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f THE ABORIGINE CONSTITUENCIES IN THE
TAIWANESE LEGISLATURE

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Abstract

The Republic of China on Taiwan has long reserved legislative seats for its indigenous minority, the *yuanzhumin*. While most of Taiwan's political institutions were transformed as the island democratized, the dual aborigine constituencies continue to be based on an archaic, Japanese-era distinction between "mountain" and "plains" aborigines that corresponds poorly to current conditions. The aborigine quota system has also served to buttress Kuomintang (KMT) control of the legislature: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and "pan-indigenous" parties have been almost entirely shut out of these seats. Nevertheless, aborigine legislators have made a modest but meaningful difference for indigenous communities. The reserved seats were initially established during the martial law era as a purely symbolic form of representation, but during the democratic era they have acquired substantive force as well. Taiwan's indigenous peoples have not always been well-served by their elected legislators, but they would be worse off without them.

Keywords: Taiwan, legislature, ethnic quotas, aborigine, electoral systems, representation

For its entire democratic history, Taiwan has reserved a significant percentage of the seats in its national legislature to represent the indigenous peoples on the island, known in Chinese as *yuanzhumin* (原住民) or “aborigines.” Although officially recognized *yuanzhumin* make up only about two percent of Taiwan’s population today, over five percent of members of the current legislature (six of 113) are chosen from special aborigine districts, providing a potentially important avenue of influence in national politics for these historically marginalized peoples.

English-language writing on Taiwan’s aborigine seats is sparse. As a consequence, despite rising scholarly interest in the origins, practice, and consequences of reserved seats for minority groups around the world, Taiwan has at present not featured much in this developing research agenda.¹ This is a shame, because the aborigine quota system in Taiwan is relevant to several open questions in this area, including how such seats get introduced in the first place, how details like eligibility to vote and to run as a candidate are determined in practice, and whether their existence actually increases not only symbolic but also substantive representation of marginalized minority communities.² A better understanding of the Taiwan case can also contribute to the ongoing debate about whether reserved seats are a good thing for democracy at all³: do they aid democratic consolidation by broadening representation, or instead serve to freeze old identity categories and perpetuate, rather than tamp down, inter-group conflicts in multi-ethnic states?

In addition, the status of Taiwan’s *yuanzhumin* peoples is clearly relevant to both normative and descriptive questions about indigenous communities’ relationship to state institutions. Formal state acknowledgement of the unique rights and claims of indigenous peoples tends to fall somewhere along an autonomy-representation continuum: at one end is the recognition of full sovereignty for “tribes” or “nations” distinct from the dominant nation-state; at the other fall special guarantees of indigenous representation within state institutions. Taiwan historically has been at the representation end of this continuum, yet

¹ Recent exceptions include Lublin 2014 and Kroeber 2014.

² E.g. Reynolds 2005; Krook and O’Brien 2010; Hughes 2011; Dunning and Nikelani 2013; Bird 2014; Krook and Zetterberg 2014; Lublin 2014.

³ For reviews of this literature, see Htun 2004 and Lublin and Wright 2013.

as its democracy has consolidated, rising group consciousness among segments of the indigenous population has led to demands for greater autonomy as well. The trajectory of this process can tell us about when and how purely symbolic representation might evolve into something more substantive.

Finally, Taiwan offers an intriguing comparison for the People's Republic of China, which provides its own substantial numbers of marginalized minority groups with quota seats in the National People's Congress, as well as guaranteed representation in most other state and party institutions.⁴ Reserved seats for the indigenous minorities in Taiwan were introduced under martial law by a Nationalist (*Kuomintang* or KMT) regime that maintained a claim to be the rightful government of all of China. To the extent these seats have contributed to the peaceful integration of minorities into national politics while promoting state responsiveness to the interests and concerns of historically marginalized groups, Taiwan provides an encouraging precedent for a hypothetical democratic China.

In this article, I address three topics. The first is the origins and evolution of apportionment and voter eligibility in the aborigine constituencies. While most of Taiwan's political institutions have been transformed as the island gradually moved from a repressive dictatorship to a vibrant democracy, the aborigine electoral system has been a glaring exception. It is based on a now-archaic Japanese-era classification that corresponds poorly to the current patterns of residency, tribal membership, linguistic ability, and cultural assimilation. Taiwan's contemporary indigenous peoples are not well-served by it.

The second topic is about who wins elections in these constituencies. Since the introduction of the first reserved seat in the Legislative Yuan (LY) in 1972, aborigine legislators have consistently been KMT members from one of the three largest tribes on the island. While several non-KMT candidates have won seats in the past 15 years, they have almost all been either independents or members of a KMT splinter party. By contrast, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been almost entirely shut out of these seats, as have nascent "pan-indigenous" parties that in theory should

⁴ Sautman 1999.

have a special advantage here. As a consequence, the aborigine seats have in practice served mainly to buttress KMT control of the legislature.

Finally, I take up the question of whether reserved seats for aborigines have contributed to substantive, and not just symbolic, representation of indigenous interests. Overall, aborigine legislators have had a modest but meaningful impact on issues of concern to indigenous communities, most notably in the creation of the Cabinet-level Council of Indigenous Peoples and the adoption of the Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples. The influence of the legislators from reserved seats has been conditional: major legislative achievements have mostly come when the partisan balance of power in the legislature is close to parity, making the aborigine bloc a potential swing vote. When one party controls a comfortable majority in the legislature, by contrast, aborigine legislators have had less impact. In addition, relations between the aborigine representatives have typically been competitive rather than cooperative, undermining their potential effectiveness. Nevertheless, despite its remaining institutional flaws, the reserved seat system that was initially established as a purely symbolic recognition of distinct aborigine interests has acquired real substantive force. Taiwan's indigenous peoples have not always been well-served by their elected legislators. But they would be worse off without them.

The Origins and Evolution of Reserved Aborigine Seats in Taiwan

Who Counts as Aborigine in Taiwan?

Official statistics of the Republic of China on Taiwan indicate an indigenous population of about 530,000 out of 23.3 million in 2013, or about 2.3 percent of Taiwan's total population.⁵ Broadly speaking, these officially recognized "aborigines" are the descendants of the pre-Han inhabitants of Taiwan. As with most official identity categories, however, these statistics obscure a more complicated reality, including a

⁵ *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China*, 2013.

complex history of interaction between the indigenous population and Han immigrants and their descendants.

The earliest reliable records of contact with the indigenous population of Taiwan are from Dutch sources. The Dutch East India Company established a settlement on the island in 1624. Aborigines were a majority of the population known to the Dutch; an estimate from 1650 suggests a population of about 100,000 island-wide, only half under Dutch rule, as compared to less than 1300 Dutch and roughly 15,000 Han Chinese migrants from the southeast coast of mainland China.⁶ When a rebel Chinese army led by the Ming Dynasty claimant Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga in western sources) defeated the Dutch in 1662, it brought at least 30,000 and perhaps as many as 70,000 people from the mainland, significantly shifting the ethnic composition of the island's population.⁷ Qing Dynasty forces in turn invaded and defeated the rebels for good in 1683, subsequently imposing imperial authority over most of the western plains of the island.

The Qing authorities initially forbade additional immigration to Taiwan, and they also made it official policy to keep the settler population physically separate from the remaining “uncivilized” indigenous communities in uncultivated territories on the island. To do so, the Qing administration drew a sharp distinction between the “Han” settlers, who included many Sinicized aborigines and people of mixed ancestry, and the “barbarians” (*fan* 番). The Qing proved incapable of enforcing the prohibition against immigration and incursions into tribal areas, however, and throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, an increasing percentage of the indigenous population became Sinicized to some degree, both through continued high rates of inter-marriage with Han settlers and through the adoption of Han agricultural practices. By the late 19th century, Qing registries distinguished between two kinds of “barbarians”: those who had adopted some Han customs—termed “cooked barbarians” (*shoufan* 熟番) – and those who remained unassimilated—termed “raw” (*shengfan* 生番).⁸ By the end of the Qing period, the “raw” aborigines who remained free of effective state control were mostly isolated in rugged mountain regions and Taiwan's east coast.

