Of Regimes and Rhinoceroses: Immigration, Outgroup Prejudice, and the Microfoundations of Democratic Decline
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“The rhinoceroses, rhinoceritis and rhinoceration are current matters and you single out a disease that was born in this century... For a while, one can say that a man is rhinocerised by stupidity or baseness. But there are people-honest and intelligent-who in their turn may suffer the unexpected onset of this disease, even the dear and close ones may suffer...It happened to my friends” (Eugene Ionesco, as in Quinney (2007, p. 47)).

In his famous play, “The Rhinoceros,” Ionesco describes a French town’s response to the unresisting, if not willing, transformation of its citizens into rhinoceroses—the transformation of humans into wild beasts. The play is an allegory that asks the question occupying the minds of many an intellectual in the mid-20th century: what makes people embrace authoritarian parties and leaders that, in the extreme, can be as beastly as the Nazis in Germany, the Stalinists in Russia, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Idi Amin in Africa, or the slavery regime in the Americas? What psychological factors underlie the process of rationalization, willful excuse, and active support among a substantial portion of the public for elites that seek to destroy democratic institutions of forbearance and accountability, and curtail the rights and liberties of political opponents and voters?

In recent years, the question of what explains the rise of institutional authoritarianism and the corresponding erosion of democracy has come back with a vengeance. The ebullience of the early 1990s that followed the end of communism and the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere (Fukuyama 1989), has been followed by alarm at the rapid growth in popular support for radical leaders and parties (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017, Foa and Mounk 2016), some on the left (e.g., Venezuela, Greece) but many more on the right. Masters of economic and nativist populist discourse (Brubaker 2017), when these leaders come to power, they have often advanced agendas that embrace changes to electoral rules in ways that benefit their parties. Many have also sought to muzzle the opposition by controlling the media and targeting opposing elites and their supporters for investigation and prosecution (Zakaria 1997, Schedler 2013, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017). Turkey’s Erdogan jailed journalists and academics who resisted his efforts to consolidate power. Hungary’s Orbán mocked the idea that citizens are “free to do anything that does not violate another person’s freedom,” and forced through constitutional changes to centralize power in the executive. Poland’s Law & Justice party claiming “ politicization of courts,” enacted sweeping reforms of the judiciary designed to bring judges under government control. Greece’s SYRIZA has sought to bring the media under party control by limiting the number of permits available for private broadcasters while it is currently supporting the prosecution of ten prominent opposition leaders on corruption charged on the basis if secret evidence (The National Herald 2018).

And it is not just Eastern Europe. Extremist parties and leaders, hostile to liberal democracy, have emerged across Europe. In France, Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, and
elsewhere parties that promise to prevent and even reverse immigration, close the borders to outsiders, and “de-islamize” and restore ethnoreligious homogeneity to their societies (Said-Moorhouse and Jones 2017), have become strong contenders for government either as leaders or as coalition partners. In addition to civil rights for minorities, other institutions of liberal democracy have become implicit or explicit targets. Even the world’s oldest democracy is not immune to the allure of an exclusionary, organic “people” led by a populist strongman who claims to be above the law.

The rise of Donald Trump has been accompanied by the blatant disregard if not contempt for the country’s egalitarian social norms, the politicization of the administrative state (e.g., claims of disloyalty against the Department of Justice and national law enforcement, and calls for the Post Office to charge higher rates to Washington Post owner, Amazon), and efforts to change electoral rules and even the composition of high courts to cement party advantages and prevent the opposition from gaining ground. From extreme gerrymandering, to voter-ID laws, to proposed constitutional amendments to exclude non-citizens from the official population count or the latest proposal for U.S. Census questionnaire changes meant to impact apportionment, to calls for the impeachment, replacement, or “packing” of state high courts issuing decisions that political leaders dislike, the U.S. has witnessed it all in the span of a decade.

The President, when he is not busy inciting chants of “lock her [Hillary Clinton] up!” among his supporters, has been excluding media from state functions and issuing open threats against journalists, state functionaries, and even judges, on social media. Trumpist elites at the federal and state levels have followed suit. More recently, such “fighting dirty” tactics have been endorsed by supporters of the Left who argue that their policy agenda and the rights of the people can only be safeguarded by exploiting institutional openings to create a one-party state of the other persuasion (Faris 2018).

