonesians in whose name it had been made still did not enjoy levels of predictability, transparency, and safety high enough, or a society prosperous enough, or a state accountable enough (including officers subordinated to civilian rule and politicians committed to peaceful means) either to prevent a savage first strike or to stop it from being used to excuse a catastrophe when Suharto struck back. The Left’s decimation in that slaughter was another, far bloodier fait accompli.

These actions pose a dilemma that continues to bedevil Indonesia conceived as a nationalist artifact built from the top down and the center out. A struggle over control of the state is logically prior to the struggle to root that state in a nation. But in the absence of institutionalized procedures for political change and the peaceful settlement of grievances, the Indonesian state stayed up for grabs: in 1945–1949 during the revolution; in 1950 when an anti-Jakarta revolt broke out in Ambon; in 1952 when the army staff chief tried to have parliament dismissed; in 1956–1958 when army rebels rose against Jakarta on several outer islands; and in 1957 when Sukarno declared a state of war and siege that expanded the military’s role. Two years later he shut down parliamentary rule, replaced Indonesia’s provisional constitution, and dispersed its elected but deadlocked institutions. The upshot was yet another regime for Indonesians to cope with—an undemocratic “guided democracy” guided by none other than Sukarno himself, later named president for life.
Seen in this context, what made 1965–1966 so exceptional was the number of its victims and the sweep of its consequences, not the fact of another conspiracy in progress. Actually, there were two of them: Untung’s effort and Suharto’s artfully legality-seeking coup disguised as a countercoup that installed, top-down, an authoritarian “new order” on an already much-muddled country.

Future historians may still conclude that Suharto’s resignation in 1998 and democratic elections the following year finally broke this cycle of autocratic improvisation from above. In 2001 at least, such optimism was premature. It was precisely the erratic and unilateral style of President Abdurrahman Wahid that had alienated the elected legislature and people’s assembly to the point of instituting proceedings to remove him from office. Since February Wahid had sought military support for a state of emergency that would have served as a preemptive first strike against the looming contingency of his own impeachment. On July 22 he threatened to freeze the People’s Assembly, suspend the country’s second-largest political party, and hold new national elections, despite the lack of a constitutional basis for such actions.

His military having refused to go along, Wahid decided to go it alone. Soon after midnight on July 23, he issued a presidential decree. It declared an emergency, dissolved the People’s Assembly, and promised elections in 2002. By sunset that same day, the chief justice of the supreme court had declared the move unconstitutional, and the assembly members whose ouster Wahid had announced had impeached him unanimously and replaced him with his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Intransigent to the end, Wahid threatened to force Megawati’s government to drag him kicking and screaming from office, but finally relented and left of his own accord.

Is the system to blame for the actions of individuals and groups within it? Even if the state has failed in Indonesia, why implicate the nation in that disappointment? Arbitrariness and illegality at the top may require only procedural adjustments. If so, the four composite amendments to the constitution that were adopted in 1999–2002 could turn out to have been remedy enough. Certainly the legislative and direct presidential elections of 2004 further normalized Indonesia’s fledgling democracy—a sunnier identity for Indonesia.

But not even successful reform will erase the historical question: Why has it taken Indonesia such a long and turbulent time to institutionalize an effective and responsive political system? Nationalists should not be faulted for conditions they could not affect. Hindsight can be unfairly harsh. But one of the possible answers to this question does point toward a more or less consistent inability, perhaps an unwillingness, possibly even a fear on the part of successive elites to build, downward from the top, a nation to which the inherited state—their state, with themselves on top—could then be held accountable. As for effectiveness, it is disquieting to think that the New Order’s most lasting intellectual legacy could be the surely false idea that Indonesians can have a dynamic economy, or a democratic polity, just not both at once.