⁶ Shepherd 1993, 38-9; Chiu 2008, 4.

⁷ Shepherd 1981, 107-8.

⁸ Chen 2001.

Qing rule ended abruptly in 1895 with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which transferred control over Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. The Japanese rapidly put down a short-lived rebellion and set about transforming Taiwan into the Japanese empire's first colony. As part of its strategy to consolidate control over the island, the colonial administration instituted a new island-wide household registration and mutual-security system, the *bao-chia* (保甲), which included the unassimilated indigenous communities.⁹ The Japanese classification of the indigenous population originally followed Qing-era categories by maintaining the distinction between the partially assimilated *shou* aborigines and the fully “Han” population. By about 1915, however, most Japanese authorities abandoned efforts to record race altogether as the differences between the two continued to be blurred through intermarriage and cultural change. As a consequence, a large share of those of indigenous descent effectively “disappeared” into the broader Taiwanese population during the Japanese era.¹⁰ The exceptions were the remaining autonomous Austronesian tribes who lived in the high mountain regions known to the Japanese as the “barbarian areas” – *banchi* (蕃地) in Japanese – which were permanently subdued by force much later, from about 1930 on, and the adjoining “plains areas” (*hirachi* 平地) which abutted these territories and contained the major urban settlements on the sparsely populated east coast of Taiwan. By 1935 Japanese administrators had collectively renamed the remaining unassimilated indigenous peoples “mountain tribals” (*takasagozoku* 高砂族)—a word with more positive connotations of bravery than the old derogatory Mandarin term, *shengfan*.¹¹ As part of the process of subjugation, Japanese authorities also began identifying and naming individual groups of communities with shared characteristics, introducing for the first time the concept of distinct “tribes” (*buzoku* 部族). By the end of the Japanese period, nine tribes had been formally recognized; indigenous people living outside the *banchi* and *hirachi* areas were lumped

⁹ Chen 1975; Barclay 2005.

¹⁰ Brown 2004, 54, 66-74.

¹¹ Simon 2014, 7.

into an amorphous “plains tribe” (*heihozoku* 平埔族) category that remained unrecognized.¹²

When the Nationalist regime assumed control of Taiwan at the end of World War II, the new government renamed those with tribal membership “mountain compatriots” (*shanbao* 山胞), but otherwise retained the Japanese-era system of identifying this population by place of household residency.¹³ *Shanbao* were classified into two types, “mountain” (*shandi shanbao* 山地山胞) and “plains” (*pingdi shanbao* 平地山胞), based on where their family’s place of official residence was located. Qualification as a “mountain *shanbao*” was automatic: it included all persons who had previously held residency in a mountain tribal area (or whose closest paternal relative had) and had been registered as a member of one of the nine mountain tribes recognized by the Japanese. “Plains *shanbao*” was not: any tribal member who held residency in an adjoining “plains area” was eligible, but not required, to register as a *shanbao* with the local authorities, and it is unclear from source materials how many actually did so.¹⁴ Notably, this strict division between “official” aborigine townships and others appears to have excluded *any* indigenous descendants whose households were registered elsewhere during the Japanese era from claiming aborigine status, including anyone in the *heihozoku* / *pingpu* category.¹⁵ Thus, the percentage of Taiwanese today who could plausibly claim indigenous ancestry is undoubtedly much greater, and probably an order of magnitude greater or more, than the 2.3 percent who are officially recognized as aborigine.¹⁶

The term “aborigine” (*yuanzhumin* 原住民) is of relatively recent origin, having first appeared in the Republic of China constitution in amendments adopted in 1994, and becoming the official name for the indigenous population only with the passage in 2001 of the Aborigine Identity Law.¹⁷ This law, too, retained the distinction between mountain

¹² Wu 2001; Ericsson 2004, 34. Note that this “plains tribe” is unrelated to the category of “plains mountain compatriot” (*pingdi shanbao* 平地山胞)—later renamed *pingdi yuanzhumin*—introduced by the Nationalists, which covered only members of tribes recognized by the Japanese.

¹³ Executive orders in 1954 and 1956 formally codified this practice. Haisul 2010, 48-49.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ In recent years, activists have pushed for recognition of Japanese-era plains aborigines as a separate “tribe,” to be called “Pingpuzu” (平埔族), a direct appropriation of the Japanese term. See Loa, Iok-sin. 2014. “Pingpu activists demand government recognition,” *Taipei Times*, 15 July.

¹⁶ Brown 2004, 66-69.

¹⁷ Shih 1999; Haisul 2010, 48.

and plains categories, so that today's recognized *yuanzhumin* peoples remain divided for official state purposes into these two rather arbitrary groups. Confusingly, the Republic of China on Taiwan also separately records membership in individual tribes, of which there are now officially 16, shown in Table 1. Since 1996, tribal affairs have been managed and promoted through the Council of Indigenous Peoples (*yuanzhuminzu weiyuanhui* 原住民族委員會), a cabinet-level agency that is part of the Executive Yuan, Taiwan's executive branch. Nevertheless, household registration as a mountain or plains aborigine, rather than tribal affiliation, still dictates participation in elections and other official government business.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The Aborigine Electorates in Taiwan: Mountain and Plains Constituencies

Among the peculiar features of the definition of *yuanzhumin* is the category's geographic, rather than tribal, basis—one that is rooted, moreover, in Japanese-era administrative practices. The Nationalist regime retained not only the classification scheme for individual aborigines, but also the administrative boundaries and special status of indigenous-populated areas. These jurisdictions—mostly townships (*xiang* 鄉), but also a handful of towns (*zhen* 鎮) and cities (*shi* 市), as Table 2 shows—were renamed “self-governing” (*zizhi* 自治) territories. Despite the name, they were fully integrated into the standard administrative hierarchy of the island as sub-units within counties, with no separate sovereignty or special privileges.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

From the time of their establishment in the early 1950s, the selection of township heads (*xiangzhang* 鄉長) and councilors (*mindabiao* 民代表) in these “self-governing” areas took place in the same way as in other townships: through direct popular election by all adult residents, whether indigenous or not. Because aborigines continued to be a

majority in many mountain townships, an aborigine candidate usually would win the township head election, although this was not required by law until 1999.¹⁸ In plains townships, with their larger non-indigenous population, no such rule has ever existed, so Han candidates have often won these races and continue to do so today. Thus, the special autonomy implied by a township's "self-governing" status has in practice meant little for the indigenous communities there, particularly those in plains townships who are outnumbered by non-indigenous residents.

Rather than granting meaningful autonomy to aborigine communities, the Nationalist regime instead moved to set aside quota seats for aborigine representatives at higher levels. In the 1950s and 1960s, central government bodies including the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly remained off-limits to direct elections, but at lower levels reserved *shanbao* seats for mountain and plains aborigines were introduced quite early on: in 1950 to councils in counties with aborigine townships, and in 1951 to the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. The presence of these special quota seats created a strong precedent: if aborigines needed to be guaranteed representation at the county and provincial levels, then why not elsewhere, too? Thus, in 1972 when the Republic of China held so-called "supplementary elections" (*zengxuan buxuan* 增選補選) for the Legislative Yuan to replace the increasing numbers of mainlander members who were becoming incapacitated and dying, one of the 36 new seats was reserved for a *shanbao*, elected by the entire aborigine electorate on the island.¹⁹

With the introduction of a second *shanbao* seat in supplementary elections in 1980, the mountain-plains dichotomy was replicated in the national parliament. As Table 3 shows, these separate districts have survived multiple reforms of Taiwan's political institutions, including the introduction of additional aborigine seats in 1989, the beginning of fully contested legislative elections in 1992, the expansion of seats in 1998, and the halving of the size of the legislature and change in the electoral system in 2008. Today, of the six reserved *yuanzhumin* seats in the Legislative Yuan, three continue to be elected from a multi-member mountain constituency and the other three from a plains

¹⁸ Haisul 2010, 26.

