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Exploring the Integration of Protestants in Mexico since the Southern Reformation: Competition and Conflict

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

For decades, Mexico has existed as a stoutly and loyally Catholic country with Catholic roots and Catholic values. In the early 1990s, Mexico confronted the Southern Reformation, a phenomenon characterized by many waves of Methodist, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and other Protestant sect missionaries to areas throughout the country. The Southern Reformation produced a great number of converts and new faithful, increasing the share of Protestants in Mexico to 9%. The existing body of literature on the effects of the Southern Reformation varies; while some experts argue that increased Protestantism greatly benefitted communities because competition for worshippers forced the Catholic Church to reform, others point to the fact that different value systems and political ideas between the two types of Christianity created conflict. This thesis builds on the current existing literature with a study of religious violence in rural communities in Oaxaca. A thorough and original analysis of the 2010 Mexican national census reveals that there is significant correlation between the increased rates of Protestantism in Oaxaca and religious violence, suggesting that Protestants new and old have clashed with the traditional Catholic make-up of Mexico. I make the case that the correlation between Protestantism and violence, as well as the extreme fractionalization of Oaxaca localities, is evidence that Protestants have not been well integrated into Mexican society. I conclude this study with a brief review of the limits of my findings and their implications for Mexico and its national government.

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Chapter One

I. Introduction

Mexico, a country that has been devoutly Catholic since the beginnings of Spanish colonialism, has endured a divisive religious history that dates back to the start of the Mexican Revolution. The armed struggle, which lasted from about 1910 to 1920 and originated as revolt against the regime of Dictator Porfirio Diaz, pitted several paramilitary and rebel groups against each other in a violent civil war. Most importantly, the Mexican Revolution created huge rifts between conservative elites and radical peasant and middle class groups, a divide that foreshadowed a political showdown that would later endanger the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church. The 1917 Constitution of Mexico, instituted during the Revolution by radical, anti-clerical secularists tired of traditional hierarchy and conservatism, limited the participation in civil life of religious officials and organizations because the country's new leaders feared that religion would hold back Mexico's progress. Article 3 of the Constitution effectively sentenced the Church to years of underground operation despite the fact that a large majority of the Mexican population remained strongly loyal to their Catholic faith.

Years of underground partisan work[1] was no easy feat for an organization that was almost more political than religious. The Church had long acted as if it had a larger responsibility to Mexican society to speak and to guide the country on a wide range of financial, social, and moral issues (Camp, 1997). The Church's proactive stance dragged the institution into an ideological

[1] Although federal government pressure on the Catholic Church during most of the 20th century was not as proscribed as, for instance, the crackdown on the Church in Poland during communist rule, the treatment clearly qualified as state repression, as described by scholars like Anthony Gill and J. Charlene Floyd. Pope Pius XI famously wrote in a 1926 encyclical that Catholic priests were put in the same category as "criminals and the insane" in Mexico after the reforms that prohibited actions such as preaching politics from the pulpit.

war that many clergy wanted to avoid and that is still playing out today. The Church was seen by many Mexican radicals, especially in the period before and after the Mexican revolution, as a reactionary force that would limit progress (Gill, 1998). In an effort to participate in the spirit of democracy following the overthrow of former dictator President Porfirio Díaz, Catholic elites formed their own party, reinforcing the tie between religion and politics. In 1926, popular anger and frustration at the anti-Catholic policies simmered over during the Cristero War when the government under President Plutarco Elías Calles decided to enforce Article 3, try to eliminate the power of the Church, and further suppress common religious celebration. The rebellion, which was composed of mainly rural, poor peasants and was one of the largest manifestations of the tense and hostile relationship between Church and State, was resolved and ended in 1929. The uprising left a shortage of priests, but a faithful following, who fashioned a homespun religion, practiced in private, and forewent social commitment due to the lack of priests to foster community.

The state-controlled oppression of the Catholic Church and Catholic practices continued when the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was formed to manage the country after the Revolution in 1929. The PRI, the dominant party for the majority of the 20th century, incorporated national secularism as a principle that would guide Mexican uncommon democracy for many decades. In 1991, after years of turmoil and efforts by priests and churches to influence Mexican politics, the Federal Government officially gave legal recognition to religious institutions and ended the traditional government antagonism towards the Church. Relations with the Vatican were also restored. The 1991 reconciliation under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari restored the clergy's right to vote and criticize the government, legalized the presence of foreign priests and ministers, and allowed the open presence of convents and monasteries. Above all, the

new laws finally embraced the powerful Catholic faith of the Mexican population, a population that was about 96% Catholic. To this day, the Church remains an economic heavyweight with major corporate interests and an international banking establishment and extensive institutional sway.

Mexico's strong Catholic faith did not make it immune to the popular upsurge of grassroots Protestantism, called the "Southern Reformation", that swept through Latin America at the end of the 20th century. In the early 90s, for the first time protestant missionaries, especially Pentecostals, started to challenge the traditional dominance of the Vatican in a region that held around 40% of the world's Catholics. The beginning of the Southern Reformation, which started in Central America, happened to correspond with the rise of the National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico, a conservative political party with a distinctly Catholic identity. As PAN won its first federal election in 2000, the flourishing Southern Reformation started to creep across Mexico's southern border and sweep through southern regions of the country.

A brief look at the background literature proposes that the grassroots Protestantism, which seemed to catch hold of Mexico nearly last, was built as a movement of struggle against Catholicism (Montes 1992). As a result, it is important to note that the Southern Reformation was driven by partially by *the faults and mistakes of the Catholic Church* and partially by *innovations and protections that set Protestantism apart from Catholicism.* First of all, Protestantism appealed particularly to Mexicans that were seeking a more personal relationship with God, a new style of worship, and greater emphasis on morality than Catholicism had to offer (Dow, 2005). For a Catholic Church that had been at the center of a number of scandals and corruption allegations and appeared to constituents as arcane and backwards at the turn of the century, community-based Protestantism was a confident contender. At the same time, the

Catholic Church remained relatively silent on matters of drug trafficking and cartel crime, leaving many Catholic faithful feeling unprotected and ignored, a sentiment that might have encouraged Mexicans to turn towards the outspoken, "name and shame" practices of the Protestants. Some religious studies experts propose that the Catholic Church's repression of its progressive wing drove the rise of evangelism (Garrard-Burnett and Stoll, 1993). Towards the second point, a popular opinion among political scientists is that the rapid growth of Protestantism in Latin America was mostly a result of the charisma of the movement in a region with everyday physical, psychological, and moral afflictions produced by poverty, such as alcoholism and domestic discord (Chestnut, 2003). Part of the appeal is also due to the fact that a greater percentage of evangelicals participate in church life than Catholics, making Protestants the progressive movers and shakers of the religious scene. In many native communities, the conversion to Protestantism was not just a reaction against the well-respected Catholic Church; Protestant sects that emphasized renewal and rebirth speak to the African and Indian roots of native villages, as well as help native communities cope with the abuse generated by the Indian *cargo* systems[2] (Dow, 2005). In general, Protestantism has called to Mexico's poor and underprivileged, shocking the Catholic infrastructure and legacy.

Furthermore, experts and the existing work suggests that the differences that set the two religions apart in the Mexican context have produced political, economic, and social competition between Catholicism and Protestantism. Most scholars agree that the Mexican landscape is still defined as opposition between Catholic traditionalists and non-Catholic modernizers, an atmosphere that most likely breeds political competition (Gross, 2003). Similarly, the two

[2] *Cargo* systems, which originated in indigenous parts of Mexico and Guatemala, represent the obligation to perform religious and spiritual practices to honor images of Catholic saints. *Cargos* often included major religious festivals, hosted by wealthy patrons to generate political power, during which locals had to pray to and celebrate local divinities.

movements compete economically because they are challenging each other for worshippers, or 'clients', as well as donations and financial support from worshippers (Chestnut, 2003). Finally, the two religions have opposing interests and ideas for the structure and governance of Mexican cities and towns, leading to drastic social competition.

Recently, political scientists and anthropologists have turned to trying to expound the effects of Protestantism on the politics and civil life of Latin America. Though scholars agree on the causes of tension between Protestantism and Catholicism, such as class differences or the structure of the religious organization, experts seem divided on how competition between the two religions affects the relationship between Protestantism and Catholicism in Latin America. On one hand, the appearance of the new Catholic Charismatic movement is suggested evidence that the Catholic Church is working to rebound and undermine Protestant missionaries (Stark 2010). On the other hand, it is possible that competition between Protestants and Catholics for worshippers has encouraged each sect to reform and to better speak to the demands of their constituents (Trejo 2009). My thesis will build on these conflicting theories and expand on the consequences of the competition between Protestants and Catholics.

II. Framing My Research Question

In 2014, Mexico's population was 81% Catholic and 9% Protestant, a dramatic change from 1970. Mexico remains a Catholic stronghold overall, but the number of Protestant-affiliated individuals continues to grow. In this thesis, I will seek to understand how Mexico's somewhat uniform religious culture has reacted to the growth of Protestantism. Broadly speaking, how has the Southern Reformation shaped the religious landscape in Mexico? My thesis will tackle the research question: *Taking into account the former traditional make-up of Mexico as highly Catholic, how has the dramatic increase in Protestants in Mexico since the start of the Southern*

Reformation affected rural communities? Further on in this thesis, I will conduct an extensive literature review of scholarly pieces that explain the rise of and some of the results of Protestantism in Latin America. Given the existing literature, I hypothesize that:

As a result of the competition between Catholics and Protestants, the increase in Protestants in Mexico has produced religious violence in rural communities.

Given that this thesis sought to test whether or not the Southern Reformation and the increase in Protestant converts has produced religious violence in traditionally Catholic communities, I conducted an in-depth analysis of the relationship between rates of Protestantism and the presence of religious violence using data derived from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI) 2010 census. I used my final data set, which contained 4,122 villages centered in Oaxaca, Mexico, to create a logistic regression to model the relationship between religious violence and rates of Protestantism. My data analysis, which included many logistic regressions and a comparative placebo test, revealed that the percentage of Protestants is strongly correlated with the chance of religious violence in each Oaxaca locality. The results of my placebo test confirmed the statistical significance of the relationship between higher amounts of Protestantism and religious violence. After initially supporting the first study hypothesis outlined above with thorough statistical analysis, I dug further. Why is it that the high rates of Protestants in Mexico is correlated with the presence of religious violence?

