Polarized Electorates in South Korea and Taiwan: 
The Role of Political Trust under Conservative Governments

Hyunji Lee  
University of British Columbia  
lee.lhyunji@gmail.com

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Introduction

The electorates in East Asia are much less polarized along the left-right ideological continuum than those in consolidated democracies (Dalton and Tanaka 2007a, 203-223). Left-right terminology does not seem to be a part of common political parlance in Taiwan (Jou 2010); and in South Korea (Korea, hereafter) the perceived ideological distance between the two major parties peaked in 2004 but has declined since then (이내영 2011, 251-287). Despite these seemingly limited ideological divisions, there is a widespread perception that the electorates in both countries have become increasingly polarized in recent elections. As manifested in the unprecedented mass protests in Korea (2008) and Taiwan (2014), political conflicts have intensified in recent years, allegedly increasing polarization in the electorates. However, the conceptualization of parties as being aligned along an ideological continuum does not fully capture this perceived polarization in the electorates.

To address this issue, this paper employs “affect” rather than “ideology” as an indicator of mass polarization. By examining how Korean and Taiwanese partisans feel toward the opposing party and why they feel the way they do, this paper aims to identify similarities and differences in the patterns of political cleavages between the two countries. Recently, a number of scholars of American politics have demonstrated that affect-based partisan identity serves as a more diagnostic indicator of mass polarization than ideological orientation (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012, 405-431; Hetherington and Rudolph 2014; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). This is also the case, in my view, in the East Asian context where the existence of the traditional left-right ideological continuum is questionable. In brief, I argue that examining affective, not ideological, identity helps better understand polarization in the electorates in both countries in the following two senses. First, it enables us to identify sources of political cleavages that may not be captured by ideology or policy preferences. Second, unlike ideology, affect does not require a shared understanding of the terminology, and thereby makes systematic cross-national comparisons possible.

With affective polarization as a dependent variable, this paper proposes and tests the importance of political trust as an explanatory variable. My main argument is that political trust or a lack thereof is at the root of affective polarization both in Korea and Taiwan. While there are differences in the range and types of issues that divide the electorates in the two countries, the effect of political trust on partisan affect is similar in each. More specifically, I find that there is a strong correlation between partisan affect and political trust, especially trust in the quality of representation in the democratic process. Discontent regarding democratic representation is closely associated with cold feelings toward the ruling right-wing party in each country (Saenuri (former Grand National Party (GNP)) in Korea and the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan). This may reflect the persistence of a softer version of the old pro-democracy vs. anti-democracy cleavage that originated during the pre-democratic period. That is, in each country people who are distrustful of government hold more negative feelings toward the right-wing party that is reminiscent of the authoritarian past. Alternatively, this pattern may reflect the relative discontent of the opposing party supporters toward the ruling party, exacerbated by a series of the ruling parties’ alleged violations of democratic practices. In either case, political trust or a lack thereof being a source for affective polarization implies daunting challenges for the ruling parties to create conditions under which opposing partisans are willing to cooperate with them.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the literature on political polarization, the dependent variable in this study. Here I also discuss why affect is a better indicator than ideology to measure polarization both in Korea and Taiwan. In the second section, I introduce an explanatory variable for the polarization – i.e., political trust. I propose a hypothesis that political distrust is associated with cold feelings toward the conservative party (relative to their feelings toward the progressive party) and provide the rationale behind the hypothesis. In the third section, I test the hypothesis by using survey data conducted in recent elections in each country. I then conclude by discussing some implications of the study.

**Dependent variable: Affective polarization in Korea and Taiwan**

There has been a widespread perception that the electorates both in Korea and Taiwan have grown increasingly polarized since their first democratic power alternations (1997 in Korea and 2000 in Taiwan) (Fell 2013, 75). As evidenced by the unprecedented mass protests in recent years – the beef protest in Korea (2008) and the Sunflower movement in Taiwan (2014) – intense political conflict over a range of issue areas has often led to significant gridlock in the legislature, allegedly deepening partisan antipathy in the electorates. In a recent survey (2009), for example, the majority of Koreans (56.9%) said that the social and political conflicts had become more intense even compared to a year earlier; only 13.2% said they had been eased (이내영 2011, 251-287). Likewise, partisan polarization is widely perceived to be occurring in Taiwan especially over issues of national identity and cross-Strait relations (Wang 2010).

Scholarship on partisan polarization focuses largely on ideological agreements or disagreements between partisans. Despite some disagreements on the content and nature of ideological competition, scholars in general seem to agree that political issues are discussed or summarized in terms of the left-right ideological spectrum (Dalton 2008, 899-920). The distance between partisans in the left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension has therefore been used as the most direct measure of polarization, along with bimodality in the distribution of the electorate along the left-right continuum (i.e., a decline in the number of ideological moderates) (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, 690-755). Scholars also consider ideological consistency – i.e., the correlation between party affiliation on the one hand and ideology and issue attitudes on the other (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009, 1-24) – although there is a disagreement as to whether ideological consistency (or constraint) should be considered an indicator for polarization. Some distinguish increasing consistency from polarization, referring to the former as “party sorting” (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006, 49-71).