¹⁹ In the National Assembly, two *shanbao* reserved seats, one plains and one mountain, were introduced at the same time. The number was increased to six in 1991, eight in 1996, and 14 in 2005, shortly before the NA was abolished. See Haisul 2010, 39-41.

constituency using the same single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system that was abolished for the non-aborigine districts. More by accident than design, the size of the electorate has remained similar in both: in the 2012 elections, there were about 184,000 eligible voters in the mountain constituency, and about 172,000 in the plains.²⁰

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

It is worth reiterating here that the formal names are misleading: both mountain and plains constituencies function in practice as single national districts and are not limited to their respective townships. That is, no matter where the indigenous peoples presently live in Taiwan—in their family’s original township, in a different aborigine township, or even in Taipei—all mountain aborigines vote for a candidate in the mountain election, and plains aborigines in the plains election. One consequence of this arrangement is that candidates for office have to appeal to an electorate that is widely dispersed and not easily identified. In 2012, for instance, 35 percent of all mountain aborigine constituency votes were cast outside mountain aborigine townships, and 51 percent of plains votes were cast outside plains townships.²¹ The separate aborigine districts create some logistical complications for election administration, as well. Each polling place in Taiwan must have on hand a separate ballot and ballot box for aborigine voters, even if only a few are registered in the district.²² This requirement applies even to the islands of Matsu and Kinmen, ROC-controlled territories just offshore of mainland China, and the Penghu Archipelago in the Taiwan Strait—jurisdictions that have a vanishingly small aborigine presence. Nevertheless, this presence is not zero, and some aborigine votes are cast even in these islands: official returns from the 2012 legislative election, for example, record a total of 102 votes combined from Matsu and Kinmen in the mountain constituency election, and 117 in the plains.²³

For better or worse, this system also works to weaken the tribe as a unit of political organization. Tribal members are often split between the two constituencies.

²⁰ Central Election Commission elections database, at: <http://db.cec.gov.tw>

²¹ Author’s calculation, from CEC data.

²² See the Central Election Commission’s voting station pamphlet, available at: http://web.cec.gov.tw/ezfiles/0/1000/attach/18/pta_10664_8197118_69407.pdf

²³ CEC elections database.

For instance, the Saisiyat (賽夏族) tribe in the north-western hills of Taiwan historically lived in lands that later were divided between Wufeng Township in Hsinchu County and Nanchuang Township in Miaoli County. Because Wufeng was classified in the Japanese era as a plains aborigine township while Nanchuang was a mountain township, tribal members whose households were registered here are considered to be plains aborigines, while members whose households were registered in adjacent Nanchuang Township are mountain aborigines. Thus, different members of the Saisiyat tribe vote in different constituencies, weakening the tribe's influence on election outcomes in either district.²⁴

These features make the current aborigine electoral system appear quite archaic: it is based on a residential classification that is now more than 70 years old, does not reflect subsequent migration around the island, and corresponds poorly to the current patterns of residency, tribal membership, linguistic ability, and cultural assimilation of Taiwan's contemporary indigenous population. For example, a hypothetical life-long resident of Taipei whose paternal grandfather was registered by the Japanese as a member of a "high mountain tribe" would still vote in the mountain constituency, even though he might never have set foot in a mountain township or retain any linguistic or cultural connection to that tribal group. Likewise, long-time neighbors in Hualien, a city on Taiwan's east coast with a large indigenous population, might vote in separate constituencies because one is classified as a "plains" aborigine while the other is "mountain."²⁵

Who Wins Aborigine Elections?

The Rising Competition for Aborigine Seats

Since the introduction of the first reserved seat for aborigines in the Legislative Yuan in 1972, Taiwan's party system has evolved from a one-party dominant system to a fully competitive one. The KMT gradually lost seat and vote share through the 1980s and 1990s, and while it survived in power through the transition to democracy, won the first direct presidential election in 1996, and maintained a majority in the legislature until

²⁴ Palalavi 2010, 27.

²⁵ In the 2012 election, for instance, Hualien City recorded 917 votes cast in the mountain constituency, and 3539 in the plains.

2001, it no longer enjoyed electoral advantages so great that many of its candidates could stand unopposed. Today, the party system has consolidated around the KMT and DPP, with other formerly significant parties reduced to a minor presence. Both local and national elections on Taiwan are fiercely contested, typically featuring a two-way race between the major parties' nominees.

The aborigine districts have been laggards in this process, but they, too have become the site of more competitive races since the transition to democracy. In the inaugural election in 1972, the official KMT nominee, a member of the Paiwan tribe (排灣族) named Hua Ai (華愛), ran unopposed, and became the first aborigine to sit in the Legislative Yuan. Hua Ai was re-elected unopposed in the next supplementary election in 1975, as well. In 1980, the first election to include separate seats for mountain and plains aborigines, Hua Ai ran in the mountain constituency and again faced no challengers. In the new plains constituency, however, voters were presented with a real choice. Five different candidates contested the election, and the official KMT nominee, Lin Tung-hung (林通宏), won with only 37 percent of the vote; his nearest competitor captured 29 percent. Notably, none of the four other candidates was affiliated with the *Tangwai* (黨外), the nascent opposition group that later became the DPP; instead, all five candidates registered as KMT members.

The pattern was repeated in 1983, 1986, and 1989: with the exception of Hua Ai, who faced no competition until stepping down in 1986, elections in both aborigine districts featured a battle between the official KMT nominee, several un-nominated KMT members, and occasionally one or two non-partisan or opposition-affiliated candidates, as detailed in Table 4. Despite the competition, the KMT nomination proved decisive in these early elections. A good illustration is the case of Lin Tung-hung, who despite being the incumbent in 1983 came in a distant 4th place when the KMT instead nominated Yang Chuan-kuang (楊傳廣). Ruling party support, rather than tribal affiliation or effective advocacy for aborigine communities, was the key to winning these elections.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Since the 1992 elections, the importance of a KMT nomination has declined, and the tribal affiliations and hometowns of candidates have become more influential. As Table 4 shows, most aborigine legislators have been from one of the three largest tribes: Atayal (*taiyazu* 泰雅族), Paiwan (*paiwanzu* 排灣族), and Amis (*ameizu* 阿美族). Most obvious has been the success of the Amis tribe, whose members have monopolized the plains constituency since the transition to democracy, winning all but one seat up for contestation between 1992 and 2012. Likewise, almost all successful mountain constituency candidates have been from the Paiwan or Atayal tribes. Geography has also played an important role in determining the winners. The legislators with the strongest electoral performance have tended to be from the vote-rich townships of Hualien and Taitung Counties on Taiwan's east coast, where a quarter to half or more of the population is *yuanzhumin*, and the mountainous central county of Nantou. Candidates from other areas have occasionally broken through, but they have struggled to sustain this success over multiple election cycles. The fact that voters outside the core aborigine townships are widely dispersed across the island makes it difficult for candidates from there to build a lasting electoral base.²⁶

The Separate Party System of Aborigine Constituencies

Despite the increasing competitiveness of aborigine elections, these districts have nevertheless continued to be bastions of support for the KMT and its nominal ally, the People First Party (PFP), as Table 4 shows. The legislator Chen Ying (陳瑩), who won the third of four seats in the plains district in 2004, is the only DPP legislator ever to have held an aborigine constituency seat.²⁷ As the traditional party of Hoklo ethnic nationalists, the DPP has been viewed with suspicion by many aborigine voters. One reason is the long history of exploitation of indigenous peoples by Han Taiwanese. By contrast, the mainlander core of the KMT has long claimed a historical role as protector of the aborigines against Hoklo exploitation, and significant intermarriage between

²⁶Haisul 2010, 172, 347-357.

