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Center for International Security and Arms Control
Stanford University
320 Galvez Street
Stanford, California 94305-6165
(415) 723-9625
http://www-leland.stanford.edu/group/CISAC/
Claim-Making and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late Twentieth Century

Pamela Ballinger

Report of a workshop held March 7-9, 1997 at Stanford University
Publication June 1997

Pamela Ballinger is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology at Johns Hopkins University.

The Center is grateful to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for supporting this project. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent positions of the Center, its supporters, or Stanford University.

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Abstract

“Claim-Making and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late Twentieth Century,” held March 7–9, 1997, at Stanford University, was an experimental workshop to preview the dimensions on the eve of the twenty-first century that the Consortium will explore over the next three years: war and institutions of violence, globalization, society and the ecosphere, and identity and social power. The idea was to examine these dimensions as large structural macro-historical processes and also to look at how these processes are immanent in the political and cultural claims made by contending actors. All of the workshop panels brought out issues of several dimensions. The first panel, on Globalization and Social Claims, looked at processes of globalization and also at society and the ecosphere. The second panel, State Formation and Claim-Making, focused on the dimensions of war and institutions of violence and also identity and social power. The third panel, Identities and Social Power, was on that dimension, largely in the context of globalization. The fourth panel, a roundtable on Claims to Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union, was most related to the dimension of war and institutions of violence.
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March 7-9, 1997

Welcome

Lynn Eden, senior research scholar, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, welcomed the participants to the first MacArthur Consortium conference of 1997. She noted that this workshop represented an experiment of sorts, with panels exploring various questions that the Consortium wants to examine in greater depth over the next three years. These issues include globalization; society and the environment; war, violence, and changing sovereignty; and identity. Eden extended a particular welcome to Consortium colleagues from the Universities of Minnesota and Wisconsin and to Kennette Benedict and Stephanie Platz, from the MacArthur Foundation.

Panel: Globalization and Social Claims

Introductory Comments by Chair, Raymond (Bud) Duvall, University of Minnesota

Duvall opened the conference proceedings with a synthesis of the main tendencies in writings about globalization, a concept which in itself is a large-scale claim and whose conceptualization vis-à-vis other forms of claim-making remains highly contested. He outlined three main “rhetorics of globalization.”
1) The first views globalization as a process, shaped by the constraints of geography, leading to the compression of the world into a single space characterized by a single consciousness. This rhetoric is indebted to McLuhan’s notion of a “global village,” as well as to Wallerstein’s thinking on world systems, and resonates in the popular metaphor of “spaceship Earth.” As Robert Reich and others see it, globalization involves an inexorable process, variously determined by technological innovation, the logic of capitalism, or biophysical imperatives. This inevitably leads to a borderless world in which nation-states no longer have relevance, becoming merely the “local authorities of the global system.” In this view, social claims are seen as either “progressive” (i.e., in conformity with the inevitable) or not. This understanding of globalization is now seen by the left as an ideological expression of the right. The question, then, is whether globalization should be a cause for celebration or consternation. The answer leads to an interesting, and sometimes surprising, configuration of positions.

2) The second approach has a more “cultural” tone indebted to both Marx (“the bourgeoisie remakes the world in its own image”) and modernization theory. This take on globalization views it largely in terms of cultural imperialism: the spread of Coca-Cola, Benetton’s notion of “united colors,” Levi’s on the streets of the world’s capitals. The work of sociologists like John Meyer and Kevin Featherstone proves important here. Globalization is seen as a social-cultural process of homogenization via the Western project of modernity through capitalism and the development of a shared consumer culture, shared human rights discourse, development of modern state structures, etc. While this approach is now criticized for its Eurocentric character, in and of itself it does not imply any inevitable content of homogeneity and, indeed, one could view the Islamic project as globalizing. Here, social claims facilitate the terrain of contestation over claims to either resisting or fostering homogeneity.

3) The third approach treats globalization as an interpretative category or social imaginary, with practices in the world seen in relation to globalization as a process of relativization. This line of thought draws upon thinkers such as Nietzsche, Simmel, and Durkheim. It also follows from Robertson’s view of globalization as a process involving the simultaneous universalization of particularisms and the particularization of universalisms. Here, then, globalization itself is the terrain of contestation between homogeneity and difference with production through relativization. We see reference to claims made through space (note Appadurai on “globalscapes”).

“Economic Globalization and State Transformation”
Michael Malley, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Malley’s paper examined how economic globalization affects state transformations. Given that no consensus exists over what globalization consists in, Malley operates from the following definition: a process whereby activities in three dimensions open up four-dimensional spaces now unbounded by territory. This suggests a “spaces of flows.” With economic globalization, finance is de-linked from this three-dimensional grid; note, however, that production will more likely remain territorial.

The standard political science reading of economic globalization links it with positive political and regime change, i.e. “good things go together.” Economic globalization here involves both cause (with liberalization by major powers) and effect (further liberalization on the part of smaller powers); this dynamic leads many to liberalize economic regimes and
replace strongmen with democrats. This conventional model predicts a narrow range of political effects of economic change. This model sketches out four stages:

1) globalization as cause
2) national policies of economic liberalization
3) national socioeconomic change
4) national political change

Within this view, society becomes increasingly differentiated with globalization and economic power moves from state to society. It accepts the idea that the leading social groups to emerge out of this process of globalization will press for wider political participation.

This model draws upon the work of Charles Tilly and emphasizes sub-national societies. It argues that the nature, rate, and extent of economic territorialization varies across sub-national societies and states. Sub-national changes create uneven pressures. While the conventional model predicts one state, one society, Malley’s alternative model incorporates sub-national units and thus captures a greater variety of claims.

“Social Imaginaries and the Politics of Economic Globalization”
Himadeep Muppidi, University of Minnesota

In his paper, Muppidi argued that globalization is a social imaginary productive of reality itself. Muppidi’s focus here is on the changing social claims of states, particularly as states withdraw from the domestic economic space with the advent of privatization. In India, for example, the domestic economy has been and continues to be sutured to the nation, with an emphasis on self-reliance and planned development. This was embedded in a larger international imaginary.

The guiding question in this paper is: How should the nation be redefined so it does not prove destructive to the project of economic reform? The Indian response has included a redefinition of the nation to include the diaspora, i.e. a deterritorialization of the nation. Non-resident Indians have thus become important and what was previously seen as a “brain drain” is now seen as a “brain bank.” What it means to produce India in the international system—India having previously been seen as non-aligned, Third World, resistant to colonialism—is now not so clear.

Another response to the question Muppidi lays out has been to equate India with Hindu-ness. This strategy, pursued by the Hindu right, has not been accepted by the dominant middle class. Muppidi then goes on to note the mutually constitutive relationship between politics and the ability to mobilize meanings and social claims, laying emphasis upon the agency of social actors. In conclusion, globalization represents a large-scale historical process that can’t be defined because it itself is a social imaginary; the state is merely one site of this.

“Contesting Sustainable Development: Interpreting Conflict between the State and the Maya of Southern Belize”
Joel Wainwright, University of Minnesota

In introducing his topic, Wainwright noted the resistance within his own field—geography—to the notion of globalization. His paper draws upon fieldwork carried out in September 1995 in southern Belize and examines how globalization plays out in identity conflicts. In
particular, Wainwright considers global aspects of the interpretative conflict between indigenous Mayan identity and that of the state of Belize. This involves conflicting claims about sustainability, claims to identity as an indigenous peoples, and claims about identity as national subjects.

The paper follows out of Wainwright’s involvement in the “Maya Atlas Project” centered at UC Berkeley. Mayan claims to land are being underwritten by the creation of an atlas, the first such project by an indigenous people. Cartography must here be treated as political endeavor, recognizing that in this hemisphere cartography has played an important role in the erasing of indigenous landscape. The Atlas project thus involves a kind of resistance to globalization that itself reflects processes of globalization (new technologies, flows of peoples and ideas, etc.).

Wainwright then displayed a copy of one such map, showing different kinds of land use in an area where the state recently burned villages. The Mayans state that they are an indigenous people and not immigrants from Guatemala, as the Belize government contends. The series of maps Wainwright showed were made through drawing and tracing done by Mayans on foot, not by aerial photographs. These maps, showing logging concessions, are now being used to sue the government of Belize.

The third map, showing indigenous claims to land in conflict with state claims, stands as a kind of metaphor for globalization with contested claims brought together by global technology. These maps have been featured in local papers in Belize and the phrase “on their lands” is an emotive statement.

Discussion

Dan Froats opened the discussion by asking if the Maya have any rights to their land analogous to those of Indians in Mexico. Have the logging areas been clear-cut?

Joel Wainwright replied that the Maya have no such legal rights. It’s not known whether the areas have been clear-cut, but the government is now burning villages in those areas.

Gay Seidman then inquired whether we can draw a parallel between the Mayan example and colonial administration in Africa and understandings there of communal tenure. In the African case, communal land was broken up, and this is not a process new to globalization. We talk about local-global conflicts as if they were homogeneous, but what about the middle class? asked Seidman. What about the Hindu diaspora that Muppadi doesn’t talk about? Who the bearers of this identity are in class terms becomes important. (Seidman then asked about Maya graduate students using their training to assert ethnic identity; Wainwright confirmed this hypothesis.)

In response to Seidman’s questions, Muppadi stated that he himself focuses on the dominant community but that diasporic Hindus indeed prove more worried about asserting their Hinduism. The diaspora reflects the tensions between those supporting liberalization and those supporting a tradition of swadeshi. Muppadi warned that in such a case class doesn’t easily map onto politics.

Francisco Ramirez seconded Seidman’s statement, commenting that these processes aren’t unique to this time frame. The elite discovery of being “ethnic” certainly isn’t new. The cloaking of particularisms in universalistic images (i.e., the Maya right to self-determination) leads us to ask what kind of universal vocabularies are being activated here.

Muppadi replied that in India, the West was a kind of universal (especially under colonialism) and that globalization involves a negotiation with the West by which the West
is particularized in specific ways. The Indian state project consisted in achieving nationhood but now different meanings have come into play, with India in some instances seen as a global actor. This involves the universalizing of what was seen as particularistic.

Wainwright added that geographical metaphors are useful for conveying the scale at which people are talking about conflict. Is it local-state? Or state-global?

Michael Alley agreed with Seidman and Ramirez that these processes aren’t so new. The issue then becomes what sets them apart from the past.

Ramirez suggested that the UN has become important in the construction of a category of “indigenous peoples.” He wryly added that there certainly must be a Ph.D. involved in the Maya case.

Alley disagreed that the UN represents such a qualitative change. Rather, he argued, these represent “eternal” processes.

Gail Lapidus then asked Wainwright to elaborate on the “mediating relationships” in the Maya case. Lapidus suggested that property rights and the discourse around norms prove important here and that we need to know the relationship between communal/private/state property. If we don’t merely accept claims to “tradition,” we can begin to connect such a case to larger concerns about globalization.

Wainwright said that the discourse of property indeed proves central here and needs further research. How can we make sense of how changing state-global relationships play out locally? he asked. Wainwright noted that his work looks at the play of levels simultaneously.

Lynn Eden inquired as to how the papers could be linked together more explicitly. She pressed Duvall to locate them in his grid, as well as to provide the group with a better sense of the concept of social imaginary. Agency seems important here, Eden commented, and yet we hear no agency in Muppidi’s paper (“India did this...”).

Duvall then rephrased his main points. He noted that:

1) The first view sees globalization largely in terms of economics and communications, as an essentially new phenomenon. Globalization is thus wedded to an underlying technology driving worldwide processes (the notion of a twenty-four-hour economy, fictitious money, etc.). Older metaphors of spaceship Earth are useful here. The inexorability of this process is stressed: “adjust to it—there’s no alternative.”