These ideology-based measurements however do not seem to be fully capturing the perceived deepening of political polarization in Taiwan and Korea. In Taiwan, the existence of a left-right framework of party competition is uncertain (Dalton and Tanaka 2007b, 203-223). The percentage of the public that is cognizant of the left-right terminology has been consistently low (Jou 2010, 366-394). The TEDS survey of 2008, for example, shows that 45% (858 out of 1905) of the respondents do not locate themselves on the left-right ideological continuum¹, by saying “don’t know” (640) or “never heard of” (28), or refusing to answer (95). More than a half of the

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¹ The TEDS (2008) survey asks respondents to position themselves along a left-right scale using the following question: “In politics, sometimes people talk about the left and the right. This card lists eleven positions from the left (0) to the right (10). Which position do you occupy?”
respondents also do not locate each of the major political parties (KMT and DPP) on the left-right continuum. Furthermore, while the KMT is in general seen as being on the center-right and the DPP on the center-left, the perceived ideological distance between the two parties (4.19 vs. 6.26 on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right)), as well as the distance between the ideological self-placements of the KMT leaners and DPP leaners (6.04 vs. 5.19), is fairly small. It is also notable that almost 60% of those who gave self-placements on the left-right scale place themselves in the exact center. This unusually sizeable portion of the public to place themselves in the center raises doubts about whether this portion partially conceals nonresponse (Jou 2010, 366-394). These characteristics suggest that the terms ‘left’ or ‘right’ lack relevance in Taiwan as a conceptual tool to differentiate policy positions between political parties.

Unlike Taiwan, the left-right terminology is widely accepted in Korea. The terms “left” and “right” emerged in the political scene around 1997, and since then an increasing number of Koreans have employed the left-right terminology to discuss and summarize political issues and positions of political parties (Shin and Jhee 2005, 381-396). The large majority of the electorate (more than 95% of respondents, based on 2008 and 2012 election studies) can position themselves and the political parties on the left-right scale. The ideological distance between the two major parties—though it has narrowed since 2004—has been clear and relatively stable over the last ten years (박경미, 환정택, and 이지호 2012, 127-154; 이내영 2011, 251-287). Also, ideological self-placement is closely associated with views on a range of policies, from foreign policy issues, e.g., U.S.-Korea relations and policies toward North Korea, to social economic issues, e.g., growth vs. distribution and political order vs. individual freedom. Some scholars argue that the ideological terms do not serve as meaningful heuristics to voters in Korea, pointing to frequent reconfigurations of the party system (Dalton and Tanaka 2007a, 203-223; Jou 2010, 366-394). This argument however contradicts the evidence presented here. Despite the prediction that frequent party splits and mergers would make it difficult to position parties along the left-right spectrum, the Korean party system “increasingly derives its stability from ideological linkages between voters and parties” (Hellmann 2014, 53-84).

Even in Korea, however, there is little sign of increased mass polarization, at least in terms of the ideology-based measurements (ideological distance and bimodality) discussed above. There has been no decline in the number of ideological moderates since 2004 (이내영 2011, 251-287); and the ideological distance between partisans peaked in 2004 but has been narrower since then. Admittedly, there has been increased correlation between policy views and self-identified ideology: ideological (and partisan) divisions that had been confined to some foreign policy issues, such as the issues of pursuing engagement with the communist North or strengthening alliance with the United States, are now placed on the left-right continuum.

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2 About 52% of the respondents (997 out of 1905 for KMT, and 1007 out of 1905 for DPP) do not locate the two major political parties on the left-right ideological continuum. More than 95% of those who do not (966 out of 997 for KMT and 973 out of 1007 for DPP) say they have never heard of or do not know the terminologies.

3 The concept of ‘left-right’ or ‘progressive-conservative (in the Korean context)’ had not been included in the national election survey questionnaires until 1997. Only in the surveys conducted after 1997 did I find questions that ask respondents their self-positions on the left-right continuum. Also, there were few questions in the surveys conducted before 1997 about the attitudes of respondents toward policy issues that could be placed on the left-right continuum. I infer from the comparison of survey questionnaires between pre- and post-1997 that the concept of left-right ideology emerged only after 1997. Even in 1997, however, the ideological distance between the two parties appeared minimal.

4 The results are based on the analyses of 2010 and 2012 EAl election surveys.

5 The distance between the ideological self-placements of the DP supporters and Saenuri Supporters is only 1.81 (4.65 for DP supporters; 6.46 for Saenuri supporters)
States, have expanded to include economic issues (economic growth vs. distribution and universal vs. liberal welfare). This development is however not so much polarization as “party sorting” (Fiorina).

While ideology-based measurements suggest no evidence for polarization in either Taiwan or Korea, it is perhaps hasty to conclude that polarization in the electorates is only a misperception. Ideology is not the only way of defining polarization; and mass polarization may result from some combination of (cognitive) ideological disagreements and “partisan affect” – i.e., affective feelings toward political parties. Indeed, a number of scholars of American politics have recently incorporated affect into the analysis of polarization, showing that affect is a more diagnostic indicator for mass polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012, 405-431; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hetherington and Rudolph 2014; Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Abramowitz ). They find that the American electorate may show only limited signs of polarization defined in ideological terms, but when defined in affective terms of likes and dislikes directed toward opposing partisans and co-partisans, mass polarization is definitely on the increase (Iyengar and Westwood 2014).

This paper employs “affect” rather than “ideology” as an indicator of mass polarization. With affective polarization as a dependent variable, I examine similarities and differences in the patterns of political cleavages between Korea and Taiwan. I argue that examining affective polarization helps better understand polarization in the electorates in both countries for the following two reasons. First, using affective polarization as an indicator makes systematic cross-national comparisons possible. Affective polarization is a more diagnostic measure of partisan polarization than ideology especially in Taiwan, where the validity of ideological terminology is uncertain. Also, both countries have essentially two-party systems (in terms of the effective number of parties (ENPV)6), where partisan competition implies a zero sum game – i.e., the losses of one party will almost always be the gain of the other. Intense partisan competition in the two-party system may have generated an environment that deepens partisan antipathy without necessarily increasing ideological polarization.

Second, and relatedly, focusing on affective identity will enable us to identify sources of political cleavage that may not be captured by ideology or policy preferences. Ideological distance between partisans does not reflect the intensity of partisan conflicts that may derive from long-standing social and cultural cleavages. That is, it is certainly possible that partisans may offer relatively centrist ideological stances, but still display hostile feelings toward the opposing party. Figure 1 shows average feeling thermometer scores of partisans toward the opposing party and their own party in Korea and Taiwan. Despite the relatively centrist positions in ideological selfplacements of the partisans in both countries (Table 1), there is clear evidence for affective polarization (defined as the tendency of partisans to view the opposing party negatively and their own party (the party they identify with) positively).

