Jean Oi [00:45:44] Thank you very much. Now we are going to move to our other panel members. And the way that we have this arranged is that we have three very distinguished speakers. We've got two people who I think are mainly known for their knowledge on China. And we also have Harry Harding who does a lot on Chinese politics and U.S. foreign policy. But he also, we invited him here today because he has been spending about the last three years or so at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology so he's sort of seen it up close himself. And then we also are very pleased to have Professor Ming Sing from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and he is an expert on Hong Kong politics and also has a forthcoming book on the Umbrella Movement. I think it'll be fascinating to see those comparative, hear his comparative insights. And finally, Mike Lampton, David Michael Lampton who is here with us at Stanford and he is also of Chinese politics as well as U.S. Chinese relations and the former head of the National Committee on U.S. China Relations. And so, with that I'm going to turn it over first to Harry and I believe the speakers will just speak from the table and then at the very end we will ask Mrs. Chan to provide some final reflections and comments and then we'll let the panelists have some discussion then we open to questions.

Harry Harding [00:47:27] Well thank you very very much Jean and good afternoon everyone. It is an enormous pleasure for me to be back at Stanford. I came to Stanford in 1967 to begin my graduate work and the following summer, 1968 was my first visit to Hong Kong. I fell in love with the city at that time have gone back regularly on an occasional basis but have had the pleasure to spend half of the last four years spending time mainly at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and also a briefer time at the University of Hong Kong. I also happened to be married to a Hong Kong citizen with a Hong Kong passport. My two stepdaughters are proud graduates for those of you from Hong Kong diocesan girls school doing their undergraduate work in the United States. So, in some sense I am a Hong Konger as well, at least I like to think that I am. There is little that I can add to Anson's brilliant overview of the problem and her view of what might be a possible solution. But let me add my own interpretation of the protests, give unfortunately a somewhat more pessimistic forecast of Hong Kong's future and conclude with a brief mention of the implications of developments in Hong Kong for first the United States and then for Taiwan.

[00:48:53] I'll take my starting point with the slogan that at least many of the Hong Kong demonstrators have used for their movement. Gwongfuk Heunggong, in Mandarin Guangfu Xianggang (光复香港) which unfortunately has been translated into English as Liberate Hong Kong. Now even those with the rudimentary Mandarin like me know that liberate is Jiefang (解放), Guangfu means something else. It means to recover, it means to restore. It is in a fundamental sense a nostalgic slogan that is mourning something that was lost and is asking that it be retrieved and rehabilitated and restored.

[00:49:37] To try to understand what that was, let me go back to the night of June 30th July 1st 1997. Like Anson I was at the handover ceremony. She of course was occupying, really, center stage. She's told me privately this was a coincidence. If you look at the photographs of the event in the Hong Kong convention center you will see
her standing at the top of the middle aisle with the British delegation on the right as the audience looked at it, the Chinese on the left. Anson in a bright beautiful red gown standing in the middle between the British and the Chinese flags and coincidence or not the symbolism was so powerful. She was the symbol of continuity that this was going to be a smooth transition. And I can tell you that the mood in the streets of Hong Kong at least for a visitor, was one of great anticipation and indeed great optimism, great joy. This was something to be welcomed.

[00:50:45] There was however one rather awkward moment that I remember vividly and it speaks to a question which is just beginning to bubble up. When the first Chief Executive C.H. Tung took the oath of office, sworn in by the way I think this is right, Anson, by the Chief Justice, more recently they're sworn in by the President of the People's Republic. (Discussion between Anson Chan and Harry Harding). Was, he really? He was? OK, thank you. Anson has a far better memory than I. In any event as he began his inaugural address, he opened his mouth and what came out, Cantonese. Now there was a delegation of high level Chinese mainland officials behind him who listened in horror because they couldn't understand a word he was saying, they had to fumble for their earphones to turn on the Mandarin translation. And I mention this because the future of language is going to be a big issue, it's going to be part of this nostalgic protest. Whether it is the dialect that is spoken or the form of written Chinese that is used, full or simplified characters.

