The Ethics of Violence in War

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Ethics, by one definition, comprises “the rules of conduct recognized in certain associations or departments of human life.” In a wider sense, ethics encompasses jurisprudence and the science of law. Many people are surprised to hear that there might be a connection between ethics and war. Their understanding to the contrary is that war consists of giving men weapons and sending them off to kill. But killing is not so easy as that. Nor is war so lawless.

In this series, in the lectures to come, you will hear about many different aspects of ethics and war. To facilitate those discussions, I’d like to lay out some basic processes and structures and to explore some universal dilemmas that result from the transformation of civilians into combatants prepared to use lethal violence. It is in that transformation, and because of those dilemmas, that ethical limitations have been devised to canalize and constrain the conduct of war.

These issues have come up for discussion, it seems to me, because modern combat has strained the traditional limitations on violence in war to the breaking point and beyond. Partly that’s because modern weapons make it possible for individual combatants to inflict far more lethal violence upon enemy forces than was possible in the old days of single-shot rifles and hand
grenades. Partly the strain results from the degeneration of war from the organized combat of nation-states, now largely foreclosed by the advent of nuclear weapons, to combat by irregular forces in what are increasingly ill-regulated quasi-civil wars within failing or failed states. Terrorists take the degeneration of war a step further, attempting the intentional mass killing of noncombatants.

Let me first describe an evidence-based model of how civilians are transformed into combatants prepared to use lethal violence, after which I will explore how that violence is deliberately limited in ethical war, why those limits sometimes break down, and the consequences of such breakdown for the combatants themselves as well as for policy.

We are prepared for membership in any significant social group by an informal but structured process of identity transformation called socialization. Autonomous individuals, already socialized into family, ethnicity, religion and nation, become farmers, teachers, physicians, police officers, pastors, actors, artists, nurses or military combatants by being socialized to those new identities. Socialization typically involves challenges and rituals designed to break down the candidate’s presenting identity and then to replace it with an identity appropriate to membership in the new group. Hazing, indoctrination, apprenticeship and testing may all be involved.

Military recruits in particular are deliberately and systematically rebuked, scorned and punished for civilian behavior and coached and rewarded for military behavior, including the controlled use of violence. They
are not merely taught to use weapons; they are also resocialized into new identities as combatants prepared to use serious violence to defend themselves and to protect those whom they value—in particular, the comrades-in-arms beside whom they fight. The method of that resocialization derives historically from a universal, longstanding, informal process that the American criminologist Lonnie Athens first identified during graduate work at Berkeley in the 1970s, a process he calls “violent socialization” or “violentization.”

Athens developed his violentization model by interviewing individually and in depth several hundred violent criminals of diverse race, ethnicity, gender, education and socioeconomic status incarcerated in American prisons, eliciting in particular their memories of violent social experiences backward in time from their crimes of record to their earliest memories of violent encounters. Then, comparing these extended narratives, Athens matched up those violence-related experiences that every subject had in common—100 percent. The model he developed from these patterns of experience common to every one of his subjects is therefore a causal model, not one of correlations; for at least the subjects of Athens’s study, violentization is the cause of their violent behavior. Every new case tests the model, of course, just as every new case tests the model of a particular disease. I have looked at the life histories of dozens of violent individuals in the years since I first encountered Athens’s work, from Lee Harvey Oswald to the so-called “ordinary men” of the SS-Einsatzgruppen, and wherever there was sufficient information about their personal histories to form a judgment, without exception Athens’s model applied.
Let me interject here that I am not equating military combatants with violent criminals. The difference, however, is not fundamental; it is one of degree, not of kind—a question of ethics and a matter of law. Violentization proceeds by stages; each stage must be fully experienced before the next stage can be attained. The institutional program that militaries derived historically from the violentization process is designed to stop well short of creating violent criminals. Violence is not intrinsically criminal; it becomes criminal when it is directed without authority at inappropriate objects to an inappropriate degree.