Building on Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s classic studies (1978), much of the recent literature has focused on the institutional and discursive strategies that elites have used to undermine liberal democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017, Sunstein 2018, Brubaker 2017). These top-down processes are very important in answering the questions of when and how elites may move against democratic norms and institutions. However, all regimes, including authoritarian systems require support from a substantial portion of the public. It is from citizens that regimes draw legitimacy, recruits, voters, and defenders. It is the abandonment of democratic principle, and sometimes of humanity itself, among citizens that enables extremists, populists, and demagogues of all persuasions to reach and hold on to power. Which brings us to the question that was central to Ionesco’s allegory: what drives ordinary people, to willingly become rhinoceroses?

I argue that social identities based on race, ethnicity, language, or religion, the way they have become intertwined with political and partisan identities, and the politics that surround them threaten to upend democratic polities. In the context of increased social diversity, portions of the public is willing to support calls for an exclusionary moral community of virtue at the expense of norms and institutions of democracy. Contrary to our idealistic normative assumptions, citizens do not have a principled or ideologically constrained approach to democracy any more than they have a principled approach to governance and policy (Converse 1964). Rather, they are prone to understand democracy through the lens of group memberships. When the social position of cherished groups is perceived as threatened, and when trusted in-group elites use narratives of group threat and
out-group dehumanization to justify anti-democratic actions, group members become more vulnerable to authoritarian leaders and parties that promise protection or restoration of the group’s status but at the cost of institutional democracy.

**The Prejudice Hypothesis: Rhinoceritis as Acquired**

In the American context, beliefs about the role, scope, and character of government have been and continue to be filtered through the prism of race and alienage with class biases serving to amplify negative group perceptions. Since its inception, the United States has been deeply ambivalent about the breadth and depth of inclusion that it should allow and encourage for aliens and minority groups, at times supporting highly anti-democratic laws in the name of protecting the “national character.” From Jefferson’s concerns that the economic dependence of the immigrant working poor (let alone the emancipation and of black slaves) would open the door for corruption and tyranny, to Ben Franklin’s fears that new immigrants would “Germanize” the character of the country’s English inhabitants, to Trump’s “Muslim ban,” there is a long tradition of white American elites and their numerous followers who have supported various forms of repression and un-freedom in the name of protecting the nation and the polity.

Debates over the power that should be allotted to branches of the national government (executive v. legislative) and levels of government (federal v. states), have often been triggered by or framed in terms of who is best suited to manage and control the enemies within and protect the “true” Americans from all manner of harm (Pickus 2005, Key 1949, King 2002). Not surprisingly, over time, the United States has hosted multiple and overlapping political regimes that concurrently but differentially governed (and continue to do so, especially in the case of immigrants) categories of people based primarily (sometimes implicitly) on ascriptive criteria (Smith 1997, Key 1949, Pickus 2005, Mickey 2015).

Democratic institutions in the American South co-existed with a harsh authoritarian regime that governed the lives of black slaves; both were sustained by the ideology of white supremacy which cultivated equality and social trust among whites from across social classes and nativity lines while at the same time maximizing social and political distance between whites and blacks (Mickey 2015, Roediger 2003, Cash 1941). After the Civil War and Reconstruction, the nominal elevation of slaves to national citizenship was accompanied by the undemocratic system of social and residential segregation which took roots across the country, effectively nationalizing Southern authoritarianism (Sugrue 1995, Klinker and Smith 2002).

Starting in the 1850s and culminating in the 1920s, the same ideological and social dynamics served as the basis for an exclusionary immigration regime which used Anglosaxon whiteness (variedly defined over time) as the main criterion for immigrant admission. Nativism and racism provided the justification for the exclusion of a variety of immigrant groups (especially Asians but also Latinos) from political and civil rights and liberties ensuring that race and alienage status determined the level of democracy one experienced. Populism, the language of Southern politics, devised to justify the “union of freedom and slavery” (Patterson 1999), became the rhetorical structure that various nativist and racist elites used to justify curtailing democratic rights and abandoning norms. In on key strand of American populist discourse, those fighting on the side of racial egalitarianism were portrayed as corrupt, un-American, “communist” elites seeking to destroy American democracy.
In the Southern system, we see the strongest evidence that beliefs in democracy may not be principled but rather directional. Southern leaders and their followers perceived no contradiction between individual liberty and chattel slavery and “white southern celebration of liberty always included the freedom to preserve black slavery” (Cooper 2000, 35). Free elections and egalitarian political institutions for whites were embraced, as leaders forged a personal bond with followers based on their common whiteness which enabled elites to use government in defense of an aristocratic, doulotic, social order. In this world, representative government institutions were not inherently a threat: only when centralized outside this closed political system and led by individuals who did not accept the beneficence of the “peculiar institution” did democratic government become a threat to individual rights and specifically to the “natural” right of owning human beings as property (Ericson 2000, Faust 1981).

