Objectives

During and after the viewing of this video, students will:

- learn about Latin America’s problems of drug trafficking and violent crime;
- consider the links between poverty, violence, and police use of force; and
- evaluate the successes, challenges, and significance of Rio de Janeiro’s current “Pacification” program.

Materials

Handout 1, Video Notes, pp. 7–8, 30 copies
Handouts 2A–2E, Interpreting Research Data, pp. 9–17, six copies (optional)
Handouts 3A–3D, Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic, pp. 18–29, eight copies (optional)
Handout 4, The Pacification Process, pp. 30–31, 30 copies (optional)
Projection, Crime and Policing in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas, p. 32
Teacher Information, Video Transcript, pp. 33–35
Answer Key, Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic, pp. 36–38

Equipment

Computer with Internet access and speakers
Computer projector

Teacher Preparation

Instructions and materials are based on a class size of 30 students. Adjust accordingly for different class sizes.

1. Make the appropriate number of copies of handouts.
2. Set up and test computer, projector, speakers, and video before starting the lesson. Confirm that you are able to play the video with adequate audio volume.

Procedures

1. Begin the lesson by engaging students in a brief discussion about crime and violence. Suggested discussion points are provided below.
   - Think about violence around the world. What are some of the most violent places in the world today?
   - Violence has many types and manifestations, but one measure of a region’s violence is its homicide rate. What region of the world do you think has the highest homicide rate? Latin America has the world’s highest homicide rate. It also has the world’s highest rate of deaths caused by firearms.
   - Latin America’s high homicide and death-by-firearm rates are symptomatic of its high rate of violent crime in general. Why do you think so many violent crimes take place in Latin America? Much of the violence is associated with the drug trade. Drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine) are grown in Latin America, trafficked across the region, and then smuggled to the United States and Europe by powerful criminal organizations. These heavily armed criminal organizations control their drug routes through intimidation and violence against local residents, law enforcement, and rival organizations.

2. Display Projection, Crime and Policing in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas, and set the context for the video by providing students with the following background information.
   - In some parts of Latin America, criminal organizations are so strong that government authorities do not or cannot challenge them. For example, in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro—one of the region’s largest cities—there are more than 800 slums called “favelas,” many of which have been governed by drug traffickers for years.
   - About 20–25% of Rio’s population has lived in these favelas with little or no police presence. When police did enter a favela to confront criminals (e.g., for a drug raid), the ensuing violence often claimed innocent residents’ lives. In addition, Rio’s police forces have been plagued by widespread corruption for decades. As a result, favela residents have generally distrusted the police.
   - In 2008 the Rio de Janeiro government introduced a new policing plan called “Pacification.” The plan was to drive criminal organizations out of the favelas, establish a permanent police
presence there, and rebuild trust between *favela* residents and the police. These specially trained police units are called “Pacifying Police Units” or “UPPs” (short for *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* in Portuguese).

3. Inform students that they will now listen to a Stanford professor discussing the Pacification process and how it has affected crime and policing practices in Rio de Janeiro. Distribute one copy of Handout 1, *Video Notes*, to each student, and instruct students to complete the handout as they view the video. Allow students a minute to read through the handout before they watch the video.

4. Play and project the video “The Use of Lethal Force by the Police in Rio de Janeiro and the Pacification Process.” If necessary, allow students some time after the video ends to finalize their notes.

5. Lead a classroom discussion to review and debrief the video. Suggested discussion points are provided below. (Those marked with asterisks involve discussion that goes beyond the scope of Handout 1.)

   • Why does PovGov focus its research on Latin America? *PovGov* studies issues surrounding violence, and Latin America is the most violent region of the world. Fifty percent of the world’s deaths by firearms occur there, and 41 of the world’s 50 most dangerous cities are located there.

   • What is the primary cause of violence in Latin America? Latin America’s violence is mostly related to crime (specifically, drug trafficking), not war or ethnic violence.

   • Where is the violence concentrated? Violence is concentrated in cities, especially in their poorest neighborhoods.

   • What is the relationship between poverty and violence? *Professor Magaloni* says “Poverty causes violence, but violence also perpetuates poverty.” They are closely interrelated. For example, in Rio de Janeiro there is a very strong correlation between a neighborhood’s poverty, violence, and lack of government services (e.g., electricity, sanitation).

   • Who is Mariano Beltrame? He is Rio de Janeiro’s Minister of Security. He led the initiative to introduce Pacifying Police Units into Rio’s favelas.

   • What are examples that show how the UPPs try to build trust in their local communities? *Professor Magaloni* describes a Pacifying Police Unit that works with local kids and teenagers, teaching them karate and boxing, and working with them to grow vegetable gardens.

   • * What other measures can you think of that might help Rio’s police build trust within the *favela* communities?

   • What research has PovGov done in Rio de Janeiro? What information are they collecting, and what research questions are they trying to answer? *PovGov* has conducted several kinds of studies in Rio, such as interviewing favela residents and police officers, mapping homicides and police behavior (e.g., excess shooting), and adding miniature cameras on the police. These studies help to answer the question of how to effectively restrain the excessive use of force by the police and create a more humane police.
• In the video, Professor Magaloni says, “If you don’t restrain the use of force through rule of law, principles, and institutions, police behave like criminals.” What does she mean by “rule of law, principles, and institutions”? Explain these concepts and provide examples. Do you agree with Professor Magaloni’s statement? Why or why not?

