

***Does the Anti-Secession Law Signify
Greater Irrationality of China's Policy Toward Taiwan?***

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After passage of the Anti-Secession Law by China's National People's Congress on March 14, 2005, the *People's Daily* reported from Taipei that, "Most of the people believe the Anti-Secession Law is a practical, firm, gentle, rational law, creating an opportunity to push on the relations across the Straits." In reality, however, the law has triggered massive protest in Taiwan and sharp criticism from the US government, as they see Article 8 of the law about authorizing the use of "non-peaceful measures" as provocative at this moment. As the *Washington Post* described on March 23, 2005, China has paid a price abroad, "spoiling a strategy for relations with Taiwan, undercutting a drive to end Europe's arms embargo and reinforcing unease over the growth in Chinese military power."

Indeed, the passage of the law is ill-timed. It came after Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian began to soften his stance and pledged not to declare independence nor change the island's official name during his second term at the Ten Point Declaration on cross-strait issues, made jointly with James Soong, Chairman of the opposition People First Party. He even accepted a deal brokered by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) to launch the unprecedented non-stop charter flights across the Strait by both Taiwan and PRC carriers during the Chinese New Year since 1949.

The Anti-Secession Law, in this case, as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in an interview, has "increased tension from the Taiwan Straits not diminished it," as it brought a temporary halt to the relaxation across the Strait over the winter. While the most pro-independent Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) sent an "Anti-Annexation Law" to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, President Chen joined about a half million people in Taipei on March 26 marching to denounce the law in one of the largest political demonstrations. The furor over the anti-secession law and the march allowed Chen to woo back many angry independence advocates but was criticized by Beijing as creating "new tension across the Strait."

The Anti-Secession Law has also raised alarm bells from the US and Europe. Before announcing the law, China was gaining ground, both in the international community and in Taiwan and Chen was criticized as a trouble maker by more and more people in the Bush administration as Chen pushed the envelope with uncalled-for initiatives against Beijing. *The Australian* wrote on March 28, 2005 that the anti-secession law has switched the focus from Taipei to Beijing for changing the status quo “by introducing the new law authorizing the use of force against Taiwan just when relations looked ripe for repair.” In the meantime, the anti-secession law has made it more difficult for the European Union to lift the arms embargo that many suggested could happen this summer, in spite of the strong US lobby against it. By underlining China's willingness to go to war over Taiwan, the law has also set back China's multi-faceted diplomatic campaign to persuade the world, especially the East Asian region, that its rise as a world power is peaceful and does not constitute a threat to other nations.

The law has been described by some people as a war authorization law, mainly driven by Chinese nationalism, to set a benchmark against nationalist pressure and show Chinese leaders’ willing to risk war across the Taiwan Strait at all cost. It thus signifies greater irrationality of China’s policy toward Taiwan.

Is Chinese nationalism a cause of international aggression, making China’s policy toward Taiwan more irrational and inflexible? Does the anti-secession law signal that Beijing is on a path that reduces its scope for rational choices?

To find answers to these questions, let’s start by a brief discussion of the recent rise of Chinese Nationalism and its Foreign Policy implications.

Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations

Chinese nationalism has indeed been rising in recent years. The leadership has rediscovered the value of nationalism to hold the country together after the decline of communist ideology. Its nationalist legitimacy was bolstered in the fight for China's entry into the WTO, the maintenance of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) or the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status in the US, the Olympic Games in Beijing, and also the fight against Taiwan independence.

Nationalism has resonated among Chinese intellectuals and popular society. Concerned that the Western countries would come to confront a rising China, some Chinese intellectuals have argued that nationalism would be indispensable and a rational choice to advance China's national interests.

This development has raised a question: whether or not an aggressive nationalism has or would emerge from China's "century of humiliation," making Chinese foreign policy irrational and inflexible.

Indeed, nationalism has played very different roles in Chinese history. It inspired generations of Chinese intellectuals fighting to resist imperialism and seeking ways for modernization. It also produced fear, hatred, and hostility toward foreigners. These different international orientations have been linked with different nationalist perspectives: nativism, anti-traditionalism, and pragmatism. Each is rooted in a different assessment of the sources of national weakness and advocates a distinctive approach to revitalize China.