I went on to further hypothesize that the two variables are correlated because Protestants have been poorly integrated into Mexican society. I concluded my data analysis and the methods portion of my study and thesis with a measurement of the fractionalization of each locality, as well as the feelings of marginalization in each locality, to get grasp on how well integrated are Protestant populations.

III. Why This Research Is Important

So far, there has been an impressive diversity of research, from anthropological ethnographies to historical analyses, conducted on Protestantism in Latin America. Many scholars have noted with awe the rise of Pentecostalism and studied its character, yet few concrete quantitative studies have analyzed the effects of the movement. Past research has failed to clearly define what religious conflict means and to show that there is any measurable relationship between Protestantism and conflict in Mexico. Furthermore, to this day, the majority of studies on Protestantism in Mexico have focused on urban evangelism, leaving uncertain the influence of Protestantism on religious dynamics in rural areas. Finally, existing literature is especially lacking in outlines of the consequences of conflict in the Mexican case.

My research builds on the existing literature in four ways. First of all, my research will analyze whether or not there is a relationship between increased rates of Protestantism and greater religious conflict. Taking into account the wealth of supportive literature, I hypothesize that there is a positive correlation between high rates of Protestantism and local community religious conflict. Secondly, my study draws on data from the rural areas of Oaxaca, Mexico, a region in the Southwest of Mexico with a high Indian population, as opposed to the urban areas of Mexico. Previously, Oaxaca has been a popular district of study for experts looking at indigenous cultures and the relatively peaceful living standard of the region. Next, if there is evidence of religious conflict, my thesis will evaluate HOW the religious conflict disturbs the services of each town in order to show that Protestants have or have not been smoothly integrated into Catholic Mexico. Lastly, my research relies on a very under-utilized data set that I believe can shed a good deal of light on the conversation about religion in Mexico.

I am writing this thesis in order to bring the study of Protestantism in Latin America up-to-date. A majority of the existing scholarship was conducted and concluded over ten years ago, leaving looming questions about how the influence and effect of the Southern Reformation has changed. By studying integration, as opposed to the state of Protestantism at this time, my thesis takes the wide range of existing literature into consideration and takes both a chronological and statistical approach to the issue of Christian religion in Mexico. The rise of Protestantism is a process that has taken place over a number of decades and I cannot ignore the historical significance of Protestantism when analyzing its role in Oaxaca communities today. Lastly, there have been few comparative studies of religion in Latin America, let alone few comparative studies of the effects of different religions on conflict.

In the end, I tentatively concluded that the increase in Protestants in Mexico is related to greater community tension and conflict, as well as locality fragmentation due to failed integration. At this point, it is difficult to see if Protestantism preceded community conflict and to prove causation, a significant shortcoming of my study. There was not a strong correlation between decreased rates of Catholics and violence, which may suggest that the tension does not actually stem from competition or conflict with Catholicism. I acknowledge the limitations of my study further in the conclusion, as well as recommend opportunities to build on my findings.

Chapter Two

I. Literature Review: The Origin of the Southern Reformation

For the purpose of this thesis, it is essential to understand how much Mexican politics and culture are informed by Catholic values in order to comprehend the Church's investment in its

dominance of Mexican religion and to realize the shock that Protestant missionaries posed to such dominance. First, I will start with a brief overview of the Church's influence in Mexico that hints at some of the nuances of the special strain of Mexican Catholicism. Then, I will characterize the type of Protestantism that took hold of Mexico, so that readers can see why Protestantism presented a fresh, nontraditional alternative to Catholicism. I will conclude this section by delving into the prevailing theories on the origin of the Southern Reformation and its success.

Catholicism in Mexico is deep-rooted and dedicated to the people and the common good of the country. Catholicism in Mexico is not unlike that in 20th century Argentina and Chile, where local priests sometimes protected villagers from or advocated against the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 80s. Often, the Catholic Church in Mexico spear-headed charity services, connected communities, and worked to uplift the poor. Above all, it is important to acknowledge that Catholicism in Mexico is diverse and often beneficial. I must also note that, although this thesis talks about the Catholic Church and the Catholic faithful as a single unit, the Catholic Church does not stand for all Catholics in Mexico. Many Catholics more strongly affiliate with grassroots Christian networks operated by small-town priests and community members because many Catholics do not uniformly agree with Catholic Church policies. In fact, in 2014, 59% of Mexicans said religious leaders should *not* have an influence in politics and 74% said that religion should be kept separate from government policies (Lipka, 2016). Additionally, the persecution of Catholicism during the 20th century weakened Catholic networks, leaving rural communities detached and distanced from the Vatican.

The history of Catholicism in Mexico is two-sided. On one hand, the values that the Church imparted to its faithful helped define Mexican culture. On the other hand, pride in Mexico's

revolutionary past and the rhetoric of outspoken progressives earned the Catholic Church a reputation as conservative and reactionary. It is widely accepted that the strong impact of religious belief, church ritual, and lay-clerical relations inherited from Spanish colonial times on both social relations and political affiliation for centuries has created a link between Catholic values and Mexican culture and government (Casanova, 1985). At the same time, since the introduction of state anti-clericalism by a pro-Western, market-oriented government after the Mexican revolution, the Catholic Church has been affiliated with political conservatism. Dr. Benjamin T. Smith draws a similar conclusion from his historical analysis of Mixteca Baja peasants from 1750 to 1972, arguing that Catholicism inspired "provincial conservatism" among its poor faithful (2012). Although Smith takes issue with the fact that liberal historians negatively portrayed the Catholic Church as spreading anti-modern propaganda, Smith acknowledges that the Church did install their ideas about hierarchy and property in local infrastructure (2012). Overall, the extent of the Church's countrywide influence and political investment cannot be underappreciated when studying local religious interactions. The Catholic faithful are both fiercely loyal and defensive after many years of persecution.

II. Literature Review Continued: Defining Southern Reformation Protestantism

Ironically, the same 1991 law that allowed Catholic officials to participate freely in Mexican state affairs and encouraged Catholic Church involvement in civil life once again also allowed for Protestant missionaries to penetrate Mexican communities (Torre, Gutiérrez Zúñiga, 2008). Protestantism flourished in many communities as a result of the Mexican constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion and the desire of the disadvantaged to challenge and change the norms around religion.

Foremost, it is important to distinguish the unique type of Protestantism that characterized the Southern Reformation in order to understand what set it apart from Catholicism. The majority of the literature on Protestantism in Latin America is dedicated to creating a detailed and colorful description of the Southern Reformation. The arrival of Protestant missionaries in Latin America was not new or unique to the Southern Reformation, since preachers had been arriving in the region from Europe and the U.S. starting in the late 19th century (Freston, 2001). Yet, the manifest zeal of the fundamentalist faith missions that started the Southern Reformation was exceptional. Although the early waves of the Southern Reformation were made up of puritan and Methodist preachers, the majority of the Protestantism that took hold in Latin America during the Reformation was evangelism similar to indigenous Christianity and based on intense emotional spirituality (Westmeier, 1993).

The movement stuck the most in Brazil, Chile, and parts of Central America and enjoyed relative independence and economic autonomy from parental missionary organizations usually based in the United States (Chavan De Matviuk, 2002). The movement was and is extremely diverse and lacks unity, but remains a massive spiritual force (Sánchez Paredes, 1998). For that reason, José Sánchez Paredes identified the Southern Reformation as a relatively inimitable religious resurgence in his study of Pentecostalism in Peru (Ruuth, 1998). The power of the resurgence was in its communication techniques (Chavan De Matviuk, 2002). Not only did faith missions take advantage of the new radio and television technology in the early 1980s, but the missions utilized public spaces to create inclusiveness (Chavan De Matviuk, 2002). With the introduction of mass evangelism in public spaces, religion was no longer a private familial matter. Missionaries were also set apart from the Catholic Church by their innovative means of recruiting that appealed to the oral storytelling of indigenous communities (McCleary, 2016).

Lastly, although Protestantism was much more accessible and accommodating to many than Catholicism, with its flexible style of worship, self-appointed ministers, and decentralized structure, it was still relatively individualistic compared to community-oriented Catholicism.

There are two major schools of thought that explain the strength and speed with which the Southern Reformation took hold of Latin America. One school points to the faults of Catholicism and the Catholic Church for driving worshippers into the arms of the Protestant missionaries and the second credits the freshness of the Protestant movement for attracting new worshippers. It is possible that the recent abuses, sex scandals, and allegations of corruption undermined the confidence of the Mexican people in the Catholic Church's moral leadership (Gill, 1998). According to Stoll, Latin America is a "Catholic continent trapped in an increasingly Protestant world", a fact that was bound to isolate and alienate the Catholic Church (Garrard-Burnett, Stoll 1993). Stoll claims that the Catholic Church embraced liberation theology in Latin America to revive devotion, but that the failure of liberation theology to mobilize popular opinion in the face of exceptionally emotional and powerful evangelism showed the brilliance of the Protestant movement.

Considering the fact that the PAN party, the representatives of which were strongly associated with Catholicism, swept national elections well into the first decade of the 21st century, about 20 years after the Southern Reformation started to take form, it is likely that the influence of Protestantism probably stems from a combination of the two schools. For instance, a 1995 study of the Bolivian people revealed that the excessive drinking at local Catholic festivals turned off the more spiritual and puritanical faithful (Ruuth, 1998). Pentecostalism "consists of a total radical change of lifestyle" that former Catholics seek as a means of salvation (Ruuth, 1998). On the note of salvation, some attribute Protestant growth to a new hypothesis of religious

deprivation caused by the weaknesses of the Catholic Church. In the case of Mexico, Stark and Smith claim that the Protestant missionaries' reliance on supernatural solutions appealed to impoverished individuals that needed the hopeful promises that God would come to the rescue (2010).

In addition to class and income, scholars have pointed to other demographic factors that determine the strength of Protestantism, such as location and ethnicity. The spread of Pentecostalism in Peru coincided with rapid urbanization and movement to Lima, evidence that links the surge of religious groups to the process of adaption to the social sectors most directly implicated in migration and urbanization (Sánchez Paredes, 1998). Indians were particularly likely to convert to Protestantism during the Southern Reformation because evangelism occupied a space left empty by Catholicism by offering identity markers and modernity (Gros, 1999). Aside from location and ethnicity, Protestant converts are typically female, but vary in terms of age and level of education (Lipka, 2016). Non-traditional families were also attracted to Pentecostalism for its less rigorous and strict definitions about familial structure and tradition (Martin, 1990).