• Describe the study regarding police officers’ experiences of violence in childhood. What did the researchers discover? Researchers surveyed 6,000 police officers about their experiences of violence in childhood and adolescence. Around 45% reported witnessing a homicide, and many were victims of crime or heard gunshots constantly in their childhood. Using statistics, the researchers demonstrated that the officers who experienced more violence in childhood tended to engage in more violence as adults.

• Why do you think this finding (i.e., that childhood experiences of violence affect officers’ adult behavior) is important? How can this information help Rio create a more humane police force? Student answers will vary. To Professor Magaloni, this finding is important because (1) it humanizes the police, and (2) in the future it could help Rio select officers who are less likely to engage in excessively violent policing.

• Why does police use of force occur mostly in poor neighborhoods? There are likely multiple factors, but Professor Magaloni cites one factor that appeared in PovGov’s interviews with police: Officers know that poor people are less likely to know their rights and so can be treated with less respect.

• What other factors might help explain why police use of force concentrates disproportionately in poor neighborhoods?

• When Professor Magaloni alludes to events that “happened recently in Missouri,” she is referring to the fatal 2014 shooting of a black man (Michael Brown) by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The incident sparked large protests and a nationwide debate on race, discrimination, and policing—including issues like police use of force and community distrust of police. In your opinion, is PovGov’s research in Rio de Janeiro relevant to the U.S. context? Why or why not? Which aspects of the research do you think are potentially relevant, and to what degree?

• Under what conditions have the police reforms in Rio successfully reduced crime and violence? Under what conditions have the reforms failed? In some favelas, the reforms have dramatically reduced both criminal violence and police violence. But in favelas where criminal organizations are very powerful, the reforms have been less successful. In these places, different types of interventions are necessary.

• Why is “continuity” important for the reform process in Rio? The reforms are meant to change Rio’s culture of violence, which takes time. In Professor Magaloni’s words, continuity is important “because this process is a very challenging one, and it’s not going to be easy.”
At the end of the video, Professor Magaloni briefly describes the United States’ role in Latin America’s problems with drug trafficking and violence. In your opinion, to what extent does the United States bear some responsibility for Latin America’s problems with crime and violence? What can the U.S. government or society do to help mitigate these problems?

Optional Activities

For a more in-depth exploration of the topics and themes raised in the video, a list of activity ideas is provided below.

- **Interpreting research data.** In the video, Professor Magaloni describes several of PovGov’s recent research studies in Rio de Janeiro. You can engage your students in an analysis of the real data behind these studies and other studies concerning poverty, violence, and policing in Brazil. Divide students into five groups, and distribute one version of Handouts 2A–2E, *Interpreting Research Data*, to each group. Each team will work to interpret research data relating to one of five related topics: (1) the relationship between poverty and violence, (2) police life in Rio de Janeiro, (3) the use of lethal force by police, (4) Brazil’s homicide patterns, and (5) the UPPs’ effect on reported crimes in pacified communities. Allow students to discuss and interpret their data within their teams. Students can then share their research with each other via jigsaw-style sharing or traditional group presentations.

- **Situating UPP in Rio’s history with drug traffic.** To more fully understand and appreciate the successes, challenges, and significance of Rio’s current pacification project, students need to consider it in the city’s historical context—particularly, Rio’s recent history of violent crime, drug trafficking, and failed police initiatives. Divide students into four groups, and distribute one version of Handouts 3A–3D, *Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic*, to each group. Each team will read part of a chapter from a World Bank report that places the pacification project into Rio’s broader historical context. (The full report, entitled “Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding changes in community life after the UPP pacification process,” is available online at [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).) Students can then share their topics with each other via jigsaw-style sharing or traditional group presentations. Answers to the review questions on Handouts 3A–3D appear in Answer Key, *Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic*.

- **The work of the UPPs.** Although Professor Magaloni discusses the UPPs several times in the video, she only briefly mentions some of the work they do on a daily basis. For a more in-depth understanding of the UPPs’ daily work and their role in the favela communities, have students conduct their own independent research on the Pacifying Police Units. There are many resources online, including the English version of the official UPP website ([www.upprj.com/index.php/as_upps_us](http://www.upprj.com/index.php/as_upps_us)) and numerous articles, papers, and studies.
• Implementing Pacification. Although the Pacifying Police Units are the most visible and enduring presence within pacified favelas, they are only a part of the overall Pacification strategy. Assign Handout 4, The Pacification Process, for students to learn more about the step-by-step process of “pacifying” a new territory, as described by Colonel Paulo Henrique Moraes, General Commander of Operations of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro.

• Policing practices in the United States. Much of PovGov’s research focuses on Latin America, but the topics PovGov explores—such as the connections between poverty, crime, and police practices—are just as relevant in the contemporary United States as they are in Brazil. At the time of writing, U.S. society is in the midst of a broad nationwide conversation concerning these issues. Engage students in this conversation by either leading a classroom discussion or having students conduct independent research relating to these topics. Possible research questions include “How can communities foster a more peaceful and trusting relationship between residents and police officers?”, “What factors influence an officer’s decision to employ force while on duty?”, and “What are the characteristics of ‘good policing’ and ‘bad policing?’”
VIDEO NOTES

You are about to watch a 13-minute video interview with Professor Beatriz Magaloni, Director of Stanford University’s Program on Poverty and Governance (PovGov). Professor Magaloni will describe the research she has conducted in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which focuses on three related concepts: poverty, crime, and police violence. Use the space below to take notes on the video.