Nativism sees foreign imperialist invasion and the subversion of indigenous Chinese virtues as the root of China's weakness and calls for a return to Chinese tradition and self-reliance. Anti-traditionalism sees China's tradition as the source of its weakness, calling for the adoption of foreign culture and models. Pragmatic nationalism takes a middle road and sees the lack of modernization as the source of China's weakness and would adopt whatever approach that can make China strong. As Deng Xiaoping said; "it doesn't matter if it is a black or white cat as long as it can catch rats."

The three perspectives of Chinese nationalism are often related to different international orientations. Nativism is often related to confrontational anti-foreignism. The most extreme example is the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Anti-traditionalism is to accommodate to a "progressive" or "modern" world. One example is China's early effort to adopt the Soviet model and accommodate to the Soviet-led communist world. Another example is liberal anti-traditionalists' call in the 1980s to adopt Western models and accommodating to the Western world. Pragmatic nationalism is to adapt to the changing world but has nothing, or very little, to do with any ideology, either Marxism or liberalism. It is a national interest-driven doctrine.

All three perspectives of Chinese nationalism have influenced the thinking of Chinese communist leaders. Chinese foreign policy swung between the two extremes of confrontation and accommodation driven by either nativism or anti-traditionalism in the early decades of the PRC. After Deng launched economic reform, pragmatism was established as the dominant thinking of Chinese leaders.

Pragmatic nationalism sets economic prosperity as the overarching objective of China and the pathway for the CCP to stay in power. It is also the foundation for China's rising nationalistic aspirations. To pursue economic prosperity, peace, and development has been emphasized as China's major international goals. Although pragmatic nationalism is assertive in defending China's national security and uncompromising with foreign demands involving China's perceived vital national interests, such as the preservation of national sovereignty and the reunification of China, pragmatic leaders have tried to avoid confrontational relations with the United States and other Western powers because it would not be in the interest of China's modernization.

From a pragmatic perspective, nationalism is a double-edged sword. While the Communist government may use nationalism to compensate for the declining communist ideology, it may also cause serious backlash and place the government in a hot spot facing challenges from both domestic and international sources.

Domestically, nationalism is both a means for legitimating the CCP rule and a means for the Chinese people to judge the performance of the state. If Chinese leaders can not deliver on their nationalist promise, they would become vulnerable to nationalistic criticism. As a matter of fact, the rising nationalism has run into a criticism of China's foreign policy, including the seemingly too "soft" stance toward Taiwan independence movement, particularly by those people in the military and other circles who have criticized and made strong demands of the Chinese government to take very radical actions against Taiwan.

Internationally, the rise of Chinese nationalism has coincided with a negative view of nationalism in the modern world. In this context, the new tide of Chinese nationalism has caused anxiety in Asia and the rest of the world in the recent years.

Balancing the positive and the negative sides, pragmatic leaders have been very ambivalent to promote nationalism and cautious to prevent the nationalist sentiment of Chinese people from getting out of hand. On the Taiwan issues, although nationalism has set the rhetoric, its policy has been constructed based on prudence.

The Making of the Anti-Secession Law

Beijing's sovereignty claim over Taiwan and actions to stop Taiwan from becoming independent played a special role in maintaining nationalist legitimacy of the communist regime because territorial integrity and national unity has a symbolic value in Chinese nationalism. However, nationalism has not prevented Beijing's pragmatic leadership from adopting a peaceful strategy, rather than costly military action, as the most desirable approach to achieve national unification. Indeed, the Anti-secession Law is not a welcome development. However, the law does little more than codify long-standing policy and does not expand the conditions under which force might be used.

Looking back at Beijing's threat of using force in the last decade, we have seen a typical pattern of talking tough but acting prudently. During the crisis following President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US in 1995, China threatened using military force by launching missiles close to Taiwan's coasts. However, it proved to be only military brinkmanship, using the threat of war to ensure peace across the Strait. The logic is that: China would have to wage a war against Taiwan if it declares independence; so military threats would reduce the likelihood of a declaration of independence; and so military threats would make a war less likely.