*Indonesia as a nationalist artifact?* Indeed, and with some success. The entity that Sukarno and Hatta announced in 1945 was not, and did not become, an ethnically Javanese empire in disguise. By 1963, with western New Guinea regained, Indonesian nationalism had managed to extend its field to the territorial limits of its Dutch legacy. In these senses, the nation did fit the state. But too many Indonesian leaders had too little interest in closing a different gap: between the intensity of their sometimes dangerous maneuvers in the capital and the paucity of their efforts to involve the vast rest of the country in, together, making a nation worth sharing. Aside from Indonesia’s two democratic experiments—in the 1950s and from the late 1990s—the results were more state-first than nation-based.

**Personal Meanings**

As a nationalist undertaking, Indonesia recapitulates political history: the formation of the Indonische Verbond van Studenten (Indonesian Students’ Society) in the Netherlands in 1917; the morphing of the Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association) into Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association) in 1922; the paradigmatic launching of the Youth Oath of 1928. And so on through the world depression (1930s); the Japanese occupation (1941–1945); the Indonesian revolution (1945–1949); parliamentary democracy (1950–1957); a transition between regimes (1957–1959); guided democracy (1959–1965); another transition (1965–1967); the New Order (1967–1998); and the latest transition, through four presidencies—B. J. Habibie (1998–1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004—) toward whatever, and whomever, lies ahead.

This sequence highlights the milestones of national politics—changes of regimes and leaders—as if they were the prime drivers of Indonesian identity. The drama of high politics implies a “great tradition” of identifications that government officials have invoked on patriotic holidays. This Indonesia has been about dates, heroes, emblems: 1928 and 1945; the legendary revolutionary general, Sudirman, and the champion of independence, Sukarno; the mythological garuda bird emblazoned on the national seal and the five principles of pancasila coined by Sukarno and sanctified by Suharto.

“Little traditions” of Indonesia, meanwhile, have resulted from the filtering of high-nationalist ideology through local identities, including local histories and local symbols—and local mixtures of affinity and grievance toward the metonymy of Jakarta as the country. Beyond these constructions
lies Indonesia as individually experienced and imagined by its inhabitants. Alongside collective traditions of what Indonesia means, these personal versions also merit attention.

In 2001, in the middle of Indonesia’s rocky transition, first-year students at Atma Jaya University in Yogyakarta were given a questionnaire. Table 1.1 presents one of the questions and organizes the answers to it by topic and subtopic. The question (in Indonesian) was: “When you hear the word ‘Indonesia,’ what first occurs to you—what do you associate it with?”

Table 1.1. Representing Indonesia: Some Free Associations

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<th>Category and Subcategory</th>
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<td><strong>A. Nature and Geography</strong></td>
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<td>1. Natural resources</td>
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<td>2. The archipelago</td>
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<td><strong>B. Conflict and Failure</strong></td>
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<td>1. Political and economic chaos and crises</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>2. Feelings of shame (country no longer peaceful)</td>
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Table 1.1 cannot be said to stand for Indonesian opinion. These were beginning college students in Central Java, of whom a majority were Christian—features that hardly match the national distributions of educational status, residential location, or religious affiliation. Without being representative, however, table 1.1 is germane. The question was left open-ended to attract personal meanings—whatever the respondents at that moment happened to associate with “Indonesia.”

A first impression of table 1.1 is how few—just 12 percent—of the answers it presents lie in the “great tradition” of national-patriotic symbols. Also striking is how nearly all of those who did evince such an understanding of Indonesia identified their country with unity in diversity, or bhinneka tunggal ika. (Remarkably, only one person thought of the national flag.) Would “great tradition” references to bhinneka tunggal ika be more frequent in a comparable survey of Muslim Indonesians? Possibly not. One could at least hypothesize that, other things being equal, minority groups, including Christians, have more invested in meanings of “Indonesia” that emphasize cultural diversity than Muslim-majority Indonesians do.

A second impression is that the students’ perceptions and feelings about Indonesia reflected the turbulence of the country’s transition, so obviously and uncertainly under way at the time. But in view of those circumstances, is a 29 percent emphasis on conflict and failure higher than, lower than, or roughly equal to what might have been expected? One can also wonder, had a similar group of respondents been asked the same question annually as Indonesia’s transition wore on, whether the lone vote in 2001 for benign despotism (B.9) would have remained alone.