Figure 1 about here

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6 The effective number of parties (ENPV) is an indicator that counts parties after weighing them by size (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). Its formula is ENPV = 1/(\(p_i^2\)) where \(p_i\) is the share of the vote won by the \(i\)th party. Given the vote (seat) share of individual parties in the National Assembly election in 2012 – Saenuri 152, DP 127, Liberal Frontier Party (LFP) 5, and United Progressive Party (UPP) 13, and independent 3 – the ENPV in Korea is currently UNP 152, GMP 121, DLP 10, MDP 9, LDP 4, and independent 2 – the ENPV in Korea is 2.37. In Taiwan, with the current seat share of individual parties – KMT 64, People First Party (PFP) 3, Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU) 2, DPP 40, and Taiwan Solidarity Party 3 – the ENPV in Taiwan is 2.23.
Independent variable: Political Trust

In this paper I argue and empirically demonstrate that affective polarization as described above is closely associated with political trust, especially trust in the quality of representation in the democratic process. Political trust or a lack thereof may not account for perceived differences in ideology between the major parties, but account for differences in partisan affect. Specifically, I hypothesize that discontent regarding democratic representation is associated with cold feelings toward the right-wing ruling party in each country (Saenuri (former Grand National Party (GNP)) in Korea and the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan), relative to their feelings toward the left-wing opposition party. In this section I discuss the rationale behind this hypothesis, which will be put to test in the following section.

Since the comeback of conservative governments in 2008, there has been increasing public outcry over the executive’s seemingly unilateral decision-making in a number of controversial issues in both countries. President Lee Myung-bak of Korea enjoyed the advantage of unified government with his Grand National Party (GNP) holding the majority (153 out of 299 seats) in the National Assembly. With the unified government providing the Lee administration with much room to maneuver politically, a number of controversial bills were pushed through. These bills include the re-commencement of importation of US beef, the so-called “grand canal” project (which later turned into the “four rivers restoration” project), the new Media Law that allows cross-media ownership, and the Jeju naval base project, among many. These were either implemented in the form of an executive order, or passed unilaterally by the governing party in the legislature in what the Korean media often describe as a “snatched” way. A series of massive protests followed, such as the US beef protests in 2008.

The case of Taiwan is surprisingly similar. When President Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated in 2008, his KMT party and its pan-Blue allies secured a three-quarters majority (81 of 113 seats) in the Legislative Yuan. The scale of the KMT’s legislative majority gave it the power and confidence to press on with its plans on a variety of controversial issues, regardless of opposition (Cabestan 2014). This eventually led to a serious crisis of confidence among the public⁷ (Muyard 2010, 5; Rigger 2010, 12). The most controversial issues revolve around the opening of cross-Strait economic relations. As a part of Ma’s commitment to closer engagement with mainland China, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)⁸ was signed in June 2010. The ECFA however sparked intense political controversy. The opposition DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) and others in the pan-green camp raised concerns that the ECFA would ultimately make Taiwan too dependent on China and threaten Taiwan’s sovereignty. Despite the political divide, the ECFA was pushed through and ratified in the legislature by the KMT majority. In 2013, the Cross-Strait

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⁷ The missteps by the government and Ma himself that had undermined public confidence in the government included: the debacle surrounding the resumption of US beef imports (2009-2011) without respect for a past legislative resolution and public concern over the health risk of BES (2009) and the leanness-enhancing drug ractopamine (2011); and Ma’s push for some well-intended but unpopular reform initiatives, including an energy reform program that removed government subsidies for electricity and gasoline (2012), and pension reform (2013).

⁸ The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed in June 2010 by two semi-official bodies that handle cross-strait relations (the Straits Exchange Foundation in Taiwan and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in China) to reduce tariffs and commercial barriers between the two sides. The ECFA is a “framework agreement” that focuses on the structure and objectives that are needed before entering into negotiations of a full-fledged free trade agreement (FTA). The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), signed in 2013 to liberalize trade in services, is also a part of the ECFA.
Service Trade Agreements (CSSTA) was also signed as a part of the ECFA, but the legislative debacle over its ratification eventually led to what is now known as the “Sunflower movement”.

Despite the differences in the substance of the issues that sparked controversy, the unprecedented mass protests of the two countries manifest some interesting similarities in their backgrounds. It is noteworthy that the eruption of these protests coincides with the comeback of the right-wing parties (with strong majorities in their legislatures), reminiscent of each country’s authoritarian past with state-centric development. Both Lee Myung-bak and Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency pledging to revitalize the economy. Lee promised high economic growth comparable to that of the Park Chung Hee era, while condemning what is called by conservatives a “lost decade” of “leftist” or “pro-North” presidents of the opposing party (Doucette 2010). Likewise, Ma was elected on a platform that promised economic revitalization after eight years of the allegedly inept and corrupt tenure of the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian. Indeed, upon inauguration both Lee and Ma actively pursue a number of neoliberal economic policies, which ranged from fiscal discipline, to a reduction of the public sector, to openness to foreign economic competition. Both the US beef deal in Korea and the CSSTA (as a part of the broader ECFA) in Taiwan that led to the unprecedented mass protests were also part of these neoliberal economic plans.

The catalyst for the massive protests in Korea (2008) was Lee’s quick, unilateral decision for the full opening of Korea’s market to U.S. beef: the decision was made only hours before Lee’s first summit talk with President Bush at Camp David, eliminating many of Korea’s existing quarantine procedures against meat that carry a risk of infection from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as Mad-Cow Disease. While public health and safety implications made the issue highly salient among the public, the abrupt and unprecedentedly comprehensive decision (in the scope of opening) aggravated public insecurity over the issue, leading to a furious public backlash. Eventually, the protests, initially focused almost solely on the beef issue, developed into a broad condemnation of the Lee administration for its “authoritarian” decision-making style. While compared with the June Struggle, a nation-wide pro-democracy uprising in 1987, the beef protests escalated into the biggest anti-government protest since Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987.

