Thank you, Jean. Thanks for having me here. I do feel a bit like an imposter. I want to say that right in the front. And then I thought well surely, I'll be able to disagree with Condi on something and I don't. So I'm gonna disappoint you all with that. It reminds me a little bit, somebody who was asking me why am I here, and I said it reminds me a little bit about – you probably don't know this, Jean, but I played in a rock and roll band when I was a student here at Stanford. A lot of you people probably didn't know that. My contribution was all energy and enthusiasm because I didn't have a lot of talent or expertise on anything I played. I could play lots of instrument but I only knew three or four chords. So in that spirit I'm gonna bring some energy.

It's also a great honor for me to be here at this forum. I've been to many of these forums. Mike was a great colleague of mine, incredibly generous, always interesting to go listen to and actually he had a lot of enthusiasm too, among many other things and many other talents. He was enthusiastic about everything he did and I think about that and I'm grateful to try to emulate some of that enthusiasm, giving up for the lack of knowledge about China. But I took my assignment seriously. Jean asked me some questions and so I'm just gonna run through some of my answers. I'm gonna talk a little bit about the Cold War part and then I'm also gonna pivot at the end about what it means for Stanford. There was a question earlier about what this means for Stanford, and in my job at FSI these days I've spent more and more time with the university thinking about those things so I want to end with that.

First just to reiterate this moment we're in, this inflection point, this pivot. I hope when we get to a discussion we might actually explain why this is happening. I don't know. The expert community and the government and the think tank world, I know some things but it really is interesting. You guys started the conversation with Condi and then she didn't answer it, but I hope we'll come back to it, whether this is a Xi phenomenon, a communist party phenomenon or a China phenomenon.

I tend to think of it in Xi terms, but I also tend to think, and that's gonna get to my remarks about why I don't think it is appropriate metaphor that there's been an overreaction. There's been literally from the Economist, I think it came out yesterday, just to underscore the point that there's lots of this conversation. And like Condi, and then just one more document, read this document and you'll learn that we are now competitors with these revisionist powers, China and Russia, that's the national security strategy. I'm gonna come down on the side with Condi, and generally speaking I think this metaphor distorts more than it illuminates in terms of the Cold War.

But there are some things that we should at least acknowledge that others might say and some things I think are true. And so it's not just black and white. I think there's some more nuance there. First on the similarities, there are two global powers, and one's rising and one's at the top, but that is something similar in terms of the structure of the international system. Second, this ideological competition – I'm glad you guys already
dug into this. I'm gonna tell you in the next slide why I think we're exaggerating it, but there most certainly is different systems that are being articulated in some ways saying one's better than the other, and we heard that exchange in the last session. And I think we would be naïve not to acknowledge that there's something about that.

I would also stress compared to the Cold War that the ideological division in the world is a lot less than it was at the heyday you might say in the 1970s/1980s when the world was divided in red and blue, and I'm gonna show you that in a minute. This global competition regarding economic assistance is also there. That's a feature that we had with the cold war with the Soviets and Americans. I think it's different in that I actually think the Chinese model will probably be more successful than the Soviet model was.

But as somebody who did write about this, and my PhD was about what the Soviets did in Africa, in Southern Africa, I would note that it didn't work out too well for them and they did try to replicate the communist party system, allow the Soviet system in places like Angola and Mozambique, and in many ways, that was the end of the Cold War because of that expansion in this period. This other one I'm putting as a question mark for our China specialist when we talk. This is a hypothesis that I hear when I go to conferences and Washington about this. I don't see a lot of data to support this hypothesis in terms of intentionality, but I don't know anything about intentionality and that's why I'm just gonna talk about capabilities here.

And then the same one with the last point here. A lot of talk about that. What is the evidence that would support that hypothesis? On this one I do think there is more evidence with respect to what China's trying to do in its region. But even there, is it as aggressive as people think? And I'm gonna talk about capabilities, but I want my colleagues to talk about intentions, 'cause I don't know what those intentions are. But this slide is more important to me. These are the differences. Condi's already talked about it at length, so let me just go through this pretty quickly.

Yes, there are two great powers in the international system, but they are not the global superpowers that the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold War, and I'm going to show you some evidence for that in a minute. It's different. Second, yes China is a rising military power but nowhere near the power and resources the United States has in terms of military power. It is wrong to equate that there are two military superpowers in the world. That's just not true.