2) In the second approach, globalization is seen in large part to date from the period of European colonization and the introduction of modernity to the world, with capitalism an expression of modernity. This involves the making of the world in a particular form, a process intensified recently, thanks in part to the development of communications technology. This view posits the homogeneity of consumption together with a universal discourse of human rights. In this view, social claims are either about resisting the process or remaking the world (identity politics as resistance).

3) The third view starts from the notion of a “community of discourse” shaped by shared elements of interpretation and signification. In such a community, there exist representations of the world that “make sense,” that describe what worlds are imaginable. This perspective proves attentive to the global time-space compression whereby time increasingly comes to stand in for space. Thus whether one is located in Asia is now less consequential; one can be both outside India (geographically) and still be in India.
What is different today from the past, contended Duvall, is the constant process of relativization. Globalization is thus an intensifying process where it is impossible for people to not engage in this relativizing: one sees oneself as part of humanity and sees communities in relation to other communities, a process which expresses itself as greater homogeneity and intensified difference. Claims here are largely matters of the social and political activity of creating space.

M uppidi then took up Eden’s question about the social imaginary, defending it as a useful concept. Given that nations are imagined communities, we must then ask how they are imagined. How do we concretize this? Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), for example, has specific meanings in the United States (junk food) while in the Indian context it denotes a whole different set of meanings (modernity, exploitation, expensive lifestyle, Western imperialism). In a social imaginary or a field of meanings, some meanings make sense and others don’t. (If one crosses a boundary, meanings become incommunicable.) This is all about agency, since here meanings have to be constructed; they’re not determined or given, as in a structural account. Agency consists in the ability to make claims that compel recognition. States today have chosen to see globalization as something that leaves them no choice. States thus enter the process of globalization and take on the meanings they find useful.

M alley added that it’s not possible to dispute Duvall’s framework but rather, if we find it useful, we can diversify it. The first and third categories are in contrast, since the first sees globalization as new while the third doesn’t. M alley, however, sees many similarities. Duvall stresses intensification or tightening and this suggests something that is not new except in scale. There may be a heightened relativization, but it could be more useful to think of new processes.

Eden then took up the question of adapting or diversifying Duvall’s framework by asking Wainwright whether his case fit more neatly into category one or two.

Wainwright contended that a dialectic exists between changing economic-political structures and the politics of identity.

Hakan Yavuz illustrated Wainwright’s point, arguing that Islamic movements represent an attempt to challenge homogenizing processes at the same time that they constitute a challenge to produce their own modernity. They show that Europe is not universal while they simultaneously attempt to globalize/universalize their own vernaculars. Here, then, print culture becomes important. Access to a text allows a way of imagining self and culture. Current Islamic movements find a way to universalize and particularize. Yavuz then asked M alley, whose work looks at Malaysia, what made Malay leaders see their culture as universalizing.

In Malaysia, replied M alley, Confucian culture was promoted (especially in Singapore) as a kind of universalism that went hand-in-hand with particularistic “Asian values.” This facilitates a confusing Confucian and Islamic alliance.

Seidman interjected at this point that the group was mixing together processes of mobilization with what claims get made. Wainwright’s insistence on indigenous actors making maps may, in fact, work to “authenticize” claims to autochthony. Seidman warned her colleagues to be careful in their assumptions. She also added, in response to the earlier discussion, that what’s changed today is the international framework in which people can make claims. (She mentioned Rogers Brubaker’s work on Serbian nationalism inside and outside of the state borders.) With the UN, indigenous claims now find an institutional framework. This represents a huge shift since 1945 as regards claims and what people do with them.
Malley agreed that the UN offers a concrete example of what has changed. (Someone added a comment here about the importance of “transnational advocacy networks” and the powerful ways in which diasporas can now make claims.)

Seidman offered the example of Filipinos who can now make claims for protection when they work abroad in ways that Italian immigrants to the United States couldn’t in the nineteenth century. This illustrates changing ideas of citizenship.

Mike McFaul contributed to the discussion by urging the group to consider when homogenization/relativization have two different outcomes. Consider the example of the introduction of McDonald’s in Russia and the fact that local, state-owned competition is now outselling McDonald’s. This underscores the importance of questioning the assumption that globalization represents a radical assault on state sovereignty.

Malley picked up on McFaul’s point, stating that international relations literature treats the state as having no choice vis-à-vis globalization. The state can’t solve all collective action problems on its own in a world where transactions are so global. Malley contends, however, that finance is more susceptible to being globalized than is production. Certainly there exist “footloose industries and free capital, but what about mining, timber, heavy industry, infrastructure projects (especially important in Asia)? Some modes of production are rooted in place in a way that produces certain territorialized social forms. Interests in one part of a country are different and produce different claims on the state.

Muppidi furthered Malley’s idea by suggesting that we can identify a certain kind of agency if the state resists globalization discourse (e.g., Cuba). There is another type of agency when states recognize that globalization facilitates loans, economic growth, etc. Here, states want to get into the global system and see what they can get out of it.

Wainwright interjected that the Maya maps offer a kind of parallel to the fast-food industry. Maps represent how landscape is seen in response to changing geographies of production.

Duvall returned to McFaul’s example about Russian fast food. He noted that this phenomenon has two possible interpretations: (1) as a process of resisting globalization, read as homogenization or (2) an expression itself of globalization.

Froats then asked Malley how economic claims affect political units, given that in Malley’s framework causality is unclear. There exists a general consensus that in the European case, stated Froats, claims by regions are growing in strength and importance. He pressed Malley to explain the increasing power of regions in Europe relative to national capitals.

Noting that his own work focuses on Asia, not Europe, Malley went on to add that Europeanists draw a parallel to the industrial district literature based on the idea of flexible production versus Fordist production.

There then followed an exchange as a result of some of Wainwright’s earlier statements about legal claims by the Maya. Wainwright clarified that legal claims are being made but that the state doesn’t recognize such claims. These claims are not based on written tradition or maps, but rather on a politics of landscape. The Maya are now suing the state for infringing property rights and thus maps become crucial.

Seidman inquired as to what standing a geographer would have to sue in U.S. court for Maya land rights.

Wainwright said that geographers and anthropologists have sued, or been involved in such lawsuits. Anthropologists say that the Maya are indigenous, in contrast to government claims. (There follows a brief exchange about the possibility of Wainwright suing on the
basis that his livelihood as a geographer is being damaged.) In response to Wainwright’s earlier statement that the government had only recently denied M aya claims to land for the first time, he further clarified that in 1923, British colonial authorities in Belize created a system of Indian reservations and thus the M aya are denied any land outside these reservations.

Shampa Biswas summarized the debate thus: what is at issue is power and how it relates to claims. She noted that in the KFC case previously mentioned by M uppidi, KFC did eventually open in Delhi and thus one particular claim (about foreign capital) won out, and this underscores the importance of class issues. Whose interests does this serve in India? It brings to mind Spivak’s article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” and leads us to ask what effect such processes have on whose discourse is legitimated.

M uppidi countered that the traditional argument runs that liberalization serves the middle class and the diaspora’s interests. One of the most oppressed sectors in India, however, favors liberalization, while some industrialists do not. He reiterated his earlier statement that there are no clear class patterns operating here.

Wainwright seconded this, noting the complexity of the politics of oppositional discourse.

 Ramirez then addressed four points: (1) fast food, or the "McDonald’s thesis"; (2) agency; (3) homogenization/relativization; and (4) wage labor. Ramirez noted that fast food is spreading but this is not a simple story of one thing spreading through the world. As far as agency goes, we need to wrestle with this as a core element in the community of discourse. Ramirez reminded the group that agency is a very Western concept and that we need to get away from the idea that homogenization produces consensus. He instead predicts much conflict and tension. (Note that Catherine M cK innon some years back had asked why, if torture is seen as a violation of human rights, rape is not. For the first time, we now have rape defined as a war crime.) In regards to wage labor, Ramirez contended that we are currently witnessing an extraordinary proletarianization of the world.

Wainwright picked up this last point, noting that in southern Belize, the state says wage labor works to facilitate capital accumulation while oppositional discourse says the peasant economy is morally superior to wage labor.

Malley replied that while many say the peasant economy is superior to proletarianization, many peasants themselves are happy to become proletarians since there’s no money in the moral economy.

M uppidi also jumped into this discussion with his comment that in India, the working class (10 percent of the labor force) that gets benefits from state control resists liberalization, while for the rest of the populace the availability of wage labor is seen as liberating.

Eden pondered whether there exists a body of work on globalization that is more historical in its perspective.

Duvall insisted that if we avoid viewing globalization as inexorable, it must necessarily be seen as historically contingent and derived from different understandings and representations. He maintained that the third category in his framework directs us toward such an analysis. Globalization is thus not seen as de-economized or inevitable. Rather, how it becomes the dominant social imaginary (a new universal) remains the question. Analysis of type three always involves examining different positions of power and contexts in which discourses are shaped and made.
Eden disagreed with this notion somewhat. She contended that Malley’s work falls between categories one and two, given that it tells a structural story which is contingent. Type three, instead, is like a proglomena.

Duvall reiterated that at the heart of this historical process is a view of the particularizing of the world as creating potentially larger wage labor pools. This sees people across the world as potential wage laborers and their relativizing of themselves in terms of capital. This is not, then, an approach devoid of story or history. Most people nonetheless slip into the idea of inexorable logic— “the sweep of history” — rather than think about how this is made possible or is resisted.

When Eden added that she reads Malley’s story as one of a differentiation of sectors, Malley renewed Eden’s earlier call for a better understanding of the notion of “social imaginary.” He said that he would emphasize the way globalization affects nation-states, i.e. how actors make sense of the world in these territorially rooted locations.

Muppidi admitted that he is not sure how he would locate himself. One school exists, for example, in which globalization is seen as an interpretive claim. On the other hand, there exists a space for recognizing objective and material processes that affect meanings.

Byron Bland shifted the discussion with a series of questions as to whether globalization as framed by these three categories proves inherently violent, whether this in turn would justify violent claims made against it, and whether we should work to lessen such violence.

Wainwright responded that these processes are inherently transformative and thus perhaps radical violence proves possible, if not justifiable. Certainly, this potential differs from place to place given particular claims and structures. In Wainwright’s work, for instance, violence in Belize involves deterritorializing people and he rejects claims that structural adjustment necessarily leads to deforestation.

Malley argued that Bland’s questions proved impossible to answer, given the absence of an agreed-upon definition of either globalization or violence.

Muppidi seconded this, adding that globalization is transformative and thus its realities and outcomes are still unclear. The greater the lack of clarity about these processes, the more important it becomes to attend to democratic institutions that lessen the chance for violent outcomes.

Seidman returned to the question of Duvall’s framework, which she felt works as intellectual history but nonetheless blurs different processes such as technological advance, changing institutional frameworks, and cultural homogenization. In the end, we risk that globalization signifies nothing.

In a brief exchange with Seidman, Muppidi wondered if we can even talk about technological forces as separate from culture.

Duvall commented that the limitations of time forced him to provide some sort of coherence in seven minutes but that if he were to undertake a project on globalization, he would not think of technology as deterministic. Rather, he sees technology as opening up possibilities.

At this point, Katherine Verdery attempted to synthesize comments by Duvall and Muppidi. Praising the utility of Muppidi’s notion of globalization as entailing various imaginings, Verdery inquired as to the political stakes in such imaginings. What do they point to for analysts to give attention to? Who is popularizing the notion of globalization and how? These questions, suggests Verdery, help us to see the social actors involved.

Duvall said that he had tried to hint at this. In his first category, for example, there is a politics at work that eliminates agency. Category one expresses an ideological project of the
right, a closing down of political space. The second category involves politics of a Eurocentric kind which see the world as being acted upon by the project of modernity. These strike Duvall as grounds for caution.

Verdery agreed, noting the need to inspect a variety of contexts, including scholarly ones.

Mike McFaul then returned to the question of what technology does. He posited a disconnect between core and periphery, the exact opposite of homogeneity, with capital flows in the core and merely some trickles to Eastern Europe and elsewhere. McFaul concludes that this represents a process of disconnection, not globalization.

