Pathways to Reconciliation

A Track II Dialogue on Wartime History Issues in Asia

Final Report

Co-sponsors:

Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat

May 12–13, 2014
Stanford University
Pathways to Reconciliation
Track II Dialogue on Wartime History Issues in Asia

Executive Summary

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) convened a Track II dialogue of academic experts from Asia, the United States, and Europe to discuss the issues of wartime history that continue to impact relations in the region. The dialogue, “Wartime History Issues in Asia: Pathways to Reconciliation,” was held on May 11–13 on a closed-door and confidential basis with the goal of offering practical ideas to help resolve tensions surrounding those issues. Shorenstein APARC has been a leader in academic research on the formation of wartime historical memory through its “Divided Memories and Reconciliation” project, including a groundbreaking comparative study of the treatment of the war in the high school history textbooks of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Taiwan, and the United States.

The core participants in this dialogue were scholars from China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States, along with Stanford University scholars. Most of these participants have significant experience in previous efforts to foster dialogue and reconciliation on wartime history issues. In addition, experts on the European experience in dealing with wartime historical memory participated.

The dialogue took place under the co-sponsorship of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), based in Seoul. TCS is an international organization established by the governments of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2011 to promote peace and prosperity among the three countries. Through various initiatives, the TCS strives to serve as a vital hub for cooperation and integration in Northeast Asia.

TCS representatives attended the dialogue as observers and participated in their personal capacities. The dialogue sessions were structured to promote maximum discussion among the participants – each session began with presentations on key issues from American and European academic experts, with the ensuing dialogue largely carried about among the Asian participants. The dialogue yielded, as hoped, a set of forward-looking recommendations to civil society, researchers, and governments. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat has taken those recommendations under study for consideration.

As Ambassador Iwatani Shigeo, Secretary-General of TCS, said in his letter of invitation, “It is my sincere hope that through this joint scholarly endeavor, TCS will be provided with the necessary direction and guidance to follow-up on bilateral efforts at historical dialogue over the past years.”

The Stanford dialogue could launch a new effort to resolve wartime history issues in the region. “Our further hope is that this will be an ongoing process, building on previous efforts at bilateral dialogue on history issues that will go beyond this initial meeting,” Shorenstein APARC director Professor Gi-Wook Shin said.
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Agenda

Monday, May 12, 2014

DIALOGUE DAY ONE

9:00 a.m. WELCOME REMARKS
Gi-Wook Shin Director, Shorenstein APARC
Shigeo Iwatani Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat

9:15 a.m.–12:00 p.m. SESSION 1: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES OF HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION
Given the persistence of wartime history problems in Northeast Asia, why do we need to take on this issue now? Won’t history issues inevitably fade away over time as the wartime generation passes away and the countries of the region become increasing integrated economically and culturally? Recent events suggest that not only are history issues persistent, they are rising in intensity as political leaders are under the pressure of popular nationalism. Younger generations, educated with limited understanding of wartime history, have shown even more intense feelings about the past. This rising nationalism is fueled by the growth of digital media, from social media to the broader use of the Internet, which creates even more rapid transmission of such ideas. More dangerously, the rise of tensions now poses a real and growing threat to peace and stability in the region. Political leaders in the region, and the United States, are increasingly worried that tensions over history issues (including the territorial questions that derive from the wartime past) could trigger escalating tensions that could lead to armed conflict.

Karl Eikenberry Stanford University
Daqing Yang George Washington University

2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. SESSION 2: DIVIDED MEMORIES
Shorenstein APARC will present research on the comparative study of the formation of historical memory about the wartime era in Asia. Shorenstein APARC will present the results of its comparative study of high school history textbooks, as well as the impact of popular culture and elite opinion on how China, Japan, Korea, and the United States have formed their “divided” understandings of the past. The problems of “patriotic education” and the need for comparative study and mutual exchange will be discussed. The discussion will look at the lessons of bilateral dialogues on history conducted by Japan, China, and South Korea and how we might build on those efforts to move ahead on history education. We will also examine any lessons that might be gained from looking at Europe’s experience in this area.

Daniel Sneider Stanford University
Gary Mukai Stanford University

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

DIALOGUE DAY TWO

9:15 a.m.–11:45 a.m. SESSION 3: PATHWAYS TO RECONCILIATION
Northeast Asia has made limited progress, particularly compared to Europe, in achieving reconciliation. The lack of progress is partly attributable to the geopolitics of the Cold War that, unlike Germany and France, placed principle antagonists (China and Japan) in opposing camps. The United States, for reasons of Cold War geopolitics, tended to reinforce the status quo established by the San Francisco Treaty system. Since the 1980s, however, following normalization of relations between Japan and China and between Japan and South Korea, there have been growing tensions over the past and efforts to deal with those tensions. While some attempts at reconciliation have taken place, particularly the bilateral commissions on historical issues, the progress has fallen short of what has been seen in Europe. And tensions continue to arise over history issues, centering on issues of compensation for victims and territorial problems left unresolved by the San Francisco treaty.

We will offer specific case studies of pathways to reconciliation, ranging from expanded people-to-people contacts, new approaches to textbooks and education, including supplementary teaching materials for use in classrooms, and discussion of what lessons, if any, Asia can gain from European experiences in dealing with wartime memory.

Simone Lässig Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research
Kathleen Stephens Koret Fellow, Shorenstein APARC

12:00 p.m. CLOSING REMARKS
Introduction

Dr. Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, introduced the dialogue by discussing Shorenstein APARC’s work on its “Divided Memories” project and stressing that the United States does not have to be an outsider in reconciliation efforts. He emphasized the role of the meeting as an exchange, not a conference; participants were encouraged to express their opinions without restraint, and respect for those opinions was paramount.

TCS Opening Remarks

Ambassador Iwatani Shigeo, secretary-general of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), explained that the secretariat was, for the first time, squarely facing history issues that were impeding trilateral cooperation. The scale of the challenge is considerable, he noted, and he expressed hope that two issues could be addressed over the course of the dialogue. The first issue was to explore the format and relevance of joint historical studies. What can be done to avoid repeating the mistakes of previous studies? What successes have joint studies have to date, and how can that information be used in the design of future studies?