Given the historical incorporation of Catholicism into the political and civil spheres in Mexico, how have the great number of conversions to Protestantism shocked the Catholic system? Although the Mexican Constitution provides for freedom of religion, Catholicism was unquestioned as the religion of Mexico for centuries, a fact that left very little room for flexibility and accommodation by the Catholic Church. It is entirely possible that Catholicism and Protestantism can peacefully co-exist as religious forces in Mexico, yet the Catholic Church may aggressively respond to the challenge to their influence by creating conflict. In the next

section, I will review how Protestantism and Catholicism have interacted according to the background literature.

III. Literature Review Continued: Catholic and Protestant Competition

What does the background literature predict about the relationship between the rising Protestantism and the traditional Catholicism in Mexico? Most scholars make clear that it is impossible to separate an analysis of modern-day Latin America from the long history of rivalry between Protestantism and Catholicism. Competition between the two religions is not new, a pretext that has left relations between the two organizations bitter and hostile. The vision that Protestantism has for Latin America comes into direct conflict with the vested interests of the Catholic Church (Montes, 1992).

The general consensus by experts is that the relationship between the two religions is marred by intense competition, a rivalry that can be explained by two different theoretical approaches to religion. The first is the cultural-institutional approach that argues clients will join organizations that exhibit values with which they agree (Knowlton, 2016). As a result, clients of different religions may clash due to their different values, political beliefs, and social ideas, creating tension. The second theoretical approach puts forward the idea of rational choice that portrays religious pluralism as a market, where adherents will select the religion from which they win the most benefits (Knowlton, 2016). According to rational choice, the Catholic-Protestant relationship would be strained by the organization's oppositional roles as contenders for the faith of Latin America.

The cultural-institutional approach highlights large value and structural differences between Catholicism and Protestantism that shows why the two religious movements might be at odds. For example, indigenous conversion to Protestantism in Mesoamerica is directly tied to changes

in ethnic self-identification, to the point that converted Protestants started to use evangelism to sidestep traditional Indian social hierarchies (Dow, Sandstrom, 2001). The study by Dow and Sandstrom suggests that Protestantism better embraces values of equality and liberty, while also showing that local Mexicans that conversion signified not only a religious choice, but a strategic social and political choice (2001). The more recent rapid growth of the Charismatic Catholic movement is pointed to by both Stark and Chestnut as evidence that there is a value war taking place in Latin America. The two argue that the Charismatic Catholic movement, built as a grassroots missionary movement that emphasizes morals and ethics, is the product of the Catholic Church's re-structuring to better compete with Protestantism and to highlight progressive standards that might appeal to Mexican constituents. Secondly, the Catholic Church is an institution in Mexico, spearheaded by a clerical hierarchy, whereas Protestantism is characterized more as an elastic populism initiated by local missionaries. On one hand, Catholicism may offer more resources given its connection to the state. But on the other hand, Protestantism relies on local networks, so it may better empower local leaders and create community, thereby attracting individuals that feel sidelined by Mexican politics or society. For those that feel discriminated against, communal Protestant networks offer a sense of solidarity and support. The difference in structure is only one potential point of conflict between the two different organizations.

From the perspective of rational choice, one of the best representations of competition between the two religions was completed by R. Andrew Chestnut, who portrayed the spiritual plurality in Latin America in economic terms to show how the Catholic Church and the Protestant missionaries fought for constituents (2003). Protestantism and Catholicism in Latin America practice rivalry as unregulated economic competition similar to that between commercial firms

because the Latin American religious market is one of the most desirable to control, given the strength and passion of the region's faithful (Chestnut, 2003). Some scholars went farther than the rational choice approach and even suggested that the North American roots of missions, associated with the wealth and prosperity of the U.S., provided Protestant missionaries with an economic advantage that appealed to the very poor in Latin America. It's also important to consider the case that competition arises between Catholicism and Protestantism in Mexico because the Catholic Church "struck a deal" to cooperate with the national government (Gill, 1998). The "economic exchange", made between two autonomous institutions with the expectation of mutual benefit, allowed the Catholic Church to take advantage financially and politically of its exchange with the government, leaving the Protestant missionaries disadvantaged and frustrated (Gill, 1998). Similarly, politicians in Mexico have always seemed anxious to appear in public with the pope, suggesting that the government needs the Catholic Church to bolster its popular appeal amid scandals and letdowns.

The competition between the two religions is amplified by the fact that Protestantism and Catholicism are not just competing spiritually, but are also competing socially and politically. At first, Latin American Protestants forsook political participation and prided themselves on their worldliness and spirituality. More recently, though, a newer generation of missionaries has found politics to be an apt arena to enact reform and bring redemption, a change in attitude that makes studying the Protestant-Catholic relationship today very pertinent. For instance, a qualitative study of Protestantism in Oaxaca shows that Protestant missions in local settings invoke new forms of imparting justice and new opinions about the role of state institutions, beliefs that challenge Catholic influence in community governance (Montes, 1998). Furthermore, the Mexican political landscape is still regarded as an opposition between traditionalists and

modernizers, an atmosphere that breeds competition when the Catholics are thought to be political traditionalists (Gross, 2003). Although Gross argues that Protestantism is often exaggerated as a trigger of social change, he states that the Mexican poor and marginalized still associate Protestantism with progressiveness and an optimistic future (Gross, 2003). Protestant evangelists worked hard to carve out a free social space apart from Catholic spiritual spaces that allows the poor and indigenous to escape the oppression of colonial rule and authoritarian mestizo priests (Martin, 1990). Protestants were also famous for the celebrated extensive use of live music and preaching at indigenous fiestas by Guatemalan Protestant missionaries, methods that are believed to show the strong political and ethnic underlining of evangelism (McCleary, Pesina, 2011).

It is difficult to ignore the antagonism that could arise from the fundamental differences in value, structure, and style between the Protestants of the Southern Reformation and the Catholic Church. It is possible to draw basic parallels between Karel Steenbrink's in-depth study of Protestant missionaries in Indonesia in the early 20th century and the Southern Reformation of today. There are many similarities between the movements, including the fact that Protestantism in Indonesia at the time was also considered the 'new' Christianity and that Protestantism was used as a means to oppose the Catholic colonial government. Steenbrink demonstrates that the rise of Protestant missionaries led to increased local conflict in areas such as Soinrat because the rise of Protestantism highlighted the division between the upper and lower classes of Indondesia. The fact that conflicts between Protestants and Catholics were reported in Steenbrink's study more often than conflicts between Catholics and Muslims is a testament to the strength of the antagonism. In the 1980s and 1990s, in the highland villages of Chiapas, Mexico, one of the most marginalized states in the country, violence broke out on a large scale between Catholics

and Protestants, a history that has not received nearly enough attention. Even more worrying are reports and studies of parachurch mobs in Guatemala playing "intrusive, extralegal" roles that have incited crime and fought with other religious groups over their violent means of "cleansing" communities (Luce Project, 2016).

Many experts believe that the chance of heated conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Mexico is small. Given that Guatemala, which has the largest number of evangelicals in the region, has yet to face intense religious war, what would cause intra-religious violence in Mexico? Yet, in modern-day Chiapas, stories abound of discrimination and mistreatment by Catholics against recently converted Protestants (Saliba, 2012). The Pope, in his recent visits to Mexico, has been suspiciously silent about the fact that Catholic officials cut off water supplies and electricity to several Protestant families in 2014 after they refused to participate in Catholic festivals. Vincente García, a Pentecostalist street vendor, was forced to leave his hometown of San Juan Chamula when "'the Catholics drove out [his] family'". García is one of many that feared for his life in Chiapas, which has reported years of religious strife due to tension between converts and traditional Catholics.

This is the conflict that I seek to study in this thesis. Is Chiapas a unique case? Or has the competitive and tense relationship between Catholicism and Protestantism manifested as violence in other parts of Mexico? If religious violence is driven by the increasing number of converts to Protestantism, what does that say about the security of Protestants, the integration of non-Catholics, and the future of religious pluralism in Mexico?

Chapter Three

I. Introduction to Study Design

Given that this thesis seeks to better understand whether or not the Southern Reformation and the increase in Protestant converts has produced religious violence in traditionally Catholic communities, the study requires an in-depth analysis of the relationship between rates of Protestantism and the presence of violence. In this chapter, I will first present the data set with which I worked, including a description of the 2010 Mexican national census and the methods used by INEGI to capture the census data. Then, I will explain why I chose to focus on Oaxaca, as opposed to other regions in Mexico. After describing the variables relevant to my study and the sample population of the study, I will introduce the measurements I used to complete the statistical analysis. Using the program *R Studio*, I completed a logistic regression that modeled the correlation between religious violence in the villages and the rates of Protestantism and Catholicism in the same villages. Following the logistic regressions of the most relevant variables, I also carried out a placebo test on various other kinds of violence, including territorial violence and criminal violence, to verify the strength of the correlation between religious violence and religious identity. To solidify the study, I completed a test of the fractionalization of each of the villages to confirm that Protestantism offers serious competition to Catholicism and should be considered a major influence and stakeholder in each community. I conclude this chapter with a review of my findings and other interesting relevant results.

Before introducing the data set with which I worked, I do want to acknowledge that violence in Mexico has proven notoriously hard to investigate. The rise of drug cartels and the commonality of trafficking through major Mexican states have created chaos, divided Mexican

communities, and made it difficult to decipher the exact motivations for violence. That is why I was very intentional about finding the best means to isolate and study purely religious violence, a process that I will describe below. That is also the reason that my hypothesis asserts correlation, not causation. Furthermore, I recognize that the plurality within each religious community in Mexico means that social scientists, including myself, should be particularly careful drawing inferences from such pluralism in beliefs to specific political consequences. The personalities of different Protestants and Catholics vary differently, as does the importance of religion to each community. There are too many churches, too many spokespersons, and too many worshippers for simple references to Catholics and Protestants to suffice, so in the following sections I describe the Protestant and Catholic communities in detail and with nuance.

II. The Data Set: INEGI, Oaxaca, and the Sample Population

The *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI), or the organization that directs and collects the national census of Mexico every five years, was created in 1983. INEGI united the former offices of the Director General of Statistics, the Director General of Geography, the Director General of Informative Politics, and the Director General of Integration and Information Analysis. The particularly comprehensive mandate and holistic approach of INEGI, which takes into consideration issues such as assimilation and public services, as wells as its professionalization, makes the INEGI data set one of the most reliable sources used by academic researchers on developing countries. INEGI does a great job of capturing the uneven distribution of the Mexican population between highly-concentrated and dense cities and very small villages, thereby providing a clear picture of religion in the most rural areas of the country.