²⁷ Other DPP aborigine candidates have won seats via the party list, most notably Bayan Dalu (巴燕達魯), who was a legislator from 1996-2002, and Chen Ying herself, who was placed high on the DPP's party list in 2008, sparing her a tough battle to retain her district seat.

retired KMT (mainlander) soldiers and aborigine women has contributed to a strong connection to the KMT in many indigenous villages.²⁸

It is not KMT partisanship, however, but the continued practice of clientelism overlaid and reinforced through traditional tribal structures of authority that is the primary source of continued pan-blue (KMT and PFP) success in the aborigine areas. As a mass-based party organized along Leninist lines, the KMT put considerable effort during the authoritarian period into building a dense set of local networks that fed into the party's hierarchical structure. The legacy of that organization remains especially pronounced in indigenous communities. KMT party membership still includes a quarter of the adult population or more in many aborigine villages, and party members still hold most key positions of authority.²⁹ In addition, traditional tribal or family authority remains strong and tends to buttress the KMT's grip on elections. Both party and tribal influences are reinforced in many cases by additional "gifts and favors" extended to constituents: there is ample evidence that successful aborigine candidates regularly engage in some form of material exchange with voters, even as this practice has declined in prevalence and effectiveness elsewhere on the island.³⁰ The continued loyalty to KMT candidates, then, is due at least in part to that party's more generous budgets for local campaigns.

To date, the DPP has not been able to break the KMT's grip on the aborigine constituencies, despite its successes elsewhere. Instead, the main challenge to the KMT in these seats has come from independents and the PFP. The PFP was founded on the heels of James Soong's (宋楚瑜) independent campaign for president in the 2000 election, when he narrowly lost to the DPP's Chen Shui-bian. Soong had previously served as general secretary of the KMT and provincial governor of Taiwan, and in these positions he devoted considerable attention to building factional support in the aborigine areas through patronage and favors. After the handover of power in 2000, he was able to convert some of this support into votes for his upstart party; the PFP did particularly well in the aborigine constituencies, winning both a mountain and plains seat in 2001. The party has since faded in popularity and effectively merged back into the KMT before the

²⁸ Simon 2010, 732.

²⁹ Lu 2014, 18.

³⁰ Haisul 2010, 395; Simon 2010, 733-736; Lu 2014, 31.

2008 election; one of its three remaining legislators in the current term was Lin Cheng-er (林正二), who represented the plains aborigine constituency until he was convicted of vote-buying and forced to step down in 2013. The PFP's survival in the aborigine constituencies, then, reflects the continuing importance of traditional electoral practices and weak partisan identification among these electorates.

Finally, we should note the striking failure of any pan-indigenous party to gain any more than fleeting electoral success. The first and most prominent of these, the Indigenous People's Party (*Taiwan yuanzhumin dang* 台灣原住民黨), was organized in the late 1980s by leading figures in the nascent aborigine social movement, many of whom were well-educated and held academic positions. The party's connection to local village and tribal politics was limited, however, so it ultimately had little appeal in the aborigine races: activist candidates ran with its endorsement in 1989, 1995, 1998, and 2001, but none came close to winning.³¹ The legislator most closely associated with social activists is probably Walis Pelin, who originally won a seat as an independent in the mountain constituency in 1992, then was nominated by the KMT in 1995, then left the ruling party and won again as a minor-party candidate in 1998 and 2001. But his success in elections arguably came despite, rather than because of, his role in promoting pan-aborigine interests in the legislature.³²

Overall, the existence of reserved aborigine seats has important consequences for national politics in Taiwan. First, the aborigine districts stand apart from the party system in the rest of the island's districts, which is increasingly institutionalized and nationalized. Electoral competition in the aborigine constituencies does not turn on two-way blue-green (KMT vs. DPP) contests, as it does in most of the island's races. Instead, competition is between candidates from the pan-blue camp and independents. Second, because the DPP has little shot at winning any of these seats under current conditions, their overrepresentation relative to population contributes to malapportionment in the legislature—already an issue because other small pan-blue strongholds such as Matsu and

³¹ Iwan 2005, 134.

³² Iwan 2005, i-ii. In December 2012, indigenous activists founded a new pan-indigenous party, the Taiwan First Nations Party. In the 2014 local elections, the party's candidates had modest success, winning a county council seat in Nantou, a district head in Kaohsiung, and a town representative seat in Taitung County's Chengkung Town. The party is likely to nominate a candidate for the mountain constituency in the 2016 legislative election, as well (Simon 2014).

Lienchiang (Kinmen) Counties are overrepresented, too. As a consequence, under the current electoral system, the aborigine seats serve to reinforce a significant structural bias in favor of the pan-blue camp in legislative elections.

Substantive Representation: Do Aborigine Communities Benefit from Separate Reserved Seats?

Given the more than 40-year history of reserved aborigine seats in the national legislature, it might appear straightforward to evaluate how the existence of these seats has affected the interests of the aborigine communities themselves. Yet it is difficult to disentangle their independent effect from the many other fundamental changes in Taiwanese politics and society. Taiwan's political system looks dramatically different today than it did in 1972. It has transformed from a repressive and insecure autocratic regime with a rigid Chinese nationalist ideology into a vibrant, pluralist, and rather messy democracy, featuring fiercely contested elections and a deep divide over competing conceptions of national identity. The island's living standards have jumped; whereas it was a poor, albeit rapidly developing, economy in 1972, today Taiwan has joined the developed world with a median per-capita income on par with many European countries. And even if we focus exclusively on changes in the aborigine communities, these broader political and economic changes complicate whatever inferences we might try to draw about the effect of reserved seats.

Nevertheless, we can at least state some general impressions from the position of aborigine groups within the larger polity of Taiwan today. First, by and large they remain on the periphery of Taiwanese politics, the economy, and society. Part of the reason is their small share of the population: no more than 2.3 percent of the electorate holds official recognition as aborigine. But even so, it is remarkable how minor a role indigenous representatives have played in national affairs: there are no aborigines heading legislative committees other than indigenous affairs, nor are there any in the legislative leadership of either the KMT or the DPP. And in the executive branch, few if any aborigines have held positions outside those specifically reserved for them, such as

head of the Council of Indigenous Peoples. To date, then, the aborigine legislative seats have not served as springboards into national politics for their occupants.

Second, the indigenous population remains for the most part at the bottom of socio-economic indicators. The most recent comprehensive survey of aborigine households of which I am aware was conducted in 2006, and it found persistent large differences between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. For instance, average aborigine household total income was estimated to be only 47 percent of the general population. Male aborigine life expectancy was more than 10 years lower than the island-wide average, at 62.9 versus 74.5 years, and the gap between females was almost as large, at 72.5 versus 80.8 for the general population. The aborigine infant mortality rate, at 10.26 per 1000 births, was more than twice that of the general population rate of 4.98. And while the gap in household income declined modestly from 2002-2006, from 43 to 47 percent of the national average, the gap in health indicators showed no significant narrowing.³³

Nevertheless, these discouraging statistics do not foreclose the possibility that the existence of reserved seats has benefited aborigine communities. Like indigenous peoples around the world, Taiwan's *yuanzhuminzu* have had their life fates shaped by state policies characterized by either malign indifference or deeply paternalistic interference. Gaps in health and employment between dominant and marginal groups are common across many contexts. So the proper evaluation of the reserved seats depends not on whether they have helped the indigenous peoples of Taiwan "catch up" to the dominant Han majority on some set of metrics, but whether they have provided levers of power to exploit in interactions with the state. And it is clear that they have.