Self-defense may be violent, for example, but it is not criminal unless the degree of violence applied is determined to be excessive. A soldier who kills an enemy combatant in the line of duty serves his country; a soldier who deliberately kills an unarmed enemy civilian commits murder, punishable as such under military law. Much of the confusion about the cause or causes of violent behavior that currently plagues the fields of sociology and psychology results from a fundamental misunderstanding of the origin of violent behavior. Those in particular who seek the cause of violent behavior in brain abnormalities or lesions have yet to identify the location in the brain of the organ that sorts good violence from bad—the authorized violence of the violent professionals who protect the rest of us from criminal assault from the “bad” violence of criminals. It’s true that many violent criminals demonstrate various degrees of brain damage. It’s also true, like professional football players, that most of them have extensive experience with being hit on the head. Violence is a kit of tools, available to those who have been socialized to use it for good or for ill. Good violence is constrained by law and by
institutional ethics. Bad violence is unconstrained, outside the law and, at least in modern times, beyond society’s tolerance. Athens’s violentization model explains what organic models fail to distinguish: the difference between the two.

How, then, does someone become violent? Athens identifies four stages of violence development.

To become capable of committing unprovoked, seriously violent acts, Athens argues, someone must undergo violent socialization, which is therefore the cause of violent criminality. Any number of other experiences and conditions may color a violent individual’s social development. He may, for example, become a rapist who never uses violence against his family, or an abusive husband who only uses violence against his wife, or a seemingly timid person (but always and necessarily one with previous violent experiences) who one day seemingly “snaps,” or a drug dealer who kills routinely in the course of doing business. He may be mentally disturbed, with conditions such as paranoid schizophrenia or borderline personality disorder. But all criminally violent individuals, Athens’s model asserts, in all their seeming variety, have undergone at minimum the four-stage process of violent socialization—or they would not be prepared to use unprovoked serious violence and would not do so. Many of you will recognize some of the component stages of violent socialization as stages you have personally experienced. Hopefully, few or none of you will have experienced and completed all four stages.

Violent socialization typically (but not necessarily) begins in childhood. For most of the men Athens interviewed, the process of turning an innocent
child into a violent criminal was complete by the time they were fourteen. Girls typically finished the process a few years later. But there is no upper age limit.

The first stage of violent socialization is **Brutalization**. Brutalization consists of three component traumatic experiences that may be undergone simultaneously or separately, in any order: violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching. Each of these components has a common element: harsh treatment by a member of the novice’s primary group, such as his family, his gang, his clique, his military unit.

In **violence subjugation**, a violent authority figure uses physical violence or the threat of physical violence to force the novice to acknowledge his authority and acquiesce to his control: “Do what I tell you or I’ll beat the hell out of you.”

**Personal horrification** occurs when the novice experiences someone close to him, someone he values, being violently subjugated—such as children witnessing their fathers beating or threatening their mothers or their siblings. Witnessing the victim’s experience, the novice wants to intervene but finds himself afraid to do so, knowing he’s likely to be assaulted in turn. Personal horrification is an even more traumatic experience than violent subjugation, because to the novice’s feelings of fear and humiliation are added feelings of shame for being unable to protect someone he values.

**Violent coaching**, the third component of brutalization, is the experience of being credibly directed to take personal responsibility for violent action. The violent coach says things many of you have heard: “I don’t let people push me around. When Joe tried to push me around, I broke his arm.”
“Don’t let that bully pick on you. When someone picks on you, fight back.” “If you don’t get out there and smash that bully, I’ll smash you when you get home.” The coach who offers this direction is usually older than the novice; the novice may have more than one coach at the same or different times. A coach could be a mother, a father, an older brother, a gang member, a drill instructor or any combination of such figures. A credible coach must be someone whom the novice perceives to be, or to have been, an authentically violent person, not someone who brags or pretends but who has not personally committed violent acts. The coaching need not be explicit, nor does the coach necessarily teach the candidate how to fight or defend himself. Rather, the coach asserts the candidate’s personal obligation to use violence when he is provoked. Coaching may proceed by boasting, threatening, ridiculing, minimizing, belittling, haranguing, or a combination of such techniques.

Brutalization—these three component experiences—is involuntary and traumatic. People don’t choose to be brutalized. Brutalization is usually experienced in childhood, but it can also transform adults; it may extend across a period of years or be compressed into a few traumatic weeks or months, as sometimes happens to soldiers in war. But when the novice has fully experienced all three components, he will feel enormous conflict about what has happened to him. This troubled emotional state, almost a breakdown, certainly an identity crisis, precipitates him into stage two, Belligerency.