A third noteworthy aspect of these answers is the considerable—46 percent—attention they pay to the natural attributes of Indonesia. Was this, in effect, a default category? Were these students driven toward natural phenomena that exist independently of human beings for lack of positive human achievements to cite in giving meaning to “Indonesia”? Or would nature have figured as prominently even in the absence of the shame-inducing bloodshed and other failings of human behavior that had occurred since the twilight of the New Order? The frequency with which these students associated Indonesia with its natural resources could be construed as optimistic, if those who replied in this vein were thinking of the gains in welfare achievable by wisely exploiting their country’s gas, oil, minerals, forests, and water. My own guess is less presumptuous: that the table reflects a more general and independent tendency to associate Indonesia with its natural contents. Whatever the explanation, the prominence of geography in these meanings of “Indonesia” would seem to offer some indigenous warrant for the visual-spatial orientation of much of this chapter.
A fourth impression is how differently these Indonesian students imagined their country compared with how their American counterparts might be expected to picture the United States: Table 1.1 includes no mention of democracy. This omission also contrasts with the frequency, in American diplomatic rhetoric, of references to Indonesia as the world’s “third largest democracy” or the “largest Muslim democracy.” The issue at stake here is whether democracy, so central to American self-conceptions, will become a baseline referent for the Indonesian reconstruction of Indonesia.

Fifth and last is another intriguing absence in these results: Pancasila. Has this term followed the fate of federalism in having become too guilty by association—Pancasila with Suharto, federalism with colonialism—to be usable as a major part, let alone a keystone, of national identity? The students’ replies, of course, only raise this question; they do not answer it. Their silence on Pancasila does match, however, a more general reluctance among politicians and officials to reinstall that particular emblem as the mainspring of national identity. Pancasila has not been abandoned. But it has been placed in abeyance since having been, under Suharto, compulsory.

What if the students whose responses occupy Table 1.1 had been individually interviewed? Still different perceptions of Indonesia might have emerged. Relevant to this possibility are some conversations—not formal interviews—I had with college age and younger Indonesians in Jakarta in April 2001. When I asked them what Indonesia meant to them, they gave none of the answers in Table 1.1. Nor did they talk about democracy, or Pancasila. They spoke instead of the friends they liked to hang out with and the things they enjoyed doing together. “This,” one said simply, “is where we live.”

Is it helpful to speak of a “privatized” national identity in this most personal case? If so, is the lack of historical, political, or other “public” content in the conversational answers I elicited a symptom of retreat by these young Indonesians—unable as they may have been to take pride in a severely tarnished political tradition? Had they been shamed by their country’s crises and failings into shrinking the semantic horizons of “Indonesia” toward the private, apolitical self?

I did not sense this. If anything, Indonesia as these informants had personally experienced it seemed in their accounts not a last recourse but a first one, not a fragile default but a solid design, not dutifully copied off the high doctrines of patriotism, nor filtered through a parochial localism, but inductively built up around lives actually lived—something quotidian, hence unproblematic.

Just as the survey in Yogyakarta was unrepresentative, so were my encounters in Jakarta. Had the latter taken place in Aceh, say, or Papua, and depending on who my informants were, the answers could well have differed, even sharply, from what I heard in the national capital. That said, the interactions I did have in 2001 were encouraging, if microscopically so, for the sustainability of Indonesian identity. Taking one’s country for granted as one’s home—where else did you think I would live?—does not imply the disintegration of Indonesian identity, and is at least compatible with an opposing view of Indonesia as a normal address. Conceivably, one could even take the Atma Jaya students’ focus on natural attractions less as a refuge from high-national disillusion with Indonesia’s performance than low-national pride in physical features, which are sure to outlast whatever regime happens to be in power and outlive those who have been corrupted by it.

Radically replying the now conventional reading of a nation as an imagined community, one might even say that the less imagined—more real—a community is, the greater the likelihood that it will endure. I live here. These are my friends. Therefore, this is my country. End of story.

