



CENTER ON DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT,
AND THE RULE OF LAW

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**EVALUATING INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON DEMOCRATIC
DEVELOPMENT**

***Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Transitions:
Research Guide for Case Study Authors***

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INTRODUCTION

This document provides authors participating in the research project “*Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development*” with a shared, coherent and substantive framework to guide the research and writing of their individual case study reports.

Achieving the project’s goal of producing two dozen structured and focused comparative case studies from across the world requires that each and every case study conform to a shared analytical framework and writing format. Tackling such a mammoth intellectual and logistical challenge necessitates a high degree of research and writing discipline. The purpose of this guide, therefore, is to provide the common structure necessary for case study research and writing.

The guide is divided into 4 consecutive sections, and your report should parallel this four section structure:

Section 1: defines the outcome to be explained. For this volume, the dependent variable is transition to democracy (or the lack thereof).

Section 2: lists the range of potential domestic variables responsible for the outcome under consideration, articulated as questions. For this volume on transitions, this section examines first the set of possible precipitants that helped to trigger (or perhaps came close to triggering) a democratic transition or breakthrough. Second, this section will also examine any possible longer term or structural factors that may have influenced the precipitants.

Section 3: lists the range of potential external variables affecting domestic change For this volume on transitions, Section 3 examines the set of possible external factors that influenced or could have influenced the set of domestic variables responsible for triggering (or coming close to triggering) a democratic transition or breakthrough. This section should also include any external factors that may have influenced longer term or structural factors that in turn influenced the precipitants.

Section 4: lists potential modes of interaction between domestic and external variables, in order to get as close as possible to establishing causal links.

In each of the four sections below, we list potential influences on your observed outcome (transition) as questions. Please address fully all those that are relevant in your case. We realize that not all questions are relevant to all cases, but have mapped out what we think is the range of potential relevant factors. Of course if you identify one or more that are not covered here, please address them in your case study.

SECTION 1: DEFINING TRANSITIONAL SUCCESS OR FAILURE

Define the outcome of your case – a successful democratic transition or democratic breakthrough, or a near success but ultimate failure.

Following O'Donnell and Schmitter, we define transition in this project as “the interval between one political regime and another.” We also include in our scope of analysis instances of democratic breakthrough, that is cases in which a pivotal moment or set of events qualitatively transformed the regime from non-democracy to, at least, minimal electoral democracy. We understand failure to mean that the old autocrat was challenged but remained in power or while the old autocrat may have been ousted, a new autocrat rather than democrat was installed as leader.

What do you consider to be the moment of transition or failed transition?

What is the time period of transition for your case?

Why was this moment definitive? For example, was there international recognition of the new regime? Did members of the old regime die or resign or otherwise publicly recognize defeat?

SECTION 2: DOMESTIC VARIABLES MOST IMPORTANT IN EXPLAINING TRANSITION OR BREAKTHROUGH/ OR FAILED TRANSITION/BREAKTHROUGH

The number of possible domestic variables is large and it is impossible to fully catalogue an exhaustive list. Accordingly, please treat the following as a general guide. If you identify a significant domestic variable that we have not accounted for (a distinct possibility) please make sure to include it in the analysis.

At this stage in what we take to be accepted wisdom regarding transitions, the field has not yet arrived (and maybe never will arrive) at a unified theory about transitions. We therefore are asking all case study authors to probe the full list of factors that might have triggered a transition to democracy (or came close to triggering democratization, but ultimately failed to do so.) We separate these into two subcategories: Proximate causes and more long-term or structural factors.

			Yes/No - comments
A		Long term, structural factors	
	1	i What type of autocracy existed before the immediate period of (possible) transition? (a monarchy, communist regime, authoritarian, military dictatorship etc?) Was the regime completely authoritarian, competitive-authoritarian or other?	
		ii Were there earlier, previous attempts at democratic transition in the country? If so, when? What was the outcome of any previous attempts (complete failure, partial failure, success followed by breakdown)? What legacy, if at all, did any previous attempt at transition leave?	
	2	i What was the level of economic development (as measured by GDP per capita, and human development index rating) at the time of (attempted) transition?	
		ii What was the structure of the economy? Was it largely agrarian or industrialized? Was it resource dependent? What percentage of the economy was state owned, if you think this is relevant?	
	3	What was the dominant class structure at the point of transition? Was there a landed aristocracy? Was there a poor working agrarian and/or industrial class?	
	4	Was the state a strong or weak one ? What was the governing or capacity of the state at the time of (attempted) transition? For example, was the state still able to provide vital public goods and services like health care or social welfare/poverty relief? What was the strength of the military? Was it united? Divided? Loyal to the old regime? Did it have strong ties to any particular factions within either the old regime or opposition forces?	
	5	Were there any other long-term, structural or systemic factors that led up to or materially affected the transitional moment?	