Likewise, the Sunflower movement in Taiwan was triggered by a number of violations of due legislative procedures governing the ratification of the CSSTA. The public hearings held by the KMT on the CSSTA ended after only one week with several members of business groups and NGOs complaining about a lack of access; and the KMT’s blocking of the previously agreed clause-by-clause review of the bill led to clashes in the legislature. Also, the KMT’s claim that the

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9 Both the KMT and the GNP are former authoritarian ruling parties, which returned to power in 2008 after their first losses to the opposition parties (in 2000 for KMT, and in 1997 for GNP).
10 As demonstrated by his signature “747” campaign slogan of raising Korea’s annual GDP growth to 7%, per capita income to 40,000, and the size of the economy to 7th largest in the world, Lee Myung-bak prioritized economic growth. Just like Lee’s 747 slogan, Ma’s “633” plan – an annual economic growth rate of 6 percent, annual per capita income of $30,000 by 2016, and an unemployment rate of less than 3 percent per year – also exhibits his growth-first policy orientation.
11 Although the beef issue is technically not part of the Korea-US free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), they were tightly intertwined as the US pressed for full access to the Korean market by linking the issue with the FTA. Lee believed that the beef issue had to be resolved in order to facilitate U.S. congressional consideration and support for legislation to implement the FTA, and was indeed willing to concde on the beef issue.
12 It has been reported that several business representatives were not invited to attend the public hearings, or were informed at the last minute, making their participation almost impossible.
agreement could not be amended and had to be adopted as-is\textsuperscript{13} magnified public suspicions that public hearings or even the legislative review process would be little more than a show. Eventually, following days of clashes with the opposition DPP that made use of various legislative tactics to stall the ratification process, the KMT unilaterally passed the trade pact to the legislative floor for a vote (as if it were an executive order that does not require legislative approval) without the promised clause-by-clause review. Not surprisingly, this move sparked public anger, followed by the unprecedented occupation of the Legislative Yuan by student protesters.

Both Korea’s mass protests and Taiwan’s sunflower movement exemplify public frustration against the executive’s highhanded manner in dealing with highly controversial issues and their lack of transparency in decision-making. It is noteworthy that the public criticisms of both cross-strait trade initiatives and re-importation of the US beef have been directed at the similar leadership style of Lee and Ma – \textit{i.e.}, a perceived lack of transparency in the process and effective communication; and that the protests escalated into a pro-democracy movement demanding greater democratic accountability and responsiveness. While the general uneasiness of the public about the BSE or the China factor (e.g., increasing China’s influence on the island) builds the background, a lack of trust in government – especially, a lack of trust in the quality of representation in the democratic process – fueled the uneasiness, leading to the unprecedentedly intense protests. The authoritarian legacy of the GNP and the KMT may have reinforced the distrust of government in its democratic representation.

Based on the similarities of the two countries described above, I argue that political distrust lies at the root of affective polarization. Specifically, I hypothesize that political distrust is closely associated with colder feelings toward the ruling right-wing party, relative to their feelings toward the opposition left-wing party. Affective polarization in both countries may result from some combination of policy disagreements and lack of trust in government. That is, disagreements about policies divide the public along the partisan lines, but this divide can be intensified by the lack of political trust among those who do not support the policies, \textit{i.e.}, the opposing partisans. Here I conceptualize political trust as an orientation toward political institutions in general (diffuse trust), as opposed to an orientation toward individual political incumbents (specific trust), with a special emphasis on trust in government in terms of the representation component of democracy. However, I do not exclude the possibility that diffuse and specific trust may be closely intertwined for the cases of Korea and Taiwan, where individual evaluations of the quality of representation likely differ depending on their perceptions of the ruling right-wing parties. The perceptions that these parties, as former authoritarian ruling parties, lack respect for democratic representation are perhaps not new\textsuperscript{14}. However, I expect that these perceptions would have become much more pronounced under the right-wing government, especially among those critical of the right-wing party, eventually contributing to affective polarization, in combination with their ideological (or policy) disagreements.

\textsuperscript{13} Following the completion of public hearings, KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung, the presiding chair of the legislature’s Internal Administrative Committee, said the agreement could not be amended and had to be adopted as-is (http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-occupy-legislature-over-china-pact/).

\textsuperscript{14} In both countries, democracy had come with compromise by the former ruling party, which left a legacy from the authoritarian period. Taiwan is no longer under one-party rule, but much of the KMT’s old authoritarian legacy still remains in place (Zhu 2008). Likewise, while Lee Myung-bak’s GNP of Korea has renamed itself multiple times, it is still struggling with the lingering legacies left by the former authoritarian regime. It is also noteworthy that Lee’s leadership was often contrasted with that of the former left-wing government – especially with Roh Moo-hyun’s so-called “participatory” government that had often appealed directly to the people when dealing with controversial issues.
Political trust or a lack thereof accounting for affective polarization, if demonstrated, would suggest that it is challenging for the ruling parties to create conditions under which opposing partisans willing to cooperate with them. As Hetherington and Rudolph (2014) nicely put, political trust provides a “bridge between the ruling party’s policy ideas and the opinions of those who usually support the other party” (Hetherington and Rudolph 2014). Studies also have consistently found that the more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to comply with its demands (Tyler 1990; Tyler 1998, 269; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). That is, affective polarization as a consequence of polarized trust suggests that there may be more partisan conflicts with little increase in ideological or policy disagreements.