SOCIALIZING THE STATE

What does Indonesia need in the future? If a metaphor is called for, perhaps it should be borrowed not from construction but from ecology. That would imply a shifting of priorities—away from erecting a nation deductively to meet the specifications of yet another leader’s abstract scheme, and toward the inductive cultivation of better governance in the service of society as it is. Not redesigning the nation but socializing the state. This may be something of what Robert Hefner has in mind in the next chapter when he writes of “scaling up” political civility in Indonesia.

In those parts of the country most scarred by tit-for-tat communal violence, of course, there may not be much local civility left to be “scaled up”—to be used as a basis for civilizing the state. And even in localities with a record of civic pluralism, specifically how should “scaling up” be undertaken, by whom, and on whose behalf? In hundreds of district-level jurisdictions, Indonesia’s adventure with decentralization may be generating hundreds of different answers to this question as I write it.

Some of these answers will be promising enough to warrant deeper study and broader application. Others may show why in some deadlocked settings local entities may have to be addressed from above in a process that involves “scaling down” national identity as a shared basis for badly needed empathy, or at least tolerance, between opposing groups. Noteworthy in this context is 2001–2002 was the crucial role played by national actors, including members of Megawati’s cabinet, in facilitating peace-seeking agreements that for all their imperfections did help reduce communal violence in Sulawesi and Maluku.
Returning one last time full circle back to my beginning: What is Indonesia? It is many different things at once to different people for different reasons. It is a project endlessly shaped by multiple intentions. I have featured one version of the project: to rebalance a state-nation into a nation-state. But the futures of Indonesia are multiple enough to confound any one—or anyone’s—interpretations, including mine here. Indonesia is a process that cannot be reduced to even a complex causal design. A transition is not a trajectory that ends conveniently in a destination.

Whatever else it may be, Indonesia is unpredictable. Seen as an omen of fragility, that is weakness. But as evidence of vitality, it is a strength. Beginning of story.

NOTES

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1. From a speech by the chairman of Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, on May 20, 2002, as excerpted in the Jakarta Post, www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_26.asp.

2. Heard at a sold-out performance of the play, written by Riantiarno and staged by Teater Koma, in Taman Isniami Murzuki, Jakarta, on April 27, 2001; see also N. Riantiarno, Republik Bagong: Sandiwara Teater Koma (Yogyakarta: Galang, 2001), 139. In the title of the play Riantiarno used a laughably bumbling character in Javanese mythology, Bagong, to poke fun at the Indonesian republic (Republik Indonesia).


7. Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1992), xxv. Note how “the size of a tennis court” conveys a physical reality but also implies the subjective experience of a limited audience. Most Indonesians, never having seen a tennis court, could not be expected to know its size. But neither would most Indonesians be in a position to read, let alone purchase, Cribb’s book. And to how many of them would it occur to count islands (of whatever size) as a way of answering the question, “What is Indonesia?”


10. Neither is, say, France. But compared with the islands and waters of Indone-


12. In 2000, Papua’s density was six persons per square kilometer, barely more than half the density of the next least populated province, East Kalimantan (11), and less than two-thirds of 1 percent of that of Central Java (959), the densest province except for the provincial level but urban core areas of Yogyakarta (980) and Jakarta (12,635). Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Indonesia, www.bps.go.id/sector/population/table3.shtml.


25. These controversial speculations have given rise to an ongoing discourse among historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, among others, that runs well beyond Indonesian evidence to raise questions about the past and future identity of Southeast Asia as a region. The locus classicus of these conjectures is O. W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, rev. ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999).

26. This definition reflects my general understanding of the mandala polity as described by Wolters, History, Culture, and Region, passim. In distinguishing the mandala as a diagram and a metaphor, I have omitted a third usage advanced by Wolters: the mandala as a name attached to a specific polity, such as Bravigiaya, in a surviving epigraphic or written record (141). The obvious question, to what extent “mandala” as a contemporaneous name implied for its users the same rich content of “mandala” the retrospective metaphor, I prefer to leave open, Wolters himself acknowledged (without accepting) the argument made by Jan Wisseman Christie that the mandala model was too static to describe accurately Java’s polities over half a millennium—from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, Christie, Negara, Mandala, and Despotism State: Images of Early Java, in David G. Marr and A. C. Milner, eds., Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 85–86, as referenced in Wolters, 138.