Another case was the threat during Taiwan's 2000 presidential election. One month before the election, the Chinese government published a white paper that noticeably put forward the "*sange ruguo*" (Three Ifs) to clarify the premise for the Mainland to use force against Taiwan. Before this white paper, China had threatened military action only if Taiwan declared independence and/or in the event of foreign invasion of the island. The white paper added the third "if": if Taiwan indefinitely refused the peaceful reunification through negotiations. Three days prior to the election, in his NPC news conference on March 15, Premier Zhu Rongji threatened the Taiwan voters that a Taiwan independence forces' victory would spark a cross-strait war. In the end, however, although Beijing was unhappy to see its most unacceptable candidate, Chen Shui-bian, elected as the president,

weighing options, pragmatism prevailed as Beijing decided to refrain from using force. Instead, it formulated a Wait-and-See policy.

The Anti-Secession law is just another case of making war threats to win peace. It grew out of Beijing's frustration by Chen's pushing the envelope, particularly his attempt to change the ROC constitution. Beijing has been on the defensive and reactive in this most recent decade. When Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to office and began to consolidate their power, they looked for ways to change this passive position not only because rising Chinese nationalism has blamed Beijing's leaders for being too soft toward Taiwan's independent movement, but also because they became very concerned about the real danger of Taiwan's formal declaration of independence via a constitutional change.

Initially intended as a response to Taiwan's enactment of a Referendum Law in December 2003, China began talking about the law after Chen won the marginal victory of re-election in March 2004 and announced a highly provocative *zhengmin* (name correction) campaign, such as changing the name of state-owned enterprises to emphasize "Taiwan" instead of "Republic of China" and inserting the name "Taiwan" in official correspondence from the Foreign Ministry. Beijing was very worried that the December Legislative Yuan election would give Chen the majority necessary to move toward amending the constitution in 2006.

The pro-independence ruling pan-green coalition, led by President Chen Shui-bian, however, failed to win the crucial Legislative Yuan elections. The defeat was interpreted as a signal by the majority in Taiwan to maintain the status quo rather than risking a war with the Mainland by pressing for formal independence. Chen's position, therefore, began to soften. The law, however, widely publicized in China's state media, had already worked its way through the party bureaucracy and was ready for the approval of the National People's Congress. The domestic political cost would have been too high to stop the momentum.

However, Beijing certainly does not want to see the passage of the Anti-Secession Law fuel tensions across the Straits. In spite of its current setback, Beijing has tried to accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative effects in its follow-on treatment of the Law. A *People's Daily* editorial stressed that "This law fully embodies our consistent stand on striving for peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and the greatest effort" and that "it is not a law of war, but is a law for the peaceful reunification of the country." At a

press conference, Wang Zaixi, Deputy Minister of the State Council Taiwan Affairs office, is overwhelmed with reassurances of peaceful intent by emphasizing that the passage of the Law does not mean the toughening of its attitude towards Taiwan and that the law is meant to promote peaceful reunification rather than undermine bilateral relations. In a speech the day before the law was passed, Hu Jintao attempted to show his good will by expressing China's willingness to relax restrictions on agricultural imports from southern Taiwan.

Indeed, although the Anti-Secession Law codifies China's determination to achieve national unification under the "one China" principle and the military option is clearly included among the "non-peaceful measures" to deter Taiwan independence "under any name or by any means," the law does not add any new provisions or contents to Beijing's past policy positions in the aforementioned white paper nor does it establish a timetable or deadline for unification, after which military action would occur, as some Chinese officials in recent years had advocated. Against this background, the law is less threatening. Under the fictional assumption that Taiwan is already legally part of "one China," there is no ultimatum for reunification, only an interdict against a formal declaration of independence.

While many people have focused on the "non-peaceful means" statement, one needs to pay equal attention to emphasis on the peaceful means as the most preferable approach to reach the long-standing objective of national unification, to be achieved through phased consultations (Article Six), conducted on an equal footing as long as there is a "glimmer of hope" of success in reunification. It is interesting to see two last-minute changes in the text before the law was finally passed. The wording of the third "or" that would compel China to employ "non-peaceful means" in Article Eight was originally "that *conditions* for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted." In the final text, it becomes "that *possibilities* for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted." According to a Chinese scholar, this change implies that China would "exhaust all possibilities to achieve peaceful unification." Article Two in the final text added a sentence that Taiwan, being part of the PRC, together with the Mainland make up "one China", and reconfirmed the position that talks between Beijing and Taiwan would be on an equal basis. That is why reading the text carefully, an *Asia Times Online* article indicated that "China's Anti-Secession Law is neither as inflammatory as many had feared nor as bombastic as Beijing's previous statements on cross-straits issues."