In 2010, INEGI released a module on the characteristics of rural localities to promote national policies that encouraged equitable and sustainable development between different regions. The

census included not only the usual demographic data, but also information about the infrastructure and services of all registered towns under 5,000 inhabitants. Unlike previous numbers-based censuses, the more qualitative module was intended to give policymakers and political scientists better opportunity to analyze the civil and political environment in communities. Probably the most pertinent to this thesis, the *Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010* included new variables about the presence of certain types of violence as perceived by local authorities and leaders. The INEGI office has produced a couple of statistical reports on the 2010 census, but to my knowledge, this is the first academic study dedicated to the se2010 census violence variables.

Since I relied heavily on the data of the *Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010*, I want to briefly review the INEGI methods used to collect the census figures. INEGI first modernized and verified the findings of the *Conteo de Población y Vivienda 2005* to update the size of towns and subtract villages that no longer existed as a result of migration or the fusion of two previous villages. INEGI designed a new instrument, called the *Cuestionario de Localidad*, used by the trained government interview supervisors to create a profile of each village included in the census. In addition to measuring the size and demographics of their assigned towns with cartographic materials, the supervisors were in charge of managing in-person interviews with local village authorities to gather answers to the survey data about conflict, public services, and other characteristics of the town. It is essential to know, for the purpose of ensuring the credibility of the survey responses, that the interviewed local village "authorities" were elected presidents, delegates or municipal officials that had lived in their respective localities for 15 years or more.

Although the 2010 census was conducted nationally and offers beneficial opportunities for comparison between regions on any number of socioeconomic issues, I focused my study on Oaxaca. By focusing on one region, I build a descriptive case study that guarantees my findings are as specific as possible and can provide a certifiable framework for further study of religious violence across all of Mexico. I also promise that the scope of this original research is manageable, that my findings are consistent, and that my findings are relevant. I avoid overgeneralizing and oversimplifying the complex relationship between religion and violence that varies regionally in each part of Mexico. Finally, I ensure that any potential policy responses to the findings of this thesis can be tailored to Oaxaca.

So then, of the 31 federated states in Mexico, why study rural Oaxaca? Oaxaca has geographical, social, and political significance. Oaxaca is in the southwest of Mexico, near the border with Central America and therefore, closer to the Latin American hotspots of the Southern Reformation. Evangelical Protestantism is strongest in the southern states of Mexico, making Oaxaca an appropriate location to evaluate real competition between Protestantism and Catholicism. For instance, Oaxaca in 2010 was only 81.3% Catholic, compared to the 93.2% Catholic or the 88.9% in central regions like Aguascalientes or Nayarit (INEGI, 2016). Oaxaca is also located directly to the north of Chiapas, where a majority of the reported eye-witness conflict between Protestants and Catholics takes place. Additionally, Oaxaca is a center of liberalism, so the relatively progressive and modernized attitudes of evangelical missionaries would particularly appeal to Oaxaca locals.

By studying Oaxaca, I also lend extra integrity and accuracy to the responses of local leaders because the communities of Oaxaca place great emphasis on local forms of self-government (Vázquez-García, 2012). The government of Oaxaca has legally recognized indigenous self-

government, a political move that empowered and encouraged widespread rural self-government focused on custom and tradition (2012). As a result, the opinions of the leaders on the presence of religious violence, as recorded by the violence variables of 2010 survey, matters greatly. Lastly, to refer back to the importance of studying rural religion, Oaxaca poses a great opportunity to study rural religion because the region has a relatively large amount of registered villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants (the threshold for rural according to this thesis). Rural towns of less than 5,000 hold 28% of the total Mexican population, a significant portion of the population that cannot be ignored in the study of religious conflict. Oaxaca has high numbers of indigenous populations as well, lending the state similar demographics to that of the highland villages of Chiapas. I used INEGI demographic data to quickly verify that Oaxaca does, in fact, stay true to the general trend of the Southern Reformation because the rates of Protestantism in the region increased over the last few decades, as shown by the table below.

Table 1: The rise of Protestantism in Oaxaca (INEGI)[3]

Year	2000	2010
Percent of Population in Oaxaca that identifies as non-Catholic Christian	11.85%	16.77%

The 2010 census of Oaxaca includes a total number of 10, 418 localities with less than 5,000 inhabitants and each locality has a profile that details characteristics such as size, education of the population, average ages of the population, etc. I further narrowed the data set to accommodate small gaps and errors in the original data set. For instance, I removed all villages that lacked exact sums for population total, such as those measurements recorded by census

[3] This measurement is restricted to years 2000-2010 for lack of more data on religious affiliations of town inhabitants. The year 2000 was the first year that the census completed an in-depth investigation of religious identification and, unfortunately, the 2005 population census does not include variables on religion that are available to the public.

supervisors with asterisks (*) to signal wild card numbers (for example, an asterisk in "2*" signals that the village population is between 20 and 30). I also removed all villages without clear responses, such as "NE" or "NDAI" (representing responses where the local authority did not have an opinion or did not know whether or not religious violence took place) on the religious violence variable. Lastly, I removed towns with less than 100 inhabitants in the case that the smallest villages lacked any infrastructure or government to actually speak with authority on matters of religious violence. A large number of the original 10, 418 villages were villages with only 1 or 2 inhabitants, making it hard to judge whether or not the town could hypothetically experience religious violence. My edits to the data set left me with a total number of 4,121 towns to analyze.

During my study, I worked with two different types of variables drawn from the census: demographic and conflict variables. The demographic variables that are pertinent to this study are total population, the population number that identifies as Catholic (PCATOLICA), the population number that identifies as Protestant (PNCATOLICA), the population number that identifies as another non-Christian religion (POTRAS_REL), and the population that identifies as non-religious (PSIN_REL). In this thesis, I use the label Protestant to encapsulate all non-Catholic Christians, in line with the INEGI census definition. I should note, though, that the term Protestant is a contentious term at points because many self-identifying Christians do not agree with or affiliate with the term Protestant. Yet, I chose to use the term to simplify this thesis because 'Protestant' is commonly understood to encompass non-Catholic groups. I define the label Protestant broadly and rely heavily on the anthropology espoused by Virginia Garrard-Burnett and David Stoll that uses Protestant as an umbrella term for a number of diverse groups like evangelists and Biblicists (Garrard-Burnett and Stoll, 1993). I converted each number of

Catholics, non-Catholics, non-Christians, and non-religious into percentages of the total population to create useful variables for analysis.

I worked with four different conflict variables: religious conflict (CONFLICTO1), electoral conflict (CONFLICTO2), criminal conflict (CONFLICTO3), drug and alcohol-related conflict (CONFLICTO4). The four conflict variables registered either "Yes" or "No" depending on whether or not the local authority believed the village exhibited violence related to each subject. At this point, the local authority's perception of religious violence is the strongest measurement available because it is difficult for a foreign researcher or outside government official to discern the religious environment of a locality. It is also quite difficult to get accurate statistics on motivations for killings or violence.

Table 2: Random sample of towns from data set and their relevant variables

NOM_LOC	CONFLI	POB	PCATO	PNC	POTRA	PSIN_	PTPCAT	PTPNC
Abejones	NO	1,009	800	0	0	197	0.79	0
Icayuco	NO	143	141	0	0	0	0.99	0
La Trinidad	NO	456	451	0	0	0	0.99	0
El Vizaje	NO	240	239	0	0	0	1	0
Arroyo Chical (Nuevo Arroyo Chicali)	NO	1,230	1188	1	0	0	0.97	0
Santiago Yaitepec	NO	4,120	4085	12	0	5	0.99	0
Piedra de Amolar	NO	1,992	1969	16	0	1	0.99	0.01
Profesor Otilio Montaño	NO	438	366	6	0	64	0.84	0.01
San Felipe Tejalápam	NO	2,308	2228	48	0	13	0.97	0.02
Guayacán	NO	189	167	4	0	18	0.88	0.02
La Permuta	SI	714	446	265	0	2	0.62	0.37
María Lombardo de Caso	SI	3,857	2462	1031	0	291	0.64	0.27
Loma Larga	SI	144	63	43	0	38	0.44	0.3

III. Research Tools and Findings

In order to test my hypothesis that increased rates of Protestantism correspond with religious violence in Oaxaca communities, I established my dependent and independent variables. My

independent variable is the percent non-Catholic in each locality and my dependent variable is the presence of religious violence (whether or not the local authority responds "yes" or "no"). I also recognized the null hypothesis of this study, that the percent of the population that is Protestant and religious conflict are unrelated. In this section, I review the measurements I used to evaluate the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and the findings of my study. First, I carried out a logistic regression model to show that there is a positive correlation between rates of Protestantism and religious violence. Then, I followed up with a placebo test to show that the relationship between Protestantism and religious violence is unique. Finally, I finished by measuring the fractionalization of each locality, a measurement that indicated that Oaxaca is, indeed, ripe for religious conflict as a result of the significant share of communities that Protestants influence and control.

I tested the correlation between the independent and dependent variable using the program R Studio. The language R was the best option for predicting a dichotomous, or Boolean value, dependent variable such as the violence variables represented as "yes" or "no". The R Studio program is the best platform, in my opinion, for graphing relationships between numbered variables and Boolean true/false variables. I used the graphing package ggplot to represent the data, which was extremely useful for capturing the complexity of the relationship between Protestantism and violence. On R Studio, I developed a logistic regression model to predict the chance that there is religious violence for every possible input (the rate of Protestantism in each town). More specifically, I used a generalized linear model (GLM), the standard and reliable logistic regression model, to find the intercepts of the independent and dependent variables. With the GLM, I was able to produce an equation, written below, that predicts the probability of violence. The logistic regression equation $y = e^{ax+b}$, where variables a and b represent the

coefficients for the intercept of the independent and dependent variable, estimates the correlation between religious violence and the rate of Protestantism. The equation $y = e^{ax+b}$ allows the prediction to better fit the data than a simple linear equation would. The GLM predicted that the variable *a* was valued at *.738* and the variable *b* was valued at *-2.44*. As a result, the model estimates that the probability of religious violence given the rate of Protestantism in each village can be predicted by the following equation:

$$y = e^{.738x+(-2.44)}$$

The equation, when graphed, shows that there is a positive correlation between religious violence and rates of Protestantism. The utility of the equation above can best be understood by example. For instance, take the locality La Permuta, which is about 30% Protestant, in Table 2 above. The model equation then predicts that there is a 11.45% chance that there is religious violence in La Permuta. The 11.45% may not seem important, but overall, only 8.8% of towns have religious violence, so the 11.45% prediction is quite high. Taken relative to the very low percent chance there is religious violence in strongly Catholic towns, the model equation is a consistent and robust predictor. Piedra de Amolar, a village that is 99% Catholic and only 1% Protestant, has an 8.7% chance of violence.