Part 1: Introduction
Why does PovGov focus its research on Latin America? Cite figures.

What is the primary cause of violence in Latin America?

Where is the violence concentrated?

Part 2: “What is the relationship between poverty and violence?”
Describe the relationship between poverty and violence.

Part 3: “How is Rio de Janeiro addressing issues of poverty and violence?"
Who is Mariano Beltrame?

How have the UPPs tried to build trust in their local communities? Provide examples.
Describe the research that PovGov has done in Rio de Janeiro. (e.g., What information are they collecting? What research questions are they trying to answer?)

Fill in the blank: “I think that excessive use of force by the police creates serious problems because ____________________________.”

Part 4: “What have you learned from your research?”
Describe the study regarding police officers’ experiences of violence in childhood. What did the researchers discover?

Why does police use of force occur mostly in poor neighborhoods?

Part 5: “What are the prospects for reducing violence in Rio?”
Under what conditions have the reforms successfully reduced crime and violence? Under what conditions have the reforms failed?

Why is “continuity” important for the reform process in Rio?
INTERPRETING RESEARCH DATA: POVERTY AND VIOLENCE

You are a team of researchers studying the relationship between poverty and violence, both within Rio de Janeiro and around the world. Study the map and table below, and work with your team to analyze and interpret the data.

Directions
1. First, analyze the map, which shows the geographic distribution of homicides (2005–2012 data) and income levels in an area of Rio de Janeiro. (The areas labeled “UPP Rocinha” and “UPP Vidigal-Chácara do Céu” received UPPs in 2012.) Discuss the following questions with your team.
   - Do darker colors signify richer or poorer areas?
   - Is there a geographic pattern to the homicide distribution?
   - In this case, do the data show a strong correlation between income and homicides? (i.e., Are homicide rates higher in poorer neighborhoods?)
   - What question(s) does this map not answer? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand the relationship between poverty and violence in Rio?
2. Second, analyze the table, which shows data for countries around the world at various income levels. Discuss the following questions with your team.
   - In this case, do the data show a strong correlation between income and homicides? (i.e., Are homicide rates higher in poorer countries?)
   - Are there any other notable patterns in this data?
   - What question(s) does this table not answer? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand the factors that contribute to a country’s homicide rate?
3. As a team, write a short paragraph that summarizes your observations and conclusions from the data. How are poverty and violence correlated in Rio? Around the world? Do the same patterns emerge? Include one or two new “research questions” that scholars should pursue to better understand the relationship between poverty and violence.
Map: Incomes and homicides in southern Rio de Janeiro (2010 income data)

Table: Comparing countries’ incomes and homicide rates (2010 data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Adjusted net national income per person (US$)</th>
<th>Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>2520</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>9036</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>15630</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>19724</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>29393</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>34739</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>40732</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTERPRETING RESEARCH DATA: POLICE LIFE IN RIO DE JANEIRO

You are a team of researchers studying police life in Rio de Janeiro, specifically (1) the environment in which police officers work and (2) officers’ well-being. You have just conducted a survey of Rio’s police force and now you are ready to analyze and interpret your data, which appear in the two tables below.

Directions
1. Examine Table 1, which shows police officers’ common encounters. Discuss the following questions with your team.
   • How are the survey results organized? What is the most common incident? What is the least common?
   • Which of these incidents involve violence? Which do not?
   • How frequently do officers encounter violence in their work?
   • Which of these figures surprise you, if any? Why?
   • In your opinion, do these data provide us with a good idea of the environment in which Rio’s police officers work? Why? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand officers’ working environment?

2. Interpret Table 2, which shows officers’ symptoms of stress. Make sure you understand how to read the data. (For example, 21.9% of officers frequently have insomnia and 30.9% sometimes have insomnia, so 52.8% of officers have insomnia at least sometimes.) Discuss the following questions with your team.
   • What are the most common symptoms of stress in Rio’s police force? What are the least common?
   • Which of these figures surprise you, if any? Why?
   • How might officers’ stress level affect how they perform their duties?
   • In your opinion, do these data provide us with a good idea of officers’ well-being? Why? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand officers’ well-being?

3. Consider the two tables together. Do you think police officers’ relatively violent working environment is linked to their stress symptoms? Why or why not? Do your data prove a link? Why or why not? What question(s) do the data not answer? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand police life in Rio de Janeiro?

4. As a team, write a short paragraph that synthesizes and summarizes your observations from the data. What conclusions can be drawn, if any? What requires further investigation? Include one or two new “research questions” that scholars should pursue to better understand the relationship between officers’ work environment and their well-being.
Table 1. Proportion of officers who “frequently” face each type of incident in their professional routine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of incident</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance of peace/excessive noise</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession and use of drugs</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Fights</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic violations</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contempt of Authority/Disobedience</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shootouts</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm seizures</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Violence</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Percentage of officers with symptoms of stress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often do you ...?</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have insomnia</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel anguished</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to cry</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel lonely</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel anger</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have pain in the chest/lack of air</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel depressed</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think of ending your own life</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lose patience with others/prefer to stay alone</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel fear of losing your family</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel disheartened</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTERPRETING RESEARCH DATA: USE OF LETHAL FORCE BY POLICE

You are a team of researchers studying the use of lethal force by police in Rio de Janeiro (i.e., deaths caused by police). You have gathered statistics in Rio de Janeiro and other cities, and now you are ready to interpret your data.