B			Short term, precipitating factors	
	1		Weakening of the Existing Autocratic Regime: What precipitated the weakening of the existing regime?	
		i	Was there an economic crisis?	
		ii	Were there falling rates of economic growth?	
		iii	Did a long serving autocratic leader die?	
		iv	Was there a defeat in external or internal war?	
		v	Did decolonization trigger the regime transition?	
		vi	Was there a split between the leaders, institutions, or groups within the existing autocratic regime? How did this originate?	
		vii	Was there mass protest as a consequence of an extraordinary event or scandal (revelation of corruption, acts of violence against dissidents etc)?	
		viii	Did the popularity/legitimacy decrease appreciably right before the transition moment? If so, why and how? What issues were involved?	
		ix	Which institutions helped to bring attention to the faults/weaknesses of the autocratic regime? (For instance, did the media expose corruption in the autocratic regime? Were non-governmental organizations responsible or helpful in doing the same thing? Did an independent electoral commission expose fraudulent results? Did the courts play an independent role at a critical juncture?)	
	2		Was there an organized opposition pushing for regime change?	
		i	If so, was it an elite group/s? (What main elite group/s participated in the opposition? Was there a coalition and if so, which leaders, parties, or classes comprised the coalition?)	
		ii	Did it involve mass mobilization? (How was it accomplished? What issues were important for mobilization? What technologies were used for mobilization? For example, were strikes, street demonstrations, or acts of civil disobedience used? For example, were pamphlets, radio or text messaging a way in which crowds were mobilized if this was an element of transition in your country case? Did the opposition use the internet - either websites or email campaigns - effectively?)	
		iii	Was the opposition movement united ideologically? In particular, were there some supporters of a regime type besides democracy?	
		iv	Was the leadership of the opposition comprised of new leaders or experienced leaders formerly members of the old regime?	
		v	Did the opposition use violence as one of its methods for weakening the ancien regime?	
		vi	Did the opposition control territory before the transition?	

		vii	Did civil society make up or support the opposition? (What were the formal and informal ties, if any, between leaders challenging the old regime and political and civil society? Was the period of transition preceded by a general increase in civil society development? If so, which sectors of civil society were most developed and/or most involved in working towards regime change? What was the relationship between political opposition pushing for regime change and civil society more generally?)	
		viii	Did religious organizations play an opposition role? If so describe.	
		ix	Did big business, merchants, professionals, organized labor or other economic group play an opposition role?	
		x	Was there a degree of media freedom prior to transition? What was the role of the media in precipitating the transition? Was it free or partly free? Did it play a role in mobilizing otherwise non-mobilized elements of civil society? What role, if any, did new media, blogs, internet, text messaging, etc., play in mobilizing mass population and/or civil society?	
	3		Who Wins and Who Loses in the Transition? Pacts and Old Elites	
		i	Is the third wave pacting literature relevant in your case? That is, was there a negotiated end to the autocratic regime?	
		ii	If so, who participated and who was excluded?	
		iii	Were any of the old regime elites co-opted?	
		iv	What role, if any, did intermediaries play?	
		v	Were any institutions of the old regime protected/kept during the transition? If so, which ones and why?	
		vi	Were the property rights of the old regime stakeholders protected?	
		vii	Were the borders of the state an issue in the negotiations over a pacted transition?	
		viii	What happened to losers in the transition? Were any killed or jailed? Was there some form of purge, lustration or were agents of the old regime put on trial? What happened to those serving in the bureaucracies of the old regime? What about those who dominated the private sector (if relevant)?	
		ix	If pacts were not involved, what was the mode of transition? Did the autocratic leadership exit peacefully? Did the opposition forces remain united during the transition moment, or did they fight among themselves in the process of assuming power? What role, if any, did power-wielding actors such as the military, other security forces, or business elites play at this time?	