The GLM is also useful because it generates a *p value* that speaks to the statistical significance of the correlation between religious violence and rates of Protestantism. The *p value* of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable is 0.0124, less than the .05 significance level threshold. The .05 significance level is standard and shows the validity of the measurements. Therefore, the correlation between religious conflict and the rates of Protestantism is statistically significant and I reject the null hypothesis (see Appendix A to see

program production of intercept coefficients and *p value*). To better illustrate the robust correlation between religious conflict and rates of Protestantism, refer to Graph 1.

Graph 1: Correlation between religious conflict and rates of Protestantism per village



In order to verify the importance of the correlation and add further confidence to my original hypothesis, I also conducted a placebo test of the relationship between the rates of Protestantism and other types of violence recorded by the INEGI data set. The control test revealed that the correlation between rates of Protestantism and religious conflict was by far the most statistically significant relationship, demonstrated by Table 3 below. Keep in mind that the lower the *p value*, the greater the statistical significance. As shown by Table 3, the *p value for the a coefficient* for religious conflict and conflict caused by drugs and alcohol are the only two types of conflict that fall below the .05 threshold. Yet, the *a coefficient* for conflict caused by drugs and alcohol is

negative, indicating a negative correlation and revealing that high rates of Protestantism are not actually a good predictor of drug and alcohol violence. The negative correlation is not surprising, especially considering that the evangelism and Pentecostalism of the Southern Reformation is famous for discouraging drinking at religious celebrations or locality festivals (Howarth, Peterson 2016). Lastly, I want to point out that the sum of squared errors, an indication of the the closeness of the model to the data, is the lowest for religious conflict, showing that the logistic model is the most appropriate and reliable.

Table 3: Testing the strength of the relationship between Protestantism and types of conflict, as shown by *p values*

Types of Conflict	*Religious Conflict*	*Electoral Conflict*	*Criminal Conflict*	*Conflict caused by drugs or alcohol*
a coefficient	**0.7381**	**0.0112**	**0.4013**	**-0.5462**
Standard Error	**0.2951**	**0.2924**	**0.2891**	**0.0454**
P value for *a* coefficient	**0.0124**	**0.9700**	**0.1650**	**0.0136**
b coefficient	**-2.4436**	**-2.0733**	**-2.2295**	**-0.9774**
Standard Error	**0.0713**	**0.0633**	**0.0663**	**0.2214**
P value for *b* coefficient	**<2e-16**	**<2e-16**	**<2e-16**	**<2e-16**
Sum of Squared Errors	**2450.948**	**2887.988**	**2716.371**	**4711.677**

N = 4,121

The contrast between Graphs 1 and 2 reinforces the importance of the relationship between religious conflict and rates of Protestantism. In Graph 2, there is no real linear relationship between higher rates of Protestantism and the chance of electoral conflict. In Graph 1, the greater the percent Protestant of each town, the greater the chance of religious violence. As is evidenced by the wide margins of error towards the end of each graph (represented by the gray areas), there

are much fewer localities dominated by Protestants. The vast majority of localities in the dataset are a large percent Catholic, which represents well Mexico's overall make-up. Only 4.85% of towns in the data set are more than 50% Protestant, meaning that the farther along the model, the less robust the relationship.

Graph 2: Correlation between electoral conflict and rates of Protestantism per village



Interestingly enough, Graph 1 reveals that the relationship is positive because the chance that there is religious violence in the locality does not start to decrease at any point. Put another way, the point when a locality is most equally divided between Protestants and Catholics is not the point when there is the greatest chance of violence. What does this say about the source of friction? One might interpret the lack of a bell curve as a sign that Protestants have been the source of disruption in Mexican communities and that the violence has stemmed from aggressive

competitive action taken by Protestants. This would mean that in towns with high rates of Protestantism, Protestants sometimes commit abuses against other Protestants, signifying that the debate needs to be reframed from "Catholic vs. Protestant" to "Protestant vs. Protestant". Given the extreme diversity of non-Catholic missionary movements, this narrative is not unlikely.

Yet, taken in the broader historical context of Mexico church-state relations, it is possible that there is another story. Instead of writing off the Protestants as the culprits, I considered the possibility that Protestants are the victims, as has been reported in states like Chiapas. After years of governmental and societal marginalization of the non-traditional Protestant groups, minority non-Catholic populations are anxious and agitated. Could activist calls to action for minority religious rights manifest as religious conflict? Or is belligerence and aggression characterized as religious conflict being used strategically by Protestant groups to catch the attention of the government and demand aid and support? At this point, I started to wonder why there was a strong correlation between Protestantism and religious violence. I hypothesized that the significant, positive correlation resulted from the failed integration of Protestants into a traditionally and heavily Catholic society in Oaxaca localities.

To build on this train of thought, I first tested the relationship between rates of Catholicism and the presence of religious violence to re-confirm my hypothesis that it was indeed high rates of Protestantism and the rates of Catholicism that determined the religious violence. As you can see in Graph 3, there is a negative correlation between Catholicism and religious violence. Although Graph 3 may seem to contradict my explanation for why the highest rates of Protestantism correlate with the highest change of religious violence, it actually supports my notion about government marginalization. As established in the literature review, Catholicism has been the popular religion for years, so it would make sense culturally and politically that

there would be less tension and less violence in religiously homogenous towns where individuals share value systems that have been shaped over many decades (Fuentes, 2012).

Secondly, I took advantage of one of the most unique and useful variables in the INEGI 2010 data set. The variable, called "Problema", asked officials and various locals what they considered to be the greatest principal problem of the locality. The respondents were asked to choose one problem from a list of potential issues that included difficulties such as lack of infrastructure or clean water, alcoholism, drug abuse, floods or droughts, lack of employment, or immigration. Three of the options from the list particularly stood out to me as possible proxies to measure integration, since the 2010 census did not attempt to investigate assimilation: *poverty and marginalization, crime and insecurity,* and *lack of government support*. Although I recognize that the three options are not completely comprehensive evaluators of the social and political integration in the localities, I do believe it is important to understand how each of the villages perceives their relationship with the Mexican regional and national governments as well as with Mexican society.

Table 5: Major Problems for Oaxaxa Towns and the Typical Religion Associated with Each Problem

Type of Problem	# of Towns that Marked Problem	Average % Protestants in Towns with Problems	Average % Catholics in Towns with Problem
falta de empleo o emigración	1,332	12.70%	82.79%
falta de recursos económicos	51	13.79%	84.42%
pobreza o marginación	529	12.73%	82.90%
falta de apoyo o deficiencia gubernamental	101	13.72%	82.24%
irregularidad o disputa relacionada con la tenencia de la tierra	78	12.00%	83.36%
delincuencia o inseguridad	74	14.49%	78.05%
alcoholismo o drogadicción	138	13.12%	82.25%

falta de infraestructura o servicio de agua	671	12.04%	82.89%
falta de drenaje y alcantarillado	63	14.78%	80.34%
falta de energía eléctrica	73	11.89%	83.43%
falta de carretera o transporte	249	13.03%	81.85%
falta de equipamiento o servicios de salud	96	13.66%	79.37%
falta de equipamiento o servicios para la educación	31	15.35%	81.37%
falta de abasto o comercio	7	3.78%	94.29%
falta de otros servicios o equipamiento	123	15.12%	79.52%
sequía, inundaciones o clima adverso	42	14.27%	79.57%
contaminación ambiental	19	11.36%	85.26%
otra clase de problema	115	14.91%	80.68%
Sin problema	159	13.66%	81.12%
No especificado	170	17.16%	76.08%

According to my calculations, the towns that marked *poverty and marginalization* as their primary problem are on average 13.49% Protestant and the towns that marked *lack of government support* as their primary problem are on average 13.7% Protestant. Not only are the averages high, but the averages are very similar, indicating that there might be something to be said for minority Protestant populations feeling isolated and ostracized by Mexican Catholic society. Although only 74 localities in total marked *crime or insecurity* as the major issue, those localities that did were on average 14.49% Protestant, one of the highest percent Protestant problems on the table. The lack of security felt by the localities show how distanced, unprotected, and vulnerable the populations feel, possibly as a result of their minority religion label. Another *problema* to pay attention to is *no especificado,* to which a number of highly Protestant towns responded, a potential representation of how uncomfortable Protestants may feel discussing their isolation or marginalization with government officials (although this is just a speculation of mine). In my opinion, the fact that so many towns marked political factors such as

poverty and marginalization or *lack of government support* as the principal problem of their locality when the census provided 16 other options related to public health and employment is shocking. The finding may also show the strength of the alienation that Oaxaca feels as a region with a relatively high Protestant population, but at this point, I do not have the data to verify that sentiment.

Graph 3: Correlation between religious conflict and rates of Catholicism per village



Since some Oaxaca localities are home to more types of religious faithful than Protestants and Catholics, it was important that I consider alternative hypotheses. Was Protestantism the correct phenomenon to pay attention to? To answer this question and to reaffirm the strong significance of the Protestant populations, I investigated which faith groups were prominent at the locality level. I re-appropriated the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (Alesina, 2003), valued at one

over the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares (in this case, religious group shares) where *s* is the share of each group, to calculate the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the total population of each locality belonged to different religious groups. In my calculations, I included four different religious groups: the percent of Catholics in each locality, the percent of non-Catholics in each locality, the percent of non-Christians in each locality, and the percent non-religious in each locality.

$$FRACTIONALIZATION_j = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1} s_{ij}^2}$$

I computed the fractionalization of each locality in my data set, a random sample of which is displayed in Table 4. The fractionalization value, out of 4, helped me discern which religious groups were prominent in certain localities. The average fractionalization value for the 4,224 towns was 1.42, showing that one and a half shares of the combined groups was significant. The fractionalization index revealed that Oaxaca is demonstrably religiously polarized, with multiple faith groups competing in many towns, another sign that the region is ripe for religious conflict due to the number of faith groups competing and clashing. The index also revealed the Oaxaca communities are fragmented as a result of their religious differences, creating an environment that fuels tension and conflict.