This leverage emerged gradually as Taiwan transitioned out of the authoritarian era. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the most influential actors working on behalf of the indigenous peoples were not legislators but social activists, including the founders of the Alliance for Taiwanese Aborigines and the Indigenous People's Party.³⁴ The greatest success of this early indigenous social movement was in disseminating global discourses about indigenous peoples' rights to a widening circle of Taiwanese, from normative

³³ Cheng and Li 2010, 211, 225.

³⁴ Ku 2005; Iwan 2005.

statements like the UN's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to new scholarship on indigenous movements in Canada, New Zealand, and Latin America.³⁵ Aborigine activists and scholars advocated changes to state policies that would bring Taiwan more in line with practice elsewhere in the democratic world. This campaign culminated in 1994 with the adoption of a constitutional amendment recognizing *yuanzhumin* as the new collective term for the indigenous peoples. Changes to state regulations were issued the next year that permitted aborigines to use indigenous, non-Chinese names in official state business. Compared to the impact of their social movement counterparts, the aborigine legislators of this era look like passive creatures of the KMT party-state: they mostly remained on the sidelines, content to remain a loyal part of the KMT's patronage system.³⁶

By the mid-1990s, though, we begin to see a change in the behavior of aborigine legislators. An increase in numbers, a rise in competition for seats, and a decline in importance of the previously decisive KMT nominations all helped breathe life into the formerly empty shell of reserved aborigine representation. By 1996, a new cohort of more active, independent legislators had emerged, and they began to play a more meaningful role in indigenous advocacy at the central government level. Judging by patterns of bill sponsorship and floor questions, aborigine legislators in the democratic era have consistently focused on issues of broad concern to indigenous communities: local development, policies on aborigine culture and education, administrative reform in indigenous areas, and economic and social welfare policies all feature prominently in the legislative record.³⁷

But if bills and questions are a good indication of aspirations, they do not tell us much about effectiveness. Here it is harder to draw general conclusions, but several major events stand out as demonstrations of the aborigine legislators' ability to effect change, given the right circumstances. The first of these followed quickly after the 1995 legislative election, which returned a narrow and shaky KMT majority of only two seats. When the new Legislative Yuan was seated in early 1996, the KMT very nearly lost the vote for speaker of the legislature: in exchange for a promise to advance a bill

³⁵ Mona 2007.

³⁶ Ku 2005, 102-105.

³⁷ Pao 2009, 2013.

establishing an Aboriginal Affairs Commission, which had languished for years under the KMT government, two aborigine legislators supported the opposition's nominee, leading to a tie in the first round. The KMT speaker was seated only when one opposition member unexpectedly abstained in the second vote. But the KMT also needed to win Legislative Yuan reconfirmation for the premier, Lien Chan, and that gave the aborigine caucus additional leverage: all six legislators then threatened to withhold their votes unless the Executive Yuan moved to establish the commission, and the KMT leadership quickly relented to the demand.³⁸ The final bill passed the legislature in November 1996, moving indigenous affairs out of the purview of the Ministry of the Interior and establishing for the first time a cabinet-level agency, eventually named the Council on Indigenous Peoples (CIP), to be headed by an aborigine and oversee state policy toward Taiwan's aborigine communities. Aborigine legislators exploited their collective bargaining power on several other occasions as well: in one notable instance, the caucus blocked a downgrading of the Taiwan provincial government—a high priority of both the KMT and DPP leadership at the time—until language providing for special “self governing” rights for indigenous areas was put back into a larger package of constitutional amendments.³⁹ Thus, although social movement activists set the agenda for this period, it was the aborigine legislators who held the crucial power that ensured some of those demands would be met.

This power should not be overstated. It depended on a nearly even split in the seats in the LY that made the aborigine legislators the crucial swing voters, and it also required the tacit endorsement, or at least not opposition, from one of the two major political camps. These conditions held in the 3rd (1996-1999) and to some degree in the 5th (2002-2005) and 6th (2005-2008) Legislative Yuan terms, and it is in these periods that the most significant legislation affecting the interests of indigenous peoples was adopted. The two clearest examples are the creation of the CIP and the passage of the Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples (*yuanzhuminzu jibenfa* 原住民族基本法), which established the legal framework for the creation of autonomous indigenous areas.

³⁸ Iwan 2005; Stainton 1999.

³⁹ Ku 2005, 113-115.

Nevertheless, even under these relatively propitious conditions in the legislature, in both cases the final product was far weaker than indigenous groups had pushed for.⁴⁰

In general, when both major political camps have opposed a policy reform, there is little the aborigine legislators can do in practice to advance it. A good example is the fate of the Indigenous Peoples Self-Government Law (*yuanzhuminzu zizhiqu fa* 原住民族自治區法), first proposed early in Chen Shui-bian's first term by the CIP. The Self-Government Law was intended to define in practical terms the rights, responsibilities, and scope of indigenous autonomous areas that were established in name by the Basic Law.⁴¹ The Executive Yuan under President Chen reduced the original 104 clauses in the bill to 15, rejecting the transformative vision contained in the early drafts and dramatically weakening the authority that would be granted to these new areas.⁴² The watered-down bill was then sent to the legislature in June 2003. Incredibly, over a decade later, no Self-Government Law exists; multiple drafts of the law have died in the legislature, probably because granting territorial autonomy to indigenous communities remains unpopular among non-aborigines.⁴³

In addition, the influence of aborigine legislators as a group has waned perceptibly since 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou was elected president and the KMT captured a huge majority in the Legislative Yuan. Without the need for aborigine votes to pass bills, the movement for aborigine self-government has stalled, despite repeated promises by President Ma to support a new draft law.⁴⁴ The end of divided government also brought with it a recentralization of policy-making in the Executive Yuan; during Ma's time in office, some indigenous activist groups have contended that the CIP now functions more as a cheerleader for the government's policies than an independent advocate for aborigines. In one prominent instance, at the height of the student

⁴⁰ Simon 2007, 236. The text of the Basic Law is available at:

<http://law.apc.gov.tw/LawContentDetails.aspx?id=FL034022&KeyWordHL=&StyleType=1>

⁴¹ Ericsson (2005) provides a good overview of the initial proposal and the key issues then at stake.

⁴² Simon 2007, 235.

⁴³ The Executive Yuan under President Ma finally sent a new draft bill to the legislature in December 2014, where it remains under consideration. The fundamental disagreements remain the same: how to define the relationship between "autonomous" indigenous areas and existing local jurisdictions, how much authority they would have, and how membership would be constituted. See Hsiao, Allison. 2014. "Cabinet Passes a Draft Bill on Aborigine Self-Rule Act," *Taipei Times*, 19 December.

⁴⁴ Shih, Hsiu-chuan. 2013. "Aboriginal Tribes Call for Autonomy," *Taipei Times*, 11 July; Mo, Yan-chih, and Chris Wang. 2013. "Ma Defends Government's Record on Aboriginal Issues," *Taipei Times*, 2 August.

occupation of the legislature that became known as the Sunflower Movement, the CIP drew widespread criticism for issuing a statement in support of the Cross-Strait Services in Trade Agreement that the students were protesting.⁴⁵ More generally, the Ma administration's policies encouraging mainland Chinese tourism⁴⁶ and additional resort development⁴⁷ have become significant flashpoints within indigenous communities, and the CIP has generally been put in the position of defending the government.⁴⁸ Aborigine legislators have remained largely out of sight in these disputes.