**Testing the Hypotheses**

To empirically demonstrate that political trust or a lack thereof lies at the root of affective polarization, I assess (1) whether political trust is divided along partisan lines, and (2) whether political distrust is indeed associated with the opposing partisans’ dislike of the ruling right-wing party. The analyses use two different national surveys: (1) the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) surveys, conducted in 2008 and 2012, and (2) South Korean election study surveys, conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in 2008 and 2012. The 2008 surveys were conducted only a few months after the presidential elections in both countries – i.e., during the so-called “honeymoon period” of the right-wing parties (KMT and GNP) that came back to power with landslide victories (after their first losses to their left-wing counterparts in 2000 and 1997, respectively). The 2012 surveys were conducted a few months after Lee Myung-bak’s term and Ma Ying-jeou’s first term were over. Unlike in 2008, Lee had become extremely unpopular by that time, and Ma’s popularity had also slumped although he managed to be re-elected. While all the surveys under analysis are those conducted when the right-wing party was in power, the differences in popularity of the government in power could help us tell whether or not the associations between trust and partisan affect vary depending on the performance of the government in power.

I begin by introducing measures of political trust. Due to data availability, the indicators of political trust used for each country are not worded the same (For more details, see Appendix). To measure diffuse trust for Korea, I use an additive index composed of the two following items: questions asking opinions about the statement that (1) “In your country only a few people control the government and politics without regard to the will of the majority of the people”; and the statement that (2) “Generally, politicians’ behaviors are very different after being elected from during the election” (TrustKorea). For Taiwan, I use an additive index composed of the two following items: questions asking opinions about the statements that (1) “Public officials do not care much about what people like me think”; and that (2) “When the government decides important policies, public welfare is its first priority” (TrustTaiwan). While these items differ in wording from those used for Korea, they all measure trust in the quality of representation and responsiveness. In addition, I include in the analysis survey questions that asked about (3) aspirations for democracy and (4) evaluations of democratic performance in Taiwan. A question that asked respondents to evaluate the country’s democratic performance also reflects perceived quality of democratic representation. I expect that responses to this question would be divided along partisan lines, and that those who have higher aspirations for democracy would be more likely to shape feelings toward parties based on their evaluations of the country’s democratic performance.
Table 1 presents the mean scores for each item by partisans. As expected, responses to all trust items above are divided along partisan lines. Those who support the ruling right-wing party in general display higher levels of trust in the quality of representation than those who support the opposition left-wing party. For example, respondents who support the opposition DP (of Korea) in general are much more likely to agree with the statement that “only a few people control the government and politics without regard to the will of the majority of the people” with the mean score of 1.65 (on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means strongly agree and 4 means strongly disagree), than those who support the ruling GNP (or Saenuri) who display a mean of 2.10. The difference is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The same pattern is found in Taiwan as well: KMT leaners are more likely than DPP leaners to perceive that public officials care about people, and that the government places public welfare as its first priority in policymaking. There are also significant differences between partisans in their views about democracy as regime, and in their satisfaction with the way how democracy works in Taiwan. KMT leaners are less likely than their DPP counterparts to say that democracy is the most preferred type of regime, but display higher levels of satisfaction with the way how democracy works in Taiwan. The gaps in trust between partisans were in general wider in 2012 than those in 2008, but not by much. The difference between partisans in every item presented in Table 1 is statistically significant with 99% confidence.

Table 1 about here

To test whether political distrust is indeed associated with the opposition partisans’ dislike of the ruling (right-wing) party, I performed regression analysis with affective polarization as a dependent variable. Affective polarization is computed by subtracting feelings toward the left-wing party from feelings toward the right-wing party (for descriptive statistics, see Appendix). The variable thus indicates differences in feelings about the two parties. It runs from -10 to +10, where -10 (+10) indicates one has most strongly favorable (unfavorable) feelings toward the left-wing party but at the same time holds most strongly unfavorable (favorable) feelings toward the right-wing party. The value of zero (0) indicates no difference in feelings about the two parties. I regressed this dependent variable (affective polarization) on three groups of explanatory variables: (1) levels of political trust (as detailed above); (2) policy positions; and (3) demographics (control variables). I expect that even after controlling for policy disagreements and demographics, political trust serves as an important factor explaining affective polarization – i.e., the higher the levels of trust, the more favorable toward the right-wing party, relative to the left-wing party.

Table 2 and 3 show the results for Korea and Taiwan, respectively. In Korea, political trust (measured by the additive index) is strongly associated with affective polarization: the more trustworthy people perceive government to be, the more favorable they are about the GNP, relative to their feelings about the DP. This effect is fairly strong: for example, the coefficient of 1.52 on the trust index (Model 1) suggests that a one-point increase in trust (on a scale from 1 (lowest trust) to 4 (highest trust)) is associated with a 1.52-point increase in affective polarization score toward the GNP (on a scale from -10 to 10). Model 1 also shows that both regionalism and age are important factors determining differences in partisan affect in Korea. People originating from the Honam area

Regional ties have been one of the most significant determinants of voting behavior in Korea since the democratic transition. Regionalism has been most pronounced in the rivalry between Youngnam and Honam regions because political leaders and parties perceived as representing these regions have appealed to regional sentiment as part of their electoral strategies (Kim, Choi, and Cho 2008, 136-150). While it has been argued that the regional cleavage is gradually being replaced with ideological and generational cleavages since 2002, the results presented here demonstrate that regionalism still remains strong.
are 2.26 points less favorable toward the GNP relative to the DP, and the reverse is true for people from Youngnam area. People also split along generational lines: younger people are much less favorable toward the GNP and more favorable toward the DP. The significance of the coefficients on regionalism and age survives all model specifications.