SECTION 3: EXTERNAL VARIABLE

The scope of possible sources of external influence is enormous and it is impossible to fully catalogue a list of potential factors, actors and types of external influence on domestic political change. Accordingly, please treat the following as a general guide, rather than an exhaustive list of potential relevant sources of influence. If you identify a significant source of external influence that we have not accounted for (a distinct possibility) please make sure to include it in the analysis.

To help organize sources and types of possible external factors, it is useful to think in terms of a “**spectrum of intervention**” in which a range of potential influences are listed in order from the most deliberate, tangible, interventionist, and coercive instruments, to the more intangible, indirect, background, soft forms of possible influence. Categorizing a source of potential influence at a “high” or a “low” point along the spectrum of intervention is not meant to make any kind of judgment about the possible impact of that measure, it is only intended to serve as an aid in mapping sources of potential external influence.

The list of possible influences below is arrayed on a spectrum of hardest or most overt forms of intervention (military or colonial occupation) to least overt or softer forms of intervention (democratic example, contagion and learning). Where relevant, we include reference to particular actors (specific states, UN, EU, OSCE, OAS, etc.) that may have engaged in this type of activity. This is meant as a primer only, it is not an exhaustive list of actors to look at. If another international actor played a role in your case, please address it.

A			Military and / or colonial occupation	
	1	i	Was the country occupied by a foreign army or colonial power? (If so, when and for how long - years, months)	
		ii	Was military or colonial occupation “complete” (did the foreign power occupy and effectively control the entire territory of the country)?	
	2		Did it achieve conditions of security, stability, economic growth; or was it turbulent, violent?	
	3		In case of military, colonial occupation, was overthrowing an existing non-democratic regime and installing a democratic regime in its stead a declared/overt goal of the occupying power? If so, how did the occupying power go about trying to achieve these goals? Was it entirely/partially/not successful?	
B			Paramilitary intervention	
	1		Did any external actor, or actors, practice paramilitary intervention in the country – the support of a faction or rebel group within the country intended to overthrow the existing regime through the proxy use of force (including training, funding, equipping or otherwise)? If so, which faction/rebel group did the external actor/s support? What was the duration, type and scale of the support?	
	2		In case of a paramilitary intervention, was overthrowing an existing non-democratic regime and installing a democratic regime in its stead a declared/overt goal of the external actor/s? If so, how did it go about trying to achieve these goals? Was it	

			entirely/partially/not successful?	
C			Covert military intervention	
	1	i	Did any external actor, or actors,(individual states or international organizations) practice covert military or intelligence intervention intended to overthrow or otherwise weaken an existing regime, or support opposition forces within the country in violent counter-regime activities – including assassination plots or coups?	
		ii	If so, what opposition group/s did the external actor/s support? What was the duration, type and scale of the support? (propaganda, insurgency training, psychological warfare)	
	2		In case of covert intervention, was overthrowing an existing non-democratic regime and installing a democratic regime in its stead a declared/overt goal of the external actor/s? If so, how did it go about trying to achieve these goals? Was it entirely/partially/not successful?	
D			Sanctions: economic, political, diplomatic	
	1	i	Did any external actor impose (at the level of individual states or international organizations like the UN, EU, NATO, etc.), or threaten to impose, economic sanctions (including withdrawing aid, trade sanctions, and embargos) on the country with the declared or undeclared aim of punishing undemocratic acts, encouraging transition to democracy, punishing the turning of a democratic government out of office, or punishing a recumbent government for cheating in elections? If so, which external actor/s participated in threatening or imposing economic sanctioning?	
		ii	What kind of economic sanctions were threatened and/or imposed? Were they focused on specific monitorable goals?	
		iii	How long were sanctions imposed? How economically significant were they?	
		iv	Who was affected by the sanctions (which elements of the regime, state, society) and what was the distribution of costs among them?	
	2	i	Did any external actor (again, individual states or international organizations) threaten to impose or did they impose political or diplomatic sanctions on the country with the declared or undeclared aim of punishing undemocratic acts, encouraging transition to democracy, punishing the turning of a democratic government out of office, or punishing a recumbent government for cheating in elections? If so, which external actor/s participated in threatening and/or imposing sanctions?	
		ii	What kind of political and/or diplomatic sanctions were imposed? Were they focused on specific measurable goals?	
		iii	How long were sanctions imposed? How politically, diplomatically and economically significant were they?	
		iv	Who was affected by the sanctions (which elements of the regime, state, society) and what was the distribution of costs among them?	
	3		How vulnerable was the autocratic government to economic, political or diplomatic sanctions?	