Nevertheless, it is likely only a matter of time before the aborigine legislators are again in a pivotal position, able to extract significant legal and policy concessions from a party that needs their votes. The most recent electoral reform adopted in 2005 has made this even more likely. Were aborigine legislators to vote as a bloc today, they would control six of 113 seats (5.3%) in the legislature, up from 8 of 225 (3.6%) under the previous system.⁴⁹ If a closely contested legislative election ended with neither of the major camps possessing a majority, an aborigine "king-maker" legislative caucus could once again become a potent weapon for advancing indigenous community priorities. That scenario has not come to pass so far because the KMT has enjoyed a comfortable majority since the first elections under the new system in 2008. But it remains a distinct possibility after the 2016 election if public support for the party declines substantially, as it has since 2012.

Perhaps the most troublesome obstacle to the realization of this vision comes not from a Han-dominated state or a large single-party majority in the LY but from the lack of cooperation among aborigine legislators themselves. With only occasional exceptions, the winners of seats in the aborigine constituencies have acted as rivals rather than as allies. A key reason is the SNTV electoral system, abolished in the rest of the geographic districts in 2008 but still used for the aborigine seats. As is well-known, SNTV pits all candidates in a district against one another in the competition for re-election. Voters

⁴⁵ Loa, Iok-sin. 2014. "Trade Pact Siege: Council of Indigenous Peoples Criticized," *Taipei Times*, 27 March.

⁴⁶ Loa, Iok-sin. 2014. "Mukumuqi Residents Block Road against Tourists," *Taipei Times*, 8 June.

⁴⁷ Lee, I-chia. 2014. "Thao Aborigines Unhappy with Resort Project Plans," *Taipei Times*, 21 August.

⁴⁸ Lii Wen. 2015. "Draft Autonomy Act Meets Opposition," *Taipei Times*, 14 April.

⁴⁹ In addition to the six aborigine seats in the current system, 73 are elected from single-member districts using simple plurality rule, and the remaining 34 from a single nation-wide closed party list with a five percent threshold, for which all voters cast a separate ballot.

cannot support a slate of candidates but instead must choose only one of the multiple candidates running in their district. This system creates strong incentives for candidates to cultivate a “personal vote” by distinguishing themselves from one another—even if their ideological positions and policy goals are virtually identical.⁵⁰

The consequences of this “personalization” effect show up in a variety of ways. The distribution of grants to aborigine communities in Taiwan, over which aborigine legislators have some control, tend to go disproportionately to legislators’ own vote bases and areas that are electorally competitive—even when these are not the areas with the greatest needs, or even the areas where most of their fellow tribal members live.⁵¹ Legislators’ votes in turn tend to be concentrated in places where they have personal ties, rather than reflecting any kind of party-line voting.⁵² And election outcomes do not turn on pan-indigenous programmatic appeals but on carefully nurtured connections with local power-brokers: by and large, activism in support of a broad pro-aborigine agenda does not help legislators win re-election.⁵³ In short, SNTV remains a significant obstacle to the creation of a unified “aborigine bloc” of legislators in the LY—one at least as important as the more obvious issue of the dual mountain and plains constituencies.

Conclusion

The introduction of reserved aborigine seats into the national legislature occurred when Taiwan was still under martial law, and its effect was at first purely symbolic. As Taiwan democratized, however, this channel for representation has gradually come alive: aborigine legislators have become more active advocates for the island’s indigenous population, and occasionally have been able to use their bargaining power in the Legislative Yuan to achieve significant changes to aborigine policy. These successes have been modest: indigenous communities remain among the poorest and most marginalized in Taiwan, and repeated promises of greater political autonomy have still not been realized. Yet the existence of reserved aborigine seats in the legislature provides

⁵⁰ E.g. Grofman et al. 1999; Patterson and Stockton 2010.

⁵¹ Luor and Chen 2009.

⁵² Pao 2011.

⁵³ Simon 2010, 736-7.

an important lever to influence state policy—one that aborigine legislators have wielded successfully before, and will probably be in a position to use again in the future.

Taiwan's indigenous peoples have not always been well-served by the aborigine quota system. But they would undoubtedly be worse off without it.

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Figure 1. Aborigine Townships, Towns, and Districts in Taiwan




Table 1. Officially Recognized Tribes of Taiwan

<i>Tribe</i>	<i>Chinese Name</i>	<i>Year Recognized</i>	<i>Estimated Membership</i>
Amis/Pangcah	阿美族	Japanese era	199300
Atayal/Tayal	泰雅族	Japanese era	85200
Paiwan/Payuan	排灣族	Japanese era	95600
Bunun	布農族	Japanese era	55600
Puyuma/Pinuyumayan	卑南族	Japanese era	13200
Rukai	魯凱族	Japanese era	12800
Tsou	鄒族	Japanese era	7100
Saisiyat	賽夏族	Japanese era	6400
Yami/Tao	達悟族	Japanese era	4400
Thao	邵族	2001	700
Kavalan/Kebalan	噶瑪蘭族	2002	1300
Taroko/Truku	太魯閣族	2004	29400
Sakizaya	撒奇萊雅族	2007	800
Seediq	賽德克族	2008	9000
Hla'alua	拉阿魯哇族	2014	7
Kanakanavu	卡那卡那富族	2014	0
Total			520,807

Table 2. Contemporary Aborigine Administrative Areas in Taiwan

<i>County/City</i>	<i>Mountain Aborigine Jurisdictions</i>	<i>山地原住民鄉/鎮/區</i>	<i>Plains Aborigine Jurisdictions</i>	<i>平地原住民鄉/鎮/市</i>
New Taipei City	1. Wulai District	烏來區		
Taoyuan County	2. Fuxing Township	復興鄉		
Hsinchu County	3. Jianshi Township	尖石鄉	31. Guanxi Town	關西鎮
	4. Wufeng Township	五峰鄉		
Miaoli County	5. Tai'an Township	泰安鄉	32. Nanzhuang Township	南莊鄉
			33. Shitan Township	獅潭鄉
Taichung City	6. Heping District	和平鄉		
Nantou County	7. Ren'ai Township	仁愛鄉	34. Yuchi Township	魚池鄉
	8. Xinyi Township	信義鄉		
Chiayi County	9. Alishan Township	阿里山鄉		
Kaohsiung City	10. Taoyuan District	桃源區		
	11. Namaxia District	那瑪夏區		
	12. Maolin District	茂林區		
Pingtung County	13. Sandimen Township	三地門鄉	35. Manzhou Township	滿州鄉
	14. Wutai Township	霧台鄉		
	15. Majia Township	碼家鄉		
	16. Taiwu Township	泰武鄉		
	17. Laiyi Township	來義鄉		
	18. Chunri Township	春日鄉		
	19. Shizi Township	獅子鄉		
	20. Mudan Township	牡丹鄉		
Taitung County	21. Daren Township	達仁鄉	36. Dawu Township	大武鄉
	22. Jingfeng Township	金峰鄉	37. Taimali Township	太麻里鄉
	23. Yanping Township	延平鄉	38. Taitung City	台東市
	24. Haiduan Township	海端鄉	39. Beinan Township	卑南鄉
	25. Lanyu Township	蘭嶼鄉	40. Luye Township	鹿野鄉
			41. Guanshan Town	關山鎮
			42. Chishang Township	池上鄉
			43. Donghe Township	東河鄉
			44. Chenggong Town	成功鎮
			45. Changbin Township	長濱鄉
Hualien County	26. Zhuoxi Township	卓溪鄉	46. Fuli Township	富里鄉