Directions
1. Familiarize yourself with the three graphs below, then talk through each graph with your team to ensure everyone understands how to read the data correctly. (Note: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are both Brazilian cities; all other cities are U.S. cities.)
2. Discuss the following questions with your team.
   - Figure 1: In terms of magnitude, how do Rio’s statistics compare with U.S. cities’ statistics? With São Paulo’s statistics? In terms of the ratio of people killed versus wounded, how does Rio compare with U.S. cities? With São Paulo?
   - Figure 2: Of the intentional homicides committed in Rio de Janeiro, approximately what percentage did the police commit? In Houston? In Chicago? How does Rio compare with U.S. cities? With São Paulo?
   - Figure 3: Between 1998 and 2013, what was Rio’s trend in civilian deaths from police interventions? What year had the lowest number of deaths? What year had the highest? When did the number of deaths start to fall?
   - Do any of these graphs surprise you? What surprises you, and why?
   - What question(s) do the data not answer? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand the use of lethal force by police in Rio de Janeiro?
3. As a team, write a short paragraph that synthesizes and summarizes your observations from the data. (e.g., Who is at relatively high risk of homicide? Who is at relatively low risk? What trends appear with regard to gender, age, race, and marital status?) Include one or two new “research questions” that scholars should pursue to better understand this issue.
Figure 1. Number of adversaries killed and wounded by the police in a year.

Figure 2. Proportion of intentional homicides committed by the police in a year.

Figure 3. Number of civilian deaths from police interventions in Rio de Janeiro.
INTERPRETING RESEARCH DATA: BRAZIL’S HOMICIDE PATTERNS

You are a team of researchers studying homicide patterns in Brazil. You have gathered extensive data on homicide victims (e.g., age, gender, race), and now you are ready to interpret your data.

Directions
1. Familiarize yourself with the three graphs below, then talk through each graph with your team to ensure everyone understands how to read the data correctly.
2. Discuss the following questions with your team.
   - Figure 1: What are the main points of this graph?
   - Figure 2: Which age group has the highest homicide rate for males? For females? At what age does the sharpest increase in homicide rate occur for males? For females?
   - Figure 3: Among Brazilian males, who is most at risk of homicide at age 27? At age 54? Who is least at risk at age 21? At age 38? Which age groups have the highest homicide rates? Which has the lowest? What are the main points of this graph?
   - Do any of these graphs surprise you? What surprises you, and why?
   - What question(s) do the data not answer? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand patterns of homicide in Brazil?
3. As a team, write a short paragraph that synthesizes and summarizes your observations from the data. (e.g., Who is at relatively high risk of homicide? Who is at relatively low risk? What trends appear with regard to gender, age, race, and marital status?) Include one or two new “research questions” that scholars should pursue to better understand this issue.
Figure 1. Total homicide victims in Brazil (2007).

Figure 2. Age-specific homicide rates in Brazil, by gender (2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Male Rate Per 100,000</th>
<th>Female Rate Per 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Age-specific male homicide rates in Brazil, by race and marital status (2001).

- Single Blacks
- Single Whites
- Married Blacks
- Married Whites
You are a team of researchers studying how crime rates in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro have changed since the introduction of the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). Your team has gathered data on all reported crimes for these *favelas* between January 2006 and July 2011. Now you are ready to analyze and interpret your data.

**Directions**

1. Familiarize yourself with the data table below. Make sure you understand how to read the data. (For example, the “0.94” figure means that each *favela* had an average of 0.94 violent deaths per month before the UPP was introduced.)
2. Discuss the following questions with your team.
   - Which types of reported crime decreased when the UPPs were introduced? Are these types of crimes similar to each other?
   - Which types of reported crime increased when the UPPs were introduced? Are these types of crimes similar to each other?
   - Do these data surprise you? What surprises you, and why?
   - Formulate one or two hypotheses to explain why some types of reported crime increased when the UPPs were introduced.
   - What question(s) do the data not answer? What additional information would you want to know (i.e., what other research needs to be done) to better understand the actual effect of the UPPs on crime in the *favelas*?
3. As a team, write a short paragraph that synthesizes and summarizes your observations from the data. Include one or two new “research questions” that scholars should pursue to better understand this issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recorded crimes in the communities before and after UPPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Rio de Janeiro: January 2006 to July 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average number of cases per month (in each community)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victims of violent death</td>
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<td>Victims of homicide</td>
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<td>Victims of “acts of resistance”</td>
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<td>(i.e., civilian deaths caused by police)</td>
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<td>Victims of disappearances</td>
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<td>Victims of intentional injuries</td>
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<td>Victims of domestic and family violence</td>
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<td>Victims of threat</td>
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<td>Victims of rape</td>
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<td>Incidents of robbery</td>
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<td>Incidents of theft</td>
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<td>Incidents of drug-related crimes</td>
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SITUATING UPP IN RIO’S HISTORY WITH DRUG TRAFFIC: LIVING UNDER THE DRUG TRAFFickers’ RULE

To more fully understand and appreciate the successes, challenges, and significance of the UPP approach, we need to consider it in Rio de Janeiro’s broader historical context. Read the text below to learn about one aspect of this broader context—what life was like under the drug traffickers’ rule. You will be asked to share your knowledge with your classmates.