Table 4: Random Sample of Oaxaca Localities and their Religious Fractionalization

NOM_LOC	POBTOT	PERCAT	PERNCAT	PEROTH	PERNREL	Fractional
Barrio Alvarado	208	11%	37%	0%	38%	3.49213
El Porvenir	112	26%	37%	0%	38%	2.92674
Santo Domingo Yosoñama	330	49%	24%	0%	24%	2.78916
San Pedro	110	61%	15%	0%	24%	2.21856
Rincón Viejo	2358	67%	18%	0%	13%	1.99643
Colonia el Pajarito	154	69%	22%	0%	8%	1.85658
Río Granada	170	92%	0%	3%	5%	1.16824
Nicolás Bravo	104	92%	0%	0%	8%	1.16552

It is important to point out that the percent Catholic, percent Protestant, percent other, and percent non-religious do not necessarily add up to 100% in the data set, probably as a result of the inability to assess some inhabitants' religions. Although it is difficult to prove without first-hand interviews, the lack of full reporting on religious affiliation could be a reflection of the toxic or sensitive nature of discussing religion in these Oaxaca localities, an indication of the tense relationships between the religious groups.

IV. Other Interesting Findings

Before moving on to my concluding remarks and suggestions for further research, I wanted to take a moment to briefly point out other interesting findings of this study related to the logistic regression model and fractionalization index. As the literature review emphasized, the choice to convert to Protestantism in Mexico is not just a decision made out of faith, but also for political, social, and economic reasons. To complement the literature review, I conducted a short test of the relationship between indigenous populations and religious violence. Using a similar logistic regression model to the one in Section III, I tested the correlation between the presence of indigenous language (whether or not localities spoke an indigenous language, according to the 2010 census) and the presence of religious violence. The test revealed that in localities that do speak indigenous languages, there is an average of a 9.42% chance of religious violence and in localities that do not speak indigenous languages, there is an average of a 7.56% of religious violence. I found these numbers striking; one could argue that indigenous communities have been proven to be marginalized and sidelined from Mexican mainstream culture and politics. This finding is not irrelevant because it shows that the models I constructed above may, in fact, reflect the isolation of the Protestant communities. At the very least, this finding confirms reports

and testimonies by indigenous peoples that have felt persecuted or targeted for their conversion to Protestantism.

Secondly, I did want to touch on the fact that the average number of non-Catholic individuals decreased dramatically from 2000 to 2010, as shown by Table 1. On page 3 of this chapter, I offered a possible statistical explanation for the decrease, but I also wanted to explore anthropological and political reasons for the decrease. The decrease suggests that in recent years, Oaxaca has experienced massive migration away from the rural localities. It would be interesting to follow this finding with a study of whether or not urban areas of Oaxaca have experienced complementary immigration over the period of 2000 to 2010. On another note, could the migration be in response to the violence and/or judgement in rural areas? At this time, that is a notion that is hard to back up statistically, but it deserves future research. Finally, I wanted to explore the fractionalization index a bit further. Aside from the average fractionalization value, there were a significant number of values for individual localities that showed the number of religious group shares to be above 3, proposing that a third religious group other than Protestants and Catholics pulls weight in towns and villages. What role do non-religious and non-Christian populations play in towns struggling with religious violence? Down the road, it will be essential to know if the growing presence of non-Christian groups and non-religious groups eases or deepens the divisions in Oaxaca localities.

Chapter Four

I. A Review of the Findings

In the last chapter, I showed that the link between rates of Protestantism and religious violence in Oaxaca is undeniable. Similar to Mexico overall, Oaxaca has experienced an increase in Protestantism over the last ten years. A statistical analysis of the 2010 Mexican census

violence variables revealed that, as the percent of the total population of a locality that is Protestant increases, there was a greater chance that a locality witnessed religious violence. I also opened a discussion about integration of Protestants and I used the *problema* diagnostic and the fractionalization index as proxies to measure how Protestants possibly feel about integration. The index revealed that Oaxaca localities are fragmented. Furthermore, the fractionalization index results showed the Protestantism is a serious and compelling force in the state that poses a threat to Catholic dominance.

First and foremost in this chapter, I will argue that the findings of my study are direct evidence that Protestant populations have been poorly, if at all, integrated into Catholic society. I will review why failed integration is a threat to Mexican society and then I will explore how the Mexican government, either at a regional or a national level, can and should respond to this state problem. Later on, this chapter will touch on the limitations of my study, although overall I believe I have shown the study to be reliable and robust. I will focus more on the alternative narratives and lingering questions that remain after the conclusion of this study before making suggestions for future research and investigation.

II. Catholic-Protestant Relations: Failed Integration and the Implications for the Mexican Government

Is integration of Protestants possible in an entrenched Catholic society such as Mexico? The literature would predict no, for two reasons. The first reason is the difference in morals, structure, and political beliefs between the two organizations. As early as the 19th century, conservative Mexican politicians doubted that small amounts of Protestant immigrants from Europe could be integrated into society because the Protestants' different morals would cause disorder (Rodriguez, Vincent 1997). The second reason is the traditional dominance of

Catholicism in Mexico. Favoritism for the Catholic Church by the Mexican government and most Mexican leaders has produced a lack of common acceptance of Protestantism. In present-day Mexico, governmental and political affiliation with the Catholic Church lends legitimacy and credibility, a trend that extends to local populations (Cuamea-Velázquz, 1995). As a result, Protestant individuals are disempowered and delegitimized as proactive members of Catholic town and village communities. As Richard Millet points out in the Journal of Church and State, by far the most common involvement of Protestants in Latin America in church-state relations is active opposition to government in reaction to official preference for the Catholic Church (Millet, 1973). One might even draw a connection between Protestants today and Catholic activists during the ant-clerical laws of the early part of the 20th century. From 1920-1940, the Catholic faithful were similarly marginalized by the national government's forceful institution of the separation of church and state (Manzo, 2008).

The findings of my study offer hard statistical evidence to complement the existing literature because they do not foretell the smooth and peaceful integration of Protestants into Mexican communities. Integration, as far as I am concerned in this thesis, refers to the functional interdependence of the parts of a social system (Parsons, 1951). My results have shown that Oaxaca communities are religiously fragmented and segregated, indicating that Protestants and Catholics have not successfully coexisted. Furthermore, since a greater number of Protestants in Oaxaca localities increases the chance of religious violence, I highly doubt that the coexistence overall is peaceful and cooperative. I acknowledge that there are other indicators of successful Protestant integration, such as access to quality public services for Protestant populations, involvement of Protestants in local government, and other social factors like intermarriage. The reports from Chiapas of prejudice against Protestants by government officials would seem to

suggest that a thorough analysis of these other indicators in Oaxaca would reveal more discrimination. I will also say that, although these other indicators are important, without peaceful coexistence, it is impossible to supply uninterrupted and equal education, health, and job opportunities. Therefore, I believe my study touches on one of the most important gauges of integration of Protestants.

The failure to integrate Protestants in Southern Mexico cannot be ignored by the Mexican national government because antagonism between Protestants and Catholics has dangerous implications for local governance and security. First of all, favoritism for any religious group by government officials could lead to bribery, corruption, and ineffective public services. If local isolation of Protestants continues, it sets a negative precedent and unofficially endorses repressive Catholic action. By sanctioning repressive action, localities may form a centralized and authoritarian decision-making structure that is undemocratic. The situation between Protestants and Catholics could spiral into cultural violence, further distinguishing the religious chosen from the religious unchosen, and thereby approve or legitimize direct or indirect violence (Galtung, 1990). The low-intensity violence currently taking place undermine the stability of some Oaxaca localities, leaving room for paramilitary or drug trafficking gangs to thrive amid the developing chaos. In addition to the local effects, there are national repercussions. Local populations may feel estranged from their government, while discrimination against Protestants may harm Mexico's reputation with Protestant groups internationally, especially in the United States. At a bare minimum, this religious conflict and resulting estrangement of Protestants is a state problem that must be dealt with.

Briefly, there are a number of grassroots and national actions that the Mexican government can take to decrease the tension and better integrate Protestants. At this point, the tension

between the two groups is mostly localized. Since the religious environment in each locality is different and the social message of religious groups can be modified to fit different location, there is no one-size-fits-all solution (Baldwin, 1986). Instead, the government can focus on involving local voluntary community development groups in conflict resolution and peace projects to tap into local knowledge systems. Regional governments in Southern Mexico should encourage cooperative education that brings Protestants and Catholics together to explore common problems and perceived differences in order to further integration (Byrne, 2001). For example, local universities can offer certified courses in community development and community relations and the national government can provide local leaders with skills such as conflict medication and problem-solving. It is also important to bring together Protestants and Catholics during religiously significant festivals and holidays. By encouraging minority representation in regional government, Oaxaca can foster interfaith dialogue. It is also important to deal with representatives at the national level by limiting favoritism for the Catholic Church. Although Protestantism in Mexico is a diverse movement with many different sects, it might be helpful for Protestants to nominate and select representatives to advocate for them in Mexico City.

The last item that I want to touch on quickly is the state of Catholic-Protestant relations throughout Latin America. Although Mexico presents a special scenario because it is one of few countries with such a tumultuous past of church-state relations, it is difficult to look at Catholic-Protestant relations in Mexico in isolation. Is the antagonism and violence consistent across the region? In all of Latin America, the Catholic Church is worried about their position, a concern that cannot be discounted and may inspire surface-level antagonism. Yet, there are varying reports on Protestant-Catholic relations. In Costa Rica, for instance, incidents of violent conflict

between Protestants and Catholics were common into the 1950s, but in the years leading up to the Southern Reformation, Protestants and Catholics turned amicable over their united stand against communism (Millet, 1970). More recently than Millet's observations, one of the most fascinating cases of the Southern Reformation is Guatemala, a country that is estimated to now be between 25% and 40% Protestant. Protestant missionaries and worshippers were targeted, beaten, and killed for their outspoken opposition during the 30 year civil war, but after the Southern Reformation, evangelical forces were so strict about their "apolitical" stance that Guatemalan Protestants avoided conflict and tension (Cleary, Stewart-Gambino, 1992). On the other hand, Ecuador has experienced a number of violent conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, especially the burning and sacking of Protestant temples and churches. Given the disparity between countries and studies, it is important that this topic, of conflict between Protestants and Catholics, be re-considered in the near future.

III. The Limitations of My Study

Although the INEGI census in 2010 was comprehensive and detailed, it only represented one time period. INEGI did not start to collect the religious make-up of localities until 2000 and the 2010 census is the only survey that contains measurements of violence. I was restricted to studying religious violence solely in 2010 and it was tough to verify the extent to which rates of Protestantism increased of the last couple of decades. Integration is not automatic; it is a process that takes place of an extended period of time, so I recognize that my data cannot draw far-reaching conclusions about integration.