Duvall countered that such a phenomenon represents both disconnect and globalization simultaneously and lamented that he’d failed to adequately communicate what he meant by category three.

David Holloway made the final remark that Muppidi’s notion of globalization, consisting in what imaginaries see in it, disconnects globalization from processes that are often linked to it. But the latter are important since globalization itself is a language of claims and we need to see who is making claims and in what ways. Language itself implies a whole set of claims. We need to see globalization not just in terms of laws of development but also in a historical context. Technology, for example, is not in and of itself deterministic, but once in place has very profound cultural, social, and political effects.

Panel: State Formation and Claim-Making

Chair: David Abernethy, Stanford University

“Ethnic Protest in Core and Periphery States”
Susan Olzak, Stanford University

Olzak’s paper begins with a discussion of legitimacy and its diffusion. Legitimacy has diffused outwards, thereby increasing the amount of claim-making. The need remains for a macro perspective in theories of ethnic protest, most of which have been regional in their scope. Olzak starts from world system theory, maintaining that core/periphery distinctions are a good way to understand variations. In core countries, one finds dominance and/or centrality in military-economic networks, dominance in military power and in diplomacy. By contrast, in periphery states one finds low values for these issues of dominance.

Olzak examines accounts of internal colonialism and competition theory. The internal colonial thesis explains regional underdevelopment within larger core states, whereas competition theory posits ethnic differences increasing as regional differences decline. Collective action theory instead distinguishes between exclusionary and inclusionary states (those which have civil rights built into their constitutions).

Olzak argues that peripheral states have more violent forms of protest, even though the incidence of ethnic protests is lower than in core states, where more ritualized or symbolic protest exists. In the latter, however, violence increases with increasing ethnic inequality (i.e., internal colonialism).
In contrast to this approach, rational choice theorists posit a decline in ethnic inequality in the core nations. Here, exclusionary policies lead to suppression of ethnic protest. Olzak suggests in conclusion that strategies for future research on ethnic issues include examination of such processes over time for all countries at risk of having ethnic protest. This will allow a more comparative perspective.

“Kissinger o Molotsana,’ H istorical Context and Precipitating Factors in the Soweto Uprising of 1976”
Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, University of Minnesota

Pohlandt-McCormick’s paper takes as its moment of departure the Soweto Uprising of 1976, now seen in popular memory as a pivotal moment in the end of apartheid. The Uprising followed out of the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in South African schools. The magnitude of the student uprising led to violent repression, with 575 persons killed. This represented the first overt resistance in South Africa in fifteen years as youth sought to limit state power and claim certain state spaces for itself. Pohlandt-McCormick recognizes this as following out of both the daily experience of apartheid and massive structural constraints (local and regional changes in southern Africa, world recession, etc.).

Students invoked the global context (one dominated by Cold War discourse demonizing the external enemy) and, in particular, referred to the meetings of Kissinger in South Africa. Countless references were made to the ways in which Kissinger was shoring up the state. The Uprising’s precipitating factor was the imposition of Afrikaans, which meant exclusion from the international world and subjection to inferior education. If we see this as an issue on its own, it represents a rare convergent moment where metaphor becomes material and discourse changes rapidly, leading to violent revolt that ultimately becomes a social revolt enveloping the entire country.

In response, the state deployed a Cold War discourse in order to disparage the movement. The political claims of the youth were then denied legitimacy as being “communist” and individual acts were criminalized.

Gay Seidman, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Seidman noted that in the last fifteen years, the debate about the consolidation of democracy has acquired urgency in peripheral states. The debate is often framed in terms of what citizenship is and how to extend it. Marshall’s classic definition of citizenship outlines a universal vision, while Tilly’s work focuses on the national histories of citizenship conceptualizations. Increasingly, new work focuses on regional, sub-national understandings of citizenship. This represents a vaguer understanding of citizenship which is now amplified by a feminist vision about what citizenship means for women.

Seidman worries that as citizenship comes to be seen as malleable and undefined, it will lose its meaning. This leads to new thinking about why claims emerge. Her paper examines commonalities in the claims made by various activists in the 1980s in South Africa. It does not look at race, given that claims on the state tend not to be made on the basis of race.

Membership in the labor movement, for example, became defined by strikes and militancy. Questions of productivity, strategizing, and reorganizing have thus been difficult
for the labor movement, particularly with the move to transnational militancy in the 1990s. Given that willingness to strike defined labor membership, labor unions have had a difficult time adjusting to a more democratic setting. The government now faces problems since it may appear to privilege workers in the formal sectors.

The feminist movement mobilized in areas that were relatively protected (day care, etc.) and constructed a collective identity around those issues. This movement, then, was not “political” in the strict sense. Since 1985, the feminist movement in South Africa has drawn heavily upon international resources, both material and symbolic. The role of international movements represents part of the democratic consolidation in peripheral societies which is undertheorized.

The land reform group apparently did not involve mobilization of any rural groups and thus the ANC could easily develop a rational policy of land redistribution. In the last two years, however, there have been pockets of mobilization. Given the renewed importance of claims made on the basis of “invented traditions,” much more land was awarded through restitution rather than redistribution.

Three common features emerge from Seidman’s analysis of these opposition groups in South Africa:

1) Political opportunities shaped mobilization in ways affecting claims made in democratic consolidation.
2) For the poor, international resources become crucial.
3) The way claims are put forward shape the democracy that comes out of democratization.

Discussion

David Abernethy opened the discussion, observing that claims about states, as well as authors’ claims about states, raise questions of causation. Olzak, for example, makes a causal statement: To what extent is it coreness/peripherality that is the causal factor? Pohlandt-M cCormick links factors contributing to the outcome and makes discourse a causal factor itself. Abernethy asked the panelists how they weigh causal factors and, in particular, pressed Pohlandt-M cCormick to place discourse’s relative weight.

Seidman noted that her basis for comparison consists of three groups. The emphasis on commonalties implies that they’re equally accessible to citizenship in the new state. The operative question then becomes what explains the differences.

Olzak responded that an important issue for her work is whether coreness is a function of prior ethnic mobilization. She starts with coreness in 1400, since this highlights the need to sort out the extent to which violence increases peripherally.

Pohlandt-M cCormick contended that with the imposition of Afrikaans there comes a change in the structure of education, with students in secondary and early high school facing a critical “crunch.” The Afrikaans issue is about language and discourse. Afrikaans represented a distinct social practice that would have excluded persons from economic and international community. The Afrikaans question is where discourse and practice come together.

Seidman then stated that in the democratic transition literature, democracy is viewed as a process and not as an outcome. She admitted her doubt as to whether we can predict outcomes from this range of dependencies.
Malley then took up the general discussion, suggesting that the terms Olzak uses to define coreness don’t relate to how we define ethnic protest. He asked about other ways in which we may define states.

Olzak rejected such distinctions in favor of viewing a series of interaction effects between coreness and inclusionary policy. What happens in time with mobilizations? she asks. A relationship between coreness and exclusionary policy increases.

Judith Sedaitis objected to the privileging of a special moment that brings discourse and practice together. We can have an objectivist analysis that accords material incentives to people. (One protests as the result of a cost-benefit analysis.) Why do we need to mention discourse at all?

In response, Pohlandt-McCormick maintained that the state sets about making discourse and responding to it (through physical suppression of the uprising and construction of counter-discourse). Sedaitis countered that for her, discourse implies a certain reflexivity but Pohlandt-McCormick instead uses discourse as simultaneous with protest and claims, i.e. not reflexively.

Abernethy interjected that subjective and objective interpretations needn’t be mutually exclusive.

Pohlandt-McCormick sought to clarify her position. In the six years prior to the youth movement, she said, there was an explicit effort amongst youth activists to find a means of protest. The black movement, for example, sought spaces that didn’t threaten the government. This constituted an ongoing conversation. The efforts of the national party/government to Afrikaanerize South Africa were not done for overt economic reasons (i.e., the demand for skilled labor).

Abernethy pressed Pohlandt-McCormick on her terms here. Asking whether “purely discursive” means symbolic or anti-pragmatic, Abernethy contended that such a notion of discourse creates a semantic dilemma.

Suzana Sawyer interjected at this point, reminding the group that there do exist understandings that view discourse as simultaneously symbolic and material, not just as speech acts. Sawyer added that this constitutes the core of what claims are all about; they are grounded in a terrain of struggle that has to do with real-life practices.

David Holloway returned to the specific use of discourse in Pohlandt-McCormick’s paper. He asked whether her notion of a time at which discourse and practice crashed together implies a subsequent change in discourse. He further observed that criminalization of political action represents a standard police-state action.

Pohlandt-McCormick replied that the state attempts to create an official version and to exclude all other versions. The “experts” called in to tell the story of the Uprising, for example, were all adult outsiders (witnesses and not participants).

Holloway pressed as to whether Pohlandt-McCormick was claiming this as a novel phenomenon, given that criminalization represents a standard response of governments to disorder with this “crashing of discourse into practice.”

Eden stressed that if we work from Sawyer’s definition of discourse, we need to see embeddedness rather than a “crashing” together. She then asked Pohlandt-McCormick whether by discourse she intends “speech act” or embeddedness (à la Foucault).

Pohlandt-McCormick said that she used discourse in a more inclusive sense in order to emphasize the speed with which political action and speech changed in that particular moment.
Ramirez then took up another aspect of discourse, noting the “exceptionalism” of the South African case to the view that all nation-states are compelled to take on democratic discourse. As we shift from the elegance of M arshall’s model, the scene becomes fuzzy and we have no expectations as to what is cause and effect. Implicit is the idea that those with less access to international resources have fewer hopes for success. The political opportunities that exist under repressive regimes will condition claims that are made. Ramirez noted that Olzak’s table makes ethnic inequality the independent variable whereas the dependent variable becomes ethnic violence. He requested some clarification from Olzak on the cases for the peripheral states.

Olzak admitted the difficulty in talking about these dimensions at the same time, given that none of these themes work by themselves.

Seidman pointed out that the table proves misleading on the time dimension. She suggested the need, for example, to take account of chattel slavery. Olzak replied that she treats chattel slavery as non-violent.

Seidman further noted the way in which South Africa was seen as exceptional in a world of decolonization. (There follow a few comments about predictions of the apartheid regime’s demise.) She wanted to see regularities and thus chose land reform because she thought it would be an exception to labor and feminist movements. In the end, however, it appeared much more similar to the latter two than she had expected.

Yavuz shifted the discussion somewhat, inquiring after the difference in claims made by ethnic groups in the post–Cold War era. With a focus on lifestyles and so on, said Yavuz, the new social movements suggest one answer. We must still ask, though, whether there is a shift in the content of the claims made by different ethnic groups.

Olzak stated that most people take the end of World War II to talk about the ethnic explosion, yet the issue that is important is that this explosion began long ago in the core. (There’s good IR literature on when that began.)

Yavuz offered the example of Great Britain and its Muslim communities and the debates about creating spaces through a multi-plural legal system. Olzak replied that this type of thing happens in core states more than in peripheral ones.

Al Camarillo then asked Seidman about the explosion of movements in the 1980s in South Africa, along with the importation of political strategies. Which is more important, the material or the ideological? he wondered.

Seidman declined to answer, given that the two prove so interlinked, especially for women’s movements. U.S. and Canadian groups were looking for groups to fund, for example, and this strengthened female activists in South Africa. Many feminists there attended the Nairobi Conference in 1985. Without female activists in their ranks, mixed organizations found it harder to obtain international funding.

Biswa returned to Yavuz’s example of British Muslims. While she admits that Muslims there do make demands through parliamentary channels, she pointed out that Muslim identity really coalesced around the Rushdie affair and thus the “core” thesis can’t explain that.

Muppidi suggested that in the core, ideological hegemony is so complete that few channels exist for opposition while in the periphery they do (the idea of the “soft state”).
Olzak disagreed, noting that her theory says the opposite. There are ethnicities of all sorts in the core, she argues, but it’s “much ado about nothing” whereas in the periphery it will blow up the state.