	4		Was the strength of the threat of sanctions or the imposition of sanctions themselves enhanced by the sanctioning actor being the sole or main provider of valued goods (security, trade, political support) to the country? Alternatively, was the credibility or seriousness of the threat of sanctions reduced or mitigated by alternative sources of support?	
	5		Was the credibility of the threat of sanctions or the imposition of sanctions themselves undermined by competing foreign policy priorities of the sanctioning actor (e.g. need for oil, military bases, security cooperation etc.)	
E			Democratic Conditionality*	
	1	i	Has the country been the “target” of democratic conditionality from any external actor (including in the areas of corruption, good governance, human rights, fundamental freedoms etc.)?	
		ii	If so, by which actor?	
		iii	What incentives (punishments/rewards) were offered? For what changes?	
	2	i	Where conditionality was applied, was it diffuse and/or applied sporadically, or was it intense and continuous?	
		ii	Did conditionality evolve over time? If so how? Did the conditions increase or decrease over time?	
	3	i	Where conditionality was applied what were the speed and size of rewards (threat of punishment)?	
		ii	How did the speed and size of rewards (threat of punishment) compare to the size of domestic adoption costs?	

* We understand conditionality in general to mean that an individual state or a particular international organization grants valued tangible or intangible benefits (e.g. political or financial support, trade links, market access, security guarantees, membership in a desirable organization – such as the WTO or EU) to a target state based on the fulfillment of certain conditions by the target state. “Democratic conditionality,” therefore, refers to a specific type of conditionality that is meant to directly or indirectly protect or promote democracy. Conditionality can be punitive (i.e. if you do not do X, we will do negative Y), in which case it is similar to the threat of sanctions (see section 3.D above), but more commonly is positive, involving the granting or withholding of benefits (a carrot rather than a stick). Conditionality is used to exert direct or indirect leverage on a target government, with the intention of changing the “domestic equilibrium” – the existing distribution of preferences and bargaining power in domestic society. Conditionality can work through two different pathways: (1) top-down: it can work directly on the target government to change its cost/benefit analysis regarding the taking of certain steps or refraining from taking such steps. The assumption is that the target government calculates whether the benefits of the reward (or avoiding of punishment) outweigh the domestic adjustment costs involved in complying with the external condition. Or (2) bottom-up: conditionality can work indirectly, through the differential empowerment of domestic actors (change agents/no-change agents) and/or constraining the actions of other domestic actors. Pro-democracy conditionality, therefore, changes the domestic opportunity structure in favor of reformists, by strengthening their bargaining power vis-à-vis their non-democratic opponents if government and society. In both cases conditionality follows a “logic of consequence.” This cost-benefit balance can be shaped by four main factors: (1) the size of adoption/compliance costs in the domestic system; (2) the size and speed of rewards (or punishments); (3) the credibility of threats and promises; and (4) the determinacy of the conditions imposed.

		iii	Were the rewards promised sufficiently big to cause a real change in the domestic equilibrium, either top-down or bottom-up?	
	4	i	Was democratic conditionality credible? In particular: (1) Did the actor making the conditions have superior bargaining power compared to the target government? (2) Was the external actor imposing the conditions able to withhold granting rewards at no or little cost to itself? (3) Did the target government have any real alternatives to the rewards offered by the external actor (either from its own resources or from an alternative external actor)? (4) How certain could the target government be that the reward would in fact be delivered (or that the threat would be acted upon)?	
F			Linkage, integration, convergence**	
	1		Geographical linkage: To what countries and regions is the country geographically proximate?	
	2		Political/diplomatic linkage: At the time of (attempted) transition, what, if any, were the country's main political and security ties to foreign governments, alliances, regional or international organizations? What were the main treaties or other legal regimes the country was party to?	
	3		Economic linkage: At the time of (attempted) transition, what, if any, were the country's main trade, investment, credit, and bilateral/multilateral aid links? What, if any, were its main cross-border economic activities? Were there any transnational corporations involved in pro-democratic activities in the country (including advocacy, funding, training, facilitating transnational networks etc.)?	
	4		Social/cultural linkage: What, if any, were the country's main modes of social and cultural interactions with the external world – particularly sources of migration into	

** Linkage refers to the density of economic, political, institutional, social and infrastructural (communication, transportation, media) ties between the country and external actors (states, regional or global organizations, trade systems etc.). We hypothesize that extensive linkage to democratic and economically liberal actors could facilitate democratic change in the country, whereas weak linkage creates “a more permissive international environment,” which does not contribute as much to democratization, or may in fact hamper it. Indeed you should give equal weight to the possibility of “negative linkage” – i.e. economic, political, institutional, social and communication ties between the country and external actors that stifle democratic change.