In belligerency, the dejected, brutalized candidate, filled with emotional turmoil, begins to take stock, much as people do when they experience
divorce, or the death of someone close to them, or a serious illness or accident. The candidate examines his situation and asks himself questions. The first question he asks himself is, “Why haven’t I done anything to put a stop to all this domination?” Eventually the question changes and becomes more specific. The candidate asks himself, “What can I do to make sure other people don’t violently dominate me and the people I value for the rest of my life?” And now for the first time, with the force of sudden revelation, the candidate realizes that the violent coaching that was drummed into his head during brutalization applies to him: that the answer to his question is to heed his violence coach and begin taking violent action himself against other people who provoke him.

This first violent resolution is strongly qualified, however. Given the potentially mortal risk of starting a serious fight, and the uncertainty of outcome, the belligerent novice is prepared to risk serious violence only if he is seriously provoked and only if he thinks he has a chance of success—only, that is, defensively. He is not yet prepared to use violence in situations where he isn’t provoked.

With this mitigated violent resolution, then, the belligerent enters stage three, Violent Performances. The next time someone seriously challenges him or threatens him, the next time a bully pushes him around, he means to test his resolve by defending himself with serious physical violence, with the intention of dominating whoever provoked him even if it means inflicting (and risking) grave injury or death.

Let’s be clear. Many people make threats when they’re angry or afraid. We generally understand such threats to be verbal gestures and posturing.
Most people in civil societies are not prepared to follow up such threats with serious violence, because really to attack someone with the intention of seriously harming or killing them risks the attacker’s safety and freedom as well.

So an initial violent performance is a deeply serious undertaking. It’s not something people decide to do because they like the mock violence they see on television. It’s not something that happens just because you’re mad at someone. And it certainly doesn’t happen out of the blue, merely on impulse. When you undertake to use serious violence, you risk your life.

And not surprisingly, doing so has profound consequences. If a violent performance results in a major defeat, the belligerent may decide against a commitment to violence and look for some less dangerous strategy for survival. Or, rather than question his resolution, he may question his tactics and decide to use more violence next time and use it sooner—he may move, for example, from using his fists to using a knife or a gun. We’ve all heard about fights that ended that way—someone lost the fistfight, went home, got his gun and came back and blew his assailant away.

On the other hand, a violent performance may result in a clear victory. If it does, the violent performer experiences relief, elation, a surge of self-confidence. He’s met the challenge of his brutalization and fulfilled the resolution of his belligerency. He’s found a way to protect himself and the people he values. He walks a little taller ever after. Many men and some women, including some of you in this room, reach this point of violentization and stop there. They don’t think of themselves as violent people, but they’re prepared to use serious violence if seriously threatened. Modern civil societies
consistent of mixed populations of these marginally violent people, as Athens calls them, and of pacifists, people unwilling and unprepared to use serious violence even if their lives are threatened (many battered women, for example).

I’m sure at this point that the parallels between violentization to stage three and military conditioning for violent combat must be obvious to you. Violent domination, personal horrification and violent coaching are fundamental to basic military training. The violence used to be much more extensive than it is today, in the U.S. military at least; our military has had to find credible alternatives to the routine beatings superiors inflicted on recruits. The Russian military continues to practice a more traditional brutality. In any case, threats of violence by a credibly violent dominator are sufficient in Athens’s model for violent subjugation.

Modern civil societies, and modern militaries as well, also have to deal with a small, deviant admixture of people who have moved on from marginally violent identities into and beyond the fourth and final stage of violentization. These are people prepared to use serious violence without significant provocation.

Athens’s fourth stage is **Virulence**.

Some marginally violent people—particularly those whose successful violent performances are perceived by their intimates to be excessive, more than the situation called for—experience a remarkable transformation in their social circumstances. People’s opinions of a such a violent performer suddenly and drastically change. From seeing him as unthreatening, as not violent or
only possibly capable of violence, people close to him now acknowledge him to be an authentically violent individual. They treat him as if he were dangerous. They show him fearful respect and try not to offend or provoke him.