In this case, the Anti-Secession Law not only does not signify greater irrationality of China's policy toward Taiwan but also may not shift the cross-strait balance in any fundamental way. As a *South China Morning News* reporter noted, the law "changes nothing in the cross-strait balance, and serves no practical legal purpose, domestically or internationally." Although the existing Taiwan policy is now reinforced by Chinese law, it does not create any authority that did not exist already and its effect on decision-making is not clear. As Ralph Cossa indicated, "Passing a law – in a country where the rule of law is applied selectively, often at the leadership's whim – hardly makes an attack any more (or less) likely."

Taiwan's Reaction a Key at the Moment

The key variable at this moment, in this case, is the reactions in Taiwan. Over-reactions from Taiwan may amount to further escalation, prompting further Chinese reactions, thus producing a vicious chain reaction. The people of Taiwan have every right to express their opposition to the military threat prescribed by this law. However, as Richard Bush indicated, it is prudent for Taiwan's leaders "to avoid steps that inflame the situation further or foreclose the possibility of more positive cross-Straits steps when and if the political atmosphere changes for the better." That is why US Secretary of State Rice said to the Chinese leadership, "you do an anti-secession law, then they react, then you react to that and they react to that and pretty soon we're all up here (referring to war)." While the Anti-Secession Law has generated a drawback in the relationship, Taiwan has to be aware that Beijing cannot be pushed into a corner where the only option it has left is a military one. As a *South China Morning News* reporter indicated, "You do not need legislation to govern this divide while reason prevails, and when reason is gone, no legislation is going to make a difference, anyway."

Fortunately, Taiwan's reaction so far has been largely restrained. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders have been walking on a thin line between allowing Taiwan people to vent their feelings of grievance while not allowing those impulses to be translated into imprudent actions by the government. While the Taiwan government has made clear that the law has already damaged relations and disrupted a tenuous detente begun early this year, Chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, upon China's passage of the law, suggested that the push for cargo flights could resume if public anger in

Taiwan over the Chinese law subsidies, and he said President Chen Shui-bian intends to stick to an earlier pledge to make "peace and development" the core of his policy toward China.

Instead of initiating a referendum in response to the law, Chen has cautiously chosen to demonstrate in the streets of Taipei. Rather than calling for Taiwanese independence, the massive protest rally emphasized Taiwan's desire for continued peace and democracy. Although Chen participated in the rally, he did not speak to the masses, a contrast to previous occasions when the independence-minded president has used party gatherings to make provocative remarks. Chen has so far resisted the TSU legislators' push for counter-legislation, which would likely trigger an escalation of hostility.

Chen's restraints have been supported by the domestic political dynamics that has been called to steer relations back toward the earlier relaxation in the winter. While the opposition pan-blue coalition has blamed Chen's pro-independent actions for provoking the law, the Kuomintang, Taiwan's biggest opposition party, sent a high-level delegation led by Vice-Chairman Chiang Pin-kun to China only two days after the March 26 rally. The first official KMT delegation since the party fled to Taiwan amid China's civil war in 1949, the trip is aimed at paving the way for a visit by Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan to explore new venues for improving relations. Another development was that Taiwan's Chi Mei Group founder Hsu Wen-long, whose support to Chen was crucial for Chen's winning the 2000 presidential election, warned in an open letter published on the front page of the Taiwan's *Economic Daily News* hours before the March 26 rally, that "Taiwan independence will only lead Taiwan to war and drag people to disaster." He also stated that Taiwan and the Mainland both belong to one China and the Anti-Secession Law makes him at ease to invest in the Mainland.

Conclusion

It may take some time for the dust to settle, the setback caused by the law could be temporary as the Anti-Secession Law has not changed Beijing's rationale of threatening war for peace. This seemingly contradictory strategy of talking tough but acting in a calculated manner shows that pragmatic leaders were aware of the danger of falling victim to nationalism. China's Taiwan policy has not been dictated by the emotional voice of nationalism but based on careful calculation of China's national interests.