The Civil War may have ended slavery but it nationalized the ideology and institutions of white supremacy under the banner of “states’ rights.” States’ rights ideology which originated with Southern Democrats but was embraced by Republicans after the New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement, fused Northern libertarian individualism which emphasized government restraint with Southern racial fears and prejudices (Schickler 2016, Filindra and Kaplan 2018, Lowndes 2008). Together they sculpted a color-blind, but heavily racialized, populist narrative according to which the rights of a broad virtuous group, such as “the homeowners,” “the moral (or silent) majority,” “the law abiding citizens,” “the true Americans,” or “the taxpayers,” were being threatened because government elites were colluding with undeserving groups such as “criminals,” “welfare queens,” “extremists,” “illegals,” “anchor babies,” or “terrorists,” granting them “special rights” in exchange for political power (Filindra and Kaplan 2016, Hosang 2010, Dudas 2008). Government institutions tasked with protecting vulnerable populations and providing checks on the power of political elites and dominant social groups have been transformed into the “Deep State” whose goal is to disempower “the people.” As Orlando Patterson (1999) has noted, the heirs to Southern herrenvolk democracy sought to generate and sustain white anti-black resentment towards national institutions and leaders by “making niggers of liberals, the identification of the “N” word with the “L” word” (p. 178).

Of Rhinoceroses and Trumpism

This is the context in which we can begin to understand the “Trump effect” and similar phenomena across the West, and assess their seriousness. Here are the key questions to explore:

1. Are we experiencing a “crisis in confidence” in, if not an erosion of support for democratic institutions in the U.S. today?
2. Is such a crisis linked to outgroup fears such as racism and nativism?
3. Is Trump the cause of this crisis, a “charismatic” demagogue who managed to awake the sleeping dragon, or is he the heir of long-standing efforts by racial conservatives to undermine democratic institutions and trust in government?

Crisis in Confidence & Support for Non-democratic Solutions

As far back as the 1990s, political scientists sounded the alarm that trust in government institutions has been in precipitous decline across Western democracies (Warren 1999, Hetherington 2005, Inglehart 1999, Nye 1997). These trends exist among
both majority and minority social groups, but our focus here is on whites because of the disproportionately powerful role they play in American politics. A humorous poll from 2013 found that white Americans had a higher opinion of witches (49% v. 32%), dog poop (42% v. 34%), and the hated DMV (48% v. 28%) than they did of the U.S. Congress (Public Policy Polling 2013).

Other data suggest that it is not only trust but a variety of other attitudes towards government and its institutions that may have changed for the worst in the past four decades. First, white Americans have abandoned New Deal ideals, and have increasingly adopted ideologies that accommodate a state as the “night watchman.” According to data from the ANES, in 1992, 44 percent of whites supported a greater role of government in society and the economy; by 2016 only 28 percent felt the same way. Second, whites have come to perceive their government as a threat rather than as a protector. In 2008, the first time this question was asked in the ANES, half of all whites believed that government constitutes a threat to individual rights and liberties; four years later it had climbed to 60 percent.

Data from the 2016 ANES suggest that the problem goes beyond mistrust in and feelings of hostility towards government and its role in society. Significant proportions of white America has embraced authoritarian populism. More than a third of whites endorse having a strong leader even if he bends the rules; half want a leader who will “crush evil” and take us back to the “true path”; and just shy of a majority want the authorities to get rid of “rotten apples” who are ruining everything (Figure 1).

An online survey of white Americans (n=1,200) that I conducted in March 2018 confirms the troubling trends with some additional very disconcerting insights. These data are not fully representative of the white population the way the ANES data are, but they do match the general population in many demographic dimensions, so they are certainly directionally indicative of the mood and attitudes of the white public. Furthermore, the distribution of responses on the item measuring whether government is a threat to freedoms
is very similar to the ANES and other representative studies, so there is reason to think that these data are not wildly off the mark.