Abernethy concluded the session, observing that Olzak distinguishes between global effects, historicizing this process and locating states in a hierarchy at the same time that she suggests cases where states don’t matter. These effects are different and, in some sense, in conflict.

Panel: Identities and Social Power

Chair, Sylvia Yanagisako, Stanford University

“Mediated Modernities: Ethnic Identity and Indigenous Film in Trinidad”
Gita Srinivasan, Stanford University

Srinivasan opened her comments with a brief description of her research, which looks at ethnic identity in the Indian diaspora and, in particular, the influence of the popular Hindi film in Trinidad. Her interest lies in media’s multiple meanings and roles: its reading and rebroadcasting, its structuring of inner imagined worlds, as transnational cultural commodities, and as utopias/dystopias. Media can destroy community but it can also lead to novel appropriations; globalization has led to an intensification of the local, of the “tricky version” of the local (see Stuart Hall).

Srinivasan’s paper examines locally produced films from Trinidad done in the style of Bombay films. Stock oppositions are here recast in local milieus as the content of those categories shifts. [She shows clips from a 1960s Hindi film titled “East and West” detailing the arrival of an Indian in decadent London, and from the Indo-Trinidad production “The Girl from India” (1980).] In each film considered here, an Indian journeys overseas to a diasporic community. In the former, viewers can glance upon the “fleshpots of the West” at the same time that they feel superior to occidental decadence.

In the second film, Afro-Trinidadian culture is mapped onto that of the West. Here, calypso renders African-ness as West Indian-ness, and it becomes “the Girl from India” versus the “Man from Africa.” The conflict is framed as a cultural one by many of Srinivasan’s informants, with people asserting that they are not racist but culturalist. The conflict is played out on the body of sexual license. (Indeed, the fetishization of the Indian “movie star” involves a covering of her body in correlation to the authenticity of her Indian-ness.) We see, then, the appropriation and transformation of the categories available to Indians from Hindi films.

“The Politics of Communication Networks”
Hakan Yavuz, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Yavuz’s paper examines the shift in claim-making from state to society. In Turkey, the state has lost control over communication networks to religious and ethnic groups that challenge Kemalist identity. These communication networks converged with political-economic trans-
formations. The expansion of these communication networks facilitated (1) the raising of sub-ethnic or sub-religious consciousness (here, media images from Bosnia and the Chechen war proved important); (2) the recognition of multiple identities; (3) the creation of new autonomous intellectuals who became agents of identity-seeking movements (the Turkish elite formerly saw one path to modernity, via the EU, but, after Bosnia, Europe is seen to have two exits: Auschwitz and a Bosnian camp); and (4) the shift from orality to print culture.

Breaking the ulema’s monopoly on texts created a new space for Muslim intellectuals and rendered Islam a commodified culture forced to compete with other identities. The process is one, then, of pluralization rather than of homogenization. This allows for a way of imagining vernacular modernity and for groups to stake out their own claims on the basis of religion. What becomes “universal” or what is universal is translated as the particular. Those Islamic groups with financial means or access to communication networks and who can use intellectual links to make claims about human rights are those who define the universal.

“Religious Claims to Identity: The Shifting Meanings of ‘Secularism’ and ‘Nation’”
Shampa Biswas, University of Minnesota

Biswa’s work examines how Hindi nationalism transforms postcolonial meanings. Her paper makes three major points.

1) Structural changes (economic, political, and social) that relate to the national and global political economy create the conditions of possibility for the rise and success of claims to religious identity, as reflected in the rise of Hindu nationalism in India.

2) These claims need to be interrogated in the context of the relations of social and economic power in contemporary India. In other words, the question of whose interests these claims represent, even as they speak in the name of a homogenous Hindu community with pre-given and self-evident interests, is one that needs to be addressed.

3) These claims draw on an existing discursive economy of meanings so that Hindu nationalism has to resonate with commonsense understandings in order to enter the Indian mainstream and deflect claims of “extremism.”

Biswa then elaborates on each of these points.

1) Claims to religious identity are successful in periods of instability, at which time the negotiation of identity and the production of nation become particularly significant. In India, these changes reflect economic liberalization and integration into international markets, as well as a politics of caste.

2) We need to interrogate how nationalist claims to Hindu identity are tied to religion, caste, and class within a global political economy. The claim of Hindu nationalists to represent a homogenous community and to redefine the idea of “secularism” and “Indian nation” represents an attempt to create consensus around this hegemonic vision, subordinating coordinating competing claims to identity under an overarching and particularistic Hindu/Indian identity.

3) Structural changes in the Indian economy and politics create conditions of possibility for Hindu nationalism. The success of Hindu nationalism lies in the manner in which it has
reappropriated and redefined existing ideas about the relationship between state and religion.

“In the Shadow of the Balkans: Challenging State-Sponsored Narratives of History and Security in Trieste and Istria”
Pamela Ballinger, Johns Hopkins University

Ballinger’s paper examines competing claims for “historical justice” in the border region between Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia. Incorporated into the Italian state with the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo, the small Istrian peninsula and the adjacent port city of Trieste became the objects of a bitter and protracted territorial dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia at the close of World War II. Perceived by the Anglo-Americans in broader terms, with Tito initially seen as Stalin’s proxy, the “Trieste Question” contributed to the early articulation of a “Cold War” discourse. The redefinition of strategic interests after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 led the Anglo-Americans to ultimately force the hands of the Italian and Yugoslav negotiators and settle the conflict. As a result, Istria definitively passed to Yugoslavia in 1954 and as many as 350,000 Italian-speakers left the peninsula in a mass “exodus”; in subsequent decades, the experience of “exile” nurtured anger at having been “sacrificed” in the name of larger state interests.

With Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the demise of the Italian “First Republic,” both manifestations of broader realignments attendant to the Cold War’s “end,” Istrian exiles found a space for bringing their case to the attention of a broader public. Exile associations in Italy have demanded compensation for lost properties and persecution of “war criminals” responsible for atrocities committed in Istria during World War II; these claims have become important issues in interstate relations between Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia. Simultaneously, a regionalist movement known as the Istrian Democratic Assembly (DDI) has arisen in the Istrian peninsula, now territorially divided between Slovenia and Croatia. The DDI proposes a regional, trans-state entity in order to overcome the historical trauma wrought by the postwar exodus, as well as by contemporary territorial division.

Although DDI proponents share with exiles a vision of Istria as the object (rather than subject) of a history of conquest, regionalists encounter fierce opposition amongst the exiles. DDI supporters promote a vision of “Istrian” identity as a historic hybrid of “Slavic” and “Italian” cultures that contradicts the exile view of Istrian culture as inherently Italian. Despite their political polarity, however, the exile associations and the DDI locally refract broader changes in state sovereignty and the interstate system. The paper considers, then, the different ways in which these groups (in dialogue with one another) construct moral capital by means of historical discourses of authenticity and legitimacy and, in so doing, challenge state-sponsored definitions of “security” in the region.

Discussion

Sylvia Yanagisako initiated the discussion by asking a broad question: What distinguishes forms of claim-making in the late twentieth century from those in the early twentieth century? Srinivasan’s and Y avuz’s papers suggest that the modes of discursive representations of identity have changed, accompanied by a plurality of modes and increased transnational/global circulation. Yet Biswas stresses that the existing discursive economy of
meanings was not wholly novel in the Indian case, while Ballinger emphasizes the continuity of narratives for the Istrian case, warning against a presentist reading.

Yanagisako moved from these tensions in the panelists' papers to ponder whether we are seeing an emergence of new ideas or, rather, the circulation of old ones. We can think back to Anderson's linking of nationalism to notions like kinship and religion, which reminds us that all draw on the same cosmology of ideas about place, belonging, and solidarity. Judeo-Christian and Islamic notions about ethnicity have become commonplace, a kind of discursive resource circulating throughout the globe. Forms of claim-making in the late twentieth century probably have new terms and vocabulary, but the notions of genealogy and place remain almost identical with those constituting the nation-state.

Duvall disagreed with this statement. He claims that in the late twentieth century state, the novel element consists in a kind of inflection in these discourses of identity. Authenticity and purity have more importance.

Yanagisako countered that the “authentic” is just as essential to nineteenth century nationalism.

Seidman instead hypothesized that perhaps claims today have a different reach (consider the material from Yavuz's and Srinivasan's papers). Nineteenth century claims linked territory and authenticity much more clearly.

Yavuz noted that his work on “polluted identity” shows that a-territorial claims are being made, highlighting the problematic relationship between transnationalism and territoriality. Yavuz disagrees with Anderson: the nation is continually imagined and re-imagined, it is not a finished process.

Biswas added that contemporary nationalist movements draw on the Hindu past but in a different way. Now it’s a glorious past of plenty to be reclaimed.

Srinivasan commented that narratives are being de-territorialized through films, which operate as chronotopes by which space is materialized as time. In Trinidad, though, the culture concept is alive and well, and culture can be seen as highly commodified. There exist whole networks for promoting culture, and a few families run this cultural machine. Appadurai has written on culturalist struggles, suggesting a whole new way to think about authenticity with these films.

Yanagisako remained unconvinced that people today are more reflexive about culture.

Verdery replied that we don’t necessarily need to treat the thing as the same if the context is different. She suggested that we can think of nation as another kind of kinship idiom.

Yanagisako reiterated her position, stating that while diaspora does call into question these ideas, we nonetheless see a redundancy of meanings with everyone drawing on a similar repertoire (similarity of constructions of self, identity, land).

Abernethy then inquired as to how much we take at face value a claim that a group identifies itself in a particular way. In what way, for example, can the BGP in India cover for caste? In the Trinidad case, “cultural group” seems to be operating as a code word for racial group.

Srinivasan responded that in Trinidad, there are labyrinthian covers, multiple layers.

Holloway offered that the discussion of self-reflexivity seems more prominent in diaspora. He wondered if the development of communications has made a difference, especially since new possibilities exist for émigré groups which in the past have tended to maintain much more static and fixed notions of the home culture. With nationalism, people are calling on the same concepts and yet we could look for new concepts in new forms of political
organization. Nonetheless, these claims are still bound up with statehood. Can Hong Kong, for example, survive as an experiment with sovereignty in China?

Srinivasan picked up on Holloway’s comment, noting that in Trinidad one sees precisely this understanding of a homeland undisturbed by change. India is here seen as a place back in time, in spite of contemporary Indian films. There is great concern over “risqué” films from India: why are they coming from “pure” India? This suggests a desire to hold on to an unfixed, changing place. She expressed her uneasiness about making generalizations about diaspora. In Trinidad there’s not just the question of diaspora but also of unequal access to power by Indians.

Yavuz interjected that new social movements challenge state-centric understandings such as “national security.” They seek to empower the community through the construction of self. In Turkey, the whole body becomes a way to challenge the status quo. While in the past Europe was seen as a universal, today groups are trying to re-imagine Islam. Now Europe is seen as just one civilized space.

Froats then asked Ballinger if she had found any instances in the Istrian material in which “memory is only memory.”

Ballinger replied that she had spoken with many Istrians in Trieste who do not identify with the exile associations and who say that they built new lives and moved on. She also found that, contrary to many other cases, members of the Istrian diaspora (beyond Trieste) tend to have accepted that Istria is “just a memory.”

Eden added that she has just read a book called The University in Ruins which argues that since the identity of the nation-state has become less salient and since the university was integral to nation-state building, the university is undergoing change and identity here is becoming commodified. Now, the university talks about excellence and efficiency. With the commodification of culture, ideas about citizenship are changing. Eden then asks what we could we see as policy implications of the panelists’ work on identity.

Ballinger commented that the Istrian exile case reveals that refugees don’t forget their homes, and claims to them, even fifty years after the fact. This lesson should not be lost on those dictating the terms of the peace in former Yugoslavia. The Istrian case also demonstrates the powerful political and legal incentives for groups to define themselves in ethno-national terms and thereby present themselves as victims of “genocide.”