Table 2 and 3 about here

In Model 2, I included some controversial policy issues in the Korean context that could be associated with partisan affect. As expected, responses on all the policy questions included in the survey are also strongly associated with affective polarization: those who support (1) ratifying the Korea-US free trade agreement, (2) strengthening the Korea-US alliance, (3) keeping a tough stance on North Korea, and (4) relaxing regulations on Chaebol hold relatively more favorable feelings toward the GNP compared to the DP. Model 2 also shows that when controlling for these policy issues, the association between trust and affective polarization becomes slightly weaker (the coefficient on trust goes down by 0.4 points), but trust is still a highly significant factor explaining differences in partisan affect.

Model 3 and 4 show that the 2012 election survey presents basically the same pattern as that of 2008 described above, with some minor differences. A direct comparison of Model 3 with Model 1 demonstrates that the association between age and partisan affect became stronger, and that regionalism (at least for those from Honam) also became more distinct. Model 4, which includes a number of policy issues, shows that not only foreign policy issues but also a traditional economic issue (i.e., distribution vs. growth) – which had been viewed as not relevant in the Korean context – strongly shaped partisan affect: those who prioritize distribution over growth harbor much less favorable feelings toward the Saenuri (the GNP), relative to their feelings toward the DP.

It is also noticeable that while all the coefficients on trust (2008 and 2012) are highly significant, the coefficients are smaller in 2012 than in 2008. The decrease in size is counterintuitive, considering that a series of government missteps during Lee’s presidency (2008-2012) could have alienated opposing partisans even further by lowering the levels of political trust among them. I suspect that this counterintuitive result may in part reflect an increasing “anti-party orientation” in Korea (Choi et al 2007). Increasing antipathy toward political parties suggests that decreasing popularity of one political party does not necessarily lead to a gain for the other party even in the context of a two-party system. As shown in Figure 1 above, while favorable feelings toward the GNP (Saenuri) sharply decreased over the period 2008-2012, this did not lead to an increase in favorable feelings toward the opposition DP. The average feeling thermometer score of DP supporters toward their own party also decreased from 8.11 to 6.91.

To see whether increasing antipathy toward political parties may have decreased the association between trust and affective polarization, I replaced affective polarization with feeling thermometer scores of the Saenuri (formerly known as the GNP). If antipathy toward parties plays a role in weakening this association, I expect trust to be more closely associated with the feeling thermometer of the Saenuri than with affective polarization (where thermometer scores with respect to feelings about both the GNP and the DP are considered). The results are shown in Model 5. As expected, trust is more strongly correlated with the feeling thermometer scores of the Saenuri: 1 unit

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16 As all the explanatory variables (and the wordings of the variables) included in Model 3 are the same as those in Model 1, a direct comparison is possible.
increase in trust is associated with 0.70 point increase in favorable feelings toward the Saenuri on a scale from 0 (dislike) to 10 (like). Model 5 also shows that opinions on the ideal types of welfare model are also divided along the partisan line: those who support a liberal model of welfare state (minimalist, social safety net welfare) as opposed to social democratic model of welfare (characterized by its universal applicability) are more favorable toward the Saenuri party.

Table 3 presents results for Taiwan. All models show that political trust is an important determinant of affective polarization in Taiwan as well. In general, the more trustworthy people perceive government (or public officials) to be, the more favorable feelings they hold toward the KMT and the less favorable toward the DPP. However, those who believe that democracy is the most preferable type of regime harbor much more favorable feelings toward the DPP and much less favorable toward the KMT. This suggests that those who have higher aspirations for democracy may be more likely to shape their feelings toward the parties based on their perceptions of how trustworthy government is and/or of how democracy works in Taiwan. These interaction effects are shown in Model 9 and 10. Model 9 shows that those who believe that democracy is the most preferable type of regime are much more likely to shape their feelings toward the parties based on their satisfaction with Taiwan’s democracy: for those who have high aspirations for democracy, 1 unit increase in their satisfaction with Taiwan’s democracy (on a scale from 1 (low satisfaction) to 4 (high satisfaction)) is associated with a 0.85-unit increase in the affective polarization score; for those who do not believe that democracy is most preferable, the variable (satisfaction with Taiwan’s democracy) has no significance in explaining their feelings toward the parties. Likewise, Model 10 shows a strong interaction effect between democratic aspiration and political trust. For those who believe that democracy is most preferable, trust is a strong determinant of their feelings toward the parties: a 1-unit increase in trust is associated with a 1.85-unit increase in affective polarization score. For those who do not believe that democracy is most preferable, the association is much weaker with a coefficient of 0.55.

When compared with the models for Korea, some interesting differences stand out. First, Models 6 and 7 show that unlike Korea, where regionalism and age shape people’s feelings toward political parties, in Taiwan ethnicity and education are the major determinants of affective polarization scores among the demographic variables included in the models. Ethnic Taiwanese are much more favorable toward the DPP than the KMT; and the more educated, the more favorable toward the KMT (relative to the DPP), at least in 2008. It is also noteworthy that in Taiwan policy issues other than those related to the cross-Strait relationship have little influence on affective polarization.

Models 8, 9, and 10 demonstrate that political trust became a much more important determinant of affective polarization in 2012. A direct comparison between Models 6 and 8 shows that the size of the coefficient on political trust was almost twice as big in 2012; and satisfaction with how democracy works in Taiwan had also become strongly associated with affective polarization over the four years. While the effects of opinions on issues related to the cross-Strait relationship and ethnicity (Taiwanese) remain highly significant, the effect of education had almost disappeared in 2012; instead, age and gender had become significant factors determining affective polarization. Just like the case of Korea, older people were more in favor of the right-wing party (and less in favor of the left-wing party). It is also interesting that females in 2012 are much more likely than males to hold favorable feelings toward the KMT and unfavorable feelings toward the DPP.