Luckily, the data set was a good representative sample of localities in Oaxaca because I included over 4,000 diverse towns in my final analysis, a strength of the study that I believe solidifies my findings about conflict. It was hard to zero into one or two localities without

concrete qualitative data. In rural areas, religious tension and violence takes place at the village level and my study would have benefitted from hands-on research that included interviews with locals and victims of religious violence. I used proxies for integration, such as violence and fragmentation, because integration is hard to capture with a number. Thereby, it would have been fantastic to be able to speak with residents that had lived in each locality for many years. At the same time, who can say that my qualitative research would have been any better than the research conducted by the native Mexican INEGI officials?

Some of the limitations of my study were built into the *cuestionario* of the INEGI census. To evaluate whether or not each locality had religious conflict, INEGI survey directors asked the local leaders to response to a survey question that looked like Image 1.

Image 1: Survey of Conflict in INEGI census

32. CONFLICTOS

¿En (LOCALIDAD) **existen problemas por:**

CIRCULE SÓLO UN CÓDIGO PARA CADA OPCIÓN

	SÍ	*NO*
la propiedad de la tierra?	**1**	**2**
preferencias religiosas?.....	**3**	**4**
preferencias electorales?.....	**1**	**2**
delincuencia?.....	**3**	**4**
alcoholismo o drogadicción?....	**1**	**2**

First of all, the language used in the survey question above is different the language of the original data set. The survey question above refers to “problems”, while the original data set

from INEGI refers to “conflict” and “violence”. Since INEGI left very little information about the different individual procedures of survey directors, which may have created selection bias, in varying parts of Oaxaca, it is difficult to know if or how respondents were instructed to answer the question. Outside of the survey question above, INEGI did not collect any other information on violence, including the frequency of violence or the victims of the violence. As a result, there is some standard error in the original data set I was working with because survey respondents may have had a different threshold for what each respondent considered to be a problem. The INEGI data set used “violence” and “conflict” somewhat interchangeably, a rhetorical problem that raises questions about what constitutes violence. The vague phrasing of the survey as “religious preferences” also leaves the door open as to what type of religious preferences, i.e. is the fighting between Protestants and Catholics, Catholics and Catholics, Catholics and Muslims?

There were some other elements that were hard to control for in my study because the data was quantitative and straight-forward. In addition to the diversity of faith groups in some Oaxaca localities, there is diversity among each faith group. For instance, it would have been very interesting to investigate differences in Protestant populations that were born Protestant and those that were converted to Protestantism because their conversion status might have affected how they treated Catholicism as their former religion. In that case, there is a chance that converted Protestants might be more favorable towards Catholicism because they still exhibit and share some Catholic values from their childhood and upbringing. The opposite is also a possibility: converted Protestants had to be strongly motivated to convert away from Catholicism, so maybe converted Protestants are more vehemently anti-Catholic. In the literature review, I talked about the fact that the Protestant movement is very diverse, so it is not unlikely that some groups were more belligerent and passionate about their cause and their sect’s goals.

Evangelicals, for example, are famous for their beliefs that Catholic souls are as sinful and as in need of conversion as non-Christian populations, an opinion that may have created more friction with Catholics than the beliefs of the Methodists. On the individual level, it is hard to account for personality and the strength of faith, character differences that may lead individuals to prioritize other identities over faith. As the limitations of my study may suggest, there are a number of alternative explanations and theories about the relationship between Protestantism and violence and the role of Protestants in Mexico.

IV. Correlation, not Causation: Other Theories

The findings of my study were novel in finding correlation between the rates of Protestantism and the presence of religious violence, but I was unable to show causation. There are a number of alternative possibilities to explain the correlation between the two variables that I put forward. With more time and more data at my fingertips, I would have loved to be able to show that the reverse of my theory is not true. In Chapter Three, I rebuffed the hypothesis that it is lower rates of Catholicism, and not higher rates of Protestantism, that leads to religious violence, but it is still possible that Protestant missionaries were drawn to the areas that were already the most violent. In Junín, Peru, for instance, Catholic Church representatives from the Church Ministry of Human Dignity, stepped in to protect human rights and local citizens from the violent actions of the communist terrorist group Shining Path. The missionaries spoke out in favor of popular religiosity, social ministry work, and spiritual work despite the persecution by Shining Path (*Ser Iglesia*). The example set in Peru might suggest that the high rates of Protestantism is religiously violent communities is due to the desire of Protestant missionaries, with their altruistic ideals and attitudes, to help.

I highly doubt this hypothesis, though, for a number of reasons. Practically speaking, it is unsafe for Protestant missionaries to operate in towns that are already struck by religious strife. The Peru example is quite different because the Catholic Church was operating against a state-condemned terrorist group. Even more, it is not probable that the Protestant message would appeal to town inhabitants primarily concerned about their security and safety. Would inhabitants convert to Protestantism in a town where Protestants are part of waging conflict or where Protestants are beaten and prosecuted? Also, as discussed in the literature review, the Protestant message is often communicated through television and radio shows, a form of communication that might be cut off or ineffective in conflict-torn towns.

There is another narrative that is important to deliberate. Take the case of Northern Ireland, for example. In Northern Ireland, in the late 20th century, Protestants, who considered themselves loyalists and wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, battled Catholics, who considered themselves nationalists and wanted Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom, in a guerrilla war full of terrorism and violence. Despite the fact that Protestants and Catholics were fighting each other, the conflict was NOT a religious conflict, but an ethno-political conflict (Byrne, 2001) between two groups with different ideas about the nationhood of Northern Ireland.

Fast forward to Oaxaca, Mexico, where the correlation between religious violence and rates of Protestantism may actually be the disguise of a much deeper conflict. In Chiapas, where the violence against Protestants was first reported, it may not be a coincidence that those that were persecuted also considered themselves indigenous. There is a long history of institutional racism in Mexico against the Mixtec people and the Mixtec people live in arduous conditions (Nagengast, Kearney, 1990). Oaxaca has one of the largest Mixtec populations in all of Mexico

(RefWorld, 2001). Ethnic identity in Mexico is inextricably tied to religion, a link that makes it hard to discern if the religious conflict that my study reveals in Oaxaca localities is purely religious violence or a cover-up for other types of discrimination. The history of inequitable land distribution and property laws limiting Mixtecs from owning land has left many Mixtec areas agriculturally unproductive and poor, inspiring many Mixtec people to turn to Protestantism as an escape, as discussed in the literary review. This sad narrative may explain why the *p value* for the correlation between territorial conflict and rates of Protestantism was so low and statistically significant. In a country where religion is an ethnic and a political decision, there is no doubt that there are other social factors at play in relationship between religion and violence.

Lastly, it would be unfair to conclude this study without mentioning what a positive influence Protestant missionaries have had on Mexico. There are many tradeoffs of the Southern Reformation and the competition between Protestantism and Catholicism has been productive in certain instances. For instance, in his paper "Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico", Guillermo Trejo argues that competition between the Catholic Church and Protestant evangelicals encouraged the Catholic Church to endorse greater indigenous rights and land redistribution in order to win the favor of indigenous communities (Trejo, 2012). As a result, Catholic clergy "stepped into the secular realm and became active promoters of indigenous movements and ethnic identities," giving sidelined communities outspoken and well-respected advocates (Trejo, 2009). Similarly, in the early 21st century, the South Andean branch of the Catholic Church created a ministry committed to marginalized minorities and the Church in rural parts of Peru went from "being well-connected with local groups of power to having a different relationship with the people based on its respect for their rights and native cultures" (*Ser Iglesia*).

Latin American Protestants continue to serve as functional substitutes for ineffective or absent civil, governmental, or judicial structures and are famous for establishing more schools and more classrooms wherever they travel in order to challenge the civil authority of the Catholic Church (Levine, 2006). Also, Pentecostal religious and political leaders are pushing publicly for full separation of church and state and for all religions to have equal status in law, a sign of the democratic benefits of the religious pluralistic competition (Levine, 2006). For many small communities, Protestant oratory has been a useful resource for speaking out against lack of strong government action on crime and for restoring calm in towns after violent criminal attacks (Fuentes, 2013). If anything, the rise of Evangelism has brought the ostracism of minority identities to light and revealed the need to conduct more research about Protestantism in Mexico.

V. Further Research, Lingering Questions

I have already highlighted some topics of further research, such as the role of non-Christian religions in Mexican society and the need to investigate how Protestantism has affected Northern Mexico, farther away from the hotspots of the Southern Reformation. In this short section, I want to talk about three other areas for further research that could bolster the findings of this study, but are outside the scope of my current thesis. The first suggestion is a simple expansion of my work with the INEGI 2010 census. It would be fascinating to understand how significant and relevant religious conflict is in Mexico by asking local officials and inhabitants to rank and rate the biggest conflict threats. The INEGI 2010 census also includes variables that measure access to public services, such as the distance to the nearest schools, the presence of certified doctors, and the opportunity to access running water. One measurement I would have loved to have completed was an analysis of how the INEGI conflict variables correlate with the effective or ineffective public services of each locality.

Secondly, some research has shown that there has been considerable conflict between Pentecostal churches and the Afro-Brazilian religions in South America (Liu 2006). To expand upon the role of ethnicity in religion and religious conflict, as I alluded to above, I believe the conflict between Pentecostalism and other types of native religions needs further analysis. It would also be essential to unravel the relationship between American Protestant missionaries and native Protestant missionaries. How have the American roots of Protestant missionaries influenced how traditional Catholicism perceived and reacted to the Southern Reformation? Another important distinction that needs to be made in further research, but which I was unable to make in this study for lack of the right data, is between individuals that are born Protestant and individuals that convert to Protestantism. How do the two populations vary in their treatment of or reaction to other religions? Finally, it has been noted that some of the biggest inroads for Protestants have been in places that were already strongly progressive and modernized (Gross, 2003). What explains this phenomenon and does it change how I interpreted the motivations for conversion or the causes for violence?

VI. Conclusion: Looking Ahead

In conclusion, there is a recognizable relationship between the rates of Protestantism and the presence of religious violence in Oaxaca localities. Much of the existing literature on the relationship between religion and conflict in Latin America is thorough, but dates to the late 1980s and early 1990s. With this study, I sought to bring the literature up-to-date and to contribute original research on religious fragmentation and persecution. Today's experts and academics are concerned with issues around race and ethnicity, no longer as much with religion. If the narrative I have created, which represents the political and social significance of faith affiliation and religious rebellion against traditional religious structures, stands true, then

researchers must redirect their attention. What can be said about the relations between the two sparring religions of Catholicism and Protestantism nowadays? I hope that my study inspires more investigation and analysis of current-day Protestant-Catholic dynamics because the Protestant population is only growing and the tension is not disappearing.