Related to the concept of linkage, but narrower and more precise are the concepts of “integration” and “convergence.” Integration is the fuller, more formal of the two, and refers to official entry of a country into a regional (or exceptionally global) political, economic or security community, membership in which may entail a host of democracy promotion mechanisms (from requirements to adopt specific institutions and rules, to monitoring and official sanctioning for violation of democratic principles). Leading examples of such “democratic integration” would include membership in the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD and OAS. Like “linkage”, however, integration may hamper or prevent democratization, where the country integrates into political, economic or security community which is non or anti-democratic (for example the now defunct Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).

The term “convergence” can include integration as defined above but also refers to a wider, less complete forms of incorporation (such as association and partial inclusion). Convergence involves different degrees of movement towards conformity with a pre-existing “anchor” (which can be an absolutely or relatively powerful state, a regional organization, or, theoretically, even a global community).

Linkage, integration and convergence may occur through two main tracks: (1) through deliberate “rational” decision-making by the country's governmental and state elites, based on cost-benefit bargaining; and/or (2) through processes of social induction, learning and embedded rationalism.

		the country, educational and cultural links, tourism and diaspora communities links?	
	5	Technological and communications linkage: At the time of (attempted) transition, what, if any, were the country's main technological and communication links – particularly the degree of cross-border radio, television, and internet penetration and coverage?	
	6	Civil society linkage: At the time of (attempted) transition, what, if any, were the main ties between civil society organizations in the country, and NGOs, party organizations, advocacy and religious groups abroad? What, if any were the main transnational networks and epistemic communities in which civil society actors in the country involved?	
	7	Integration: At the time of (attempted) transition, in what regional and/or global organizations, if any, was the country a full member?	
	8	Convergence: At the time of (attempted) transition, in what regional and/or global organizations, if any, did the country have observer status, association or any other form of “partial inclusion”?	
	G	Monitoring, reporting	
	1	Prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition, was the country subject to occasional or regular international elections monitoring? If so, who carried out the monitoring of elections? (UN, OSCE, EU, IFES etc.)	
	2	Prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition were the country's political or human rights conditions subject to occasional or regular monitoring and reporting by one or more international organization, state, NGO or other external actor? (e.g. UN conventions reports, U.S. State Department Human Rights reports, EU, Council of Europe or OSCE reports, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, other human rights groups) If so, how many external actors monitor and reported on conditions? Which ones? What details were included in the reports? Were their findings made public? Or were they delivered to the target country's government / NGOs only?	
	H	Democracy financial and technical assistance****	
	1	Prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition, was the country the recipient of official development aid? If so, who were the main donors (IMF, World Bank, regional development banks, USAID, EU Commission, the UK's DFID, Japan, Canada, Australia or other national government agencies, intergovernmental regional or international organizations)? How much? (please specify figure amounts and breakdown wherever possible)	
	2	Prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition, was the country the recipient of non-official aid (by individuals, private foundations (Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Soros Foundation etc.), semi-governmental foundations (such as NDI, IRI, NED, Westminster Foundation or the German Party Foundations), corporations, foreign or international NGOs etc.)? If so, who are the main donors? How much? (please	

**** The use of official, foundation and private development or aid funds to support government, civil society or mass democratic development constitutes the most common and well know instrument of democracy promotion (or “democracy assistance”).