A second issue was the problem of the rise of nationalism among the youth of China, Japan, and Korea. Knowing that history is a complex interaction of factors and events, narratives that endeavor to reduce history to simplifications can foster dangerous nationalism. Dialogue among youth of the different nations is needed, along with an appreciation for the diversity of views and the complexity of history.
**Session 1**

**Strategic Imperatives of Historical Reconciliation**

The Role of History—the example of U.S.—Mexican Relations

The first presenter was Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, who provided an example from American history to illustrate how even diametrically opposed interpretations of history can nonetheless be overcome. The example given was that of the Mexican-American War, which in Mexico is known as “The Invasion of Mexico.” American history has ascribed the causes of the war to Mexico’s refusal to accept a good price for the territory despite their inability to settle the area, with the movement of Mexican troops across the border being the final straw. Mexican history views the invasion as being a result of America’s use of congressional legitimacy to approve the robbery of Mexican lands by extending the border, backed up by military might, to make it look like Mexico was the aggressor.

The bloodiest clash of the war was the Battle of Chapultec in September 1847. The way that the two nations view this battle encapsulates the two different versions of history at play. The bravery of six cadets who refused to retreat and fought to their deaths is a source of Mexican national pride, while U.S. history emphasizes the bravery of the forces who overcame Mexican defenses, with a statue in Washington, D.C. of the U.S. general who oversaw the battle. Yet a hundred years after the war, U.S. president Harry Truman visited the Mexican monument at Chapultec and said the reason for his visit was that “bravery does not belong to any one country. I respect bravery anywhere I see it.”

Despite the war and the differences of opinion over it, today Mexico and the United States enjoy a high degree of economic, strategic, and political cooperation. Although this war cannot stand as a direct analogy to the wartime issues in Asia, Eikenberry conceded, it shows that wartime legacies exist around the world and can be overcome by diplomacy, leadership, and understanding.

U.S. security strategy and the imperative for reconciliation

The second part of the presentation by Ambassador Eikenberry discussed why the United States is concerned about the resolution of historical issues in Asia. As he explained, U.S. security strategy is underpinned by its alliance security network, which is undermined when major allies like Japan and Korea cannot resolve these issues; the United States seeks to build open economic architectures to facilitate growth, and this requires cooperation with the world’s largest economies; and the United States is concerned when historical narratives, including those revolving around humiliation, become a source of strategic miscalculation when analyzing capability and intent.

The State of Discussions of Wartime History Issues

The second presentation, by Professor Daqing Yang at George Washington University, began by asking questions about historical dialogues themselves: what kinds of cross-national history dialogues have been held? What leads to them being
held? How have they been assessed, and what issues remain to be resolved?

There were a number of factors that led to a “new wave” of history dialogues over the last ten to fifteen years. The most obvious cause has been the historical controversies themselves: in the 1980s, textbooks and visits to the Yasukuni shrine; in the 1990s, the dispute over comfort women; and after 2000, new cross-national dialogues were held after the approval of revisionist textbooks in Japan. The opening of China and the democratization of South Korea led to a vibrant civil society interested in dialogue; and the increase in economic interdependence and travel made it easier for dialogues to take place over longer periods of time. External influences have also had an effect on the number of dialogues as Asian scholars spent time in Europe and books were written about European history dialogues.

Professor Yang gave an overview on the history of previous dialogues and joint historical research. Japanese-Korean dialogues began as a discussion over textbooks and included a government-funded research forum on historical issues; the first Japanese-Chinese dialogues were sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, which convened scholars to produce the book, Historical Understanding and Cross-National Borders.


Dialogues and joint research: an assessment

Assessing these efforts, Yang noted, there are areas of convergence and even consensus between China, Japan, and Korea; in general, more agreement comes out of non-government projects. Dialogues have aided all countries in reaching a better understanding of differing historical perspectives and differing facts, and the dialogues have induced self-critical reflection on the process by which one’s own national historical narratives are created and perpetuated.

But there are aspects to the dialogue process that have not been conducive to success: dialogue topics often avoid the most controversial issues that need resolution; the academic quality of some publications is questionable; some agreements made are only for political convenience; politicians may not take the results of dialogues seriously; and governments have heavily interfered both in the appointment of personnel and the subsequent disclosure of material.

**Discussion**

The American moderator raised five questions based on the presentations. Should East Asian historical disputes be treated as a subset of a whole, or are they somehow unique, and can only be addressed in an East Asian context? Most dialogues have not reached resolution, so is it better to discard them, rather than to build on failed efforts? How can outsiders be used most effectively, without the dialogues being viewed as “tainted” with outside impositions? Must dialogues—which revolve on questions of international relations—be begun at the government level, or would it be more effective to start from the ground level up? And finally, in these dialogues is it more effective to begin with a clarification of historical issues, or to work backward from a shared vision of how regions want the end result to be?

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*This document has been written using a modified version of the Chatham House Rule. All discussants are anonymous, identified only by nationality. The masculine pronoun is used throughout.*
A century of complexity

A Korean expert suggested that changes in the framework of international relations since the end of the Cold War means that differences in the ways that nations handle wartime memories will only continue to deepen, and called for new anthropological perspectives to understand the problem.

The expert referred to the last century as one of complexity—a change in the number of actors involved and the changes those actors have undergone. Roles have shifted, with China emerging as a power, Japan’s economy in stagnation, and South Korea’s rise as a middle power. Furthermore, through the end of the Cold War state behavior in China and elsewhere was driven by political and military real-politik considerations. Now we see that states are being increasingly driven by emotional perspectives. The new approach that is needed, the expert argued, is to stop arguing about what happened, and start trying to understand why states disagreed about what happened.

Government’s role in dialogues

A Korean expert supplemented the second presentation with personal experiences in previous dialogues. He noted that there were considerable differences between the approach and atmosphere of private and government dialogues. The former had greater camaraderie, more consensus-based topic selection, and more compromise; however, in government-sponsored dialogues, the obligation participants felt to represent their country’s interests led to antagonistic discussions. He suggested that the role of governments needed to be looked at more closely, since in East Asia they play greater roles (than in Europe) in the regulation and approval of textbooks. But despite their larger roles, they often disregard academic research and do not incorporate dialogue recommendations into educational policy or textbooks.

A Japanese expert posited that the reason historical memory issues are so controversial and difficult to discuss may lie in the obstructionism of governments. To get around this problem, a three-dimensional approach may be useful—dealing with history issues through the government, the people, and the academic community. Academic work on historical memory continues to be undermined by irresponsible statements by politicians like Shinzō Abe, who once famously said that “history should be left to historians.”