Third, again I want to defer to the experts. But as I read what the communist party, what President Xi says, I don't see the same fervor to the ideological dimension of what China is doing around the world that I knew well when I studied it and lived in the Soviet Union. I lived there for a time – several times actually – that the Soviets were doing. It was front and center to what they're doing. At least it's softer, and maybe that will make it more successful, but it is not the same front and center communism versus capitalism, they would use different words as well, that that was at the forefront of the ideological struggle during the Cold War.
Fourth, to state the obvious – I want to state the obvious 'cause we forget this a lot. Condi mentioned that the autarchic system, the Soviets, was a strategy. They tried to change it later on and then it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. But this is just radically different than our situation in the bilateral relationship between China and the United States, and I would say China and the world. And that is good news, not bad news. I think that makes – when I was in the government, my boss, President Obama, and I don't want to quote him saying this 'cause it's a word I don't use. But he said something like one of our policies is we want to not do stupid, and then it's a word, four letters, begins with S.

And the way, when I used to sit across the hall from my colleagues that worked on China at the White House, and we always admired what they had because there was so much interconnectivity between China and the United States that there was big costs to doing stupid things, whereas with the Russia/U.S. relationship there wasn't a lot of connectivity, there wasn't a lot going on, so you could invade Georgia for instance or invade Ukraine, and there was not a lot of economic cost for Russia. That is a good thing that we have a different relationship with China.

Fifth, Chinese economy is growing and experts will talk about where they're at. I just want to remind you that in GDP per capita terms, China has a long ways to go before they catch up with us. That was not true, at least we thought it wasn't true. Later when we got better data it turned out there was a bigger gap there. But during the Cold War we thought that the Soviets were doing relatively well vis-à-vis us on that dimension.

The sixth one here, no proxy, where it's really important, the Cold War wasn't cold. Actually millions of people died because we thought we had to go fight the Soviets all over the world. By the way, a lot of Americans died too. Don't forget that. That is simply not a piece of the story yet in terms of U.S./China relations. And then these last two are more new, but I would just remind you that we are in a period of retrenchment now as a society and most certainly President Trump. That is different. We didn't have a retrenchment president during the Cold War like we do with President Trump. He's off the scales.

We go back and forth in expansionist retrenchment presidents throughout the Cold War, but he is an extreme president in this isolationist retrenchment place. What I don't know is at the beginning of a long period of pull-back or is it just where we're just gonna get over it in 18 months? Or five and a half years, which will make it harder to get over it, by the way. I don't know the answer to that question. It's something I think about. I would just say, and I don't believe anybody else who thinks they know the answer to that question. I think we just don't know what the long-term trajectory of the United States is, especially because things that change us when we get on those retrenchment trajectories are usually things that are not predictable. Things like September 11, exogenous shocks as we call them in political science that then move us in a different direction.

And then on this last one, you guys talked about it already. I would just say I'm a consumer of this data. I'm trying to learn, right Jean? And I think it's just premature to assume that we are going to lose for some of the reasons that Condi already talked about
in this kind of battle, but I think it's something worth looking at. And the second part of what I'm gonna do here really quickly just to remind you about the capabilities. Yes, China is growing. Yes, it is a bipolar system. But it is not one that where the two major powers in the system are symmetric on lots of different dimensions.

So GDP in billions, we're still ahead. GDP per capita, which I already mentioned, the United States is ninth on that chart. China is seventy-first. That's a big gap and we know from other studies of modernization as countries leave that middle-income place where China is that there is a lot of drama that happens between being seventy-first and being in the top ten. At least we know that comparatively. And I'm not gonna predict it for China, but in other countries we know of there's a lot of drama, especially with relationship between economic institutions and political institutions.

Ten most valuable companies in the world – I think this is a little bit out of date. It's about 12 months out of date. Notice we are still dominant. So for those that say we've lost the Cold War already to China I would say well wait a minute. And yet at the same time when you look at high tech we are definitely losing ground. So it's a mixed picture here, when you think about China, the economies. And then Hungbee, and I think I saw you here earlier. Are you still here or did you leave? You're here. He's got a great paper I'm quoting here about the rise of robots in China, and just look at the graph. You can see it, I hope. China was not a power at all and now they are roaring in terms of this dimension. So this economic story I'm just trying to say is mixed.

You can't say it's one way or the other. There are different things going on here that I think make it complicated. It's not just a black and white story. Military spending, we're way ahead. We have been for a long time. I predict we will remain that way for a long time. Nuclear weapons. That's something we used to think about, a lot about during the Cold War as Condi said. Dramatic gaps between where China is and where the United States is. However, at the same time when we talk about the use of these military technologies for peaceful means, we are falling behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear reactors.

