The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy

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Outline

- Populism in Emerging Market Democracies
- Dutertismo: Understanding the Man of the Hour
- Resentiment: Populism in Power
- Rise of Illiberal Democracy
“Stalin’s rule also reveals how, on extremely rare occasions, a single individual’s decisions can radically transform an entire country’s political and socioeconomic structures, with global repercussions...how individuals, great and small, are both enabled and constrained by the relative standing of their state vis-à-vis others, the nature of domestic institutions, the grip of ideas, the historical conjuncture (war or peace; depression or boom), and the actions or inactions of others.” – Stephen Kotkin, “Stalin: Paradox of Power.”
Analytical Framework

- Distinction between Longue durée (long-term structural shifts), on the one hand, and what François Simiand called histoire événementielle (ephemeral changes driven by daily events), on the other.

- As Antonio Gramsci warned in the Prison Notebook, “[a] common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural.”
Democracy under Siege

- **Degeneration**: Plato’s cyclical movement from short-lived ideal democracy to entrenched oligarchy and, on the back of popular mobilization and elite paralysis, sudden explosion of demagoguery.

- Reflecting on his country’s transmogrification in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci lamented how the “the old [order] is dying and the new cannot be born,” warning how “in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms [begin to] appear.”

- **Mutation**: As early as mid-1990s, Fareed Zakaria observed how, “just as nations across the world have become comfortable with many variations of capitalism, they could well adopt and sustain varied forms of democracy.” This means, “Western liberal democracy might prove to be not the final destination on the democratic road, but just one of many possible exits.”
Political Decay and Democracy Fatigue

- In fact, as Samuel Huntington (1968) himself warned in the mid-twentieth century, “[i]nstead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there has been an ‘erosion of democracy’ and a tendency to [lapse into] autocratic...regimes.”

- The “aspiration-institutionalization gap”: For Huntington, the fragility of democratic institutions had something to do with the “decay of the administrative organization inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence.”
Modernization and Mass Politics

- **Hannah Arendt** concept of “Mass Society” The large collection of marginalized, disaffected individuals who, “are not held together by a consciousness of common interest” and “lack that specific class articulateness,” thus, unable to meaningfully participate in mainstream politics as active and empowered citizens.

- Demagogues, as **Friedrich Nietzsche** would put it, find a particularly receptive audience among “men of ressentiment,” who are stuck in a “whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge” and “inexhaustible and insatiable” in their “outbursts against the fortunate and happy [elite].”
Populist Backlash as Double-Movement

- What Karl Polanyi termed as “double-movement”, a situation where a befuddled society desperately “protect[s] itself against the perils inherent” of rapid modernization and market-driven growth;

- **Strongman syndrome**: The search for certainty in single-minded, decisive leaders, who aren’t hobbled by institutional checks and democratic paralysis and promise shortcuts to complex social maladies.
Figure 0.1 Global Survey of Share of Citizens Preferring a Strong Leader “Who Does Not Have to Bother with Elections”

Percentage of respondents answering that “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” is a “good” (shift from European and World Values Surveys Wave 3 [1995-97] to Wave 6 [2010-14]).

Source: European and World Values Survey; Mounk & Foa 2017; Journal of Democracy.
“Trouble in Paradise”
PH recent success story

- Serendipitous convergence of 5 factors:

1. Advent of post-recession QE and inflow of “hot money” into EM;

2. Descent of BRICS and tier-1 EMs, placing spotlight on tier-2 Ems;

3. Denouement of macro-prudential reforms, beginning in mid-200s;

4. Political stability brought about by Aquino’s administration;

5. Resilience of remittances and dynamism of services sectors (i.e., BPO, retail, real estate);
Figure 1.1 PHILIPPINE ECONOMY FROM MARCOS TO AQUINO (1972-2015)
GDP YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE (at constant 2000 prices)

Note: Preliminary figure as of January 28, 2016

Average GDP growth rate

3.43 3.85 3.75 2.3 4.46 6.26
Ferdinand E. Marcos Corazon C. Aquino Fidel V. Ramos Joseph E. Estrada Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Benigno S. C. Aquino III

Sources: Business World, Philippine Statistics Authority
Curious case of the Philippines: Why NOT Duterte?