	27. Wanrong Township	萬榮鄉	47. Yuli Town	玉里鎮
	28. Xiulin Township	秀林鄉	48. Ruisui Township	瑞穗鄉
			49. Guangfu Township	光復鄉
			50. Fengling Town	鳳林鎮
			51. Fengbin Township	豐濱鄉
			52. Shoufeng Township	壽豐鄉
			53. Ji'an Township	吉安鄉
			54. Hualien City	花蓮市
			55. Xincheng Township	新城鄉
Yilan County	29. Nan'ao Township	南澳鄉		
	30. Datong Township	大同鄉		

Table 3. Legislative Yuan Aborigine Seats as Share of All Contested Seats, by Election

Election Year	Aborigine Constituencies		Total Contested Seats	Aborigine Share of Seats (%)
1972	1		36	2.78
1975	1		37	2.70
	Mountain Aborigine	Plains Aborigine		
1980	1	1	70	2.86
1983	1	1	71	2.82
1986	1	1	73	2.74
1989	2	2	101	3.96
1992	3	3	161	3.73
1995	3	3	164	3.66
1998	4	4	225	3.56
2001	4	4	225	3.56
2004	4	4	225	3.56
2008	3	3	113	5.31
2012	3	3	113	5.31

Table 4. Election Results in Legislative Yuan Aborigine Constituencies, 1972-2012

Candidates	中文姓名	Tribe	Party	Nominated / Endorsed by	Valid Votes	Elected?
<i>1972 Shanbao Constituency</i>						
Hua Ai	華愛	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	92,075	Y
Total	1				95,980	1
<i>1975 Shanbao Constituency</i>						
Hua Ai	華愛	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	112,590	Y
Total	1				114,017	1
<i>1980 Mountain Constituency</i>						
Hua Ai	華愛	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	58,803	Y
Total	1				60,414	1
<i>1980 Plains Constituency</i>						
Lin Tung-hung	林通宏	Ami	KMT	KMT	15,062	Y
Yang Ren-fu	楊仁福	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	11,823	
Hsieh Chung-kuang	謝中光	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	6,749	
Cheng Yu-chang	鄭玉昌	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	6,084	
Kao Ying-ching	高贏清	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	917	
Total	5					1
<i>1983 Mountain Constituency</i>						
Hua Ai	華愛	Paiwan	KMT	KMT		Y
Total	1					1
<i>1983 Plains Constituency</i>						
Yang Chuan-kuang	楊傳廣	Ami	KMT	KMT	18,280	Y
Yang Ren-fu	楊仁福	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	15,718	
Wang Ru-chih	王如志	Ami	KMT		5,999	
Lin Tung-hung	林通宏	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	1,676	
Total	4					
<i>1986 Mountain Constituency</i>						

Lin Tien-sheng	林天生	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	45,267	Y
Total	1					1

1986 Plains Constituency

Tsai Chung-han	蔡中涵	Ami	KMT	KMT	26,485	Y
Chen Chien-chung	陳健忠	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	15,466	
Total	2					1

1989 Mountain Constituency

Hua Chia-chih	華加志	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	23,129	Y
Kao Tien-lai	高天來	Atayal	KMT	KMT-prmt	18,063	Y
Lin Tien-sheng	林天生	Paiwan	KMT	KMT-prmt	10,683	
Chen Cheng-shu	陳正樹	Bunun	Ind	IPP	6,288	
Tsai Chin-fu	蔡金福	Bunun	KMT	KMT-prmt	1,560	
Iban Nokan	林文正	Atayal	Ind	DPP	1,553	
Total	6					2

1989 Plains Constituency

Chuang Chin-sheng	莊金生	Ami	KMT	KMT	17,909	Y
Tsai Chung-han	蔡中涵	Ami	KMT	KMT	10,947	Y
Chuang Ren-yang	莊人仰	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	9,240	
Icyang Parod	劉文雄	Ami	Ind	IPP	6,088	
Hu Te-fu	胡德夫	Puyuma	Ind	DPP	2,545	
Total	5					2

1992 Mountain Constituency

Hua Chia-chih	華加志	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	16,784	Y
Mayau Kumu	高天來	Atayal	KMT	KMT	13,291	Y
Walis Pelin	蔡貴聰	Seediq ^a	Ind		10,638	Y
Lin Tien-sheng	林天生	Paiwan	KMT		6,553	
Hu Te-hsiang	胡德祥	Bunun	KMT		6,102	
Peng Mi-cheng	彭蜜成	Taroko ^a	KMT		4,398	
Huang Hsiu-rung	黃修榮	Atayal	DPP	DPP	3,769	
Tien Mao-fa	田茂發	Bunun	KMT		1,715	
Wang Shan-li	王山里	Bunun	KMT		581	
Total	9					3

1992 Plains Constituency

Kao Wei-he	高巍和	Ami	KMT	KMT	10,227	Y
Chuang Chin-sheng	莊金生	Ami	KMT	KMT	8,500	Y
Tsai Chung-han	蔡中涵	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	7,056	Y
Chang Ren-hsiang	章仁香	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	6,041	
Wu Rung-Sheng	武榮盛	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	5,261	
Yang Ren-huang	楊仁煌	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	4,154	
Icyang Parod	劉文雄	Ami	Ind		3,644	
Lin Rung-yuan	林榮元	Ami	Ind		2,574	
Li Hsun-rung	李訓榮	Ami	Ind		1,876	
Total	9					3

1995 Mountain Constituency

Walis Pelin	瓦歷斯。貝林	Seediq ^a	KMT	KMT	13,119	Y
Chuan Wen-sheng	全文盛	Bunun	KMT	KMT-prmt	11,000	Y
Kao Yang-sheng	高揚昇	Atayal	KMT	KMT	10,644	Y
Lin Ching-liang	林清良	Paiwan	KMT	KMT-prmt	9,929	
Lin Chien-er	林建二	Paiwan	KMT	KMT-prmt	9,895	
Mayau Kumu	馬賴古麥	Atayal	KMT	KMT-prmt	9,004	
Weng Wen-te	翁文德	Atayal	IPP	IPP	5,707	
Wen Mei-kui	溫梅桂	Taroko ^a	NP	NP	3,505	
Chung Si-jin	鐘思錦	Rukai	DPP	DPP	1,982	
Total	9					3

1995 Plains Constituency

Chuang Chin-sheng	莊金生	Ami	KMT	KMT	10,162	Y
Chang Ren-hsiang	章仁香	Ami	KMT	KMT	9,923	Y
Tsai Chung-han	蔡中涵	Ami	KMT	KMT-prmt	9,389	Y
Kao Wei-he	高巍和	Ami	KMT	KMT	8,480	
Wang Ching-hsien	王清堅	Ami	Ind		7,569	
Ma Hsien-sheng	馬賢生	Ami	Ind		5,320	
Li Jing-chung	李景崇	Ami	Ind		3,512	
Lin Rung-yuan	林榮元	Ami	DPP	DPP	1,573	
Lien Fei-hsiung	連飛雄	Ami	Ind		947	
Total	9					3

1998 Mountain Constituency

Tzeng Hua-te	曾華德	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	15,818	Y
Kao Yang-sheng	高揚昇	Atayal	KMT	KMT	12,923	Y
Walis Pelin	瓦歷斯。貝林	Seediq ^a	Ind	NDNPL	12,175	Y