That’s powerful motivation. You beat someone up and suddenly everyone else is calling you “sir” and bowing and scraping and getting out of your way. Such lionization is hard to resist. Athens calls these responses “social trepidation” and “violent notoriety.” They carry the violent performer to a crossroad. “[He] must now decide [Athens writes] whether to embrace or reject this personal achievement of sorts…. Although the advantages may not be well recognized, being known as dangerous does have its advantages. The subject is afforded greater power over his immediate social environment. Since other people begin to think twice before provoking him, the subject can freely interact with [them] without worrying as much about provoking them, so that for the first time he may feel liberated from the violent oppression of others. Moreover [Athens continues], painful memories of feeling powerless and inadequate, originally aroused during his brutalization and later his belligerency experiences, still linger in the back of the subject’s mind. This cannot help but make his newly-discovered sense of power almost irresistible.”

So the violent performer who receives this crucial social reinforcement usually decides to accept his violent notoriety and the social trepidation that comes with it. He concludes that if violence works so well defensively, it should work even better offensively, when he’s not being challenged. He enlarges his violent resolution accordingly, moving from a mitigated violent
resolution—to use violence only defensively—to an unmitigated violent resolution—prepared now to harm others with little or no provocation, whenever he is angered, or frustrated, or simply perceives his potential victim to be an evil person, as in hate crimes.

This new and broader resolution to use violence completes his violent socialization. From a hapless victim of brutalization, he has now come full circle and transformed himself into the same kind of brutalizer he had earlier despised. A person who is prepared to seriously injure or even kill someone who has provoked him minimally or not at all is by anyone’s definition dangerously violent.

A final social consequence that usually follows completing violent socialization is social segregation. The violent individual’s close family and friends are now afraid of him and start avoiding him. This phenomenon of social segregation is the basis in fact for the mythical violent loner of novels and film. But sooner or later the violent usually find a new group to join where a violent reputation is a social requirement.

How does violentization apply in a military context? First, as I said, militaries long ago adapted the informal methodology of violent socialization to create individuals capable of using serious violence in combat. Brutalization, personal horrification, belligerency and violent performances are all part of the process of conditioning and resocialization that militaries use to turn civilians into soldiers.
The problem for the military is keeping its men at stage three, when they are prepared to use serious violence to defend themselves and those they value, without precipitating them over into stage four and beyond, when they are prepared to use serious violence whenever it suits them, not only in self-defense but also against those who are not threatening them—against disarmed combatants and civilian noncombatants—and against their own superiors as well. A soldier in combat, facing enemy soldiers, is by definition acting in self-defense. By extension, a pilot attacking an enemy convoy or gun emplacement can be construed to be acting in self-defense as well, even if he is not immediately and directly threatened, because he also is defending himself and those he values against implicit, pending assault. Even strategic bombing, during the Second World War, was justified with such arguments, although their logic wore increasingly thin as that bombing expanded from military targets to military-industrial targets to, finally, the homes and neighborhoods of enemy civilians. Authorities felt obligated to justify such bombing with arguments of defensive intent. Credibly or speciously, war violence in modern times is consistently distinguished from criminal violence by assertions of defensive intent. That’s one reason the issue of who started a war carries such weight, and why entities involved in conflicts always try to assign responsibility for initiating them to their opponents. The German invasion of Poland on September 1st, 1939, was preceded by a little farce the previous night wherein German soldiers in Polish uniforms staged an attack on a German radio station in Gleiwitz and broadcast anti-German propaganda. The SS organized twenty-one such incidents along the German-Polish corridor to justify the invasion that precipitated the Second World War.
Holding soldiers at stage three, where they do not consider themselves to be violent but are prepared to use serious violence to defend themselves and those they value, requires an extensive network of systems of limitation and protection. The most obvious limitations are those imposed by military law, which in this regard corresponds to civilian criminal law. Civilian or military, it’s not illegal to defend yourself provided the violence you use is appropriate to the threat. Civilian or military, it is illegal to use violence against others who are not seriously threatening you.

A less obvious but perhaps even more effective restraint on malefic violence in war is military tradition and its implicit and explicit codes of honor. When a soldier’s very life depends on the mutual support of his comrades, it’s not surprising that their respect is supremely important to him. If the group limits itself to using only defensive violence, then individuals within the group are likely to restrain themselves accordingly. The code of honor common to martial disciplines such as judo, karate and aikido similarly limits the use of violence to self-defense.

Implicit in such systems, however, is support from authority figures. Military leaders up the chain of command are expected to limit their demands for violent action to appropriately defensive campaigns. If, for example, as in Vietnam, demands for body count pressure combat units to expand their killing to include civilians spuriously redefined as enemy combatants, then atrocities may well follow.