The following text is excerpted from a World Bank report entitled “Bringing the State back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life After the UPP Pacification Process.”

Living Under the Drug Traffickers’ Rule

The story of Rio de Janeiro and its favelas does not begin with drug trafficking; but the story of UPP does. It is the story of the progressive appropriation of the favelas’ physical space and social fabric of the favela by the drug trade, from the mid-1980s onwards; it can be told as the transition of the “bocas de fumo” from drug sales points to [the seat of power] in the favela. The term “boca” originated to refer to the physical spot where drugs were sold. In this case, the boca is simply [a group] of young men (who are armed to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the time of the day) that can easily scatter if the police appear. Prior to the 1980s, the bocas were small scale businesses yielding amateurish profits, and run by long-time community residents in their 30s and 40s whose family and affinity ties within the communities guaranteed a relationship of respect vis-à-vis the general population of the favela. For residents, this “respect” was evidenced by their willingness to conceal their weapons, their prohibition of drug consumption in the public spaces of the favelas and a role as benefactors in the community, for example by buying medication for the sick and elderly, helping families in dire economic need, and so forth.

The encroachment of the cocaine trade upon existing criminal networks transformed the bocas and the power relations that constituted them, as a new generation of heavily armed and increasingly younger men, teenagers even, came to run a highly profitable business. Disputes with enemy factions and violent police incursions led the drug trade to enhance surveillance within its territories to protect its markets. This new structuring of the drug trade and the turf wars that it provoked progressively came to impinge upon virtually every aspect of life in the favelas.

From the 1990s onwards, violent takeovers of certain favelas by enemy factions [created a] sense of estrangement between the drug trade and favela residents, particularly in areas where takeovers brought to power what residents term a “migratory” drug trade characterized by a total

* The literal translation of bocas de fumo is “mouths of smoke,” an expression that maintains the original activity of the bocas, the sale of marijuana.
lack of affinity ties with the community, thus replacing old relations of “respect” by “predatory” ones. Thus we find a process of gradual disenfranchisement of favela residents in their communities: while in the “early days” the bandidos (criminals) used to hide their illegal activities, today they “flaunt” them; while the space of the favela formerly “belonged” to residents, today [residents] live in the trade’s territory, abide by their rules, and live under their authority.

The extent and scope of the drug trade’s authority is evident in the so-called “law of silence” in the favelas. The law of silence developed as part of the historical process of securing the favelas’ boundaries in a way that the drug trade had full control of what happened within its turf. No stealing, no raping, no physical fights, no wife battering are rules that aim at maintaining the police safely at bay. They are reinforced by a prohibition on establishing relationships with menacing outsiders (alemãos) of any sort, in particular members of other drug factions or the police. Any breaches to these laws are dealt with at “the boca,” now meaning not only the physical site where drugs are sold, but also encompassing the parallel system of public order that has underpinned the social control of the favelas by the drug trade.

This parallel system effectively cuts off residents’ access to formal legal institutions, insofar as domestic or local disputes fall unequivocally under the jurisdiction of the trade. To resolve conflicts “at the boca” is to bring complaints to the local boss, who judges who is “right” and distributes penalties to whomever he deems a perpetrator of the laws of the favela. Punishments are unfailingly exerted upon the body of the “offender” to serve as an example that reinforces the prohibitions. They can range from beatings to execution, and also include “warnings” that brand the “offender” with the visible marks of imposture, as in the case of thieves who are shot in the hand or foot. The extent to which punishments are [turned into dramatic spectacles] varies from favela to favela depending on the personal taste of the drug boss in charge. That capital punishment was never really off the table in the favelas had two main effects: first, it did manage to virtually end certain types of crimes like rapes and robberies. But the harsh nature of punishment also meant that residents who did not wish for a violent end to minor conflict found themselves completely cut off from any possibility of conflict mediation.

These general dynamics make for an extremely precarious and ever-provisional order—that is always subject to disruptions in the form of shootouts—between enemy factions or between drug dealers and the police. Thus daily life unfolds also in the perennial anticipation of the next shootout, a situation that translates into an overarching sense of uncertainty.

In other words, the effect of the drug trade upon the favelas’ daily lives is not just about oppression and prohibition but also about the cutting off of any sense of autonomy or agency of their residents.
Review Questions
Discuss the following questions with your group mates.

1. Who were the original bocas? What was their relationship with the local community?
2. How and why did the bocas change? How did this change the bocas’ relationship with the local community?
3. What is the “law of silence”? What are its effects on residents’ lives?
4. How are conflicts resolved and justice delivered by the drug traffickers? What are the effects of this system on crime and crime reporting?
To more fully understand and appreciate the successes, challenges, and significance of the UPP approach, we need to consider it in Rio de Janeiro’s broader historical context. Read the text below to learn about one aspect of this broader context—previous attempts by Rio’s police to regain control of drug traffickers’ territories. You will be asked to share your knowledge with your classmates.

The following text is excerpted from a World Bank report entitled “Bringing the State back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life After the UPP Pacification Process.”

Failed Attempts to Regain Territorial Control
Several attempts have been made to change the brutal state of affairs [in the favelas ruled by drug traffickers]. Over the past three decades, these policies have manifested in periodic, often violent, police incursions into the favelas, many of them organized around the hosting of international events. Until the UPP, these policies had largely failed to end [drug traffickers’ control of] the favelas and establish a consistent state presence.