Lin Chun-te	林春德	Seediq ^a	KMT	KMT	11,764	Y
Chuan Wen-sheng	全文盛	Bunun	KMT	KMT-prmt	9,703	
Ye Shen-bao	葉神保	Paiwan	Ind	DA	6,600	
Yahani Isagagafat	尤哈尼	Bunun	DPP	DPP	5,742	
Wu Wen-ming	吳文明	Atayal	IPP	IPP	1,171	
Lofaniyaw	羅法尼耀學海	Paiwan	Ind		229	
Total	9					4

1998 Plains Constituency

Yang Ren-fu	楊仁福	Ami	KMT	KMT	14,493	Y
Chang Ren-hsiang	章仁香	Ami	KMT	KMT	13,069	Y
Lin Cheng-er	林正二	Ami	KMT	KMT	11,182	Y
Tsai Chung-han	蔡中涵	Ami	Ind	NDNPL	8,958	Y
Chuang Chin-sheng	莊金生	Ami	KMT	KMT	8,617	
Mayaw Kumumus	馬耀。谷木牧師	Ami	DPP	DPP	3,934	
Total	6					4

2001 Mountain Constituency

Tzeng Hua-te	曾華德	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	13,982	Y
Walis Pelin	瓦歷斯	Seediq ^a	Ind	TW#1	9,194	Y
Kao Chin Su-mei	高金素梅	Atayal	Ind		8,909	Y
Lin Chun-te	林春德	Seediq ^a	PFP	PFP	8,647	Y
He Hsin-jun	何信軍	Taroko ^a	KMT	KMT	8,530	
Li Wen-lai	李文來	Paiwan	PFP	PFP	8,259	
Kao Yang-sheng	高揚昇	Atayal	KMT	KMT	7,104	
Chuan Wen-sheng	全文盛	Bunun	KMT	KMT	6,318	
Yu Meng-die	余夢蝶	Bunun	PFP	PFP	5,132	
Lin Wen-sheng	林文盛	Atayal	TSU	TSU	4,902	
Payan Dalu	巴燕。達魯	Atayal	DPP	DPP	4,567	
Yisao Daolu	伊掃。刀魯	Atayal	IPP	IPP	790	
Total	12					4

2001 Plains Constituency

Lin Cheng-ren	林正二	Ami	PFP	PFP	13,385	Y
Chang Ren-hsiang	章仁香	Ami	KMT	KMT	11,311	Y
Liao Kuo-tung	廖國棟	Ami	KMT	KMT	9,645	Y
Yang Ren-fu	楊仁福	Ami	KMT	KMT	9,501	Y
Chuang Chin-sheng	莊金生	Ami	KMT	KMT	7,007	
Yang Te-chin	楊德金	Ami	PFP	PFP	7,152	

Chen Yi-hsin	陳義信	Ami	DPP	DPP	5,481	
Yang Ren-huang	楊仁煌	Ami	TSU	TSU	4,368	
Li Tai-kang	李泰康	Ami	Ind		476	
Total	9					4

2004 Mountain Constituency

Yosi Takun	孔文吉	Seediq ^a	KMT	KMT	17,307	Y
Kao Chin Su-mei	高金素梅	Atayal	Ind		16,284	Y
Tzeng Hua-te	曾華德	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	13,536	Y
Lin Chun-te	林春德	Seediq ^a	PFP	PFP	12,179	Y
Walis Pelin	瓦歷斯	Seediq ^a	Ind		9,415	
Chen Tao-ming	陳道明	Taroko ^a	DPP	DPP	5,785	
Lin Wen-sheng	林文生	Atayal	TSU	TSU	3,719	
Wu Hsin-kuo	吳興國	Bunun	Ind		3,145	
Li Hsiu-chin	李秀琴	Atayal	Ind		216	
Total	9					4

2004 Plains Constituency

Yang Ren-fu	楊仁福	Ami	KMT	KMT	14,706	Y
Liao Kuo-tung	廖國棟	Ami	KMT	KMT	13,304	Y
Chen Ying	陳瑩	Puyuma	DPP	DPP	8,364	Y
Lin Cheng-er	林正二	Ami	PFP	PFP	8,045	Y
Song Chin-tsai	宋進財	Ami	Ind		7,015	
Tsai Chung-han	蔡中涵	Ami	PFP	PFP	5,292	
Wang Ching-jian	王清堅	Ami	Ind		4,982	
Yang Ren-huang	楊仁煌	Ami	KMT		1,061	
Chang Hsien-sheng	章賢生	Ami	Ind		472	
Total	9					4

2008 Mountain Constituency

Uliw Qaljupayare	簡東明	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	22,659	Y
Yosi Takun	孔文吉	Seediq ^a	KMT	KMT	22,391	Y
Kao Chin Su-mei	高金素梅	Atayal	Ind		20,012	Y
Lin Chun-te	林春德	Seediq ^a	PFP	PFP	14,265	
Hou Chin-chu	侯金助	Paiwan	DPP	DPP	4,420	
Hsueh Yi-Chin	薛宜蓁	Paiwan	CP	CP	443	
Song Ren-he	宋仁和	Paiwan	Ind		168	
Total	7					3

2008 Plains Constituency

Liao Kuo-tung	廖國棟	Ami	KMT	KMT	20,156	Y
Yang Ren-fu	楊仁福	Ami	KMT	KMT	17,069	Y
Lin Cheng-er	林正二	Ami	PFP	PFP	11,925	Y
Song Chin-tsai	宋進財	Ami	Ind		10,662	
Chen Hsiu-hui	陳秀惠	Ami	DPP	DPP	5,710	
Total	5					3

2012 Mountain Constituency

Yosi Takun	孔文吉	Seediq ^a	KMT	KMT	31,629	Y
Kao Chin Su-mei	高金素梅	Atayal	Ind		29,520	Y
Uliw Qaljupayare	簡東明	Paiwan	KMT	KMT	28,581	Y
Walis Pelin	瓦歷斯。貝林	Seediq ^a	PFP	PFP	15,533	
Tzeng Chih-yung	曾智勇	Paiwan	DPP	DPP	9,968	
Chiu Wen-sheng	邱文生	Atayal	Ind		1,481	
Total	6					3

2012 Plains Constituency

Liao Kuo-tung	廖國棟	Ami	KMT	KMT	26,998	Y
Sra Kacaw	鄭天財	Ami	KMT	KMT	23,480	Y
Lin Cheng-er	林正二	Ami	PFP	PFP	13,992	Y
Hung Kuo-chih	洪國治	Ami	Ind		10,524	
Dibus Yilai	笛布斯。顛賚	Ami	Ind		8,841	
Jongren Dalus	忠仁。達祿斯	Ami	Ind		6,757	
Mayao Bihou	馬耀。比吼	Ami	Ind		4,553	
Chan Chin-fu	詹金福	Ami	Ind		1,294	
Chen Lien-shun	陳連順	Ami	TIP	TIP	986	
Lin Chin-ying	林金瑛	Ami	Ind		706	
Total	10					3

KMT = Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party (中國國民黨)

DPP = Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨)

Ind = Independent

IPP = Indigenous People's Party (中國台灣原住民族黨)

NP = New Party (新黨)

PFP = People First Party (親民黨)

TSU = Taiwan Solidarity Union (台灣團結聯盟)

DA = Democratic Alliance (民主聯盟)

NDNPL = National Democratic Non-Partisan League (全國民主非政黨聯盟)

TW#1 = Taiwan No. 1 Party (台灣吾黨)

CP = Civil Party (公民黨)

TIP = Taiwan Ideology Party (台灣主義黨)

KMT-prmt = KMT permitted candidate to run without nomination (報准)

^a Previously Atayal; recognized as separate tribes in 2004 (Taroko) and 2008 (Seediq)

Sources: Palalavi 2008; Palalavi 2010, 123-173; Election Study Center Elections Data Archive at National Cheng Chi University