Yet, maybe my analysis of the relationship between Catholicism and Protestantism was too pessimistic. Mexico, like many other countries, is in the middle of the transition away from twentieth-century systems of ideological relations between religious groups and between Church and State and toward a new model of cooperation in a multi-religious and multicultural world. *Evangélicos* are supposedly now being courted by the Mexican government, asked advice of, and included in major decisions about the future of the Church-state relations. Furthermore, Pope Francis' revolutionary new attitude, complete with nontraditional opinions on the role of Catholicism in the home and the community, may be a sign that religious groups are changing.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Description of INEGI Variables in Census Wording (in Spanish)

Variable	Descripción	Mnemónico	Rangos
Población total	Total de personas que residen habitualmente en el país, entidad federativa, municipio y localidad. Incluye la estimación del número de personas en viviendas particulares sin información de ocupantes. Incluye a la población que no especificó su edad.	POPTOT	0.999999999
Población con religión católica	Personas con religión católica.	PCATOLICA	0.999999999
Protestantes, Evangélicas y Bíblicas diferentes de evangélicas	Personas con religiones Protestantes Históricas, Pentecostales, Neopentecostales, Iglesia del Dios Vivo, Columna y Apoyo de la Verdad, la Luz del Mundo, Cristianas, Evangélicas y Bíblicas diferentes de las Evangélicas.	PNCATOLICA	0.999999999
Población con otras religiones diferentes a las anteriores	Personas con religiones de Origen oriental, Judaico, Islámico, New Age, Escuelas esotéricas, Raíces étnicas, Espiritualistas, Ortodoxos, Otros movimientos religiosos y Cultos populares.	POTRAS_REL	0.999999999
Población sin religión	Personas sin adscripción religiosa. Incluye ateísmo.	PSIN_RELIG	0.999999999
Conflictos por propiedad de la tierra	Indica si en la localidad existen o no conflictos generados por preferencias religiosas distintas de los habitantes.	CONFLICTO2	Alfanumérico
Conflictos por preferencias religiosas	Indica si en la localidad existen o no conflictos generados por preferencias religiosas distintas de los habitantes.	CONFLICTO2	Alfanumérico
Conflictos por preferencias electorales	Indica si en la localidad existen o no conflictos generados por las preferencias electorales distintas de los habitantes.	CONFLICTO3	Alfanumérico
Conflictos por delincuencia	Indica si en la localidad existen o no conflictos generados por actos delictivos frecuentes.	CONFLICTO4	Alfanumérico

Conflictos por alcoholismo o drogadicción	Indica si en la localidad existen o no conflictos generados por la presencia de personas que consumen alcohol o drogas.	CONFLICTO5	Alfanumérico
Problema principal	Indica la categoría en la que se clasificó el problema principal de la localidad, según la siguiente clasificación: falta de empleo o emigración; falta de recursos económicos; pobreza o marginación; falta de apoyo o deficiencia gubernamental; irregularidad o disputa relacionada con la tenencia de la tierra; delincuencia o inseguridad; alcoholismo o drogadicción; falta de infraestructura o servicio de agua; falta de drenaje y alcantarillado; falta de energía eléctrica; falta de carretera o transporte; falta de equipamiento o servicios de salud; falta de equipamiento o servicios para la educación; falta de abasto o comercio; falta de otros servicios o equipamiento; sequía, inundaciones o clima adverso; contaminación ambiental; otra clase de problema y sin problema.	PROBLEMA	Alfanumérico

Appendix B
Reproducing My Results: The R Studio Code

```
//Downloads the needed libraries to operate code//
library(ggplot2)
library(readxl)

//Loads the data table from Excel//
original.rawl.data <- read_excel('~/space/anna-blue-thesis/RESLOC_20XLS10.xls')
original.filtered <- original.rawl.data %>%
        mutate(population = as.numeric(POBTOT)) %>%
        filter(population > 100) %>%
        mutate(religious_conflict = CONFLICTO2) %>%
        filter(religious_conflict %in% c("SI", "NO")) %>%
        mutate(protestant = as.numeric(PNCATOLICA)) %>%
        mutate(territorial_conflict = (CONFLICTO1 == "SI"))
raw.data = read_csv('~/space/anna-blue-thesis/most_monies.csv')
rel.data <- read_csv('~/space/anna-blue-thesis/most_monies.csv') %>%
        mutate(lengua = grepl("Con", HLENGUA)) %>%
        mutate(pobreza = grepl("Pobreza", PROBLEMA)) %>%
        mutate(falta = grepl("gubernamental", PROBLEMA)) %>%
        mutate(conflict = as.logical(RELCON),
                conflict2 = raw.data$CONFLICTO2 == "SI",
                conflict3 = raw.data$CONFLICTO3 == "SI",
                conflict4 = raw.data$CONFLICTO4 == "SI",
                conflict5 = raw.data$CONFLICTO5 == "SI") %>%
        select(name = NOM_LOC,
                conflict,
                conflict2,
                conflict3,
                conflict4,
                conflict5,
                protestant = PTPNCAT,
                other = POTRAS_REL,
                catholic = PTPCAT,
                none = PSIN_RELIG,
                total_pop = POBTOT,
                lengua,
                pobreza,
                falta) %>%
        mutate(anyConflict = conflict | conflict2 | conflict3 | conflict4 |conflict5)
attach(rel.data)

//Calculates the percent of towns with religious conflict//
mean(rel.data$conflict)
```

```
//Calculates the percent of towns with rates of Protestantism higher than 50%//
mean(rel.data$protestant > .5)

//Calculates correlation between Protestantism and religious conflict//
cor(protestant, conflict)

//Shows results of generalized linear model that uses the rates of Protestantism to predict
religious conflict//
summary(glm(conflict ~ protestant, data = rel.data, family=binomial()))
summary(glm(territorial_conflict ~ protestant, data = original.filtered, family=binomial()))

//Relationship between religious conflict and language//
summary(glm(conflict ~ lengua, data = rel.data, family=binomial()))

//In towns that speak an indigenous language, what is the chance there is religious conflict?//
mean(rel.data$conflict[rel.data$lengua])

//Relationship between Protestantism and various problems//
mean(rel.data$protestant[rel.data$pobreza])
mean(rel.data$protestant[!rel.data$pobreza])
mean(rel.data$protestant[rel.data$falta])
mean(rel.data$protestant[!rel.data$falta])
prop.test(x = c(mean(rel.data$conflict[rel.data$lengua]), mean(rel.data$confl
ict[!rel.data$lengua])), n = c(sum(rel.data$lengua), sum(!rel.data$lengua)))

//To calculate sum of squares for religious conflict and Protestantism//
((summary(glm(conflict ~ protestant, data = rel.data, family=binomial() ))$sigma)
^2)*nrow(rel.data)

//To calculate the coefficients of the model for religious conflict and Protestantism//
coef(summary(glm(conflict ~ protestant, data = rel.data, family=binomial())))[, 1]

//Read fractionalization set (useful for testing purposes)//
fractional.raw.data <- read_excel('~/space/anna-blue-thesis/fractional.xlsx')

//Calculates the fractionalization index (useful for testing purposes)//
fractional2 <- fractional.raw.data %>%
        filter(!is.na(PERCAT)) %>%
        mutate(cat = PERCAT,
                ncat = PERNCAT,
                other = PEROTHER,
                nrel = PERNREL) %>%
        mutate(frac.2 = 1 / (cat^2 + ncat^2 + other^2 + nrel^2)) %>%
        filter(frac.2 > 4)
```

```
//Adds the fractionalization index data to the original data set (useful for testing purposes)//
frac.data <- rel.data %>%
        mutate(fractional = 1 / (catholic^2 + protestant^2 + (other / total_pop)^2
+ (none / total_pop)^2)) %>%
        filter(fractional < 4)

//Shows results for multivariate model predicting religious violence based on Protestantism and
whether or not an indigenous language was spoken in each locality//
summary(lm(conflict2 ~ protestant + lengua, data = rel.data))
```

Appendix C

Example R Studio Code to Reproduce the Graphs

```
//To model the equation representing the relationship between rates of Protestantism and the presence of religious violence//
ggplot(data = mutate(rel.data, conflict_continuous = as.double(conflict)), ae
s(x = protestant, y = conflict_continuous)) +
        stat_smooth(method = "lm") +
        xlab("Protestant percentage of population") +
        ylab("Rate of conflict") +
        ggtitle("Religious Conflict by Protestant Population")

//To create a scatter plot with all of the data points collected to model the relationship between rates of Protestantism and the presence of religious violence//
ggplot(data = mutate(rel.data, conflict_continuous = as.double(conflict)), ae
s(x = protestant, y = conflict_continuous)) +
        stat_smooth(method = "lm") +
        geom_point(position = "jitter") +
        xlab("Protestant percentage of population") +
        ylab("Rate of conflict") +
        ggtitle("Religious Conflict by Protestant Population")

//To model the equation representing the relationship between rates of Protestantism and the presence of electoral violence//
ggplot(data = mutate(rel.data, conflict_continuous = as.double(conflict3)), a
es(x = protestant, y = conflict_continuous)) +
        stat_smooth(method = "lm") +
        xlab("Protestant percentage of population") +
        ylab("Rate of conflict") +
        ggtitle("Electoral Conflict by Protestant Population")
```

Appendix D

Steps for Reproducing my GLM Results

1. Given 2010 Mexican Census Data, select the variables that are relevant and hide other non-pertinent variables before copying the remaining variables to another sheet.
2. Excel manipulation: Remove towns that are less than 100 people, towns with NDAI or NE marked in the columns on religious violence (showing that the local officials do not know or do not have an opinion on religious violence), and towns with a non-exact Protestant population total.
3. Calculate the percentage of the total population in each locality constituted by each religion.
4. Convert the new sheet into a CSV before uploading into R Studio.
5. Input code with varying variables

Appendix E
Example of R Studio GLM Results

The image below is a screenshot of the R Studio Program after calculating the correlation between rates of Protestantism and religious violence in Oaxaca localities. The top left panel is the data set is CSV form. The bottom right square predicts the relationship between the two variables. The bottom left panel is the results: the two coefficients and the p value (the three values are identified by the red squares around them).