There is little good to report here. The best news is that only a fifth of our white compatriots think that the President should shut down Congress and govern alone but twice as many (38%) believe that under some circumstances, an unelected government is preferred to an elected one. A similar proportion (39%) think that there are circumstances that would justify a military takeover of the American government (this is very close to what a 2015 YouGov Study reported). Almost half (45%) of white Americans believe that the media have too much freedom in expressing political views, and more than half (55%) would like a leader with an iron fist. Finally, 58% of our white compatriots think that the federal government poses a threat to the rights and freedoms of citizens.

![Figure 2. Support for Anti-democratic Institutions & Norms (March 2018 Qualtrics Survey)](chart)

**Bringing the Rhinoceros into the Picture: Is the Anti-government and Anti-democracy Trend Driven by Outgroup Resentment?**

Historical analyses by numerous scholars of American political development have provided evidence that the linkage between out-group resentments and hostility towards government and its institutions is long standing (Schickler 2016, Key 1949, Lowndes 2008, Mickey 2015, Patterson 1999). Studies in political behavior confirm that whites have embraced racial populism: perceptions about the scope and role of government, feelings of threat by the federal government, concerns about the fairness of elections, support for voter identification laws, all are fueled by racial resentment (Appleby and Federico 2017, Filindra and Kaplan 2018, Wilson and Brewer 2013). This attitudinal link between racial resentment and confidence in national institutions not only predates Trump, it also predates Obama. Our analyses with Noah Kaplan (2018) find that racial resentment and distrust in government have been correlated as far back as 1988, the first instance when both measures are included
in the National Election Survey. Buyuker (2018) shows that racial resentment as well as anti-immigrant attitudes contribute to dominant group enthusiasm for authoritarian populism.

The partisan realignment which started with the New Deal and concluded with the Obama presidency, brought racially resentful whites to the fold of the Republican party strengthening the link between partisan and social identities, on one hand, and “affective partisanship” or negative feelings towards the out-party, on the other (Huddy, Mason, and AarØE 2015, Abramowitz and Webster 2018). The conservatives’ racialized hostility to government institutions and democratic norms was amplified and evangelized to new audiences with the emergence of Fox News as the conservative movement’s megaphone (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007, Schroeder and Stone 2015). The election of Barack Obama as the country’s first black President further strengthened the role that racial grievances play in white Americans’ political judgements (Tesler and Sears 2010).

The racial realignment coupled with a shift of extremist rhetoric from the margins of the conservative movement to the mainstream of the Republican Party (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2017, Filindra and Kaplan 2018) have had a consequential effect on white public opinion. The increasingly negative rhetoric focused on the government and its institutions, the charges that political opponents are “crooked,” “corrupt,” or agents of the “Deep state,” along with swirling conspiracy theories of all types, have served to link white racial attitudes to ideas and beliefs related to democratic institutions.

How can we assess the effects of this link? Below, I present descriptive analyses from both the 2016 ANES and the 2018 online survey. In both cases, I show preferences for anti-democratic norms and institutions by racial resentment and by partisan affiliation. The racial resentment measure is a common measure of anti-black sentiment based on responses to a battery of four questions (Kinder and Sanders 1996). According to recent analyses, the proportion of whites who can be classified as high racial resenter has hovered at the 60% mark for several decades (Kinder and Chudy 2016). Although the share of the general population that is white has been in decline since at least the 1970s due to immigration, white Americans continue to represent the majority (about 67%) of the total population. This suggests that about 40% of the American population today can be classified as high racial resents.

Figure 3 shows responses to the same three 2016 ANES items presented earlier but for whites who score high on racial resentment and those who score low on racial resentment based on the mean. The differences in endorsement of authoritarian norms between these two groups is striking. Among those scoring high on racial resentment, 86% agree that a strong leader who on occasion bends the rules to get things done is not a bad idea; only 15% of those who score low on racial resentment endorse this viewpoint. A similar proportion of high racial resents (86%) believe that authorities should get rid of the rotten apples who ruin everything, while only 14% of low racial resents agree with that view. Almost four-in-five (79%) of high racial resents believe that our country needs a strong leader who will crush evil, while only 21% of low racial resents express similar beliefs. All these differences are statistically significant (p<0.05).
My 2018 survey is not fully representative as the ANES is, but has an advantage: it includes a range of attitudes about how political leaders should behave and what kinds of actions are appropriate. In the terms used by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2017), these questions seek to identify whether racial resentment drives whites to abandon support for norms of forbearance and tolerance. The survey also includes the measure of racial resentment.