In summary, the analyses shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 confirm the hypotheses proposed in this paper: there are clear partisan differences in the levels of political trust; and political trust is
indeed an important determinant in shaping affective feelings toward political parties in both countries. As shown in Table 1, those who support the right-wing party tend to have higher levels of political trust than do those who support the left-wing party. The differences are fairly large, and all statistically significant with 99% confidence. The regression models presented in Table 2 and 3 also demonstrate that the higher the political trust, the more favorable toward the right-wing party (and the less favorable toward the left-wing party). It is also noteworthy that in Taiwan, those who have a strong aspiration for democracy tend to dislike the ruling KMT more than those who don’t, and they are also more likely to shape their feelings toward the political parties (KMT and DPP) based on their perceptions of Taiwan’s democratic performances. The results suggest that differences in their perceptions of the country’s democratic performance lie at the core of affective polarization in both countries.

**Implications and Conclusion**

The electorates both in Korea and Taiwan are polarized along the party lines. While ideology-based measurements provide little evidence for polarization in either country, electorates in both are clearly polarized when defined in terms of likes and dislikes directed toward political parties, i.e., affect. In this paper, I have examined affective polarization as defined above, and thereby identified similarities and differences in the patterns of political cleavages between Korea and Taiwan. I argued that examining affective polarization not only enabled us to compare the two countries systematically, but also helped identify sources of political conflicts that may not be captured by ideology or policy preferences – i.e., political trust in the case of this paper.

Examining affective polarization uncovered some interesting differences between the two countries: while policy issues related to cross-Strait relations seem to dominate political debate in Taiwan, with these issues solely shaping feelings toward political parties, in Korea a diverse range of issues from foreign policy to traditional economic issues are closely associated with partisan affect. This difference is in fact counterintuitive given that the party system of Taiwan is much more formally institutionalized than that of Korea, and would therefore be expected to be more firmly anchored through programmatic linkages with the electorate. The patterns of affective polarization also show some interesting differences in terms of their long-standing social cleavages. In Korea, regional ties serve as one of the most significant determinants of partisan affect. While it has been argued that the regional cleavage is gradually being replaced with ideological and generational cleavages since 2002, the results here suggest that regionalism remains strong. Koreans are also split between an older generation who generally prefer the GNP (or Saenuri) over the DP, and a younger generation who generally prefer the DP over the GNP. In Taiwan, on the other hand, ethnicity is a strong determinant of partisan affect. Ethnic Taiwanese tend to like the DPP much better than the KMT. It is also interesting that levels of education that were closely associated with favorable feelings toward the KMT in 2008 became almost completely insignificant in 2012, replaced with gender and age.

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17 Further studies are needed to understand how Korean parties have been able to develop programmatic linkages with the electorate without formally institutionalized party organization; and why this is not the case in Taiwan, which is known for its relatively well-institutionalized party system.

18 Although debatable, regionalism in Korean politics has been viewed as an impediment to Korea’s democracy, as it is in a “primordial” form functionally equivalent to ethnonational conflicts, and as such, regional voting patterns follow emotional ties, not rational self-interest (Kim 2003).
More importantly, the comparison of the patterns of affective polarization reveals an interesting similarity between the two countries: political distrust, defined here as discontent regarding the quality in democratic representation, is closely associated with colder feelings toward the ruling right-wing party, relative to their feelings toward the opposition left-wing party. I have argued that this may reflect the persistence of a softer version of the old pro-democracy vs. anti-democracy cleavage that originated during the pre-democratic period. The perceptions that the right-wing parties as former authoritarian ruling parties lack respect for democratic representation may have become reinforced under the right-wing government, especially after the procedural missteps made by the Lee and Ma administrations in the process of pushing through their policy plans. Alternatively, one could also argue that the association between political distrust and cold feelings toward the ruling right-wing party has more to do with the relative discontent of opposing partisans toward the ruling party (exacerbated by a series of the ruling parties’ alleged violations of democratic practices), rather than with the authoritarian past of the right-wing parties. If this is the case, we would observe the opposite pattern under a left-wing government – i.e., an association between political distrust and cold feelings toward left-wing parties.

In either case, political trust or a lack thereof accounting for affective polarization suggests that it is challenging for the ruling parties to make opposing partisans cooperate with them. It has been well-documented that the more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to comply with its demands. That is, political trust serves as a “bridge” between the ruling party’s policy ideas and the opinions of the opposing partisans, because people who are distrustful of government will be unwilling to cooperate with them by making “ideological sacrifices,” using the term by Hetherington and Rudolph (2014). Political distrust among the opposing partisans therefore suggests more partisan conflicts even with little increase in ideological or policy disagreements. I suspect this is in fact what has been happening both in Korea and Taiwan, as evidenced by a series of protests in recent years.
Bibliography

Abramowitz, Alan I. "Partisan Nation: The Rise of Affective Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate.".


Hetherington, Marc and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2014. "The Emergence of Polarized Trust." Available at SSRN 2484755.


Figure 1. Affective polarization in Taiwan and Korea

Notes: The graphs show the mean feeling thermometer scores (0 to 10) for supporters of each party in 2008 and 2012. The top graphs are for Taiwan while the bottom graphs are for Korea. The grey-filled squares show the feelings of people toward their own party, while the black-filled squares show their feelings toward the other party.
### Table 1. Means of Diffuse Trust Items by Partisan Lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Public officials do not care much about what people like me think”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KMT leaners (2008): 2.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DPP leaners (2008): 2.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KMT leaners (2012): 2.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DPP leaners (2012): 2.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In your country only a few people control the government and politics without regard to the will of the majority of the people”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- GNP supporters (2008): 2.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DP supporters (2008): 1.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Saenuri (GNP) supporters (2012): 2.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DP supporters (2012): 1.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“When the government decides important policies, public welfare is its first priority”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KMT leaners (2008): 2.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DPP leaners (2008): 2.31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KMT leaners (2012): 2.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DPP leaners (2012): 2.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Generally, politicians’ behaviors are very different after being elected from during the election”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>- GNP supporters (2008): 1.70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Saenuri (GNP) supporters (2012): 1.61</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DP supporters (2012): 1.48</td>
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</tr>
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<td>“Democracy is the most preferred type of regime” (dummy)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>- KMT leaners (2008): 0.48 (48%)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>- DPP leaners (2008): 0.59 (59%)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>- KMT leaner (2012): 0.53 (53%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DPP leaner (2012): 0.63 (63%)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Satisfaction with the way how democracy works in Taiwan</td>
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</tr>
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<td>- DPP leaners (2008): 2.47</td>
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<td>- KMT leaners (2012): 2.90</td>
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<td>- DPP leaners (2012): 2.54</td>
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Table 2. Models of Affective Polarization (Korea)