Domestic historical memory interpretations may clash, too

A Japanese expert noted that one reason the understanding of history issues is such a complex process is that these issues have different interpretations even within one country. These domestic disagreements between the left and right are often overlooked by external observers, but they are important to recognize as they inevitably create a bias in how the people view the issues at hand.

It is also important to examine the role of the individual historian, who strives for impartiality but who is instantly politicized and labeled as progressive or conservative once he writes something. And it must be recognized that while historians are comfortable with a spectrum of accounts of a historical event, the public requires one grand narrative, and this can hinder constructive dialogue.

An expert from an American university agreed that it was vital to get away from the specifics of the wartime past and instead focus on finding paths to reconciliation. In doing so, it is necessary to look at each country’s postwar history as well as the differences in how each country approaches wartime memory, given their vastly different political structures. For example, China has essentially established a consensus in public memory, while Japan remains conflicted, and Korea is a little bit of both.

He also stressed that discussion of pasts needed to be broadened out past specific wartime incidents to include themes like Chinese national humiliation, Japanese colonialism, Western colonialism in the region, and the Asia-Pacific War as a whole.

East Asia may not be ready for consensus

A Chinese expert noted that there is a problem that emerges from the approach of both governmental and private dialogues: both try to create common histories and set aside differences in favor of consensus. But when such histories are codified into publications, they are not likely to be taken seriously by either the government or the public, and thus their influence is restricted to the academic community.

Whereas in Europe there have been postwar moves toward unification and a general consensus, in East Asia vastly different political regimes and evolution-
ary paths have resulted in a lack of consensus on the facts.

A Korean expert suggested that civilians and the general public play the most important role in reconciliation, as governments tend to take advantage of historical memory issues in order to forward narrow political interests. This tendency has led to journalists in turn reporting on these government agendas, leading to the current phenomenon where relatively small media outlets have an outsize effect on the broader trilateral relations framework. He also advocated multilateral and international dialogues rather than bilateral ones, as the former can help to create an international community that can embody a common voice to pressure governments.

As an earlier discussant expressed, an American expert noted that dialogues among scholars differ from dialogues among publics, because the latter is mediated through the Internet, an unregulated media. This raises the question of whether it is possible to educate the media—to undertake a trilateral or greater dialogue that involves the media and historians together, to address the poor quality of reporting to date. He concluded by declaring the unfortunate reality that wartime history issues have kept the heads of China, Japan, and Korea meeting for two years. Is there a way to progress past this?

An expert at an American university followed up on the question of the media by noting that journalists and scholars were brought together for the Balkan history dialogues, and journalists were given the results before the general media, thus allowing them to serve as communicators. And in the case of Japan, media outlets like Yomiuri and Asahi have been involved in studying historical issues.

A Japanese expert bemoaned the effect of the Internet on history issues and expressed frustration that history issues are leading to a breakdown of relations. Despite these setbacks, he asserted there has been academic progress. One thing he would like to see is more interaction between Chinese, Korean, and Japanese students in a way to develop empathy, rather than simply an opportunity to parrot their respective government lines. Governments do not encourage this because of political preoccupations, but the process of reconciliation should be shifted to focus on improving relationships.

A Korean expert agreed that the mass media plays a critical role in the public discourse on history, but that the tendency has been for that role to be negative. One example has been the Japanese media’s rule to not discuss sensitive issues, making establishing consensus difficult and instead forwarding its own narrow interests. Both the Korean and Japanese mass media fears that broaching sensitive issues would provoke a public backlash and impact their standing.

A Japanese expert noted that media exchanges are taking place and journalists have been having dialogues on historical and territorial issues. The problem is there are no historians at these dialogues—historian-journalism interaction is key in cross-national forums. Addressing the inflammatory effect the Internet has had on shaping the discourse, he advocated that Internet commentators, such as bloggers, should be involved in the dialogue. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation already invites Chinese bloggers to write about Japan each year.

**European reconciliation efforts: lessons, not blueprints**

Agreeing with previous commentators, a European expert suggested that the European history of reconciliation should not be used as a strict blueprint for all regions because of the importance of context. Nonetheless, he offered the example of the German-Polish textbook experience. The recommendations of a UNESCO-established commission were published in 1976 and were criticized for being too politicized, too compromised, and for being too deferential to either side’s taboos. However, ignoring those taboos would have meant the disbanding of the commission. He doubted that there was much education of the media by scholars regarding the recommendations. Yet in the end the commission maintained academic freedom from politics and its results stimulated discussion among the West German legislature, media, and civil society, leading to more than forty years of fruitful dialogue.

The American expert who moderated the session closed by noting that no one had explicitly stated the necessity of historical reconciliation, and stressed that it was imperative for the future of the region. He questioned the purpose of reconciliation: is it to resolve historical debates, or to clear the way for something of more importance? Textbooks, he asserted, are a basis for common vision: let historians figure out what happened, write compatible textbooks, and let politicians grapple with the issues.
The Divided Memories and Reconciliation Project

The second session on Monday afternoon began with a presentation by Stanford University’s Daniel Sneider, who discussed the “Divided Memories and Reconciliation” project, conducted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The project focuses on a comparative understanding of the formation of perceptions of wartime memories in East Asia and takes the view that the United States should not be an outsider to this process. The research imperative is the continued influence that the war has on interstate relations, spurring the rise of nationalism in Asia and preventing a regionalism comparable to what has emerged in Europe.

“Divided Memories” is a three-phase project divided into the analysis of high school history textbooks in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States; a study of the role of contemporary cinema in historical memory in Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States; and finally, a look at elite opinions on wartime history in East Asia.

Sneider explained that history textbooks were a natural focus of attention, as they have been employed in forming a sense of national identity. As Peter Duus has suggested, history textbooks formalize the state’s understanding of history. There is a tradition in East Asia where the study of history has been explicitly linked with a patriotic education.

Japanese history textbooks have been a source of controversy since the 1980s, but since then the government has required that the texts take into account views of other governments in the region. Japanese conservatives took issue with this, and textbooks produced by a conservative group have continued to be a source of controversy, even though in fact these textbooks are not widely used. The Stanford study, however, focused on the most widely used textbooks in all the countries, which have the most impact on students.

Textbook differences primarily in terms of focus, not narrative

The presentation reviewed an analysis of how each country’s textbook portrayed four wartime issues: the Manchurian Incident, the Nanjing Massacre, forced labor and comfort women, and the atomic bomb. The research found that in reality the differences in accounts of these incidents from country to country were not that great, in terms of historical narrative; the difference was instead one of focus, which is usually tied to national identity—American textbooks focusing on the atomic bomb; Chinese on the Nanjing Massacre; and Koreans on the forced labor issue. Sneider discussed whether the example of joint textbooks in Europe could be replicated in Asia and suggested that may have to be a product of the cultivation of a regional identity in East Asia, as has occurred in Europe.