- Rapid GDP growth under reformist president Benigno Aquino
- Yet, extreme concentration of wealth: **40 families took home 76 percent of newly-created growth**
- Oligarchic capture: Studies show that around **178 political dynasties dominate 73 out of a total of 81 provinces** in the country; political dynasties occupy vast majority of elected **legislative positions (70%)**, an astonishing number even when compared to Argentina (10%) and Mexico (40%).
- A “protest vote” was long in the making.
“[People] will tolerate poverty, enslavement, barbarism, but they will not endure aristocracy,” Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America.*
“Politics of the future will be the art of stirring up the masses” – N. Bonoparte
Hybrid Populism
What is populism?

- Benjamin Moffitt explains in his book “The Global Rise of Populism”: It is ultimately a “style”, with heavy reliance on “bad manners” to project authenticity;

- Jan-Werner Müller in “What is Populism” (2016: 1): “Populists claim that they and they alone speak in the name of what they tend to call the ‘real people’ or the ‘silent majority’. This claim to a moral monopoly of representation has two consequences that are immediately deleterious for democracy. Populists accuse all other political contenders of being illegitimate.”

- Laclau: “Populism relies on empty signifiers”; left-wing vs. right-wing populism.

- Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser argue that populism is “an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism. It criticizes the exclusion of important issues from the political agenda by the elites and calls for their repoliticization.”

- Overlapping with fascism, but not necessarily the same, though interesting to look at Umberto Eco’s “Ur-Fascism”.

- Randy David (2016) described the phenomenon of “Dutertismo”
“Inclusive” Populism: Atin To Pre

- **Strongest among the ABC class**: AB, who seek law and order for better business environment, while C and upper-Ds, the ‘aspirational middle class’, who resent ‘glass ceiling’ of mobility and worry about basic safety (moderate-to-high elasticity in political leaning, particularly the NCR-Luzon area)

- **“Populist” charisma**: Folksy persona, informality, anti-elitist rhetoric, accessibility, and perceived “political outsider” image.

- **Strongman**: Limited respect for institutions of checks and balances, micro-manager (still ‘mayor’ mode), and openly threatening regime change;

- **Key strength**: Perceived as non-corrupt, decisive and single-minded, and a radical “change” from usual mold of national politicians (“Iba Siya”); effective and systematic discrediting of alternative politicians (“Oligarchy/Dilaw/Elitista/Trapo/Salita Lang, Walang Gawa”).
The Three Duterte’s

- **The Showman**: Similar to other emerging market populists such as Hugo Chavez, he can hold long-winding, humor-laded, laid back, and entertaining speeches; cuss words interpreted as ‘authenticity’ (e.g., *Aló Presidente* and *Gikan Sa Masa, Para Sa Masa*).

- **Dirty Harry**: Effective deployment of ‘penal populism’: I maybe an SOB, but I am your SOB against the real forces of evil (i.e., criminals, drugs users, oligarchy, imperialist powers); strong appeal among evangelists, aspirational and upper middle classes, and anti-crime groups.

- **The Machiavelli**: Knows how to get things done, mobilize support and build coalitions, ensure loyalty, and combine the Fox (charm) and the Lion (strength) to win over people. Never lost an election in life, won all by a landslide!
The Arc of Populism

- Past decade has seen the rise of populists and/or strongmen around emerging market democracies

- **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey)** – Former mayor of Istanbul, who won landslide elections on the back of decisive brand of leadership, mobilizing the previous underclass and emerging middle class against the laic, Westernized elite;

- **Narendra Modi (India)**: Former governor of booming Gujarat state, who won a landslide elections in India by harnessing Hindu nationalism, anti-elitist rhetoric, and touting his decisive, non-corrupt brand of leadership.