However, this does not mean that China's threat of force against Taiwan is in any way justifiable. Though the rationale of the law is to deter what Beijing perceived as a challenge to its fundamental interests and to discourage what it calls secession separatism, it has never found a way to make its national unification attractive to Taiwan because it has never understood why Taiwan fears the "one country, two systems" approach to unification. As Richard Bush indicated, by raising the specter of the use of force in the Anti-Secession Law, Beijing has "increased Taiwan's fears and undermined its own unification appeals. Its threats have rendered hollow all of its assurances. The balance it has struck between the two has had a perverse effect. It has strengthened the very political forces it wants to weaken. Indeed, it has united a hitherto divided populace." Hope that Beijing's leaders may learn more from the drawbacks of the Anti-Secession Law.

Question and Answer

1st Question:

China's increasing use of nationalism as a pragmatic approach toward maintaining its authority and legitimizing its ideology may force China to act upon its saber rattling against Taiwan in the future in order to keep up the nationalist perception of a strong China. So if China's policy intent is to bring about the peaceful reunification of Taiwan, won't the effect of this nationalism and the anti-secession law on Taiwan and other countries around China be interpreted as threatening, rather than simply a "pragmatic" method to avoid war?

Suisheng Zhao:

In terms of the language of the law, there is nothing particularly new that hasn't already been spoken about in the past. Yet the world has really focused on Article Eight, which is, of course, the "war article." But the other articles in the law do not talk about war, rather, peace. So although nationalism has been a driving force leading to the culmination of this law, the law has, in fact, not made the Chinese voice any more threatening than China's previous statements on the issue. China's tough talk means that it will not abandon the use of force, which has been their primary long-standing policy towards Taiwan. Naturally, Chinese leaders are also concerned about the US response to China's inclusion of "non-peaceful means" in their official policy, but that aspect of China's policy toward Taiwan has been in existence for a long time; it is nothing new. So there should be no more cause for worry today than there was yesterday.

2nd Question:

I find that the anti-secession law was a response to three major factors: the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that if China attacks Taiwan, the US will provide "whatever's necessary" to defend them. It was also a result of the power struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, in which Hu was believed to have too soft an approach to the cross-straits issue and therefore enacted the law to better assert and consolidate his authority within the People's Congress. I believe the third factor leading to the law was when Chen Shui-bian was re-elected president, causing considerable worry among the Beijing leadership. Do

you concur with this assessment?

On another issue, I find that the KMT's decision to open a dialogue with Beijing is not unprecedented, as it happened both before and after the war to help deal with Japan, and that now the KMT's reasons for going to China again is actually to seek help in fighting against the DPP.

Suisheng Zhao:

Indeed, all three aspects were critical in prompting China to enact this law. When China heard of Taiwan's Referendum Law, China felt it was necessary to find a law to counter the oft-mentioned Taiwan Relations Act. It was because of this that legislation on the re-unification law began, not the anti-secession law, to counter the US Taiwan Relations Act and Taiwan's Referendum Law. But that is just one cause.

In terms of the power struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, most of what is written is based upon speculation. There is little strong evidence of differences between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao that would have spurred Hu Jintao to propose the law to defend his authority. With regard to the internal transition of Chinese leadership authority, over the last two decades there has been a general consensus on what actions are necessary to defend China's national interests. Thus I believe that in the case of Jiang Zemin and the Hu-Wen leadership, everyone was in agreement on what needed to be done on this issue.

With regard to the third factor, after Chen Shui-bian was re-elected to the presidency, he wanted to consider his legacy in Taiwan's history in his second term. He realized that he would not be able to leave a legacy of an independent Taiwan, but that he might be able to leave a legacy of being Taiwan's Nixon for helping to bring peace across the Taiwan Straits. I think that is why he changed his tone and began to soften his position.

However, China has always held a deep sense of distrust towards Chen Shui-bian stemming from their feeling of betrayal from Lee Teng-hui. Following Chen's re-election, China was also very concerned about the change that could result from the outcome of Taiwan's legislative yuan elections which was predicted to be in favor of pan-green. Therefore, they sought to find a way to restrain Chen Shui-bian's actions, from which the anti-secession law came into legislation. So indeed, all three factors that were previously

mentioned were strong variables leading to the passage of the anti-secession law.