Teaching About Bias and Perspective

The second presentation was by Gary Mukai, who spoke about the work done by the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), which trains teachers and works with students in the United States. SPICE used the research from the “Divided Memories” project to develop curricular materials aimed at teaching about bias and perspective. Their materials encourage students to consider terminology, numbers, and interpretation/emphasis when analyzing textbooks in an effort to understand bias. Terminology can be neutral or heavily suggestive; numbers can differ, but also the presentation of statistics can affect their reception; and textbooks can name heroes and villains, give credit for triumphs, and ignore or emphasize certain events.
**Discussion**

If textbooks aren’t so different, perhaps the difference is in how they are used

A Korean expert expressed surprise that the Stanford study found little actual differences among the various countries’ textbooks. He suggested that perhaps the reason is that the study focused solely on the textbooks themselves, and not other aspects of the educational experience.

A Japanese expert followed the same line of reasoning and wondered how the high school teachers were using the textbooks? What is the formula between the contents of the books, the teachers’ lectures, and the students’ reception of the material? He noted that Japanese historians feel that their textbooks are rather dry, but the world does not agree.

If, a Chinese expert pointed out, the differences among textbooks are not that considerable, then the issue lies in how history is actually taught. For example, China focuses on the history of the war, while Japan focuses on pre-war history. Since the 1980s, China’s focus on the war has decreased by a wide margin, yet Japanese scholars criticize China for teaching anti-Japanese history. There is a contemporary phenomenon of young people holding anti-Japanese views; Chinese textbooks do not discuss Japan’s postwar changes—something we should keep in mind for new editions—but for its part Japan does not give adequate treatment of the harm it inflicted on its neighbors.

A Korean expert pointed out the wide gap between textbook content and the public’s understanding of history. In a survey of how textbooks influenced historical views, between 20 to 30 percent of respondents said that their understanding of history was based on history textbooks. So this issue requires a two-track approach.

The role of museums

Picking up on this, an American expert noted the proliferation of museums—especially in China—that have a nationalistic bent and tend to distort history. He wondered of the impact on Chinese youth who visited these institutions, and suggested that perhaps some museum experts need to be consulted in this regard.

A Japanese expert suggested that the origin of the history disputes was triggered by diplomatic issues at the government level, and so in one respect at least this issue should be isolated as one between governments.

The way the past is framed is key

An American addressed some of these comments by explaining that the question was one of how to frame the narrative about the past; the specific details of the textbooks might be forgotten, but not how the issues were in general framed. Thus underestimating the importance of formal education in the formation of historical memories would be a mistake. Museums, he noted, are powerful narratives of history; the United States only has one museum...
dedicated to the Pacific war, instead using memorials for that purpose.

The effect of textbooks on historical understanding

A Korean expert talked about a survey of historical understanding that he conducted on two thousand students each in Japan and Korea. About half of the students reported that their understanding of history came from textbooks and teachers; media and parents were also influences. So he agreed that underestimating the role of history textbooks would be wrong, particularly in those East Asian countries where government influence on textbooks is considerable, as is the trust the public gives to those textbooks.

A Japanese expert pointed out that most Japanese college graduates become pacifists as a result of their education. While Japanese textbooks are an issue outside of Japan, the textbooks in fact choose to be neutral to avoid controversy. Japanese largely have no interest in history. Thus some Japanese conservatives have advocated that Japanese textbooks should become more like those of China and Korea—that is to say, politicized.

If common narratives are unattainable, teach how to understand the other’s narrative

There are so many different memories of war, a European expert pointed out, that European efforts to reduce textbook differences have failed. Rather than trying to develop a common European narrative, how about a narrative to learn the other’s narrative? See how things are shown differently; understand the reasons why; and investigate the arguments. There was an Israeli/Palestinian educational experience coordinated by an NGO that is illuminating. Teachers, realizing a common narrative was impossible, instead decided to have two narratives and two interpretations. Then the task for students was to think about the differences in the two narratives.

A Japanese expert noted that while the controversial Yasukuni Shrine was dedicated to the Japanese military who fought in the war, five minutes from there is another memorial to the victims of the war; and not far from there is an anti-war museum. So which represents the real Japan—even in Japan itself there are regional differences.

A Chinese expert posited that textbooks are, in fact, not the reason why there are historical disputes in East Asia. There are three forms of education: family, school, and society.

An American argued that textbooks have long been an international relations issue, that there are even international treaties on textbooks, which are understood to be vital in educating future generations to avoid war. In Asia governments are directly involved in the authoring of textbooks, or in setting standards for textbook publishers. We see a trend, he noted, toward greater nationalism in these textbooks throughout Asia. Perhaps the previous discussant’s idea of “get to know the other’s narrative” is a worthy goal. Teacher training is a good idea, as is youth exchange. In Europe, such educational exchanges of students, such as between Germany and its neighbors, have involved millions of students, sponsored by governments. There are small student exchanges in Asia carried out by NGOs but nothing on that scale.
Session 3
Pathways to Reconciliation

European Experiences in Creating History Textbooks

Simone Lässig, of the Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, presented on history textbook revision efforts in Europe. History textbooks, she explained, encapsulate the knowledge and values considered by elites to be essential to transmit to the next generation, canonize historical knowledge, and create a sense of identity. They hold the potential to both exacerbate conflict or promote reconciliation.

Lässig raised questions about Germany’s textbook dialogue with France, Poland, and other countries in Europe. Are these cases exemplars of postwar reconciliation? Can they be transferred elsewhere, or are there contextual dependencies?

She reviewed the history of textbook revision and four cases of revisions, including German-Polish, Franco-German, and Palestinian-Israeli textbooks, and suggested some conditions that provide favorable frameworks for these type of efforts. Scholarly cooperation must be symmetrical and have a certain degree of independence from political demands; perpetrator nations must be able to come to terms with unprecedented crimes and reform nationalism into a new sense of identity; and victim nations have to find a way to define themselves in a context other than victimhood, with victims’ ancestors being open to reconciliation.