27. Based on 1996–1997 data on absolute numbers of species in 141 countries in World Bank Development Data Group, 2002 World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002), table 3.4 (mammals [2nd], birds [3rd], plants [4th]), and a reported ranking (marine diversity [1st]) in Luminario Varela Jr., “Rescuing ASEAN’s Mega-biodiversity,” New Light of Myanmar, September 15, 2002, citing the ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation; bracketed ordinals indicate Indonesia’s ranking. On overall biodiversity, Indonesia has been ranked as (a) 1st or 2nd; (b) 3rd; and (c) among the top five. These estimates are from (a) Rochadi Abdulhadi, “Problems and Issues Affecting Biodiversity in Indonesia,” ASEAN Biodiversity [Los Baños, Philippines], 1: 1–2 (January-June 2001), 33; (b) Varela Jr., “Rescuing”; and (c) Rexie Jane Parreno, “The ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation,” ASEAN Biodiversity [Los Baños, Philippines], 1: 1–2 (January-June 2001), 8.

28. Cribb, Historical Atlas, tables 1.3 and 1.24 on 12 and 22, respectively. The zone is named after nineteenth-century British naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace, who first noted the contrast.

29. The figure of 726 is from www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Indonesia. See also Barbara F. Grimes, ed., and Joseph E. Grimes, consulting ed., Ethnologue (Dallas: SIL International, 2000). After noting a widely used estimate of around 200 indigenous languages (Cribb, Historical Dictionary, 260), Robert Cribb put the number at more than 350 (see n. 33 below). The meaning of “indigenous” can also vary from source to source. SIL’s listing, for example, excludes European tongues but includes several varieties of Chinese, presumably on the grounds that Indonesian citizens who grew up speaking English and/or who now use English as their primary language are negligible in number compared with those for whom a Chinese
language filled and/or fills that role. The meanings of “mother tongue” and “first language” may vary. Unless otherwise noted, on this topic, SIL’s website supplied the data and the indices cited in the next few paragraphs of text. References to Java in these paragraphs include the island of Madura.

30. Other SIL scores include China .48; United States .35; Japan .03; and zero each for South and North Korea. A better known and simpler ranking of countries by “ethnic homogeneity” yields different lists, but also places Indonesia as the twenty-eighth most diverse. Ethnic heterogeneity in the latter source appears to have been defined as the percentage of the population of a country who speak the same primary language. George Thomas Kuriyan, The Illustrated Book of World Rankings (Armock, N.Y.: Sharpe Reference, 1997), 52-53.

31. If Sulawesi is added to Papua and Maluku, this 54 percent is further enlarged. These three easternmost areas together host 70 percent of Indonesia’s indigenous languages. Linguistic and population data used in reaching these conclusions were, respectively, compiled by SIL and drawn from official statistics for 1985 cited by Hal Hill and Anna Weidemann, “Regional Development in Indonesia: Patterns and Issues,” in Hal Hill, ed., Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), 13 (table 1.1.4).

32. According to this summary source (Cribb’s Historical Atlas, 30), more than 350 indigenous languages are spoken in the republic—200-plus that are Austronesian and another 150-plus that are Melanesian. Presumably, by this estimate, many of the “languages” named and mapped by SIL would be considered “dialects.”

33. Sources for the 1971 and 1980 figures are Sensus Penduduk 1971, Series E (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1974–1975), table 1.13; Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S (Jakarta: BPS, 1980), no. 2, table 1.16.3, as cited by Christine Drake, National Integration in Indonesia: Patterns and Policies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 62. I calculated the 1990 figure from data in Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Series S2 (henceforth abbreviated SP 1990) (Jakarta: BPS, 1992), table 20.3. Here and below, in all census-based references to language use by some percentage of a population, that universe—100 percent—does not include persons who were under five years old when the census was taken. The 2000 census had no questions about language, although respondents were asked to identify themselves ethnically.