- **Joko Widodo (Indonesia)**: Former mayor of small city of Solo, and shortly governor of Jakarta, who won on the back of massive middle class, youth mobilization based on the promise of nationalism, economic protectionism, social justice (redistributive policies) and departure from the national oligarchy;
Duterte’s Art of the Deal: Sub-Altern Realism
Alexander Wendt (1992) argued that sometimes decisive and visionary leaders, as in Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, can have a decisive impact on the direction of a state’s foreign policy. Any “exceptional, conscious choosing [by a state] to transform or transcend [its traditional] roles,” continues, entails the following preconditions:

First, there must be a reason to think of oneself in novel terms. This would most likely stem from the presence of new social situations that cannot be managed in terms of pre-existing self-conceptions. Second, the expected costs of intentional role change – the sanctions imposed by others with whom one interacted in previous roles – cannot be greater than its rewards. When these conditions are present, actors can engage in self-reflection and practice specifically designed to transform their identities and interests and this ‘change the games’ in which they are embedded.
5 Drivers of Strategic Recalibration

1.) Wholesale rejection of American-leaning elite

2.) “Authoritarianization” and concentration of executive power

3.) American strategic ambivalence

4.) Chinese art of the deal

5.) Personalization of foreign policy – “I, me, and myself” as raison d'état
Domestic Politics

- Bloody crackdown on suspected drug dealers
- Open intimidation of liberal media and civil society
- Breakdown in peace negotiation with communists, and gradual exit of progressive cabinet members
- Rehabilitation of the Marcoses
- “Dutertenomics”: Neo-liberal economics, with focus on infrastructure development
- Specter of IS in Mindanao and the Bangsamoro question
SATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS, SEP AND DEC 2016

% of adults

Sep 2016

- Very satisfied: 54%
- Somewhat satisfied: 30%
- Undecided: 8%
- Somewhat dissatisfied: 4%
- Very dissatisfied: 4%
- Net*: +76

Dec 2016

- Very satisfied: 53%
- Somewhat satisfied: 32%
- Undecided: 7%
- Somewhat dissatisfied: 5%
- Very dissatisfied: 3%
- Net*: +77

*% Satisfied minus % Dissatisfied correctly rounded.
Note: % Refused is not shown.

Q139: Maaari po bang pakisabi ninyo kung gaano kayo nasisisiyahan o hindi nasisisiyahan sa kasalukuyang kampanya ng ADMINISTRASYON laban sa illegal na droga. Kayo ba ay... (SHOWCARD) LUBOS NA NASISIYAHAN, MEDYO NASISIYAHAN, HINDI TITYAK KUNG NASISIYAHAN O HINDI, MEDYO HINDI NASISIYAHAN, O LUBOS NA HINDI NASISIYAHAN?
Q: In the police’s fulfillment of their duty in the campaign against illegal drugs, in your opinion, how important is it that they arrest suspects allegedly involved in the illegal drug trade alive?

- Very important: 71%
- Somewhat important: 23%
- Somewhat not important: 5%
- Not at all important: 2%

Q151. Sa pagtupad ng kapulisan ng kanilang tungkulin sa kampanya laban sa illegal na droga, sa inyong palagay, gaano ka-importante na mahuli nila nang buhay ang mga taong pinaghihiningalaang di-umano’y kasabwat sa bentahan ng illegal na droga? Ito po ba ay... (SHOWCARD) [TALAGANG IMPORTANTE, MEDYO IMPORTANTE, MEDYO HINDI IMPORTANTANTE, TALAGANG HINDI IMPORTANTANTE]
Figure 3.3 Public Concern of Prevalence of Extrajudicial Killings (December 2016)

- Very serious: 39%
- Somewhat serious: 30%
- Undecided: 22%
- Somewhat not serious: 6%
- Not serious at all: 3%

Note: Seriousness of the extra-judicial killings or EJK problem in the present administration.

Source: Social Weather Stations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Concerns</th>
<th>Dec16</th>
<th>Mar17</th>
<th>Change*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving / Increasing the pay of workers</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling inflation</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating more jobs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting graft and corruption in government</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting criminality</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>- 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing the poverty of many Filipinos</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing peace in the country</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>- 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing the law on all, whether influential or ordinary people</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping the destruction and abuse of our environment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+ 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling fast population growth</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing the amount of taxes paid</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the welfare of OFWs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending the integrity of Philippine territory against foreigners</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing to face any kind of terrorism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the Constitution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Change indicates the difference between December 2016 and March 2017.*