Reconciliation of Historical Conflicts

The second presentation was given by Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, who explored some of the difficulties with reconciliation. At the same time that parties can be working on reconciliation, she noted, history issues can have real impacts on diplomacy, politics, and public policy. Some current conflicts show that history issues can be submerged and then return—for example, in 1970s and 1980s Asia many people were looking forward and it seemed as though many historical animosities had been put aside, but we can see today that clearly wasn’t true.

In the case of Southeastern Europe, reconciliation has not been achieved. An overriding European identity will be the best hope in reaching that goal. Like in Northern Ireland, peace processes can be successful and efforts at reconciliation can be made, but history—like the 1690 Battle of the Boyne—can still play a powerful role the community.

Ambassador Stephens drew lessons from her personal experience in mediation and reconciliation. The passage of time does not solve the problem. Younger generations can be more extreme, and the presence of economic integration does not neces-
sarily mean that views are less polarized. Political leadership is important and the symbolic actions of leaders carry great weight. The idea of a larger identity is important but getting there is a slow process, and even with regional identities many countries seem to desire localized ones. The United States can play a role as an honest broker in the process.

Discussion

An American expert began the discussion by asking what the Germans have developed in place of their delegitimized national pride, and how they achieved that.

German reconciliation with its colonial past

Another American noted that the majority of German reconciliation efforts have been with European neighbors and wondered why there has not been much effort devoted toward former African colonies.

A European expert noted that there has been one German project attempting to deal with reconciliation of colonization, but nothing else, although there is an admission that it is a problem that Europe needs to face and one that is now reflected in German history textbooks. There has been no serious attempt to set up a commission to address the issue because the Holocaust and WWII crimes were so overwhelming. Since it was never considered one of the major colonial powers, Germany originally viewed the issue as a problem for other European states, but now that idea is changing.

The problem of persistent national identities in East Asia

A Korean expert questioned the transferability of the European experience of writing joint textbooks to East Asia, noting that in Europe reconciliation took place in the context of the movement toward regional integration and the creation of the European Union. In East Asia, national identity is still too dominant over regional identity, and the relationship between state and society in Europe is much different than that of East Asia. There needs to be comparative research of context.

In the case of East Asia, he pointed out, the plural pathways needed to be stressed in the day’s topic, “Pathways to Reconciliation.” Unlike reconciliation in the context of the Cold War or post-Cold War, in East Asia reconciliation will be taking place in a century of complexity. For reconciliation to take place, East Asia needs political leadership capable of depoliticizing national identities and wartime memories. Despite the history conflict there is much room for cooperation in East Asia, with many common goals in the areas of technology, economic prosperity, environmental protection, nuclear safety, etc.

Finally, the Korean expert warned that wishful thinking of a smooth path to wartime reconciliation without a transformation of national identity into regional identity will only lead to more frustration. He proposed that TCS should have as one of its major works a museum project that illustrates a history of peaceful interaction between China, Japan, and Korea, one that will show the region had eras of peaceful coexistence and cooperation until the mid-nineteenth century.

An American expert, referring back to the discussion about Germany’s reconciliation of its colonial history, noted Germany’s recognition of the Herero...
and Namaqua Genocide, perpetrated in Southwest Africa by German colonists, an act that was close to forgotten but was brought to the forefront and is now part of German history.

Long memories can hinder reconciliation

The American recalled a number of anecdotes that showed the problem of memory and reconciliation. There was a city planner at the RAND Corporation who devised a plan for dividing Israel and the Palestinian territories, but once he actually went to Israel and the territories and discussed history with the people there, everything went haywire. There is a problem with the idea of focusing on history at the same time as trying to solve a current-day issue. A London Times correspondent has noted that, for people who live in the area, it’s as if the 1389 Battle of Kosovo happened yesterday; it is such a part of their history that it is not helpful to a reconciliation process.

Similarly, he noted that Armenian-American students in his course on law and genocide—grandchildren or even great-grandchildren of those who suffered in the Armenian genocide—are determined to have the event recognized as a “genocide.” And when he spoke on the Nuremburg trials at a university in the Northern Turkish Republic of Cyprus, the students there only wanted to discuss the fact that the event the Armenians want to call a “genocide” was not one. It was sad, he said, that these students in their twenties were so focussed on the history and not the idea of reconciliation.

The role of compensation

The American expert shifted the discussion to the idea of compensation, a recognition that every atrocity is not just a mass murder but also a mass theft. This concept came to the forefront in the 1990s not with Germany but with Switzerland, which had been accused of prolonging the war (based on a U.S. government report) by accepting stolen Nazi gold and thus allowing Germany to buy needed materials. The accusations led to a number of lawsuits being filed in the late 1990s, which were settled through a class-action mechanism with private Swiss banks.

When the settlement occurred, the Swiss banks wanted it to be an “all-Swiss settlement,” meaning they wanted it to immunize the entire nation, every institution of Switzerland, against any future claims coming out of World War II. So in a symbolic way these Swiss banks ended up obtaining legal peace for the entire nation.

More than thirty class-action lawsuits were filed against fifty-two major German companies and as they proceeded the U.S. government, under the Clinton administration, did something dramatic: Stuart Eizenstat, appointed as special representative, and Ambassador Lambsdorff, in negotiations with the Germans, put together what they called the “big tent” and lumped all the claimants together and worked to bring closure to what they called the financial books of World War II at the end of the twentieth century. They met their so-called Millennium Deadline and settlement occurred by the end of 1998 or 1999, with payments not only going to survivors and heirs, but to Jewish and non-Jewish slaves and laborers, with part of the settlement going to a “future fund,” to be used for Holocaust education and recognition of other genocides. President Clinton went to Germany and signed the Berlin Accords, where both side recognized a “legal peace,” meaning that no further claims arising out of World War II could be made against German companies or the government.

Failure of Japanese compensation efforts

Concurrently with this, lawsuits began to be filed against Japanese companies by American and other POWs who felt they were also entitled to compensation, and Eizenstat was called in to see if these claims could be successfully settled under the “big tent,” but it was a complete failure; the Japanese government did not send in a representative, and Eizenstat reported that the Japanese companies were not interested in discussing settlement. The lawsuits were eventually dismissed under the terms of the 1951 treaty. It is notable, however, that in the German case where there was litigation against German companies, those lawsuits were also dismissed, but the Germans did not walk away from the negotiating table—they realized they had a larger problem and were looking for a resolution with a sense of justice.

The total of the German fund was $5.2 billion, which boiled down to, for example, $5,000 for a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz. But what the recipients of these funds talked about wasn’t the money—it was the letter of apology from the German president,
which came with each check. To them, this was very important.