		specify figure amounts and breakdown wherever possible)	
	3	What sectors and activities were funded by official and unofficial donors identified above? (electoral monitoring aid, political party development, constitutional/legislative/standards assistance, regulatory agencies development, rule of law, judiciary/courts, legal aid, civil-military relations, decentralization/local government aid, NGO building, civil education, media/press building, labor union building, women empowerment/advocacy, minority group empowerment/advocacy, fundamental freedoms advocacy etc.)	
	4	What sectors and activities were prioritized, in terms of spending, and which ones were either deemphasized or not funded? Where did funds go? Macro/micro economic reform, government institutions, security forces, other state institutions? Civil society: a small group of NGOs, a broad range of NGOs, other? (please provide figures and sources wherever possible).	
	5	Prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition, was the country the recipient of official technical assistance (including secondment of foreign nationals – e.g. the EU’s “Twinning” program)? If so, what sectors and activities were funded? By whom? On what scale?	
	6	Prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition, was the country the recipient of unofficial technical assistance from NGOs, foreign universities, or corporations for example)? If so, what sectors and activities were funded? By whom? On what scale?	
I		Diplomacy, normative pressure and persuasion	
	1	Looking at the causes of the particular democratic outcome you are examining, were there any important diplomatic, peer pressure or other form of social persuasion interventions involved just prior to or at the time of (attempted) transition?	
	2	If so, what happened? (What form of verbal pressure/interaction) Were domestic decision-maker persuaded or shamed by an external actor or set of actors? Did domestic decision-makers seek the personal approval of any external leader, form a friendship with that leader or fear their disapproval (for non-material reasons)? Why did a particular norm/change of policy resonate with domestic decision makers?	
J		Democratic example, contagion and learning	
	1	Was the political outcome you are examining inspired by events in another, possibly neighboring country? If so how?	
	2	Do elites or the mass population consciously imitate/borrow institutional and legal models from abroad?	
	3	Do elites or the mass population interact with a substantial diaspora community (e.g. the Armenian or Georgian communities living in the US may influence elite and popular political culture in Armenia or Georgia, respectively)	

SECTION 4: POSSIBLE MODES OF INTERACTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL VARIABLES

Interactions between domestic and external variables are varied and complex. Several may be occurring at the same time or in sequence, and some forms of interaction (such as “epistemic communities” and “transnational networks” of activists) defy dichotomous internal-external characterization. The purpose of this section, therefore, is not to elaborate an exhaustive list of possible internal-external modes of interaction, but to guide structured research and writing, by outlining major potential ways in which domestic (section II) and external variables (section III) may be understood to interact.

Four such categories are outlined below: (1) “Control”; (2) “External Incentives”; (3) “International Socialization”; and (4) “Lesson Drawing”. Some categories contain issues (such as “top down” versus “bottom up” pathways of influence) that may be relevant to one or more additional categories – so you should be able to adapt questions and apply them in different categories, where appropriate. At the beginning of each category a short explanation is given for the theoretical assumptions underlying each suggested mode of interaction and its main characteristics. This is followed by a series of questions. The fundamental purpose of this section is to encourage thinking about modes of domestic-internal interactions in a manner that will bring us as close as possible to establishing causal links - or lack thereof - between internal-external factors of democratic change. If the suggested categories do not fit your case, please do not hesitate to supplement or otherwise deviate from them, as they are meant as a suggestive guide only.

A			Control⁺	
	1		Was the country directly controlled by a foreign power or alliance of powers (occupation, colonialism, international trusteeship) which dictated de jure or de facto government policy, including reform of economic, institutional, legal spheres? If so, what was the nature of the “control”? How long did it last and with what impact on domestic governance?	
	2		While not under de jure or de facto foreign control, was the country nonetheless subject to substantial foreign intervention (either overt or covert)? Examples of such intervention would include foreign power support (military, financial, organizational) for one or more factions in the country, overt or covert military intervention, effective control of key sectors of the economy or polity.	
	3		Was the country otherwise under the direct or indirect influence of an external actor or group of actors, to the degree that domestic decision making was effectively dictated or overwhelmingly influenced by external actors?	
	4		Were key political, security or other elite positions coordinated with external actors?	

⁺ Internal-external interaction through “control” refers to situations where domestic sovereignty is fully/permanently or, more typically, partially/temporarily suspended (either de jure or de facto) or otherwise significantly limited. This could be the result of full or partial military occupation, paramilitary intervention, colonial rule, trusteeship, or any other form of strong security, political or economic domination by an external actor or actors.