35. These ostensibly divisive forces were known by an acronym, sara, that stood for saka (ethnicity), agama (religion), ras (race), and conflict antar-golongan (among groups, including class conflict). Race was distinguished from ethnicity to acknowledge prejudice against Indonesians of Chinese descent, in contrast to ethnic tensions among supposedly native (non-Chinese) citizens. Prejudicial allusions to these identities in public were strongly discouraged.


38. Historical details are recounted by Decki Natalis Pigay, Evolusi Nasionalisme dan Sejarah Konflik Politik di Papua (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000), 93–97. The official shift to “Papua” has not been fully observed. In January 2005 on the Department of Home Affairs website, different pages listed the territory as “Papua” and “Papua/Irian Jaya”; www.depdagri.go.id.


40. The 1980 figure is from Drake, National Integration, 62, citing Sensus Penduduk 1980. The figures for 1990 were calculated from SP 1990, 189. It is not clear to me whether the 1928 estimate referred to the language used at home or to the language that respondents remembered having learned first.

41. Also helping the national potential of Indonesian were the global unimportance of Dutch, the declining power of the Dutch state, and the unwillingness of Dutch colonizers to evangelize their language among the indigenous. Based on the different experience of the Philippines, one can speculate that if Americans had gone on to colonize the Indies as well, Indonesian might later have faced in English a rival to become the population’s second language.

42. Suharto’s Indonesian-language autobiography included a fifteen-page glossary of Javanese expressions for the convenience of non-Javanese-speaking readers. Soeharto, Pikiran, Ucapian, dan Tindakan Saya, as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K. H. (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 570-84. See also R. E. Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 298–99. In January 2003, a university lecturer in West Java criticized Megawati for inserting Javanese words and phrases into her Indonesian-language public speeches. What especially disturbed him was her use of Javanisms in a verbal lashing of her critics before censure of her political party (“Megawati Criticized for Often Using Javanese Words,” Jakarta Post, January 31, 2003). Perhaps comparably, Javanese terms were more likely to surface in Suharto’s speech on the rare occasions when he expressed anger in public. Compared with an impervious lingua franca, a vernacular spoken since childhood seems naturally more suited to voicing strong emotion. And Megawati was speaking not in the presidential palace but inside her personal residence in South Jakarta.


44. In 1990, young people age 5 through 24 were slightly more likely than their immediate elders (age 25 through 49) and more than twice as likely as the eldest (age 50 and higher) to have Indonesian as their mother tongue. Looking ahead, this “youth wedge” of “childhood Indonesia” seems more likely to enlarge or level off than shrink. Proportions by age group were calculated from SP 1990, 162.
45. The preceding three paragraphs reflect calculations using the census data in SP 1990, 195 (table 20.2). East Timor aside, proportionally the fewest Indonesian speakers were in West Nusa Tenggara (68), East Java (75), Bali (76), South Sulawesi (77), East Nusa Tenggara (78), Irian Jaya/Papua (79), Central Java (79), Yogyakarta (80), Aceh (84), West Java (84 each), and so on upward through the rest of the country. See also the summary maps in Drake, National Integration, 63 (for 1980), and Cribb, Historical Atlas, 37 (for 1990).

46. Adopted by the national legislature in 1999, these were Law no. 22 on regional government and Law no. 25 on regional finance.

47. The laws distinguish cities (kota) from regencies (kabupaten), but as autonomous regions they are functionally equivalent and are, for convenience, grouped together as districts.

48. This paragraph reflects my reading of Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 22 Tahun 1999, effective May 7, 1999, State Gazette, Republic of Indonesia, 1999, no. 12, especially articles 7, 8, 10, and 11, www.gtfsidm.or.id.

49. By fully recognized, I mean by the Department of Home Affairs, which listed thirty provinces on its website, www.depdagri.go.id, as of mid-2003.


52. IP 2000, 104 (table 4.1.1). The percentage breakdowns in 2000 were Muslims 88, Christians 9, Hindus 2, and Buddhists 1. The average annual rates of growth in percent in 1971-2000 were Christians 2.5, Muslims 1.9, Hindus 1.6, and Buddhists 1.5.