There was a lawsuit filed by a “comfort woman,” Joo v. Japan. Lawsuits filed against foreign countries in the United States come under the foreign sovereign immunity act, which states that a foreign country is immune from litigation in American courts unless the litigation is under an exception to sovereign immunity, the most common exception being that of commercial activity. The reasoning is that a foreign country should not have immunity if it is not acting as a government, or is acting as a private trader in a commercial marketplace. In this case the lawyers in Washington DC took the ingenious route that prostitution was done in a commercial marketplace, and thus Japan should not have immunity. The judges ultimately ruled against the lawsuit and said that this was a political question.

An expert at an American University noted that the compensation issue is coming back to the United States in local industrial projects, even here in California; and the French national railroad company, for instance, has to come clean about its role in transporting Jews. Also, regarding German colonial reconciliation, there was a project in the early 2000s between Germany and Namibia, where the German government paid compensation under something called the Initiative for Reconciliation.

The problem of forming a regional identity

A Chinese expert asked why certain collective or regional identities have more lasting power than others. For example, Yugoslavia had a collective identity that worked for several decades, then collapsed into chaos; now the EU has a much-praised identity. He had two recommendations along the lines of regional identity. First, East Asian history should be taught as regional history; Korea also does this, but China and Japan should, too. Second, Korean president Park Guen-Hye suggested trilateral joint historical research. This is probably premature as such organs give expectation of a quick fix. There is room, however, for a regional forum. He noted that there is a German precedent that can be borrowed—the German Historical Institute, a German state-sponsored institution with the purpose of reconciling with former belligerent World War II countries. No East Asian country would likely be in a position to do the same, but perhaps a regional institution could be considered.

An American expert asked a question about the German situation. It seems like a sense of victimhood has emerged in the last decade or so related to bombings like that of Dresden and the suffering at the end of the war, and postwar. Has this entered into textbooks?

He responded to the Chinese expert’s idea of historians exchanging and working on the history of World War II in Asia, going into detail about a history project begun by Harvard University’s Ezra Vogel and involving senior scholars from China and Japan, and some from the United States as brokers. During the project there were times of tension, but ultimately the scholars’ ability to work together in a joint project grew. The critical aspect of this effort is that it wasn’t a government-run project.

The American expert referred back to the prior discussant’s mention of the need for multiple pathways and noted that, as most of the participants knew, there is a serious Confucian revival taking place in China. This is, of course, an interesting connection with Korea and Japan as well. This rise of Confucianism could in fact present a different kind of pathway, one that could bring together intellectuals talking about reconciliation in a very different way.

A Korean expert talked about academic arguments that the colonial behavior of Germans during World War II was not different from their colonial behavior, so this continuity of behavior has become a new discourse; and the atmosphere in Germany regarding research of this issue is very self-reflective. It is important, he said, to look at war history in connection with colonialism.

Broadening networks beyond the three nations

The Korean expert also called for a broader international network—not limited to Korea, China, and Japan—in addressing history issues. He gave the example of the organization created by Korean women called the “Women’s Six-Party Talks,” created after the North Korean nuclear problem emerged. While they were not truly six-party talks because North Korean women have never taken part, they have been invited, and have been provided with reports on the meetings. While the tangible results from efforts like these may be negligible, the network has an accre-
tionary effect that can help in creating an environment for trilateral cooperation.

Changing ideas on reconciliation in Japan
A Japanese expert referred back to the mention of post-World War II history in East Asia during the 1950s and ’60s, noting that this was the time when Japan was most concerned about its conduct during the war; the nation reflected on its conduct from the 1950s through to the 1970s, but this was unfortunately during a period that Japan did not have much interaction with other East Asian nations. Thus this reflection only took place among Japanese intellectuals. The expert then shared some information about Japanese reparation issues. It was possible in the past for a private party to file a lawsuit against Japan, and in face some Koreans and Chinese won such suits against the Japanese government. But during the period 2005–8 the Japanese Supreme Court changed their interpretations of the Japan-China Joint Declaration of 1972 and the Japan-ROK Basic Relations Treaty of 1965, and thus the right of private parties to sue the Japanese government was cancelled. The Japanese judiciary no longer functions as a place of reconciliation.

The Japanese expert made a final point about how reconciliation was about what victims want from aggressors. Only when victims change their minds from “never forget” to “forgive” can there be reconciliation. He then wondered how France has reconciled its roles as both a victim (of Germany) and a perpetrator (against its colonies, such as Algeria). How did France deal with this paradox?

The advantages of reconciling with past history
An expert at an American university noted that it has been asserted that Germany’s best export commodity was its ability to come to terms with its past history, thus opening the door for it to have a new relationship with other countries and freeing it from identifying so much with its Nazi past. Symbolic political gestures are not simply lessons just for global consumption—first and foremost are the domestic audiences. In the case of Germany, as many other Germans were killed by Germans as were Poles and other nationals. The Allies allowed Germans to conduct war crime trials addressing these issues before the Allies’ own war crime trials began to be held. What has not happened in East Asia, espe-

cially in the Korean and Chinese cases, is that they have not come to terms with being both victims and perpetrators.

A Korean expert echoed a previous discussant’s note that Korean high school students now study a generalized East Asian history course, and pointed out that his foundation had also funded a textbook called East Asia from the European Perspective. But still there is no comprehensive textbook that deals appropriately with Korean-Japanese relations, Korean-Chinese relations, Chinese-Japanese relations of the postwar era, etc. He also referred back to a previous discussant’s mention of European compensation and urged that a joint Korean-Japanese foundation create a mechanism that could compensate postwar issues like treatment for comfort women under a so-called big umbrella.

Whither an Asian collective identity?
A Chinese expert conceded a certain jealousy of the German situation, since after World War II the Germans had a clear recognition of history, while East Asia was not able to overcome obstacles to this goal. In Europe many identify themselves as Europeans, but very few Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans self-identify as Asians. In 2011 we commemorated the hundredth anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution. When Sun Yat-sen began the movement, there was much support from other Asians and there was an Asian consciousness. We need to reflect, he said, on why we had this a hundred years ago, but don’t have it today.