		Was there a reasonable perception that an external actor or actors would intervene in the ruling of the country if or unless the country went in this or that direction?	
	5	Did an external actor control a resource so vital to the order of the country (political, security, economic, symbolic) that it could exercise overwhelming influence on the country's government? If so, did the external power threaten to use this power or in fact do so?	
B		External Incentives⁺⁺	
	1	What were the "costs of adaptation" for the existing regime – were they very high (involving loss of power, risk of criminal prosecution, death of ruler and family, or deep identity change for instance) or were they moderate or even relatively low costs?	
	2	What type of external incentives were applied to domestic actors (positive/negative – threats of isolation, sanctions or promises of political, economic or security benefits – material/symbolic, compelling/weak)? By which actors? (states, regional communities/organizations, international organizations)	

⁺⁺ The external incentives mode of influence is a rationalist bargaining model. It is actor-centered and assumes that domestic actors have a degree of free choice (unlike "control" cases) and respond to external incentives to either preserve the existing regime or reform (including democratize). It therefore assumes that domestic decision-makers respond to a "logic of consequences."

The outcomes of bargaining processes depend on several considerations:

- (1) Costs of adaptation (i.e. the gap between the existing norm and the one advanced by the external actor);
- (2) The distribution of costs of adaptation in the domestic arena;
- (3) The relative bargaining power of actors ("veto players" and "change agents");
- (4) The power and credibility (material or symbolic) of the incentives (positive or negative) that an external actor is able to apply to the targeted actors;
- (5) The perception of the targeted actors of benefits and loss (which may be different from "objective" reality);
- (6) The benefits or fear of a specific bargain, compared with alternative outcomes (or "outside options" or "best alternative to compliance").

The "Cost-benefit" balance depends on a four main sets of factors:

- (1) Size of adoption costs
- (2) Size and speed of external rewards / external sanctions
- (3) The credibility of promises / threats
- (4) The determinacy of conditions

External incentives can work through two main different "pathways":

- (1) "Top-down" Intergovernmental bargaining – i.e. directly on the target government, which then calculates whether the benefits offered by adherence to external demands outweigh the domestic costs of adjustment, and opportunity costs of following another external actor (e.g. follow Russia or Iran, rather than the U.S. or EU).
- (2) "Bottom-up" Differentiated empowerment of domestic actors – i.e. indirectly, where certain domestic actors ("change agents") have interests in complying with external demand (which might be because doing so would strengthen them politically, involve utility or simply because they believe in the norms advanced by the external actor). The external incentives therefore change the domestic equilibrium and the domestic opportunity structure in favor of reformists, strengthening their bargaining power vis-à-vis their opponents in society and the existing regime. To be visibly effective this "bottom-up" pathway depends on an ability to leverage external incentives into domestic action. Even then the relative empowerment of reform actors may not be powerful enough to sufficiently change the domestic equilibrium in favor of democratic change.

3		What is the “distribution of costs” of compliance with external calls to democratize among the key domestic players? If compliance with the demands of the external actor occurs who is likely to suffer and who is likely to benefit?	
4		Were there “veto players” in the domestic system – i.e. actors in the domestic arena capable of effectively blocking the bargain from going forward? Who were these “veto players” (the existing rulers, army, judiciary, bureaucratic or business elites)? What links do they have with the external actors promoting change? How powerful were they in relation to those who want change?	
5		Were there “change agents” in the domestic system – i.e. actors in the domestic arena (within the state, army, bureaucracy, media, civil society etc.) Who were these “change agents”? What links do they have with the external actors promoting change? How powerful were they in relation to “veto players”?	
6		Were change agents empowered or weakened by association with the external actor/s? How?	
7		How compelling were the external incentives (threats/promises)? How credible were they (can the external actor/s “deliver” and at what cost to themselves?)	
8		How determinate (or specific/clear) were the conditions applied by the external actor? In other words, do domestic actors know exactly what they need to do to win the rewards/avoid the sanctions? Or were the conditions opaque or so vague that there is no clear “roadmap” to reform?	
9		Which “pathway” does the external actor you are considering follow – intergovernmental/“top-down”; engagement of the opposition, or “bottom up” – indirect, civil society/mass empowerment? How does this engagement occur (intergovernmental bargaining at political/bureaucratic levels; party support; civil society/media/advocates support etc.)?	

C			International Socialization⁺⁺⁺
	1		To what degree was there a pre-existing affinity between domestic norms and democracy prior to the transition? Which groups in society/opposition/government had this affinity, and which did not?
	2		Was the external actor/environment promoting democracy viewed as “one of us” in any sense – i.e. as part of the actor’s actual or aspirational group of belonging? Was the external actor seen as legitimate in making the demand for democracy?
	3		Was the country in geographical, cultural or other proximity to a “democratic hub” or “democratic community” of any sort? If so, how did domestic actors view this external hub or community? Did they aspire to be accepted?