Biswas warned that we need to guard against the appropriation of discourses such as that of “India” by Hindus.

Muppidi furthered this, observing that the Indian Historical Association is in crisis over the secular/Hindu split. He suggested that how we understand history and write textbooks is important here.

M alley then questioned Yavuz, who stressed orality versus print culture, about other media in the Turkish case. Is it possible that film invites a more self-reflexive thinking by bringing home images never seen before? M alley wondered. He added that in Indonesia, Western films are watched by the upper and middle classes, while lower classes tend to watch Hindi films.

Yavuz responded that television in Turkey was formerly monopolized by the state but that there now there exists a new Muslim television station. Nonetheless, print still gives more authenticity to these groups’ arguments, especially given the textual tradition of the ulema.
Srinivasan found Yavuz’s privileging of text over film interesting, given that she thinks of film as text. Film, song, narrative, and religious text thus bleed together. Srinivasan considers spectatorship as leading to a heightened awareness of one’s subjectivity.

Yanagisako expressed her skepticism. While recognizing a certain return to orality with film, she remains unconvinced that this entails a new perception or subjectivity.

Seidman turned to the topic of Yavuz’s new social movement argument, which she found unusual in this context. She proposed that the state refusal to address this has changed with the new government.

Yavuz answered that the Sufi order is critical of the welfare party. The state is thus not the solution but rather part of the problem. The Turkish Islamic movement represents a struggle to create new spaces. Consider the Ottoman example in which the government is not involved in religion or education. The Turkish Islamic movement is society oriented.

Seidman pressed her point, suggesting that this might be a product of a movement in the modernization process. Once there is a democratic opening, one sees a shift in the way social movement activists think about the state.

Yavuz remained steadfast, emphasizing that in Turkey Islamic groups interested in liberalization want to overcome the state and obtain access to international markets. He contended that we need to reverse Huntington’s question “What danger do Islamic movements represent for sovereignty?” to read “What effects does democracy have on Islam?” Yavuz posits a new situation where “God is hijacked,” leading to a commodification of religious knowledge. The rationalist state incapable of coping with diversity or difference remains the main obstacle.

Sawyer commented that in Latin America totalitarian states are initiating structural adjustments and popular and ethnic groups are mobilizing against this, a situation that is the reverse of Yavuz’s case. She further added that one of the major differences we see in the late twentieth century may be the plurality of the idea of nation.

Yavuz then said that we need to inquire when identity shifts take place. Sufis are now claiming that the homeland is the Koran itself, a mobile homeland. New media give the possibility to deconstruct this, and in Turkey there is now the realization that it is a nation of nationalities.

Ramirez returned the discussion to the theme of novelty versus continuity, arguing that the idea of a nation that is transterritorial isn’t new. Rather, what is going on now is stylized. Now we have efforts to identify with old “civilizations.” Anderson tries to argue for the collapse of old identities but this inverts it.

Srinivasan stated that there is an identification with Indian civilization in Trinidad but there is also a vocal minority that wants to create an Indian homeland proper.

Yavuz countered Ramirez, contending that we see a shift beyond nation with these redefinitions of national identity. This doesn’t necessarily negate national identity but does imply a shift from territory to text with shifting loyalties.

Katherine Verdery opened her keynote address by relating the workshop’s concern with claims and contexts to her own work on the transition from state socialism in Romania. Verdery’s current project focuses on ownership and property claims involved in the process of privatization and decollectivization. She thinks of “claims” in terms of bundles of rights and claims; privatization involves the reassignment of the bearers of property claims.

The broader context for this project is that of the global reorganization of capital accumulation, a process that has accelerated during the past thirty years. This process has two aspects: (1) getting money out of “states” and into capital markets, a phenomenon that reflects the changing role and functions of states; and (2) “flexible accumulation,” characterized by small batch production and new organizations of time and space. These dual aspects point to a move away from Fordism and “fat” states possessed of large welfare functions. The “collapse” of this older system of capitalist accumulation reflects the internal limits on economic growth and the cutting back of large state bureaucracies, with resources previously monopolized by those states now being transformed into more mobile forms. Crucial to this is privatization, which represents a form of “enclosing the commons.” So-called “collective” property is now rendered private, the assets from selling it now going into various hands.

Privatization thus has its “macro” ingredients, given that the process is reinforced by international finance institutions via loan policies, various agencies, and the creation of institutions like stock markets and private banks. Privatization has its micro side as well, for it also plays out in small locales, households, individual lawsuits, neighbors angry over gardens, and deal-making in back rooms. Verdery’s project looks at this micro side of privatization in agriculture, i.e. decollectivization. She considers what enables individual ownership claims and through what processes they occur. Each such incident represents a tiny part of what will become a new property regime.

As an anthropologist, Verdery is thus dealing with a small “sample size” and participant-observation. She is not trying to determine causality or build models but rather to unpack the significance of an event, asking how it was produced and with what effects. Verdery thus works from the premise that knowledge of social processes and cultural understandings in other places is possible, though always difficult and imperfect. She adopts a puzzle-solving rather than a textualist approach. The micro-macro issue depends, of course, on one’s vantage point (whether one is standing on the moon or sitting at a microscope). Her micro is very micro.

Verdery then presented a story about decollectivization treating a series of events in one small locale, the village of Aurel Vlaicu, where she conducted research in 1993–94. To follow the story, we need to know what happened as decollectivization began in Romania following the Law on Agricultural Land Resources, or Law 18, in February 1991. The general sequence of events is as follows:

1) Collective farms (cooperative agricole di productie, or CAPs) were liquidated.
2) Many buildings were destroyed and equipment taken away from the collective farms, although in some villages they were left.
3) People got certification of the amount of land for G4 and managed to cultivate it where they had it.
4) Buildings and equipment of collectives were auctioned off except where associations were formed.

5) A crucial provision of Law 18 biased the disposition of CAP property in favor of the associations as jural entities. In a word, CAPS now “morphed” into associations, their social capital assigned as shares to members by a complex formula (an algorithm linking one’s total land and labor contributions to the CAP). To increase one’s share required extra work and thus there was a built-in bias favoring quasi collective forms against ownership claims by individuals.

What is meant by “fuzzy property” here is (appropriately enough) a somewhat vague concept, owing to the variety of reasons for which definitions of property rights can be indistinct. Different people may contest ownership of a single object, complicating the assessment of use rights, obligations, and claims to revenue. In this talk, Verdery restricts her discussion to complex property rights at their “fuzziest”: those lying at the interface of collective and individual, with minimal state mediation.

Verdery then presented her story, illustrating the conflict between individual and collective claims. Spending time around the office of the Vlaicu association, Verdery learned from the agronomist and accountant about the liquidation of the collective farm, an irregular auction of a granary, a resulting lawsuit decided against the plaintiff—a villager she called Ionescu—and an appeal, aimed at annulling the auction. She later encountered Ionescu and heard his side of the story. Ionescu referred Verdery to Stefan, a friend of hers. Stefan’s mother criticized Ionescu, arguing that “He’s boasted all over the village that he’ll get the granary and will never have to work again, just live off renting it out. Shouldn’t it belong to the village, rather than to just one person? The whole village built it, after all.” Stefan disagreed, however, saying that Ionescu had been the victim of a breach of the law, which called for the auctioning off of goods of collective farms. The larger principle at stake, according to Stefan, was whether one respects the law.

Verdery contends that the four conversations she notes—with the two association officers, with Ionescu, with Stefan, and with his mother—touched upon the major issues and positions in what became a village-wide controversy over privatization. She spent the next months filling these issues out by attending the sessions of the court case, discussing it with the plaintiff and defendants as well as with the presiding judge, and asking many other villagers their opinion of it. What was at issue in the case was a clash between procedural issues on the one hand and the “public good” on the other, and between conditions promoting individual entrepreneurship and the values of the community. These conflicts lie at the heart of privatization, and their outcome will incrementally produce (or not produce) the “law-governed state” and state-supported conditions favoring autonomous individual action against resistant collectivities.

The events leading up to the village dispute are as follows. Following the provisions of Law 18, CAPS had fifteen days to constitute a liquidation commission, which then had nine months to dissolve the CAP. If associations—which would be the privileged recipients of the fixed capital of the old CAPs—were not formed by that time, the CAP property was to be sold at auction and the proceeds distributed to members according to the algorithm previously mentioned.

In Aurel Vlaicu it took a while to form an association. Some villagers began occupying their land and intended to work it themselves. Some of the personnel of the old CAP were thinking of forming an association but were having trouble organizing themselves for it.
When the association was still just an idea and not yet a jural entity, the village liquidation commission put the required notice in the newspaper, stating that every Thursday, “until the patrimony [of the CAP] is liquidated,” public auctions would be held for the sale or rental of buildings and the sale of equipment and other objects. One aim was to obtain enough money finally to launch the association.

Ionescu showed up one Thursday in the hopes of buying not the granary but the “annex,” a smaller building. He planned to use it as a workshop and shelter for his tractor and tools; this was part of his larger plan to create a competitor to the SMA/"Agromec” and eventually, with some villagers, their own association. Also present at the auction were several people representing the embryonic leadership council of the nascent Vlaicu association. When this group outbid him for the annex he wanted, Ionescu asked what other buildings were to be sold; among them was the granary. He asked to bid on it, the quasi-council made an offer, and Ionescu raised it. When one of the quasi-councilors asked that the bidding be stopped so they could consult with association members on how high they were willing to go, the president of the liquidation commission then suspended the bidding.

These events took place amid considerable confusion. As one of those running the meeting explained to Verdery, “We had no idea how to do an auction, how to proceed with liquidating the CAP; my image of an auction was from American movies—standing in front of people and calling out numbers—but that’s not how it happening!” No one knew whether it was acceptable to suspend the bidding, but under the circumstances—in which people representing an embryonic association suddenly realized it could not function without a granary that it did not yet have the resources to buy—that seemed the thing to do.

Deeply upset, Ionescu set off the next day in search of the mayor, whom he claims to have found in the company of the county prefect. According to him, the prefect said Ionescu was in the right and ordered the mayor to go to Vlaicu CAP and resolve the problem. The following morning, Ionescu went to the CAP to find that the mayor had already arrived and (presumably) alerted the liquidation commission. They proposed to re-open the bidding, but Ionescu now refused to bid, saying that he had won the real auction held two days earlier. Overriding his objections, the association raised his earlier bid by a small margin and was awarded the granary. Ionescu got a lawyer, sued the liquidation commission, and lost, on the grounds that he had not presented evidence of the terms of the auction. With the help of a new lawyer, he found the original announcement of the auction and filed an appeal to annul the auction as breaching the published terms. By the time the appeal began, one and a half years had passed since the auction, and the association was an essential player in village life.

The appeal took place in two court sessions, which Verdery attended. In them, the judge’s questioning sought to establish the precise course of events and pursued several additional points: these included the size of the association (more than one hundred member families), its aim (grain cultivation), who built the granary (villagers collectively, through “voluntary” labor in the 1960s), whether it was necessary to the association (very necessary, said several witnesses for the defense), why Ionescu came on Saturday and brought others with him if he then didn’t bid (disputed), whether other large items had been sold on Saturdays despite the terms of the published announcement (they had), the reactions of villagers to Ionescu’s bid on the granary (panic and disapproval, said the defense witnesses), whether certain members of the liquidation commission had also bid on behalf of the association and even stopped the auction (they had), and why the commission didn’t make
public announcement of the auctions that were taking place on days other than Thursday ("an oversight," said the commission’s president). The mayor of Geoagiu was repeatedly summoned as a witness and failed to appear, instead submitting a written statement—not taken under oath—that the Thursday auction was held only for the annex, that Saturday was assigned for auctioning the granary, and that the granary was essential to the association’s success.