Previous state initiatives in the favelas, whether through urban upgrading or public security programs, have improved living conditions in some areas but neither in taking back control of these areas, nor in extending the rule of law or the protection of their residents. Many favela-upgrading projects have been tried.

The proposal to create a different kind of police force in Rio has its roots in the post-dictatorship era, when the legacy of torture tainted the image of the police, especially in the favelas. Early efforts to implement community policing were undertaken by state governor Leonel Brizola (in office 1983–1987), but were met with harsh resistance from within the police force, and were compounded by the challenges of confronting an increasingly powerful drug trade in the favelas. The following years, under the Moreira Franco governorship (1987–1991), were marked by the intensification of conflicts and the return of police raids. As a response to the escalating crime rates between 1987 and 1990, Rio saw the consolidation of the policy of repression that held the respect for human rights as a secondary consideration.

The early 1990s saw renewed efforts of community policing, and the creation of the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE), designed to be the elite of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ). Policies in those years were consistent with the directive to respect human rights. In 1991, for example, the Center for Complaints was created, with the objective of reducing police criminality by means of anonymous reports of police violence coming from the community.

Conflict between the growing drug trade in the favelas and police escalated with the massacres of Candelária and Vigário Geral (in July and
August 1993), which were heavily covered by the media, characterizing police brutality as a sign of the treatment inflicted on working-class areas by the police in Rio de Janeiro.* Subsequent policing policies such as the “Wild West gratuity” only added fuel to the fire. This financial incentive [for police to kill] ranged from 50 percent to 150 percent of the [officer’s] monthly salary and is credited with a drastic increase in the number of people killed by the Military Police: between January and May of 1995, the average for civilian deaths at the hands of the Military Police stood at 3.2 people per month. Between June 1995 and February 1996, [after the “Wild West gratuity” had been put in effect,] this average was 20.55 per month.

Under Governor Anthony Garotinho’s administration (1999–2002), the closest thing to a forerunner of the UPP was introduced, namely, the Group for the Policing of Special Areas (GPAE). It emerged as a result of escalated tension and brutal episodes that drove significant media attention, with the goal of bringing the police (and the state, more generally) closer to the “community” by means of programs such as the creation of the Delegacias Legais (revamped police stations), integrated areas of policing, and some specialized policing programs. However, as with earlier initiatives, the GPAE was eventually undermined by reports of police corruption, and its failure to put a stop to drug trafficking or the presence of armed dealers in the slums. Overall, GPAE, as the programs before it, was ineffective in controlling violence beyond a few months and many have even exacerbated the violence through collusion with the drug gangs or militias.

The history of failed policies in specialized policing experiments in favelas not only served to deepen the chronic distrust of the inhabitants toward the police; it also paved the way for vigilante justice in the form of milícias. For a while, this type of organization enjoyed a certain degree of support from the mainstream media, which saw in the militia a kind of solution-from-within for the problem of territorial occupation by the drug trade. However, it soon became evident that the milícias often took advantage of the communities. They extorted “taxes” in exchange for security, protection and other basic services, and often colluded with the drug trade.

In order to move away from the tarnished legacy of repressive policing in Rio, the UPP program was built around a different concept which emphasized, first, regaining territorial control of the favelas from the hands of the drug gangs and militias and, next, reinstating the state’s presence in these areas with a new type of police force.

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* The massacre of Candelária occurred in July 1993, when Military Police officers murdered six under-age youths and two adults who were sleeping in vicinity of the Candelária Church, in the center of Rio de Janeiro. The following month in the same year, in August, balaclava-wearing Military Police raided the favela of Vigário Geral and killed 21 people (including women, teenagers, and men), none of whom had a criminal record. The massacre was attributed to a revenge motive for the death of four police officers at the hands of local narcotics dealers the previous day.
Review Questions
Discuss the following questions with your group mates.

1. What were the policing approaches like under Governors Brizola and Franco? Describe the crime and policing environment.
2. What is community policing?
3. What was the “Wild West gratuity”? What effect did it have on police behavior?
4. For what reasons did the GPAE experiment fail?
5. Who are the milícias? Why did they come about, and how did their role and motivations evolve over time?
SITUATING UPP IN RIO’S HISTORY WITH DRUG TRAFFIC:
UPP—A NEW BEGINNING?

To more fully understand and appreciate the successes, challenges, and significance of the UPP approach, we need to consider it in Rio de Janeiro’s broader historical context. Read the text below to learn about one aspect of this broader context—the establishment and expansion of the UPP program throughout Rio. You will be asked to share your knowledge with your classmates.

The following text is excerpted from a World Bank report entitled “Bringing the State back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life After the UPP Pacification Process.”

UPP: A New Beginning?

After [the] trials and errors [of many past initiatives], the UPP model used the lessons learned from previous experiences and emerged to mark a clear shift in public security policy in the favelas. The ‘pacification stage’ of UPP follows four basic steps. First, officers from the [Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE)], the elite squad of Rio de Janeiro’s military police, stage a massive, coordinated operation to retake control of the favela from the drug gangs. In the first favelas to be pacified, this phase, called the “Retomada,” was carried out without warning. As a result, early operations involved heavy fighting between gangs and police, with significant casualties. This phase is now announced in advance by the police in order to give gangs an early warning to leave voluntarily or turn over their arms. The military incursion is followed by the stabilization stage, when the patrolling of the favela remains under responsibility of the BOPE. The definitive occupation is then consolidated with the control of the area by the newly inaugurated UPP unit. This is often accompanied by a “choque de ordem” (“shock of order”) against various forms of [unsanctioned activity], from precarious housing to street vending.