Figure 4, shows differences in preferences for a variety of anti-democratic political norms and institutions for those who score high on racial resentment and those who score low on this measure. The news are not good for either group as substantial numbers of both high and low racial resenter—many more low resenter than in the case of the ANES questions—are prepared to endorse highly anti-democratic institutional and normative changes. However, those scoring high on racial resentment are significantly more likely, often two times more likely, than our less resentful neighbors to harbor such extreme beliefs.

In all cases, the differences between the two groups are statistically significant (p<0.05). As the first set of bars shows, two-thirds (65%) of those who score high on racial resentment endorse authoritarian leadership and believe that “the country needs a leader with an iron fist,” compared to half as many (33%) of those scoring low on this measure. A similar proportion of high racial resenter (63%) compared to 46% of those scoring low on racial bias believe that the federal government poses a threat to the rights of ordinary citizens. Whites who score high on racial resentment (54%, compared to 24% of low resenter) tend to harbor more negative beliefs about the news media, thinking that the media are allowed too much freedom in their criticism of elected leaders. The hostility
towards media that has increased exponentially during the Trump era constitutes a major threat to democracy which requires faith in the fourth estate to function properly. Four-in-ten among those who are highly resentful of blacks (42%) compared to 31% of those who are low resentsers are ready to endorse a military junta “under some circumstances.” This in a country with a long-standing skepticism of professional armies which has traditionally imposed strict civilian control over the military (Uviller and Merkel 2003).

A similar proportion of highly racially resentful whites (42%) compared to 30% of their least resentful peers are prepared to accept that under some circumstances elections are not the best way and an unelected government might be superior. These beliefs run so deeply contrary to the American political tradition that these numbers are quite alarming. Although less popular, a quarter of high racial resenteres (26%) compared to only 12% of low resenteres are ready to accept a president who shuts down Congress and governs on his own—an unaccountable dictator.

**Is Trump the Cause or the Effect?**

Trump did not cause this strong connection between racial attitudes and beliefs about government and institutional democratic norms. Analyses that Noah Kaplan and I have conducted using the ANES data suggest that trust in government among whites was negatively influenced by racial resentment as far back as 1988, while beliefs about the size of government became racialized in a similar way in the early 2000 at the time when Fox News became a major player on the Right (Filindra and Kaplan 2018). The trend continued unabated through the Obama era; during this period, we have evidence that racially resentful whites expressed less positive affect for the federal government (as measured by the feeling thermometer). Furthermore, racially resentful whites have come to believe that the national government represents a threat to individual rights. Although not discussed in terms of democracy and its norms and institutions, other studies have pointed in the same direction.
Appleby and Federico (2017) show that perceptions of electoral fairness are colored by racial resentment, while Wilson and Brewer (2013) indicate that racial resentment is a driver in white support of the new crops of restrictive Voter ID laws that introduce a variety of barriers to vote that differentially impact minorities. Buyuker (2018) shows that both racial resentment and anti-immigrant attitudes drive white Americans’ support for anti-democratic norms, such as support for strong leaders who will get rid of “rotten apples”. Miller and Davis (2018) report similar results using multiple waves of the World Values Survey, suggesting that a link between white out-group hostility, measured in terms of desired social distance from groups such as immigrants, Muslims, or blacks (among many other stigmatized groups), and anti-democratic tendencies can be found as early as 1995, long before Trump came to the forefront of national politics.

There is no doubt that Trump, the chief “birther” and a major propagator of rightwing conspiracy theories, capitalized on racial resentment and mobilized white social identities in ways that “establishment” Republicans (save perhaps for Newt Gingrich and Rudy Giuliani) were not willing to do. His rhetoric, unconstrained by the training that comes from long-term partisan socialization, relied on overt racial themes targeting Latinos, blacks, Muslims, and immigrants. He portrayed a country in decline characterized by internal “carnage,” characterized immigrants as “animals” or people from “hellhole nations” that do not deserve a place in American society, and promoted exclusion and xenophobia as the means to “Make America Great Again.”

Quo Vadis?

So where do we go from here? The Trump presidency will end. From the vantage point of May 2018, we can’t know if it will end before 2020, in 2020, or in 2024. But we know it will end. Does that mean that the threat to American democratic institutions is temporary and things will “return to normal”? Sitting in May 2018, I am not very hopeful that norms of racial egalitarianism (or gender egalitarianism, for that matter) will be easily reinstated. If American history has taught us anything, democratic norms are fragile and require the general will of people and elites to nurture and sustain them. Only when they are deeply internalized guides of social behavior do such norms thrive and contribute to isolating and minimizing the power and effect of hateful, exclusionary voices (Mendelberg 2001).