Source: Pulse Asia
Table 3.1 AWARENESS AND TRUST RATINGS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
December 2016 and March 2017 / Philippines
(In Percent)

| Countries / Organizations                  | Aware | | Base: Aware of country / organization | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                                            | Total| A great deal of trust| A fair amount of trust| Total| Not too much trust| No trust at all| Don’t Know / Refused |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)            | Mar 17 100 | 79 | 29 | 50 | 20 | 16 | 4 | 0.4 |
|                                            | Dec 16 100 | 76 | 24 | 52 | 23 | 21 | 2 | 1 |
| JAPAN                                     | Mar 17 100 | 75 | 20 | 54 | 25 | 21 | 4 | 0.5 |
|                                            | Dec 16 99 | 70 | 17 | 53 | 29 | 24 | 5 | 1 |
| AUSTRALIA                                 | Mar 17 98 | 69 | 12 | 57 | 30 | 24 | 6 | 1 |
|                                            | Dec 16 — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM (UK)       | Mar 17 95 | 53 | 9 | 44 | 44 | 35 | 9 | 3 |
|                                            | Dec 16 93 | 39 | 5 | 34 | 55 | 42 | 13 | 6 |
| RUSSIA                                    | Mar 17 96 | 42 | 7 | 35 | 56 | 36 | 20 | 2 |
|                                            | Dec 16 95 | 38 | 5 | 33 | 58 | 41 | 17 | 4 |
| CHINA                                     | Mar 17 99 | 37 | 5 | 31 | 63 | 35 | 28 | 0.4 |
|                                            | Dec 16 98 | 38 | 7 | 30 | 61 | 39 | 22 | 1 |
| UNITED NATIONS (UN)                       | Mar 17 98 | 82 | 22 | 59 | 17 | 14 | 3 | 1 |
|                                            | Dec 16 98 | 74 | 18 | 56 | 25 | 21 | 3 | 1 |
| ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) | Mar 17 97 | 81 | 22 | 59 | 19 | 16 | 3 | 1 |
|                                            | Dec 16 — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |

Source: Pulse Asia
AGREEMENT / DISAGREEMENT WITH TEST STATEMENT:
"Candidly speaking, it may be necessary now to have
martial law to solve the many crises of the nation."

December 6 - 11, 2016 / Philippines
(In Percent / BY LOCATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEST STATEMENT:</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CLASS</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Candidly speaking, it may be necessary now to have martial law to solve the many crises of the nation.&quot;</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>NCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGREE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY AGREE/MAY DISAGREE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAGREE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much disagree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding off or to Don't Know and Refuse responses.
NET TRUST RATINGS OF THE AFP AND PNP:
PHILIPPINES, SEP 1988 TO APR 2016

C. AQUINO  RAMOS  ESTRADA  ARROYO  B. AQUINO

Excellent

+70

Very good

+50

Good

+30

Moderate

+10

Neutral


AFP, +66
PNP, +55

* NET trust = % Much trust minus Little trust correctly rounded.

First Quarter 2016 Social Weather Report
March 30-April 2, 2016 National Survey
2017-2022 PIP Infrastructure Investment Targets by Mode of Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GAA / GOCCs</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Investment Target</td>
<td>4,705,065</td>
<td>1,101,487</td>
<td>1,270,050</td>
<td>48,734</td>
<td>7,125,336</td>
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<tr>
<td>(PhP M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>US$ billion</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>143.01</td>
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Conclusion: Sub-Optimal Equilibrium

- Economic growth robust, with DOF and BSP maintaining policy competence, but greater volatility in investment sentiment and policy predictability;

- Opportunity cost: Foregone investments by Western counterparts, particularly EU;

- M & M factor: Duterte maintain robust levels of popularity (neither counter-historical nor inelastic inequality), but discover limits of his unilateral decision-making power on key policies (i.e., SCS; communists rebels; US and counter-terrorism, war on drugs) as aura of invincibility is gradually shattered;

- Weakening of institutions, from law enforcement to judiciary and legislative, giving way to proto-authoritarian system;

- Specter of Putin-style crackdown on free-liberal media

- Opposition weakened, lack of central leadership and appealing narrative
The Duterte Effect: Asian Values 2.0

- The resurgence of ASEAN-style authoritarianism;

- Spread of Duterte-style “drug war” (i.e., Indonesia)

- Rejection of human rights as “Western” values, alien to the region;

- Defiance of the external intervention with sound and fury, including cuss and rejection of EU aid.