UPP Social: Bringing the State Back

The “post occupation” phase of the UPP model comes with the entrance of UPP Social, the social development arm of the program that aims to coordinate social services in these areas and thereby integrate the favelas into the rest of the city.

UPP Social began in August 2010 under the direction of the Rio de Janeiro State Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights (SEASDH), two years after the first UPP pacification. UPP Social emerged based on the recognition that the immediate success of UPP in disarming the drug traffickers in the favelas and giving people the freedom to come and go in safety, did not guarantee the creation of conditions for new economic, social, and political opportunities for favela residents to improve their lives. The UPP Social program therefore aims to consolidate the peace and promote the long-term social development of the favelas through the coordination of various social services.
UPP Social follows a three-stage process. The pre-implementation phase starts after UPP takes over the territory, and UPP Social enters with a group of local coordinators who spend up to three weeks talking to local associations, community leaders and the general population, to get a sense of the most pressing demands. This process is followed by a Rapid Participatory Mapping exercise, which provides a socio-economic assessment of each favela. Based on this initial diagnosis, a UPP Social Forum is held in each favela, bringing [together] representatives from all key municipal secretariats (health, education, housing, etc.; an of average 15 to 20 sectors are usually present), local leaders, the local UPP police commander, and private sector representatives to discuss the main demands identified and possible responses. The entire community is invited. The results of these forums, including the list of demands, participants, and agreements, are made available to the public via UPP Social’s website. Lastly, a team of UPP Social local coordinators (two or three, depending on the community’s size) is placed permanently in the communities, carrying out daily visits to be mediators between them, the government, and other services’ providers.

Expansion of UPP

In its almost five years of existence, the UPP program has gradually earned support from different sectors of society. It managed to unite political groups and figures that have traditionally played opposing roles regarding public security, social justice, citizenship, and access to rights. In general, most left- and right-leaning politicians, grassroots activists, intellectuals, community leaders, business entities and the media express public support of the program. The now-famous initials—UPP—have turned into a brand name; they are stamped on billboards and bus advertisements, marked on road signs, and sought after by different initiatives from the city and state governments.

The first three favelas to receive the UPP—Santa Marta, Cidade de Deus, and Batan—had been spatially spread out and represented three very different types of territorialities. Despite this initial diversity, from there on out, the map of occupation proceeded along what has been informally called by the general public the “Olympic belt,” focusing on favelas located in strategic areas around the locations where Rio will host the final of the 2014 World Cup and the Olympic Games in 2016. Whereas initially the UPP entered one favela at a time, the strategy now focuses on occupying different favelas simultaneously.

From the beginning, the UPP focused on the “retaking” of the territories that the state had lost in the favelas, but not necessarily on ending the drug trade in these areas.* In the period since the Governor and the Department of Security began to announce the occupations in advance in the media, there have been fewer confrontations with drug gangs during the occupation process.

* Mr. Beltrame, the State Secretary of Security since 2007, is quoted as saying that his “main goal is to rid the streets of weapons of war, not necessarily to end drug dealing.” (New York Times, October 11, 2010, p. A1).
This is not to say that the initiative has not met with resistance from the drug trade—quite the contrary. In October 2009, a police helicopter was shot down while carrying out an operation on the favela of Morro dos Macacos in Vila Isabel, a middle-class neighborhood in the city’s North Zone. Two police officers were killed in the crash. The episode had the effect of speeding up the expansion of the UPP throughout the city—as well as furthering its acceptance by the general public. In the operation that followed, at least 10 alleged dealers were killed. However, with the continuous and increasing pressure following the rapid expansion of the UPP presence, in November of 2010 dealers started to retaliate through a series of car robberies and car burnings.

UPP responded by invading the Complex of Alemão, where several of the dealers who had fled from favelas occupied by the UPP were believed to be hiding. This was the second time in recent years that Alemão had been occupied, and the experience in this case could not have been more different. The first invasion of Complex of Alemão occurred in June 2007, immediately before Rio hosted the Pan-American Games and a year before the UPP Program was launched. The operation involved 1,200 police officers and 19 people were killed, many of whom showed evidence of having been executed. The second operation in Alemão, in 2010, was broadcast live on television, and featured 2,000 men, armored Navy ships, tanks, and helicopters. This time, the occupation took place without any incident of note. With the takeover of Alemão, the challenge of occupying a large conglomeration of slums had apparently been overcome. The scale of this military occupation, its widespread media coverage, as well as the relatively peaceful way in which it played out, also served as a stimulus for furthering the policy of setting up UPP units, now with greater intensity.

Throughout 2011 the “belt” of favelas with UPPs circling the North and South Zones was completed: in the North Zone, with the occupation of Mangueira and the slums in the Engenho Novo district, such as Morro de São João; and in the South Zone by the most recent occupation of Rocinha and Vidigal by other Military Police battalions.