Trump’s behavior has taught his followers that they are not bound by egalitarian norms and that it is legitimate for them to express nativism, racism, and sexism openly and overtly. What is more, many of them feel vindicated in their views and attitudes because they seem to be guiding national policy. Explicit racism and nativism are no longer out-of-sight, hidden in some obscure Reddit posts or internet chat-groups. It is expressed daily by Trump, many of his aides, and Fox News commentators such as “Fox & Friends,” Laura Ingram, Ann Coulter, Sean Hannity and Tucker Carlson. Some of these elites, including Trump in official White House announcements, are even encouraging blatant dehumanization of outgroups—as in the recent characterization of MS-13 members as “animals” by the White House. Research shows that this insidious form of prejudice uniquely predicts justifications for aggression against out-groups, preferences for suppression and an acceptance of abandonment of democratic norms (Kteily and Bruneau 2017, Kteily et al. 2015, Zimbardo 2007).

What is more, Trump has enjoyed great success in sustaining the support of the vast majority of the Republican electorate who seem willing to justify and rationalize even his
most explicitly racist and sexist statements. Criticism from within the Party is at best muted at worst non-existent, while my recent research with Laurel Harbridge Yong suggests that ingroup critics of the President are likely to be penalized by Republican voters (Filindra and Harbridge-Yong 2017). All this provides a set of political lessons for future Republican candidates: unlike it was the case in the 1980s and 1990s (Mendelberg 2001), in 2018, leveraging overt racism and every other form of prejudice and out-group hostility can pay dividends. Political aggression and extremism that is detrimental to institutions can be electoral catnip for voters fed on a diet of racial and nativist grievances. After all, substantial number of white Republican voters are happy to reward candidates such as Trump or Roy Moore (Alabama), or Michael Williams (Georgia) and his “Deportation Bus” who play back and thus validate extreme and virulent forms of out-group hostility. These voters are also open to supporting institutional changes that limit democracy in a variety of ways if they perceive these changes as a means to maintaining a social and political status quo that privileges them while preventing the empowerment of hated “others.” This hard to reverse change in the normative environment, the rhinocerization that has been taking place for several years now, suggests that the Trump legacy may be long and incredibly destructive for the country that prides itself as the first modern democracy.

The solution to the erosion of democratic norms is not more closure and less diversity as Stenner and Haidt (2018) have argued recently. Catering to the demands of rhinoceroses is not how open, liberal, and democratic societies should handle this crisis in confidence in democracy and the state. Normalizing such attitudes and beliefs or attributing them to “economic anxiety,” and market globalization is neither the problem nor the solution. First, we need to come to terms with the fact that prejudice and discrimination of all varieties are neither the province of a small minority of our fellow citizens, nor an inconsequential phenomenon. Prejudice is central to our history, institutions, social and political life. Second, we do have the tools to combat prejudice. Almost a century of research has taught us a lot about how to identify it, alleviate it and beat it.

• Making it visible is key. The “Black Lives Matter” movement along with the countless individuals who post videos showing police brutality and discrimination by ordinary citizens have helped substantiate the pervasiveness of prejudice in American society and defeat the cacophony that claims discrimination is rare and such events are exaggerated.
• Sixty-five years after Brown v. Board of Education, school and neighborhood integration continue to be key. Over time, the U.S. abandoned school integration and with it providing its youth with the opportunity to form meaningful friendships and relationships with peers from different groups. Such positive contact is one of our best weapons in combating prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008, Buyuker, Jadidi-D’Urso, and Filindra 2017).
• Criminal justice reform that includes the de-criminalization of drug offenses and the restitution of the political rights of felons is key. Millions of people from minority communities, especially black men, have lost their political voice to a system that punishes offenders for life when it comes to political rights (Lerman and Weaver 2014).

The open society does not need to compromise with those who fundamentally oppose its values and its institutions. We don’t need any more understanding of rhinocertis, nor do we need compassion for the plight of those afflicted. What we need is a plan of action for the future that will inoculate our society and especially our youth from the harmful effects of prejudice. The tools are there, we need to find the will to do it.
References