At the end of the second session, the lawyers for the two sides summed up their arguments as follows. The plaintiff’s lawyers argued to annul the auction for procedural irregularity: (1) two persons who had bid on the granary for the association were also members of the liquidation commission; (2) the law requires publicity, since sales are not for a limited number of people but for any potential buyer, and because the publicity had mentioned only Thursday, the Saturday auction excluded buyers who might have wanted to come; and (3) it was impossible for the association as such to bid on the granary in July, for it acquired legal status only in August. Thus, the leadership council could bid only as private individuals, which would mean they had no grounds for suspending the auction to consult with anyone else. The lawyer emphasized that the manner of the auction contravened the interests of the public and of the former CAP members, since the lack of publicity kept potentially higher-bidding participants from attending, and this reduced the sale price to be distributed to villagers. The defense lawyer rejected the suit, saying that (1) the plaintiff could have bid on Saturday, but didn’t; (2) he had insisted on exceeding the mandate of the Thursday auction, which, as shown in the mayor’s deposition, was only for the annex and not the granary; (3) as someone pursuing a private outcome he was not legally qualified to sue in the public interest; and, finally, (4) because article 28 of Law 18 specifies that the fixed assets of CAPs automatically become the property of associations, the granary need never have been put for auction at all. The lawyer called into question the very notion of “public good” used by the prosecution, asking whose interests were to be protected by wide publicity—those of people in cities and towns far from the place where things are being sold, who would have had little reason to want a granary in a small village?

The summaries made clear that completely different principles were at war in this case. One was that because article 28 of Law 18 privileged new collective forms, the auction need never have occurred, in which case all the other arguments were moot. Upholding the law in the broadest sense was thus compatible with ruling against the plaintiff. Alternatively, because Law 18 gave precise instructions about the conduct of auctions, one could argue to uphold the law by arguing in the plaintiff’s favor. There was also the matter of the association’s legal status at the time of the auction, which might or might not be seen as adequate to qualify it for inclusion under article 28 of Law 18. Then there were questions about just what it means to defend the “public good”: how should one construe the “interested public,” for purposes of selling off collective property, how wide should that public be, and who is qualified to defend its interest?

The question of the “public good” turned out to be decisive, as Verdery learned from conversations with the presiding judge after the trial was over. The judge, a respected and intelligent woman dedicated to certain values, decided against the plaintiff and dismissed the case. The judge preferred to see evidence of the association’s formation as sufficient grounds for awarding it the CAP’s fixed property. Behind this preference stood her belief that the law should protect the interest of the greater number—the members of the association, rather than a single individual. Whatever the reasons for the judge’s decision, the effect of her decision was to deny legal sanction to those who would move an object from an ambiguous
status, subject to overlapping claims and rights on the part of a collectivity, into the clearly defined, exclusive private ownership of Ionescu. The granary as property of the association “belongs” to all and is managed by their representatives; each member has a claim on it, based in his past labor and present share in the revenues that might help to maintain it. To preserve its ambiguous status, in turn, shores up the position of those networks among the rural elite for whom the persistence of collective property—which they defend as the collective weal—bring possibilities for personal gain, through various forms of “political capitalism.” The judge’s ruling thus promotes this elite as a collectivity by preserving parts of its collective resource base, rather than by individualizing ownership resources.

Perhaps, paradoxically, it was not only the judge, local authorities, and the association leaders who were defending a collective good: so too did many villagers. The overwhelming opinion in the village was that the association ought to win. After the verdict, one heard such reactions following “collective” opinion: “It’s very good that he lost the trial. He never worked in the CAP a day in his life. We all built that granary, it was hard work, and he didn’t do any of it. There are many of us, we aren’t a single person trying to become rich overnight! He’s the kind of person who never really liked to work, was always looking for a way to get by easy—he even boasted he’d get this granary and never have to work again, just live off the interest! He’s not even from here. Why should it go to a single individual, when it’s the work of all of us and we need it? You can’t give the wealth of everyone to a single person!”

Only four of the thirty some informants from whom Verdery noted opinions dissented from such views. Two of these had launched themselves on ambitious “entrepreneurial” ventures for which they had bought other buildings of the CAP at about the same time as Ionescu, the third was a determined opponent of the association, and the fourth is Ionescu’s kinsman. About half the villagers who expressed an opinion against Ionescu were members of the association; most of the others had received some land and were farming it themselves. A small number were “immigrants” (like Ionescu) who received no land, have little possibility of benefiting from the granary, and thus might have sided with him; but even among these people, many saw the granary as a public good, usable (for a fee) not just by the association and its members but by anyone.

The widespread opposition to Ionescu’s suit, then, did not rest chiefly on the prospect of benefiting from the granary if he lost, even though the structure’s utility was clearly significant to people. Nor was it a simple question of “locals” against “immigrants,” though this division did play a role. Rather, Verdery argues, it was a reaction against certain aspects of the construction of capitalist individualism that Ionescu unfortunately represents, as well as against the notion of private property associated with it. Implicated in both are deeply held values concerning community and the definition of self in relation to work. To explain this, and to show why Ionescu’s suit catalyzed so vigorous a reaction among his fellow villagers, requires a further word on his personal characteristics.

Ionescu is not a native-born Vlaican: he comes from a neighboring village, whence he married into Vlaicu in the 1960s. His in-laws likewise were not native to Vlaicu but had moved there from a hill village; by local status conceptions they are “strangers” (straini), “inmovers” (veniti or venituri) of relatively poor hillbilly origin, held in some contempt by locals. Having no land, the family gave nothing to the collective farm at its formation and were not regular members of it. Ionescu himself had served as the village bus driver in the 1970s and gained a certain sympathy; this was easily reversed, however, following his 1980 visit to his brother in the United States, when he returned full of “American” ideas about how to get rich without working hard. From then on, he conformed to the stereotype of
capitalist enrichment that was central to Communist Party propaganda. Vlaiceni had been laughing for years behind his back at his plans for one or another venture in which other people would put in the effort and he would “contribute the brains.”

Why are these details significant? Because they limn the system of self-conceptions and social boundaries within which Vlaiceni constructed “the public good.” The core of village reaction to Ionescu’s case was that the granary is a public good and should not be monopolized by a single person. It is a public good not because (like people’s land) it was collectivized but because it contains the labor of all those who lived in the village when the collective was formed in 1959. Villagers had built the buildings of the CAP in their “free” time, “voluntarily” with coercive work norms to urge their voluntarism along. In a certain sense these buildings embody the common suffering of all those who lost land to the collective—the structures are everyone’s congealed labor, but alongside their sweat are blood and tears. Anyone (such as Ionescu) who did not participate in that experience but wants to appropriate its result finds himself facing the community from the outside. Thus the reaction to single owners who had taken over barns was different: “the buyers worked to build those barns too, they had a right to bid on them, and besides, we don’t need barns now that the CAP’s dairy cattle have been given away. We have more need of the money they paid to buy them.” The notion that the structures of the CAP in some sense represent villagers’ personal substance appeared in the comment of a local functionary who observed, concerning the looting of the CAP buildings in many settlements throughout Romania, “The buildings of the CAP weren’t communist, they were people’s work!”

The “public good” had a further connection with labor through ideas about creation and destruction. Association members and others were worried that because there would be no public constraints on what Ionescu might do with his property, he might repeat what he had done with a small CAP structure he had bought earlier: destroy it to use the building material for other purposes. With this, a part of the community’s very “self” would vanish.

Equally important in villagers’ opposition to Ionescu was people’s view of him as “lazy,” as “not liking to work.” An opposition was set up: we who work versus he who is lazy. More to the point: he wants to be lazy at our expense. Vlaiceni could get positively apoplectic at the thought that Ionescu would buy the granary and then rent it back to people to store their grain; thus, they would sweat in the fields and he would sit with his feet up, profiting from their efforts in the present as well as the past. Community property would thus be used to exploit community members. One woman put the problem thus: “The whole village is saying, ‘Why should he get the results of our work?’”—in short, individual ownership claims resulting from private appropriation from a public good are wrong.

Public reaction against Ionescu was therefore about what community consists of and how self is formed in relation to it. Central to both were notions concerning kinship and labor. Ionescu was placed outside the boundaries of community because he acted individualistically, like someone with no kin, and because he was seen as not valuing labor and the things built from it; nor was his labor congealed in the public goods he wished to appropriate. Also at issue, I believe, was the larger and painful process of seeking meaning for ruined lives. All villagers, and especially the elderly who lived through the devastating experience of collectivization that many felt as a live amputation, are struggling to recast and valorize the past forty years. For these purposes, ideas about work, possession, social embeddedness, and community are vital.

This discussion shows that many villagers preferred to maintain a situation of ambiguous and overlapping property rights rather than promote their disaggregation: instead of
entering the exclusive private ownership of any one person, the granary remained “ours,”
with pieces of work embedded in it. The reasons for this preference have in part to do with
the benefits villagers saw in having a collectively owned structure they could use in the
absence of proper storage facilities of their own. Even more important, however, were
people’s sentiments about work, self, and the acceptable appropriation of the fruits of their
labor. These were marshaled partly in efforts to revalue fractured lives and recreate meaning.

It was not villagers’ preferences and strivings, of course, but those of the judge that
determined the trial’s outcome. And her reasons had to do less with these kinds of notions
than with her ideas about the defense of the public good, which she did not see as resting in
private property relations. But these two sets of preferences intersected in the judge’s
decision, leaving most villagers with the sense that “justice was done.” For most Vlaiceni,
then, the trial provided what we might call a legitimating moment: it built credibility for the
legal system and the larger political order standing behind it. What were legitimated were
certain communal values rather than those of individual ownership and gain. These were
reproduced, however, not because of an order sent down from above but, rather, because the
trial mobilized deeply held senses of self and valued notions of what constitutes community.

What conclusions to draw from this case regarding claims and large-scale historical
processes? As part of globalization processes, these lead to a number of questions. How are
the “commons” enclosed? How does collective ownership give way (if it does) to the
phenomenon we call “private property”? And how does that come to be seen as legitimate?
As an accepted norm? The Ionescu story has quite a bit to say regarding these questions, two
of which Verdery underscored.

1) Macro political economic conditions constrained the possibilities for the micro, i.e. the
local association. The uncertainty of credit policies for agriculture, for instance, worked to
push villagers with legitimate property-claims towards risk-spreading solutions. “Fuzzy
property” is one such solution.

Changes in those policies lead to a shift in local possibilities and in the local balance of
interests with a possible change in the visions that receive a hearing. Those policies
themselves, of course, are made in “micro” settings.

2) This case also says something about “legitimacy.” Stable social orders don’t require
consent but it’s interesting nevertheless to ask how citizens in different political systems
come to regard themselves as positively or negatively identified with a system of rule, even if
arguing over particulars, and thus agree enough to disagree. The reverse considers how it
happens if considerable numbers (though not necessarily all) come to have confidence that
their meanings, justifications, and understandings of the world will be positively or nega-
tively reinforced in their encounters with power orders. This brings us to the questions of the
villagers and justice.

In the end it was the judge, not the villagers, who determined the trial’s outcome. While
her reasons were different from theirs, nonetheless a sense prevailed that “justice was done.”
The question is how will such events accumulate, thereby producing a sense of justice being
done for larger numbers of people. Will they cumulate to justify advocates of fuzzy property?
In this case, the outcome built credibility in a legal system and in the larger political order
behind it for a certain group of people in a certain social setting, who happen to hold the
local power balance.

Verdery concludes that what she sees as the Eastern European “transition” involves
policies that create conditions of action and the drift of behaviors and understandings that
accumulate within them as various groups consolidate their positions. In a sense, then, these processes are "micro" all the way down.

Roundtable: Claims to Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)

Gail Lapidus, Stanford University

Lapidus opened up the roundtable by noting that in her keynote address Katherine Verdery had talked about "fuzzy property" and in a sense this roundtable could be deemed a discussion about "fuzzy states." Lapidus noted that the guiding question for this discussion was "Who owns states?" In the former Soviet Union (FSU) there exist a number of states which are self-proclaimed entities (Chechnya, Abkhazia, Karabakh) possessing the symbols of statehood but which are not recognized by others. The context for this situation, of course, is the dissolution of the USSR.