A Chinese expert noted that to date the main cooperation among the three East Asian countries has been in the realm of economics. History has been overlooked, and he hoped for funding to allow for personnel exchange programs. Such a program exists between China and Korea, but not between China and Japan, and perhaps TCS could help here. We also need large-scale student exchanges for the purpose of reconciliation, which requires funding support. And finally, media exchanges are also needed, as media plays a huge role in influencing students’ minds.
The Dialogue concluded with discussion of some practical proposals for reconciliation on history issues that could be considered by all the countries in the region, as well as by academic experts in the United States and Europe. The key recommendations to emerge from the Dialogue are detailed below.

Supplementary Teaching Materials
Based on Stanford’s “Divided Memories” supplemental curriculum unit, create a supplementary teaching publication comparing the treatment of the wartime period in the textbooks of China, Japan, South Korea and the United States. One approach would be to produce something on the scale of the “Divided Memories” unit itself, which covers the entire range of subject matter. A second approach, favored by many participants, would be to reduce the scope of the supplemental material by focusing on 2–3 themes. This could take the form of an easy-to-read pamphlet in three languages. Themes could include the Nanjing massacre, the atomic bombing of Japanese cities, and “comfort women” or, more broadly, forced labor.

Ongoing History Dialogues
Create an ongoing history dialogue. There are two possible formats for such a dialogue. One would be to confine the dialogue to historians from the region, with supplementary participation by American and European historians. Such a dialogue could focus on specific historical events or on a broad theme, such as collaboration or a theater of war. The second possible format would be to create a broader international dialogue, for example with more European participation. It could take place in the region or also outside of it (including returning to Stanford). For example, a dialogue session could be held in Europe with the goal of holding a comparative discussion of the European and Asian experiences.

Educational Forums
Set up educational forums in which history scholars present views on historical events to journalists, politicians, and college students. One proposal was to focus more on educational sessions with media, including editors and reporters, from print, broadcast and online media. Scholars could make presentations to them on the results of comparative research on textbooks, historical research on specific events, and efforts at reconciliation. This could be done on a country-by-country basis, but ideally would bring together media from all three countries and perhaps also from the United States and Europe.

Exchanges among Museum Narrative Scholars
Establish a dialogue among museum directors and those who create the narratives for museums dealing with wartime issues, including exchanges with museum personnel in the United States and Europe. One suggested goal might be to create a model museum promoting reconciliation.

Large-scale Student Exchanges
Fund and promote large-scale exchanges among middle and high school students during academic breaks. These could be modeled on the Franco-German student exchanges, i.e., incorporating a clear educational element and not just tourism.
About the Participants

Michael Armacost is the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He graduated with a bachelor’s degree from Carleton College as well as a master’s and doctorate in public law and government from Columbia University. He began his professional life as an instructor of government at Pomona College in 1962. Armacost entered the State Department in 1969 as a White House Fellow, and remained in public service for twenty-four years. During that time he held sensitive international security positions in the State Department, Defense Department, and the National Security Council. These included Ambassador to the Philippines from 1982 to 1984, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 1984 to 1989, and Ambassador to Japan from 1989 to 1993. Armacost subsequently served as president of the Brookings Institution from 1995 to 2002.

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Michael Bazley is a leading authority on the use of American and European courts to redress genocide and other historical wrongs. Bazley is Professor of Law and The “1939” Club Law Scholar in Holocaust and Human Rights Studies at Chapman University School of Law in Orange, California. He is also a research fellow at the Holocaust Education Trust in London; and the holder of previous fellowships at Harvard Law School and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. He is the author of the book Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts (New York University Press, 2003), contributor of chapters to various books on genocide and the law, and the co-editor with Roger Alford of Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and Its Legacy (New York University Press, 2006).

Chen Feng is Deputy Secretary-General at the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. He was born in 1974 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China in 1995. He earned his BA from the Foreign Languages School of Shandong University. He served as Deputy Director for Border Affairs (2005–07), Deputy Director and Director for South Asia Affairs (2010–13) at the Asian Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1999 to 2002, and from 2007 to 2009, he was posted at the Chinese Embassy in Nepal, and at the Chinese Embassy in Malaysia.
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Karl Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and is a Distinguished Fellow with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011 and had a thirty-five-year career in the United States Army, retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. His military assignments included postings with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan as the Commander of the American-led Coalition forces from 2005–07. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, has earned master’s degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and Stanford University in political science, was awarded an Interpreter’s Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office, and earned an advanced degree in Chinese history from Nanjing University.

Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2004–05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–94), and chief of the China Division (1986–89). Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history, 1968), and Stanford University (MA, 1969 and PhD, 1977, both in political science).
Ha Young-Sun is Chairman of the Board of Trustees, East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Professor Ha is also a member of the President’s national security advisory panel (2013–). He was co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era (2008–12); and member of President’s foreign affairs and security advisory panel (2008–12). He received both his BA and MA from Seoul National University, and received his PhD in international politics from University of Washington. His published books include; *Editorials by Ha Young-Sun* (2012) and *Young Pioneers in Korean History* (2011). He also edited many books including *Beyond the Trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula* (2014), *Toward 2020: Ten Agenda’s for South Korea’s Foreign Policy* (2013), *The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement* (2010), *The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century* (2010), *East Asian Community: Myth and Reality* (2008), and *Korea’s Grand Strategy for a New Century: Weaving a Network State* (2006).

Iwatani Shigeo is the Secretary-General of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. He was born in 1950 in Kochi, Japan, and joined the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973. He studied law at Hitotsubashi University. He was involved in China related issues during his terms as Minister to the Embassy of Japan in China, in charge of cultural affairs (1996–98), and as Director for Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office at the Cabinet Office (2002–04). His latest posts include Consul-General of Japan in Honolulu (2005–07), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Kenya (2007–10) and Austria (2010–13).

Kawashima Shin, majored in Chinese Studies at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and obtained a MA and PhD in history from the University of Tokyo. He has taught at the Department of Politics, Faculty of Law, Hokkaido University (1998–2006), and at the Department of International Relations, the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, the University of Tokyo (2006–). He currently serves as a senior research fellow, IIPS, deputy director of CSIS-NIKKEI Virtual Thinktank, and co-editor, Nippon.com. In 2004, he was awarded the Suntory Academic Prize for his book *Chugoku Kindai Gaiko no Keisei* (The Formation of Chinese Modern Diplomacy). He has published many books, including *Kindaihokka he no Mosaku 1894–1925* (Exploring for Modern State in China 1894–1925), *Gurobalru Chugoku he no Dotei: Gaiko 150 nen* (co-author, The Road to the Global China: its Diplomacy in 150 Years) and *Nittai Kankeishi: 1945–2008* (co-author, The History of the Relations between Japan and Taiwan, 1945–2008).