Allies, huge, huge advantage to the United States. It is striking to me as a student of international politics how few allies China has been able to develop in terms of concrete alliances. By the way, I think that's North Korea. And you guys are all laughing 'cause you don't think it is real. But they have a formal – I looked it up – there's a formal treaty still there, whether it matters or not. But this is a huge advantage that the United States has, by the way that we need to preserve in my view. Universities – China's doing a great job at trying to catch up, but we are still way ahead here.

And then the last piece on this before I say one word about what it means for Stanford, I just want to remind you that there have been debates in our country's history, I'm focused on the American side here obviously, where it felt like we were losing to other great powers in the system, and those turned out to be premature predictions. And I say that not because that's going to predict the future with China. I don't know what that is, but I do know that there's been these earlier periods and I just want to remind you of them.
1930s didn't look so great for America's rising powers. There were other powers rising. They had ideological – the rise or populous idea logs was happening and we were suffering through a great recession. Had you made a prediction about us back in 1932 or 1933, there's a lot of history you would have got wrong moving forward. And there's the map. You think the rise of the populous and autocrats are bad today, please remember 1930. If you can't see the code there, the only liberal democracies there are the green states. Pretty small. Obviously after the end of World War II and losing China there was a moment in history where it felt like the correlation of forces, as the Soviets like to say, was moving against us. That turned out to be premature.

But then, because of our overexpansion in many ways and wars in Indochina and problems at home, we had another moment where it felt like we were losing this battle to the Soviets. I think Henry Kissinger used to talk about it. We're gonna lose at some point. He compared it to cancer. We just had to slow it down. That turned out to be a really bad prediction. And even with some of our closer friends, there was a time in the early '80s when we were really worried about the Japanese moving from economic power to military power. I took a course on that as an undergraduate here at Stanford and how they're gonna translate all of that economic power into military power. Obviously that prediction proved premature. So don't bet against the United States yet.

So what does it mean for Stanford? I want to say two things. One, it means to me if I think about a Cold War comparison that we need to invest more resources in studying and understanding China, understanding the intentions of the regime, of the communist party, of the people and you guys started to talk about it. Remember in the Cold War we invested a lot of money to do that. I'm a product of it, Condi's a product of it, that's how I learned to speak Polish, that's how she – we both had fellowships where the government was providing incentives for us to study China.

I think the study of China is way healthier today than the end of the Cold War was for U.S./Soviet relations. But now that you are dealing with being the most important bilateral relationship, I think it's way more important that we have an infusion of just the study of all these dimensions of what is going on in China. Even if you're really scared of what's going on in China, know thy enemy, we need to understand what's going on to make rational policy choices.

And then second, you guys already talked about it, yes be vigilant about tech transfer, but don't disengage. I think that would be a tremendous mistake, both for our country but especially if Stanford did it because we're an important mover. If we started to do it, lots of others would follow. I'm categorically against that. And then good news and bad news. Good news, we're actually doing a lot on China. And lots of the people that are doing it are sitting in this front row and I just want to say thank you. This is fantastic. All of this stuff is fantastic. We have lots of people that work on China here at Stanford in one way or the other.
We have lots of students studying Chinese. This myth that people don't care about China anymore, it's second only to Spanish still today, even though it peaked earlier, and we still have a lot of students that go to China to study, that's all the good news. We also have this fantastic place that Jean runs as you've heard earlier that I think serves as a really important bridge between China and the United States, especially at this time of rising hostilities between our governments. And I usually show this slide deck when Professor Oi is not sitting in the front row.

This is all of her good work and just to remind you of the multitude of things we do there, and I think it's more important today than ever. The bad news is I do think there are gaps. I think Mike, you told me the other day, you were surprised. You looked at our course catalog and we don't teach a course on U.S./China relations. Kind of shocking, isn't it? He's saying yes, and I agree with that. Chinese economy, we have some people that are here today, but I think we all agree there are pieces we want to know better. And then China in the world, again I'm not saying this for the people in the room that are doing this. I congratulate you. I want you to keep working. And at the same time I think we could be doing a lot more here at Stanford to be the place, the number one place, for understanding what is happening in China and what China is doing in the world.

The challenging news, I already talked about this, but I want to make sure that we don't in this political moment move the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. I think Condi gave a really rational, smart answer to what we do in terms of Chinese students, Chinese collaborators both here and in China, but I just also want to remind everybody, we are not the U.S. Government. We do not do classified work here. So we should not check people's passports when they come into our seminars.

Maybe the government needs to check them before they come here. That's their job. But we most certainly do not need to get in that business 'cause at the end of the day science is universal. These are universal facts and the idea that by keeping two people out of your seminar on AI you're gonna prevent China from eventually learning those facts I think is naïve. And that is definitely not our job here at Stanford. Thank you.

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