With regard to your second question on the CCP and KMT collaboration, I think that this time conditions are different because the KMT is not in power as the incumbent party. The KMT's visit with the Beijing leadership is not focused on making a strong impact on cross-strait relations, but on competing with the DPP and with the pan-green coalition for the domestic agenda setting and also for the next election.

3rd Question:

After the enactment of the anti-secession law, the United States criticized Beijing for the unwelcome legislation which it described as merely “unhelpful”, a term that has been radically criticized as being relatively soft. What are your thoughts on this response?

4th Question:

I think your point about timing is very important. It's possible we may look back historically and see that the principal consequence of this anti-secession law, which could have been worse in its content, was that it interrupted a possible pragmatic reconciliation that might have led to direct flights between Taiwan and the Mainland, etc. In which case we could say, well, it didn't lead to war, it mainly led to suspending a possible warming of relations that was just beginning to surface on the horizon. Do you accept this thesis?

Also, could anything happen during the remaining three years of Chen Shui-bian's term that could restore the atmosphere of the exploration of possible rapprochement that was emerging when this law was passed? Obviously, Chen can't make a concession now in the face of this, at least not for a long while. But, looking at the politics of both sides of the Strait, is there something that might occur in the last half of Chen Shui-bian's term that could put the dialogue back on track and restore momentum to at least some moderate progress like direct flights or some other elements of direct links?

Suisheng Zhao:

I agree with you entirely that this law comes at a very bad time, disrupting a lot of hopeful progress, which is why the US criticized China's anti-secession law. The US also

criticized the fact that the entire legislation process was a black box operation. There was absolutely no transparency about the law's contents until the last week before the law was passed, when China finally opened it up to the US. But before then there was only speculation, mostly assuming that the content would be worse than what it turned out to be.

In terms of what might happen in the next three years of Chen's second term, I would not be very pessimistic. There is already a general feeling of optimism in Taipei that the tensions created by the anti-secession law will pass away very quickly. An official from the Mainland Affairs Council assured that when all the dust settles, both sides will come back again and talk about direct flights, further opening up southern Taiwan's agricultural imports, and other concessions, just not now. But one day, the cross-strait relations will warm up again in a positive direction. I hope that I am not overly optimistic.

5th Question:

The Mainland sent signals to Hong Kong not to worry about the anti-secession law, as it would be explicitly stated that the law will not apply to Hong Kong or Macao, only Taiwan. They also promised that any steps towards a "non-peaceful resolution" would only be taken as a final resort. These preliminary actions show that the Beijing leadership did realize that unfavorable external implications and ramifications that might result from the law, and thus took the steps they felt were necessary to help defuse the tension.

Another issue was the supposed use of Tung Chee-hwa's resignation several days before the enactment as a distraction to keep the people of Hong Kong from having a strong negative reaction to the anti-secession law, which could not be found on any front page of Hong Kong's newspapers at the time. But aside from Hong Kong, what effect has the law had on other contested regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and other minority areas?

Suisheng Zhao:

I think that, before they saw the final text, many people outside of the Chinese government were full of anxiety about the anti-secession law. After reading the finalized contents of the law, however, much of the perceived threat that many people feared would be included in the text began to dissipate.

6th Question:

What do you think of Taiwan's or the Mainland's recent strategy of pressuring Taiwanese businessmen by denying them contracts on the Mainland? Do you think that it was motivated by the anti-secession law to pressure Taiwanese businessmen to disavow independence and Chen Shui-bian's party, or do you think that this is going to be an ongoing strategy that the Mainland is going to use to try to influence politics in Taiwan?

Suisheng Zhao:

Regarding Taiwan's complaints that China is using Taiwanese business people to promote their political agenda, both sides do it and I don't believe that this is an unfair practice. After all, it is China which has considerable economic growth that Taiwan wants to tap in to, so why not? This is probably a long-term trend that isn't necessarily related to the enactment of the anti-secession law. As Taiwan continues to rely on China to strengthen its economic interests, it will have to consider the possible political drawbacks associated with their economic investment and dependency on the Mainland.