In this region, struggles for statehood involved two interconnected, non-sequential processes: (1) The dissolution of the USSR into fifteen independent states, those of the former union republics, with full recognition by the international community and an absence of national mobilization; rather than follow out of the principle of self-determination, these states came out of "pacting," sudden and secret negotiations which culminated in Gorbachev's resignation and the USSR's peaceful dissolution; and (2) The challenge to the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of these new states.

In some cases, such challenges were ultimately addressed through power sharing and new forms of federal arrangements, while in others they led to the outbreak of violence. These outcomes did not result from political or ethnic mobilization but rather from military defeat or victory in civil wars. (Three-fourths of the cases also involve outside actors.) These new victorious entities claim exclusive control over the territories by means of ethnic cleansing and expulsions.

With the exception of the Trans-Dniester, efforts to create new states occurred where there existed a preestablished institutional base. In no case, then, did ethnic or national movements create new states. Rather, we see a capture of institutions created in the Soviet period. This points to the enormous significance given in the USSR to "titular nationalities," who in some sense "owned" republics. This points up the strong association between ethnicity and territory. Furthermore, these arrangements proved extremely hierarchical, with a continuous striving by lower units in the hierarchy to acquire the status of the higher ones in a kind of hierarchy of nested units.

A process of radicalization of demands thus unfolds with the USSR's dissolution. It should be noted, however, that in the Russian language there are a variety of terms conveying the different statuses of political arrangements. In Western analyses some confusion exists since this varied terminology is translated simply as "independence." As events unfolded, opportunity and property played important roles, given the enormous anxiety and sense of opportunity attendant to the moment of transition.

Lapidus concluded the preceding comments with a series of questions: How radically new are these phenomena? Do they demonstrate the growing obsolescence of states or the
new importance of statehood and sovereignty? Are there mechanisms other than statehood that could provide future arrangements without violence?

David Holloway, Stanford University

Holloway began his remarks by asking how we recognize large historical processes at work. He noted that today a sense of confusion prevails given that the Cold War provided a clear picture of the world and we, by contrast, have lost our bearings in its aftermath. Some see this as a cause for optimism (Fukuyama) and others pessimism (Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*). The world society at the end of the twentieth century, however, seems to be marked by a number of concerns: (1) war and the state, (2) globalization, (3) ecosphere and society, and (4) identity and social power. There exists no agreement as to whether we’re in a new phase or not, and it is precisely this lack of consensus that characterizes our historical moment.

Holloway focuses on some of the conceptual apparatus that might emerge out of Soviet rule. Looking at a more general and broad level, we find issues of nationalism and identity. This, of course, is what writers in the 1980s predicted as being at an end. While Hobsbawm’s “owl of Minerva flies at dusk” thesis was mistaken, suggests Holloway, maybe it was wrong only in its timing. Could it be that the end of communism represents the final twentieth century redivision of states into space? (This would follow upon those reconfigurations of state formations after World War II and anticolonialism.) At issue, then, is whether this is a temporary or long-term process of claim-making in ethnic/national terms.

The USSR’s breakup involves a dissolution rather than claims to self-determination. Why, though, did efforts at a new arrangement (confederation) fail, and have we seen a return to states? Here, the international legal, normative, and constitutional context proves important. The changing nature of warfare also demands consideration. The presence of nuclear weapons has made war seem pointless, for example, and the danger of war has also made large-scale conventional wars less likely; thus wars today (and overwhelmingly since World War II) tend to be civil wars. It becomes possible for non-state groups to challenge states in a military sense, and states have thus become ever more vulnerable to armed opposition. The more vulnerable one proves to ethno-national claims, the more existent states will be undermined.

Edward Walker, University of California at Berkeley

Walker opened up his discussion by stating his own interest in the grand historical processes challenging the Westphalian tradition of sovereign states. He then identified five large challenges or trends to the contemporary international system. The first is the trend toward extraterritoriality (see the Helms Burton Act). The second is the trend toward increasingly fuzzy boundaries, especially as regards economic behavior. Third, he delineates a trend toward the voluntary delegation of power upwards, as in the case of the EU. Here states are said to remain sovereign, but this delegation of power is permanent and thus they will presumably become constitutive units of a new sovereign unit. Fourth, existing states are becoming increasingly decentralized, particularly as international pressure grows to give agency to “unrepresented peoples”; this is another form of auto-limitation. Finally, Walker sees a trend toward the increasing fragmentation of existing states. There may be little
difference between autonomous status and dependent statehood, though achieving independence brings certain benefits, as well as liabilities.

All of these trends are at work and at issue in the FSU, where they have been effectively deployed in struggles since 1988. Lenin recognized that nations have the right to self-determination, a notion manifested constitutionally in the right of union republics to secede and be sovereign. By 1976, the republics of the FSU were considered as sovereign states which could participate in the international arena. (Indeed, Stalin wanted sixteen separate UN seats.) The republics were also given the right to their own constitutions, educational systems, and funding for promotion of "national cultures."

Just as many sham organizations acquired meaning during the Gorbachev era, so too did many legal rights that had existed on paper finally acquire meaning. The Estonian legislature's sovereignty declaration in 1988 led to what was called the "parade of sovereignties." The concept of sovereignty was used equivocally in Soviet and post-Soviet discourse, and this ambiguity has added to the concept's political efficacy.

Sovereignty may be seen to have various meanings. One definition of sovereignty renders it synonymous with independence. Another sees it as entailing freedom of action. Sovereignty may also imply the right of sub-national governments to distinguish powers different from those of the national government. It may be taken to mean the right of sub-national governments to preemptive declarations. And, finally, sovereignty may indicate the inapplicability of all legislation by national legislatures until the sub-national legislature approves the latter. By way of conclusion, Walker suggests that we need to also consider the notion of economic sovereignty over resources in the territory.

Arthur Khachikian, Stanford University

Khachikian began his comments with a critique of international law, which in his view fails to provide a useful framework for resolving ethnic conflict and whose very contradictions may actively work to prevent resolution. Sovereignty tends to be misperceived by participants, who see it as indivisible. Sovereignty also involves the desire to secure equal rights and prevent domination by the majority. Sovereignty itself is an obsolete concept which needs to be deconstructed; perhaps a notion of soft sovereignty would prove useful here. As far as self-determination goes, it is better to perceive ethnic groups' needs in terms of group human rights.

With the recognition question, it has become a commonplace that other states shouldn't intervene in a case of rebellion. Only after successful violence can the international community come in. While it proves difficult to bring parties in interstate conflict to the negotiation table, once one succeeds in doing so it lends legitimacy to political actors. For rebels, then, the implication is clear: One must fight and win a war.

In Abkhazia we see a demand for sovereignty similar to that made by the Aalad Islands when they were given to Sweden by Finland. In 1992 the Georgian Army went into Abkhazia and in 1993 Abkhazia counterattacked with Russian help. The major issue here is divisibility of sovereignty. The Georgians want a federation while Abkhazians desire a confederal unit (i.e., with equal status). In this case, the possibility of exit proves an important bargaining chip against the parent state. While in constitutional talks about sovereignty, agreement existed as to the "emblems of state" (flags and other symbols), disagreement over the
interpretation of sovereignty itself remained. Abkhazia, for example, began referring to a
previous treaty with it as a precedent recognizing equal relations.

Khachikian then illustrated the continuum of sovereignty with a graph and concluded by
suggesting that we need to focus on fuzzy or soft confederation.

Discussion

Eden opened up the general discussion by pointing out that all four of the panelists are
working within an institutional analysis. She asked them about alternative perspectives and
the limits of institutional analysis.

Lapidus answered that other major competing explanations come out of the ethnic
movements literature. All of these movements in the FSU, however, have had republics as
their base. The other major literature is the elite manipulation literature, which guides much
of the Russian interpretation of the Chechen situation. Here, political entrepreneurs are seen
to be promoting their interests. This doesn’t explain, however, why people are willing to lay
down their lives. Lapidus maintains that we need to show how these movements are
successfully joined to broader movements. A man in the audience seconds this, noting that
Khachikian’s continuum is descriptively adequate but psychologically unsatisfying since what
people want is more ephemeral—they want security, to be masters of their own house.

Khachikian agreed with the comment, and added that the recollection or perception of
violent conflict can make a difference.

Holloway pointed out that the notion of “master of one’s house” brings out an
important security dimension. If minorities in states do not feel secure and don’t have
recourse for this insecurity, statehood looks like the most attractive solution.

Whose home is it that you are master of? asked Lapidus. She wondered about security
arrangements that encompass this sense of justice. While we’ve had ethnic cleansing in
Karabakh and Abkhazia, she noted, we haven’t seen this in Chechnya with the Russian
population. This raises the issue of in which settings mastery implies removal of populations.
(At this point someone adds that some minorities are harder to cleanse than others.)

Walker jumped in, saying that it’s clear that we can’t have just a material or political
dimension but rather need to acknowledge the symbolic capital here. (He cited the example
of Bermuda and the interpenetration of the language of capitalism and independence.)

Seidman returned to Eden’s opening remark, expressing her discomfort with the separa-
tion here of institutional and social movement analyses. Institutions are open to renegotia-
tion and interpretation and this is where the social movement literature proves useful. She
also queried Khachikian on his spectrum of sovereignty, which treats international law as an
independent force.

Khachikian replied that the Great Powers have used international law to manipulate
various things in a kind of “sophisticated hypocrisy.”

Seidman requested clarification at this point, stating that she had understood Khachikian
to say in his earlier remarks that international law forced people into various positions.

Khachikian responded that international law has fluid aspects since it is picked up by
various parties but that, nonetheless, recognition is a strong norm.

Lapidus, addressing Seidman’s comment about institutional analysis, remarked that
“institution” also refers to a cognitive dimension. With perestroika, the idea of the USSR
was transformed from a notion of harmony to an idea of illegitimate empire that needed to
be dissolved. Social movement theory gives importance to who has resources.
Malley summarized the various commentators as saying that the collapse of the USSR was characterized by its rapidity, the predictability of the lines along which it fell apart, and the speed with which analyses labeled efforts to break states apart as ethnic. Given that the USSR fell apart on the lines drawn by empire and the dissolution was led by old apparatchiks, he asks whether this seems predictable. Certainly the fault lines of empires often coincide with those ethnic groups that have access to resources. Malley then asked Khachikian to provide some concrete examples of international recognition leading rebellions to adopt violent tactics and to indicate what the incentives to violent action are.

Khachikian admitted that he could not think of any examples of the move from nonviolent to violent tactics but added that once violence begins, military victory means obtaining international recognition. In Chechnya, for example, OSCE missions were only allowed after the “rebel” victory.

Walker stated that he had long believed and predicted that the democratization of the USSR and the preservation of territorial integrity were mutually exclusive. It is often said that people were surprised by what happened, but people were always worried about what would happen in heterogeneous areas.

At this, Holloway wondered whether it’s appropriate to talk about this as “ethnic.” He does not recall anyone predicting what, in fact, happened. The breakdown along institutional lines reflects the fact that these institutions provided the language in which claims could be made. Holloway suggested the need for a distinction between ethnic and national mobilization, given the complicated relationship between the two. The breakdown along republic lines certainly doesn’t mean ethnic issues aren’t involved.

Lapidus distinguished a major cleavage amongst those who thought the USSR had undermined ethno-national identities. There was a general recognition that the Baltic states represented a special problem. The volume Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities, for example, predicted that the USSR would survive as a state, while another current of thought viewed Central Asia and the Islamic areas as the Soviet Union’s Achilles’ heel. This view was influenced by the revolution in Iran. What no one understands, continued Lapidus, was the role played by Russia in the process of dissolution. Russia was always equated with the center, and thus no one predicted the unique way in which Yeltsin’s estrangement from the leadership and his personal struggle with Gorbachev would shape his role as underdog president of the Russian Federation.