My Lai was such an atrocity. Some of the men who participated in that notorious massacre of civilians on March 16, 1968, which resulted in the deaths of some five hundred Vietnamese women, children, babes in arms and
old men, had undergone cataclysmic violentization in their three months of prior combat experience in Vietnam. Other members of Charlie Company had arrived in Vietnam already violent, as evidenced by their immediately taking up the practice of raping Vietnamese women. Yet others resisted full violentization and consequently took no part in the slaughter despite being implicitly or explicitly ordered to do so.

In their prior three months in Vietnam, the men of Charlie Company had been sent out repeatedly to patrol for an elusive Vietcong battalion they never located. They began to feel isolated and alone, which bonded them to one another. A month before the massacre the company began to take casualties in the My Lai area—five dead, fifteen wounded—partly the result, by his own admission, of the carelessness of one of their officers, Lt. William Calley. The men’s perception of menace gradually expanded from combatants to civilians as a consequence of the failure of the military organization to meet its ethical commitment to defend them. As one enlisted man testified later:

“When we first started losing members of the company, it was mostly through booby traps and snipers. We never really got into a main conflict per se, where you could see who was shooting and you could actually shoot back. We had heard a lot about women and children being used as booby traps and being members of the Viet Cong. As time went on you tended to believe it more and more….So at the same time we were trying to work with these people, they were basically doing a number on us—and we were letting them. So the whole mood changed. You didn’t trust them any more. You didn’t trust anybody….You knew the enemy was out there—but you couldn’t pinpoint
who exactly was the enemy. And I would say that in the end [the enlisted man concludes], anybody that was still in that country was the enemy.”

As a response to this enlarging threat, some of the men of Charlie Company, violently coached by their leaders, began beating up prisoners, torturing prisoners, executing prisoners—began, that is, expanding their range of violent performances. “The voices of authority in the company,” the enlisted man explained, “the platoon sergeants and officers—acknowledged that [abusing and executing prisoners] was a proper way to behave. Who were the grunts to disagree with it? We supported it.”

Another enlisted man concurred. “It started with just plain prisoners,” he testified, “prisoners you thought were the enemy. Then you’d go on to prisoners who weren’t the enemy, and then the civilians because there was no difference between the enemy and civilians. It came to the point where a guy could kill anybody.”

The expansion of the men’s range of violent performances brought a corresponding increase in their sense of security. A few weeks before My Lai, however, the officer who commanded Charlie Company, Captain Ernest Medina, inadvertently led the men into a minefield. Three more company members were killed; twelve suffered ghastly injuries. “Rumors that the minefield had been laid by the Koreans,” write the massacre’s historians, “—allies in the war—further undermined the company’s faith that their officers knew what they were doing. But most of all, [the men] blamed the Vietnamese—not the Viet Cong whom they could not see or find, but the Vietnamese of the villages who did not warn them of the minefields and the booby traps.”
On the morning of the massacre, one of man testified, “[Medina] didn’t actually say to kill every man, woman and child in My Lai. [But] he stopped just short of saying that.” I will spare you the details of the massacre. You can read them in my book *Why They Kill*. Suffice it to say the killing was horrific, criminal and berserk. There were many such massacres in Vietnam. There’s a special place in Hell reserved for civilian leaders, safe back in their homelands, whose ambitions of victory or fear of defeat drive young men to such depravity. Many of them came home broken, their identities shattered, and remain so to this day.

One more example. I wrote about the SS-Einsatzgruppen, Heinrich Himmler’s Special Task Forces, in my book *Masters of Death*. They were SS volunteers and German Order Police who were retasked in the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 to follow behind the Germany Army securing the captured territory. In fact, their primary mission was to kill Jews. They did so by assembling their victims village by village and town by town, marching them out to killing pits dug by prisoners of war or to natural ravines such as Kiev’s Babi Yar, standing them at the edge of the pits or forcing them to lie down side by side and shooting them. Though it is not generally known, nearly as many Jews were killed by shooting during the Holocaust as were killed in the gas chambers of the death camps.