David M. Kennedy is Professor of History Emeritus at Stanford University, where he has taught for more than forty years. Graduating seniors have four times elected him Class Day speaker and he has received the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching and the Hoagland Prize for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching. His book, *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945*, won the Pulitzer Prize for History in 2000. He has been a visiting professor at Oxford University and the University of Florence, Italy, and has lectured on American history in more than a dozen countries. His most recent book is *The Modern American Military* (Oxford University Press, 2013).
Simone Lässig’s research interests include educational media research, and German, European and Jewish history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She earned her PhD and postdoctoral lecturing qualification in history at the University of Dresden, Germany, and has worked as a research fellow at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC. Since 2006, she has been director of the Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research located in Braunschweig, Germany, where she also teaches modern history. Professor Lässig has published a number of books, articles, and essays on the history of European textbook dialogue as part of a history of reconciliation in Europe after 1945, and on joint history textbook projects, collective memories of the holocaust, religion in the context of modernity in the United States and Germany, and other associated topics. She is the editor of the peer-reviewed *Journal for Educational Media, Memory, and Society (JEMMS)* and of the academic series “Eckert,” both of which publish scholarly works in the field of or related to educational media research. In addition to coordinating various research and transfer projects such as the joint German-Polish history textbook for schools, Simone Lässig is a member of numerous committees, academic advisory councils and associations, including the German UNESCO commission, the German Research Foundation (DFG), and the Max Weber Foundation—International Humanities. She is also the spokeswoman for the German Association of Historians’ subcommittee on “Historical Science in the Digital World.” In 2013, she was nominated for inclusion in the AcademiaNet Expert Database of Outstanding Female Scientists and Scholars.

Lee Jong-heon is a Deputy Secretary-General of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat. He was born in 1956 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea in 1988. He received his BA from the College of Law, Seoul National University and LL.M. Degree from the George Washington University Law School. From 2000 to 2006, he served as Advisor to the Minister for Trade, Director of Education and Training at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security and Director of Treaty Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also assigned to National Security Council and Protocol Office to the President. From 2010 to 2012 he was assigned as Minister-Counsellor at the Korean Embassy in Germany.

Stephen MacKinnon was trained in Chinese Studies at Yale and University of California, Davis, MacKinnon is a emeritus professor of history and former Director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University. Besides dozens of academic articles and book chapters, he is the author of *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China* (1981); *China Reporting: An Oral History of American Journalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (1987); *Agnes Smedley: Life and Times of an American Radical* (1988); *Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and Making of Modern China* (2008)—all published by University of California Press. Both *China Reporting* . . and *Agnes Smedley* . . have been widely translated. Between 1979 and 1981 and again in 1985, he worked as an expert for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, teaching and editing translations from Chinese to English. Research grants include American Council of Learned Societies, Committee on Scholarly Communication with China (1991), Pacific Cultural Foundation, and American Institute of Indian Studies (2003), Fulbright-Hays, ACLS-CSGG, and Nanjing Hopkins Center for Research in China (2005–06). He was in India lecturing on China with
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**Gary Mukai** is the director of the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE). Prior to joining SPICE in 1988, he was a teacher in Japan and in California public schools for ten years. Gary’s academic interests include curriculum and instruction, educational equity, and teacher professional development. He received a bachelor of arts in psychology from UC Berkeley; a multiple subjects teaching credential from the Black, Asian, Chicano Urban Program, UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Education; a master of arts in international development education from Stanford University’s Graduate School of Education; and a doctorate in education from the Leadership in Educational Equity Program, UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Education. His curricular writings for U.S. schools include extensive work on China, Japan, Korea, U.S.–Asian relations, and the Asian-American experience, and he has conducted numerous teacher professional development seminars nationally and internationally, including Korea, China, and Japan. In 1996, at the invitation of the Consulate General of Japan, San Francisco, Gary was an invited speaker at the “10th Anniversary of the Japan Exchange and Teaching Program,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. In 2009, at the invitation of the Academy of Korean Studies, Seoul, Gary was an invited speaker at the “Reflections and Prospects of the Understanding Korea Projects” conference. In 2013, at the invitation of the Nanjing Foreign Languages School, China, Gary was an invited speaker at the “International Forum on the Power and Possibilities of Liberal Arts Education.”

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**Gi-Wook Shin** is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; the founding director of the Korean Studies Program; a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and a professor of sociology, all at Stanford University. As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, and international relations. Shin is the author/editor of sixteen books and numerous articles, the most recent including *Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia*.
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Kathleen Stephens recently completed thirty-five years as a career diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service. She was Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in 2012, and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, 2008 to 2011. Ambassador Stephens graduated from Prescott College and holds a master’s degree from Harvard University, along with a honorary doctoral degrees from Chungnam National University and the University of Maryland. Ambassador Stephens has served in numerous posts in Washington, Asia, and Europe. From 2005 to 2007 she was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP). While Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) from 2003 to 2005, she focused on post-conflict and stabilization issues in the Balkans. She was Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration.

Ambassador Stephens received the 2009 Presidential Meritorious Service Award. Other awards and recognition include the Korean government’s Sejong Cultural Prize (2013), and in 2011 the Pacific Century Institute’s Building Bridges Award, the Outstanding Achievement Award from the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, and the Kwanghwa Medal of Diplomatic Merit from the Korean government. Her book, Reflections of an American Ambassador to Korea, based on her Korean-language blog, was published in 2010.

David Straub has served as associate director of Stanford University’s Korean Studies Program (KSP) in Shorenstein APARC since 2008. In 2007–08, he was a Pantech Fellow at KSP. Now an educator and commentator on current Northeast Asian affairs, Straub retired in 2006 from the U.S. Department of State as a senior foreign service officer after a thirty-year career focused on Northeast Asian
affairs. His work there included over twelve years on Korean affairs beginning in 1978. He served as head of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002, and he played a key working-level role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program as the State Department’s Korea country desk director from 2002 to 2004. He also served eight years at the U.S. embassy in Japan. His final assignment was as the State Department’s Japan country desk director from 2004 to 2006, when he was co-leader of the U.S. delegation to talks with Japan on the realignment of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of U.S. military bases in Japan. Immediately after leaving the Department of State, Straub taught U.S.-Korean relations at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in the fall of 2006 and at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University in spring 2007. He has published a number of papers on U.S.-Korean relations. His foreign languages are Korean, Japanese, and German.

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