Khachikian put it nicely when he said that, essentially, the metropole declared its independence from the “colonies.”

Lapidus further elaborated that the “center” here is a political, not an ethnic, concept. Russia under Yeltsin appeared as the defender of other states against the center, here seen as an imperial regime but not as a territorial entity.

Walker commented that the extent to which ethnicity proves central to statehood here varies considerably. Yeltsin was very explicit in laying out sovereignty and citizenship in the preface to the constitution, which talks about the multinational peoples of Russia.

Yavuz then asked Khachikian what he means by cultural autonomy, one of the terms in Khachikian’s continuum. Is cultural autonomy without political autonomy possible? pondered Yavuz. He then suggested that one possible model might be the Ottoman millet system. Khachikian agreed that the millet represented an excellent example, at which point Yavuz pressed him as to whether such a system could work today for cultural groups in the Caucasus. While acknowledging such a model’s possible utility, Khachikian noted that cultural autonomy implies rights to cultural clubs, schools, etc., but that these rights may
easily be revoked by the majority. (A brief exchange followed over the issue of whether cultural autonomy means cultural equality.)

Yavuz moved from this discussion to ask about the possibility for a neutral, de-ethnicized or de-nationalized state. Walker suggested that if there’s an example of a state that has attempted it, it’s the United States. Yavuz mentioned the university debate in the United States about multiculturalism and asked if we can even imagine a polity with equal distance to religious and ethnic groups. If not, he concluded, the nation-state can be seen to have two exits: Auschwitz and Bosnia.

Khachikian remarked that assimilation often leads to a “termination” of the diaspora, to which Yavuz countered that Armenians in California or Croats in the United States are pushing events in the home countries, too.

Holloway disagreed with the language of neutrality being used by Yavuz here, fearing that this implies an abandonment of history. Holloway rephrased the issue thus: If we have old groups asserting identity in new ways, what kinds of accommodations are possible? Repeating his point that posing the problem in terms of “neutrality” is too abstract, Holloway suggested that consociationalism represents one effort to deal with this.

Walker seconded Holloway, reminding the group that even if we could imagine a neutral state delimiting only individual rights, it could still be inadequate for many minorities. In the Caucasus there are more than fifty indigenous languages and here neutrality implies cultural death. Walker instead sees a need for institutional protection.

Lapidus then commented that the very idea of “transition” implies stable states with institutions and resources to support language and media in different languages. In reality, however, illiteracy in this region is on the rise, as is a sense of insecurity.

Muppidi asked the panelists to clarify the way categories such as nation are understood by social actors in the FSU.

Noting that many different words exist in Russian, Walker revealed his preference for the Soviet term “nationalities” in spite of its state-ethnographic construction. In some cases, there are territories with various groups in which the “titular peoples” are regarded in a manner one doesn’t find in other similar arrangements, like Armenia.

Lapidus added that in the hierarchy of political units there was also a hierarchy of terminology to describe groups. “Nationalities,” for example, now has a pejorative connotation. “Ethnic group” is seen as a U.S. social science notion projected onto the USSR. Lapidus said that in English we use “national” when meaning the Russian Federation, whereas in Russian “national” is synonymous with ethnicity. For this reason, stated Lapidus, some scholars now employ the term “ethno-national.” To this Holloway remarked that such scholars are trying to negotiate between self-understandings (in the region) and academics’ use of the terms. Walker suggested that we consider this a menu of Russian terms inherited from the Soviet period.

Lapidus pointed out the further complexities of terminology, warning that “national minority” becomes contentious when used to describe Russian populations in new states. Those Russians prefer the term diaspora.

Returning to the previous exchange over the issue of neutrality, Srinivasan rejected the utility of the notion of neutrality given the inextricable links between culture and power. In some cases, assimilation may be giving way to a “salad bowl” idea. She further suggests that there is always a process of invention involved in the creation of new authenticities.

Lapidus urged the group to consider the enormous problems confronted by Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania in constructing a unified national past out of complicated histories.
How one describes the past and populations illuminates the complexity of constructing identity, especially in such borderlands regions.

Seidman returned to the issue of the territorial implications of nationalities. Asking what that means for minorities and cultural autonomy, she proposed that the lack of ethnic cleansing in Chechnya may belie a clearer idea of homeland there.

Lapidus added that in the case of Kazakhstan, whose population is 40 percent Russian, the question “Whose state?” becomes highly contentious.

Walker indicated another important aspect—that of extraterritoriality—which involves not just the claims of the Russian diaspora but also those of other diasporas outside the FSU (Tatars, for example). Who decides who is Tatar becomes a claim of the Tatar state.

Bland offered his conceptualization of ethnic groups as analogous to an onion which, when peeled, has nothing at the core. Ethnic groups seem to be clearer about what they’re not rather than what they are. In Bland’s view, a group recognizes itself as culturally autonomous when it acts against what’s out there.

Sawyer interjected that Katherine Verdery’s Daedalus article on nation as symbol is useful. In this approach, the question of how this symbol is deployed is what becomes interesting. In the twentieth century, suggests Sawyer, we see a delinking of the hyphen between nation and state and it is the rearticulation that will be interesting to see.

Eden then reformulated one of the conference’s predominant themes, that of novelty versus continuity, and asked the panelists to identify major continuities and differences between the contemporary scene and the post-World War I period of nation formation.

While Walker confessed that the nation-state association always struck him as “bizarre,” Holloway remarked that Sawyer’s comments provide a partial response to Eden’s question. Elaborating upon Sawyer’s words, Holloway noted that we think differently today about nation and state. What’s gone is the previous notion that great nations deserve states while little ones don’t, they’re not worthy. More and more, we’re grappling with a notion of system imposed by groups, and this is much more problematic than in 1919. The idea of a disarticulation of nation and state is helpful, though we don’t yet know how to deal with that.

Khachikian added that the search for alternatives has not been very successful and that he in no sense intended to overemphasize cultural autonomy.

Walker, returning to Bland’s “onion peel” imagery, agreed with the logic that who we are is “not you,” but disagreed that there is no substantive content to ethnicity. The smaller the group is, the more content there is.

Lapidus made the last remark of the conference, reflecting that in contrast to the past there exists today hope amongst groups that the international community will provide certain guarantees but that this is simultaneously joined to an enormous sense of disappointment and an awareness of the fragility of relationships. Lapidus concluded that another conference exploring state and nation building in other eras would be necessary to do justice to such issues.
“Claim-Making and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late Twentieth Century”
7–9 March 1997, Wattis Conference Room, Littlefield Hall, Stanford University

Friday, 7 March 1997

5:50 p.m. Out-of-town participants meet in hotel lobby of Stanford Terrace Inn.

6 p.m. Dinner for out-of-town participants at Chez Sophie, 201 California Avenue at Park St., Palo Alto.

Saturday, 8 March 1997

8:20 a.m. Pick-up at Stanford Terrace Inn

Starting at 8:30 a.m. Coffee and pastries at Wattis Room, Littlefield Hall, Stanford campus

8:45 a.m. Introduction to the Workshop

9-11:30 a.m. Panel: Globalization and Social Claims

“Economic Globalization and State Transformation”
Michael Malley, University of Wisconsin–Madison

“Social Imaginaries and the Politics of Economic Globalization”
Himadeep R. Muppidi, University of Minnesota

“Phantom Citizenship and the Prosthetics of Corporate Capital: Identity, Rights, and Accountability across Transnational Space”
Suzana Sawyer, Stanford University

“Contesting Sustainable Development: Interpreting Conflict between the State and the Maya of Southern Belize”
Joel Wainwright, University of Minnesota

Chair: Raymond (Bud) Duvall, University of Minnesota

11:30 a.m.–1 p.m. Lunch at Wattis Room

1-2:30 p.m. Panel: State Formation and Claim-Making

“Ethnic Protest in Core and Periphery States”
Susan Olzak, Stanford University

“Kissinger o M olotsana,” Historical Context and Precipitating Factors in the Soweto Uprising of 1976,”
Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, University of Minnesota

Gay Seidman, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Chair: David Abernethy, Stanford University

2:30-2:45 p.m. Coffee break
2:45–5 p.m. Panel: Identities and Social Power

“In the Shadow of the Balkans: Challenging the State-Sponsored Narratives of History and Security in Trieste and Istria”
    Pamela Ballinger, Stanford University
“Religious Claims to Identity: The Shiftings Meanings of ‘Secularism’ and ‘Nation’”
    Shampa Biswas, University of Minnesota
“Mediated Modernity: Ethnic Identity and Indigenous Films in Trinidad”
    Gita Srinivasan, Stanford University
“The Politics of Communication Networks”
    Hakan Yavuz, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Chair: Sylvia Yanagisako, Stanford University

5 p.m.–7 p.m. (open)

7 p.m. Dinner at Nouveau Trattoria, 451 Bryant St. at Hamilton, Palo Alto

    Katherine Verdery, Johns Hopkins University

Sunday, 9 March 1997

8:20 a.m. Pick-up at Stanford Terrace Inn
Starting at 8:30 a.m. Coffee and pastries at Wattis Room
9–11:30 a.m. Roundtable: Claims to Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union
    Gail Lapidus, Stanford University
    David Holloway, Stanford University
    Arthur Khachikian, Stanford University
    Ned Walker, University of California, Berkeley

Chair: Gail Lapidus, Stanford University

11:30 a.m. Lunch at Wattis Room

This workshop is held under the auspices of the MacArthur Consortium on International Peace and Cooperation, a joint project of the University of Minnesota, Stanford University, and the University of Wisconsin at Madison funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Participants

Prof. David Abernethy (dba@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of Political Science
Mail Code 2044, Bldg. 160
Stanford, CA 94305-2044

Ms. Pamela Ballinger (pamelab1@leland.stanford.edu)
Department of Anthropology, Johns Hopkins
c/o Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Dr. Kennette Benedict
John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Program on International Peace & Security
1400 S. Dearborn St., Suite 1000
Chicago, IL 60603-5285

Ms. Shampa Biswas (sbiswas@gold.tc.umn.edu)
University of Minnesota
Department of Political Science
1414 Social Sciences, 267 S. 19th Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Rev. Byron Bland (bland@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University
Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Prof. Albert Camarillo (camar@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of History
Mail Code 2024
Stanford, CA 94305-2024

Prof. Raymond (Bud) Duvall (rduvall@polisci.umn.edu)
University of Minnesota
Department of Political Science
1414 Social Sciences, 267 S. 19th Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Dr. Lynn Eden (lynn.eden@forsythe.stanford.edu)
Stanford University
Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Mr. Dan Froats (dfroats@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of Political Science
c/o Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
Ms. Melanie Greenberg (melanie.greenberg@forsythe.stanford.edu)
Stanford University
Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Ms. Ann Hironaka (hironaka@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of Sociology
Mail Code 2047, Bldg 120
Stanford, CA 94305-2047

Prof. David Holloway (rc.dxh@forsythe.stanford.edu)
Stanford University
Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Ms. Erin Jenne (erink@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of Political Science
Mail Code 2044, Bldg. 160
Stanford, CA 94305-2044

Prof. Ron Jepperson (jepper@leland.stanford.edu)
Department of Sociology, Univ. of Washington
c/o Stanford University Department of Political Science
Mail Code 2044, Bldg. 160
Stanford, CA 94305-2044

Mr. Artavazd (Arthur) Khachikian (arto@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of Political Science
c/o Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Prof. Gail Lapidus (lapidus@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University
Center for International Security & Arms Control
Mail Code 6165, 320 Galvez St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Mr. Michael Malley (mmalley@polisci.wisc.edu)
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Department of Political Science
1050 Bascom Mall / North Hall 110
Madison, WI 53706

Prof. Purnima Mankekar (mankekar@leland.stanford.edu)
Stanford University, Department of Anthropology
Mail Code 2145
Stanford, CA 94305-2145
Center for International Security and Arms Control
Stanford University

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