Even this monstrosity had a structure—I won’t call it ethical, but it was designed to preserve some semblance of humanity in the killers. The mass killing of Jews by the forces of the Einsatzgruppen began with killing only Jewish men of military age, who could thus be (and were) construed to be enemy combatants—potential saboteurs or guerrilla fighters. To the extent
that the killers accepted that construal, they could continue to believe, protectively, that their killing was defensive.

Things changed, however, in mid-July 1941, when Hitler convinced himself that victory over the Soviet Union would be swift and his troops would be home by Christmas. At that point he ordered the killing of all the Jews of the occupied East—of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine. Now the men of the Einsatzgruppen were tasked to kill not only Jewish men of military age but also boys and old men, women and children—by the hundreds, by the thousands, by the tens of thousands, shooting them into killing pits, watching them die. Most of the killers had not previously been violentized to such a malefic extent, and the consequences should have been predictable. Some of them, perhaps the majority of them, began to show signs of trauma. They got drunk, became depressed, broke down, in some cases even committed suicide. The SS had to open a hospital for them north of Berlin where they were sent for rest and rehabilitation.

The men who broke down Heinrich Himmler could dismiss from his safe quarters in Berlin as cowards. He was much more disturbed, however, by the other response some of the Einsatzgruppen displayed: they became enthusiastic killers, fully malefic killers, volunteering for massacres and even going out hunting Jews on their own. At some level, Himmler understood violent socialization, because he was horrified that his noble SS elite should descend to such bestiality. He wanted his men to kill out of duty, he said, not from pleasure. In his eyes, killing for pleasure was barbaric.

It has become part of the dogma of the Holocaust that the death camps were devised because they were more efficient than shooting. But they were
not. The death camps at their most efficient could gas perhaps fifteen thousand people per day. At Babi Yar, in contrast, a few hundred Einsatzgruppen murdered 34,000 people in two days simply by forcing them to lie down in rows at the bottom of that vast ravine and shooting them individually in the back of the head. The death camps were not more efficient. But they were largely operated by expendables—Russian prisoners of war and the Jews themselves—with only small cadres of SS men overseeing their operations. Himmler oversaw the invention of the death camps to reduce the trauma to the perpetrators.

Why does it matter if ethical considerations enter into the conduct of war? The usual explanation is that limitations on the use of violence, including torture, help protect our troops and civilians from being similarly treated at the enemy’s hands. That’s certainly important. Another important reason, however, as I’ve tried to demonstrate, is to protect our soldiers from themselves becoming malefically violent. Marginally violent combatants can usually return home to civilian life with little or no identity confusion. They never thought of themselves as violent, and they usually blend back into the larger population and return to civil lives. In contrast, those whom war has made seriously violent, malefically violent, have a longer struggle to face. We’re seeing that today in the returning veterans of our long conflict in Iraq with their higher rates of violence and especially of suicide.

Jonathan Shay, a Boston psychiatrist who works with veterans, describes vividly in his remarkable book *Achilles in Vietnam* the tragic
condition of the men he treats who came home from Vietnam damaged by the brutality of that conflict and the failure of military leadership to protect them. “A common utterance of our patients,” Shay writes, “is ‘I died in Vietnam.’”

If preventing war in the first place proves impossible, limiting it to confrontations among combatants—limiting it ethically—has practical and humane benefit as well as moral distinction. Abiding by such traditional limits helps protect our fathers and sons and brothers from descending into malevolence. Tragically, war by its nature tends to exceed such limits, especially with modern technology; under such Hobbesian conditions there will always be incompetent leadership and friendly fire and the emergence of malefic individuals, which one military psychiatrist calls “the natural dominance of the psychopath.” But wars of attrition that clamor for body count undermine the very values for which our wars are supposedly fought. “If war goals,” Shay writes, “operational methods and military culture were so unjust that the Nuremberg principles loomed over every Vietnam combat soldier, we must recognize that the blood is on our hands too.” This indictment parallels Lonnie Athens’s indictment of a society that tolerates the creation of dangerous violent criminals out of innocent children and thus, he writes, “tacitly becomes an accomplice in creating them.”

As we sow, so shall we reap.

Thank you.
Notes

1 OED, “Ethics,” 3c.
2 Ibid., 4.
3 Quoted in Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Viking, 1992, p. 74.
4 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
5 Ibid., p. 78.
6 Ibid., p. 85.
7 Ibid., p. 101.
10 Shay, op. cit., p. 197.