⁺⁺⁺ The “international socialization” (or learning) mode of external influence is grounded in the core theoretical tenets of constructivism, and constitutes an alternative rationale to the rationalist-bargaining mode of external influence.

International democratic socialization involves inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community which upholds democratic (and usually other liberal) norms.

Unlike, the external incentives model, the idea here is that socialization results in sustained compliance based on the internalization of those norms (as opposed to utilitarian incentives and checks). Rather than responding to a logic of consequences, in other words, this perspective holds that actors respond to a “logic of appropriateness” – i.e. that domestic actors will respond to external messages if they were persuaded by the validity, legitimacy, and appropriateness of those messages to the domestic arena.

There are two different ways in which domestic actors (societal, opposition, state, governmental) may follow a “logic of appropriateness:”

(1) actors may assume “democratic behavior” by acting according to regional or international expected behavior – i.e. by assuming a role, regardless of whether they “truly believe” in this role (this is sometimes called “type 1 internalization”). The idea here is that actors operate in “bounded rationality” – selecting modes of behavior from a “menu” of acceptable options. If democracy is on the menu, while non-democratic conduct is not part of the menu of acceptable options, the domestic actors would be compelled to choose from the available choices.

(2) following the logic of appropriateness may go beyond role playing and involve “deep internalization”. This implies that actors adopt the interests, and possibly the “identity” of the community which they see themselves as part of. In this case conscious, instrumental, or even bounded calculation, has been replaced by scripts/norms and patterns of behavior that are taken for granted as “the right thing to do” (“type 2 internalization”).

The “international socialization” mode of external influence is not “passive” (unlike “lesson drawing”) but typically involves “active soft power” – normative pressure, persuasion, and the creation of environments where learning can be achieved (multilateral organizations, networks, diffuse messages through mass media etc.) and processes of change which can be said to be cognitive and social (tracing influence of this type presents difficult methodological issues therefore).

Effective persuasion may depend on a number of factors:

- (1) The attractiveness of the norms themselves to domestic actors (i.e. existing “identity match”)
- (2) The legitimacy of the actors promoting the norms
- (3) The degree to which these norms were accepted as consensual by others in the community with which the actor identifies, and more broadly internationally
- (4) Effectiveness will increase where the norms advanced by an external actor/environment “resonate” with domestic actors. “Resonance” (or “salience”) will depend on whether domestic decision-makers were receptive to outside ideas, whether they have lost faith in the existing system, and whether there is a pre-existing “cultural match” between the external norm and existing conditions in the country.
- (5) Effectiveness will increase with the deliberative quality (intensity, duration) of the process of socialization.

	4	Was the country in geographical, cultural or other proximity to an autocratic hub or autocratic community? Was the country drawn in different directions in this respect, and if so how?	
	5	Did the external actor engage the country (or any parts or segments of it) in direct or indirect normative persuasion? For example, did it establish governmental, bureaucratic or societal forums for negotiation, coordination, political party dialogue, professional training, education, cultural exchange etc.? If so, what forms did this interaction take? How intense was it? What effects did it have on participants from the “target country”?	
D		Lesson Drawing ⁺⁺⁺⁺	
	1	Did domestic rulers reach a crisis point or impasse, resulting in loss of faith in the domestic system and a search for policy alternatives outside the country?	
	2	Was there a domestic debate about the possibility of adopting a different system modeled on another country or group of countries, whether a foreign system was transferable to the domestic context and what would be the pros and cons of such a change? If so, which external models did domestic actors look at, and which did they decide to imitate?	
	3	In the event of “learning” did domestic actors copy, emulate, combined or were inspired by an external model?	

⁺⁺⁺⁺ Finally, consider the possibility that domestic actors respond to external signals WITHOUT any form of external inducement (either bargaining or socialization). In other words, a mode of interaction between domestic and external factors may be voluntary lesson drawing that is the result of domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo, an assessment of the transferability of democracy to the domestic scene, and the subsequent adoption (many times with adaptation) of foreign ideals, constitutions or institutional models. There are essentially four types of “learning”:

- (1) Copying (direct and complete adoption of a foreign model)
- (2) Emulation (adoption, with adjustments to particular domestic circumstances)
- (3) Combination (mixtures of policies from different places)
- (4) Inspiration (an external event/model inspiring change with the final outcome not drawn from a foreign model).