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<tr>
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<th>2012</th>
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<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Model 5</td>
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<td>1.07 (0.16)**</td>
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<td>- North Korea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.06 (0.19)**</td>
<td>0.41 (0.13)**</td>
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<td>- Distribution (vs. growth) dummy</td>
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Table 3. Models of Affective Polarization (Taiwan)

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<td>2.76 (0.24)***</td>
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Appendix A (Korea)

Representation. Respondents were asked to say whether they agree or disagree with the statement that “In our country only a few people control the government and politics without regard to the will of the majority of the people”. The scale ran from 1 to 4, where 1 means strongly agree and 4 means strongly disagree.

Accountability. Respondents were asked to say whether they agree or disagree with the statement that “Usually, politicians’ behaviors are very different after being elected from during the election”. The scale ran from 1 to 4, where 1 means strongly agree and 4 means strongly disagree.

Trust (Additive Index). Computed by averaging responses on the two items above (Representation and Responsiveness). The scale thus ran from 1 (low trust) to 4 (high trust).

KORUS FTA (2008). Respondents who say “the new National Assembly should ratify the Korea-US FTA” were coded 3, “the new National Assembly should decide whether to ratify after review” coded 2, and “the new National Assembly should not ratify” coded 1.

KORUS FTA (2012). Respondents who say “the Korea-US FTA should be enforced as is” were coded 4, “the Korea-US FTA should be enforced first, but if necessary, additional negotiations can be considered” coded 3, “the Korea-US FTA should be re-negotiated and then re-ratified” coded 2, and “the Korea-US FTA should be abolished immediately” coded 1.

Multilateralism (vs. Korea-US alliance). Concerning Korea’s foreign relations and security policy, respondents who say “Korea should cooperate more with US-led world order” coded 1, “Korea should restore traditional Korea-US alliance” coded 2, “Korea should pursue multilateralism away from US-centered policy” coded 3, and “Korea should completely reconsider US-centered foreign policy” coded 4.

North Korea (2008). Concerning aid to North Korea, respondents who say “(South) Korea should halt aid to North Korea completely” coded 4, “Korea should limit aid to a humanitarian level” coded 3, “Korea should maintain current levels” coded 2, and “Korea should expand aid to North Korea” coded 1.

North Korea (2012). Concerning policies toward North Korea, respondents who say “Policies should be directed toward encouraging inter-Korean interchange and cooperation” coded 1 and “Policies should be directed toward maintaining a tough stance on North Korea” coded 2.

Regulations on Chaebol. Concerning government regulations of Chaebol, respondents who say “Chaebol reform to the market, relax regulations” coded 1, “Relax regulations except unfair trading by Chaebol” coded 2, Maintain current regulatory framework toward Chaebol coded 3, and “Strengthen further regulations of Chaebol” coded 4.
Appendix A (Taiwan)

Public welfare is govt. first priority in policymaking. Respondents were asked to say when the government decides important policies, whether they think “public welfare” is “never,” “seldom,” “sometimes,” or “often” its first priority. The scale ran from 1 to 4.

Public officials care about people. Respondents were asked to say how much they agree or disagree with the statement that “Public officials do not care much about what people like me think”. The scale ran from 1 to 4, where 1 means strongly agree and 4 means strongly disagree.

Trust Taiwan (Additive Index). Computed by averaging responses on the two items above (Public welfare is govt. first priority in policymaking and Public officials care about people). The scale thus ran from 1 (low trust) to 4 (high trust).

Aspirations for democracy. Those who say “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of regime” were coded 1, “For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of regime we have” and “In some circumstances, an authoritarian regime – a dictatorship can be preferable to a democratic system” coded 0.

Satisfaction with Taiwan’s democracy. Respondents were asked to say whether they are “vary dissatisfied,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” “somewhat satisfied,” and “vary satisfied” with the way democracy works in Taiwan. The scale ran from 1 to 4.

Unification. Self-placement of their positions about the unification with China on a scale from independence (1) to unification (3).

Evaluations of the ECFA (Additive Index). M2. After signing the cross-Strait “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” (ECFA), do you think Taiwan’s economy has gotten better, worse or is about the same? Worse (1), about the same (2), and better (3) M2a. Thinking about your own economic situation, do you think it has gotten better or gotten worse as a result of ECFA, or stayed about the same? Worse (1), about the same (2), and better (3). The additive index was created by averaging the scores of the answers for the two questions, and thus the scale ran from 1 to 3.

Stability. “Large-scale reform is most important” (1) vs. “social stability is most important” (3)

Environment. “Environmental protection” (1) vs. “economic development” (3)

Welfare (2008). “Maintaining the current (social welfare) system is the most important thing” (1) vs. “promoting social welfare is most important” (3)

Welfare (2012). Respondents were asked to say whether public expenditure on welfare benefits should be much more or much less than now. The scale ran from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more than now” and 3 means “less than now”

Law enforcement. Respondents were asked to say whether public expenditure on police and law enforcement should be much more or much less than now. The scale ran from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more than now” and 3 means “less than now”

Business. Respondents were asked to say whether public expenditure on business and industry should be much more or much less than now. The scale ran from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more than now” and 3 means “less than now”

Distribution. Respondents were asked to say how much they agree or disagree with the statement that “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. The scale ran from 1 to 4, where 1 means strongly disagree and 4 means strongly agree.