53. IP 2000, 115-16 (table 4.3.2).

54. The relevant historical statistics are in IP 2000, 115-16 (table 4.3.2).

55. These percentages were calculated from 2000 census data by Suryadinata et al. in IP 2000, 109-10 (table 4.2.2) and 115-16 (table 4.3.2).

56. Mary Somers Heidhues, Southeast Asia: A Concise History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2000), 77. Despite this evidence of an early Muslim presence in eastern Java, the first conversions to Islam almost certainly occurred to the west, along Sumatra’s northern coast.

57. IP 2000, 15 (table 1.1.2.4). More than year 2000 census data from other provinces, these figures should be treated with caution. The security situation in Aceh in 2000 prevented enumerators from counting more than half the population. Estimates cited here are projections from that base. See IP 2000, 158. According to the census of 1990, Aceh was 98 percent Muslim in that year, SP 1990, 24.

58. UURI 18 (2001), articles 25-26. The court was clearly subordinated to Jakarta in being “a part of the [Indonesian] national justice system” and “based on Islamic law within the [Indonesian] national legal system” (art. 25). Indonesia’s president, acting as the national head of state, was given the authority to hire and fire the court’s judges on the advice of the minister of justice in his or her national cabinet (art. 25). The content of the Islamic laws the court would administer was left for future determination. Permitting such laws as a way of enticing Acehnese allegiance to a larger framework was not a new idea. It had precursors dating from colonial times.

59. The drafters of special autonomy for Aceh did specify that the Islamic court would be “free of influence from any quarter”; UURI 18 (2001), art. 25. They may have had in mind the risk that local groups might try to take over the new legal structure and use it to promote secession from Indonesia.


62. In 1990, for example, excluding oil, gas, and mining, nearly two-thirds of Indonesia’s twenty-seven provinces enjoyed per capita regional products larger than Aceh’s, Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 222-23 (table 1.11.1).


67. Indonesia’s currency is the rupiah (R). In 1990, after deleting mining, oil, and gas, the per capita regional products of Papua (R 742) and Aceh (R 737) were a trivial five rupiahs apart. Hill, Indonesian Economy, 222-23 (table 1.11.1).


71. He was not alone among Indonesians in fearing this scenario. Another observer acknowledged the fears of “Muslim hard-liners” who blamed the West for driving off Catholic East Timor and suspected a Christian conspiracy against Indonesia’s Muslims . . . to divide Indonesia into two parts: The western part for the Muslim population and the eastern part for the Christians.” Lela E. Madjah, “Indonesia, a Nation Divided by Faith,” Jakarta Post, June 26, 2000, www.thejakartapost.com/j special/ots_04.asp.

72. In 1999 the foreign minister of the Netherlands promised to initiate a reconsideration of what had actually transpired in the “act of free choice” three decades before. A member of the Dutch parliament who had advanced the same idea looked forward
to a time when such a reappraisal might enable the Dutch people finally to "look the Papuans straight in the eye." Algemeen Dagblad (Rotterdam), December 10, 1999, as cited by Saltford, United Nations Involvement, 20. Six years later, however, such hopeful thinking still lacked clear policy consequences. Revising history for conscience's sake and revising Indonesia for Papua's were not the same thing.


74. Compare, in this respect, Keith Loveard, Subharto: Indonesia's Last Sultan (Singapore: Horizon, 1999), with the skepticism of Elson, Subharto, viii.

75. Based on census data reported in IP 2000, 34 (table 2.1.2). Banten later became a province in its own right.


77. IP 2000, 34 (table 2.1.2). Difficulties in gathering census data in these provinces probably imply a margin of error larger than for other provinces. Such error may, however, point toward an overestimation of Javanese strength, insofar as Javanese might have been more inclined than Acehnese to receive census takers and less likely to reside in remote or insecure areas the enumerators could not readily enter. A large physical presence is not, of course, a necessary requisite of empire. (On nonindigenous Indonesian residents, see n. 25 above.)