[00:51:53] So my point is that there was enormous optimism at that time. Some minor forecast of some problems that might emerge but the protests have been a reaction to a response to a variety of measures that Anson has summarized in part that Hong Kong people have seen as either an erosion of what they once had and that they hold dear or a violation of what they believe were promises about an even brighter future. She's given you several examples of the causes of some of the protests, the so-called moral and national and civic education proposal. There is a proposal for a national security law that was obligatory under the Basic Law and there have been other proposals that are less in the news but I think symbolically important, a protest over the demolition of the Queen's Pier on the Hong Kong Harbor indicating that what people hold as their identity is often symbolized in civic architecture and that's a major issue, it was a major issue for that. There was a protest even against the establishment of a branch of the National Palace Museum in Beijing in the West Kowloon Cultural District which was seen again as an intervention to promote traditional Chinese national culture. There was a protest against this, there was a big picture of it in the Central MTR station, one of the ones that's been recently attacked, a group of young people sitting with a banner that read in Mandarin, Mama wo e, keshi wo chibuxia (妈妈我饿，可是我吃不下). Mom I'm hungry, but I can't eat. This was a hunger strike protesting this. There was the protest against the high speed rail link between West Kowloon station and the mainland and the high speed rail network, and above all the protest against stationing mainland customs and immigration officers in space that was basically deeded to the mainland government making it part of China, exercising mainland law inside Hong Kong and the list goes on.
Looking ahead, what worries me is that Beijing's response to these protests is not going to be following Anson's advice to undertake reforms and to realize the aspirations of a younger generation of Chinese, but rather, of Hong Kongers, but rather to begin further to whittle away what makes Hong Kong distinctive. In 2047, the One Country Two Systems model expires. There is hope or has been hope, based on one enigmatic statement of Deng Xiaoping obviously many years ago now, that One Country Two Systems would be in effect for at least 50 years. I've never seen the 'at least' repeated and I think there is no reason to think, I hope that I'm wrong, that Beijing will agree to continue the One Country Two Systems model after the original expiration date of July 1, 2047. Now if that is the case then you can't wait until the last minute to begin to move remove the gap between the One Country on the mainland and the Second System in today's Hong Kong and so I fear that there will be attempts to whittle away at the defining characteristics of some of Hong Kong's key institutions. What should we be looking at? We should be looking in the first instance now that the independence of the judiciary, because so many of the protesters have not yet been brought to trial, we'll have to see whether the judiciary remains autonomous and is able to uphold the true rule of law. We need to look at the press. I'm very pleasantly surprised that so much of the Hong Kong press including the public radio and television station RTHK continues to report accurately and objectively, the South China Morning Post which is our English language newspaper, is owned by Alibaba, and the editorials are clearly sympathetic to Beijing. But many of the op-eds have very different points of views and the reporting remains objective in my judgment. We'll have to see how long that continues. There'll be pressures on universities. Perhaps my colleague from HKUST can speak to his concerns about that, if he has them. There is pressure on the business community, on Cathay Pacific our flag carrier, to fire or discipline those who had expressed even sympathy for the protests, let alone participate in them. There have been statements that the Chinese state-owned enterprises should begin to buy shares of major Hong Kong companies to assume, presumably, to acquire a controlling interest. And the list goes on of what I fear is going to begin to happen, again to narrow the gap not by making the mainland look like a lot more like Hong Kong but by making Hong Kong look more like the mainland and I would anticipate that there will continue to be these kinds of nostalgic protests to resist these especially in areas that are especially sensitive to Hong Kong young people.

Now what are the implications for, first I'll deal with Taiwan and then for the United States. Xi Jinping has recently reiterated that the original intention of Deng Xiaoping in announcing One Country Two Systems was aimed at providing a formula for the unification of Taiwan with the mainland. Hong Kong actually came later, and Xi Jinping in January of this year made a very important speech in which he said two things. One, not surprisingly that Taiwan must be reunified with the mainland, and that this should not pass on from generation to generation. Now to me it's clear what that means, it means from one generation of leaders to another generation of leaders. And since he is the core of the current generation of leaders, I think it's safe to assume that that means while he is President of China and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, that is his timetable for the unification of Taiwan with the mainland by one means or another. He also made very clear that the only formula that is acceptable
to him at this moment is One Country Two Systems and yet the developments in Hong Kong have completely made One Country Two Systems unacceptable to the people of Taiwan. Even the most sympathetic to Beijing candidate for President, Han Kuo-Yu of the Guomindang has had to say that he would accept One Country Two Systems and I quote him “over my dead body.” So, if the most favorable to Beijing would say that you can see how few people in Taiwan think that this is an acceptable formula even if some are still considering the possibility that Taiwan might one day reunify with the motherland.

[00:59:23] For the United States, it has put Hong Kong on our political agenda really for the first time in many years. During the handover not to China but to the British after the end of World War Two, the United States did have to weigh in as to whether it should go back to the British or go back to the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek. There are some wonderful historical photographs of the handover ceremony where there was both a British flag and a ROC flag actually right near where Queen’s Pier once stood as if there wasn’t really much certainty as to who was going to get it back. Of course, we know who did, and obviously United States had to figure out how to help Hong Kong navigate the Cold War between the U.S. and China when so much of its economic supply lines ran to the mainland which the United States and, under pressure some of its allies, were at least partially embargoing. But after that Hong Kong was not that controversial. And indeed the Hong Kong Policy Act which continued to apply what I, and this is totally my own formula, called most favored city status to Hong Kong, treating it after the handover as a separate economic and customs territory that would be eligible for the same tariff treatment as it had before and even more importantly would have the same limited technology transfer controls that it had before trusting the autonomous Hong Kong government to apply whatever technology controls on further onward transfer of that technology to the mainland that the United States might choose to impose. That passed by voice vote in the U.S. Congress. It didn't even have to come to a vote so noncontroversial was that measure reflecting the great optimism that members of Congress as well as the people of Hong Kong had about their future under Chinese sovereignty. Now things have changed and Hong Kong has come to center stage really for the first time. There have been a series of measures that Congress has either taken or seems to be about to take. We have extended the reporting requirement on whether or not Hong Kong is truly autonomous, it keeps being extended. The most recent report by the State Department via the, I should say the Consulate General, via the State Department said that Hong Kong has a diminished but still adequate degree of autonomy; what I can only describe as a warning shot across Beijing’s bow about our diagnosis of the situation that was in May. Presumably unless something changes the next report will not be due until next May. But certainly, if there was a report today I don't think that it would come out with the same tone at all. So that is one thing that we've done. We now have moving very rapidly through Congress the so-called Hong Kong Democracy and Human Rights Act which would impose financial sanctions against officials presumably in both Hong Kong and Beijing who are accused of violation of the human rights of people in Hong Kong. There is also a PROTECT Hong Kong Act that would deny the sale of even non-lethal police material to the Hong Kong police. And this indicates to me I think the greater concern that the Congress and American
people have for Hong Kong. Certainly, this does Beijing no favors. This has contributed to a declining positive impression of China among all sectors of American society. So unfortunately, I come to a more pessimistic conclusion than Anson. But as a proud holder of a new smart Hong Kong I.D. card, I certainly hope that she’s right.