Review Questions
Discuss the following questions with your group mates.
1. What are the four steps of the pacification stage? Describe them.
2. Why did UPP Social emerge? What purpose is it meant to serve?
3. What is the three-stage process of UPP Social? Describe it.
4. In general terms, where have UPPs been established? What is the geographical pattern?
5. How did the two invasions of the Complex of Alemão differ?
**Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic:**

**What Makes the UPP Different from Previous Policies?**

To more fully understand and appreciate the successes, challenges, and significance of the UPP approach, we need to consider it in Rio de Janeiro’s broader historical context. Read the text below to learn about one aspect of this broader context—the characteristics of the current UPP program that differentiate it from previous policies. You will be asked to share your knowledge with your classmates.

*The following text is excerpted from a World Bank report entitled “Bringing the State back into the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Understanding Changes in Community Life After the UPP Pacification Process.”*

**What Makes the UPP Different from Previous Policies?**

The UPP emerged out of decades of experimentation with different institutional models of police intervention in the *favelas*. It aims to incorporate lessons from these previous attempts, and differs from them in several important ways. These include: an exclusive focus on expelling armed groups from the slums, the submission of the social agenda to the rationale of police occupation, broad support from the media, and the mobilization of strong support from the business class.

**A more realistic ambition**

One of UPP’s most important differences in comparison to previous experiments is the break from the belief that the public security crisis might be solved by putting an end to drug trafficking and its associated commercial activities. This more realistic ambition has been present in several pronouncements made by authorities. The Secretary of Public Security Mariano Beltrame has been quoted in different interviews as saying that the main goal of the program is to rid the streets of weapons of war, not necessarily to end drug dealing. By changing its goal from “ending drug dealing” to “ending arms circulation in the hands of drug-trafficking gangs,” the UPP shifted the public security debate, [separating] the problem of combating drug dealing from the problem of the [control of territory by] the narcotics economy. The program could then focus on the “recovery of territories,” effectively committing to an agenda geared more toward the emancipation of the inhabitants of these areas, although the permanence of the police presence certainly helps to inhibit some drug trade activities.

**Social after security**

Another distinguishing feature of UPPs, when compared to former policies, is the *complementation* of the social agenda to the policing agenda. Access to social programs and social inclusion initiatives that multiply in UPP areas is thereby dependent upon a certain deconstruction of the *favela* as a [perfect area] for crime. The sequencing of the program is therefore crucial, with the expansion and intensification of a social
development agenda only being able to be implemented after the policing phase—[i.e., retaking and securing the territory]—is concluded. At the same time, these same social initiatives are necessary in order to sustain the program’s effects and achieve its ultimate goals.

**Media support**

The third and most marked unique characteristic of the UPP experiment has been the support of the mainstream media, which should not be taken as a “spontaneous” reflection of the program’s success and visibility, but rather as a key factor in its very formation. Proof of this has been apparent since the beginning, when shortly after the occupation of the first slum, Santa Marta, the media granted a disproportionate coverage to the UPP’s reach at the time. This factor has been crucial for garnering strong public support in a short period of time. This in turn encouraged the authorities to present the one-off Santa Marta experiment as a new policy model for dissemination. The media has also helped the government to receive solid support from civil society organizations (some of which have become more critical of the program throughout time, but still supportive of its overall strategy).

**An improved image for the police force**

It is also worth highlighting the Secretary of Security’s effort to build a new image for the police through the media. This has been accomplished by continuously publicizing public investments in training for these new police officers as well as by bringing attention to “intellectual officers” among the police, who are officers that have also taken graduate courses and specialized in different social sciences disciplines. Former [elite police] officers appear on the nightly news as public security specialists, and the role of women in charge of UPPs is widely publicized. Captain Priscila, of Santa Marta, recently received the newspaper *O Globo*’s “Faz Diferença” (*Makes a Difference*) award. The idea of a young and gender sensitive police force is constantly reinforced. The program also emphasizes the ‘community policing’ aspects that should be incorporated by new officers, encouraging them, and above all the local commander, to build a close relationship with the community. For example, the local UPP captain is often present at community meetings and at every UPP Social Forum. Although this relationship varies substantially depending on the favela and the local officers, the overall message and government guidance is still one of building trust and respect between this new police and the community.

**Private sector support**

Another unique characteristic of the UPP lies in the broad support it has received from the business sector, which is also effectively related to the support that has been provided by the mainstream media. As stated before, the UPP program was created and implemented in the midst of a Rio de Janeiro that was undergoing a transformation to become a stage for large international events. This context extends a new role to the business
sector in the running management of the city, and therefore it follows that sections of the business class, such as those connected to the oil economy, real estate capital, tourism, and communications and services industries in general have gradually started to support the UPP. This support takes different forms, including financial contributions for maintenance and logistical support for the UPP.

Review Questions
Discuss the following questions with your group mates.

1. What is the goal of the UPP program? How is this goal different from previous initiatives’ goals? Why has this narrower goal contributed to the UPPs’ success?

2. What is the relationship between “social” and “security”? Which must come first? Why is social development an important component of the overall UPP program?

3. How has the UPP program led to an improved image for the police force? What tactics have been used to improve the image of the police force?

4. Why has the private sector largely come to support the UPP program?
THE PACIFICATION PROCESS


“The Pacification Challenge: What Can Be Done?”
April 29, 2014

Setting the Context
Paulo Henrique began his talk by contextualizing the city of Rio de Janeiro. “Rio has a very unique configuration. The problem is spread all over the city: the same problem that we encounter in the north zone, it’s also found in the south zone. This isn’t just local, this is an issue of an entire city,” he said. Within Rio’s scenario—where heavily armed criminal organizations controlled territories for decades with no state intervention—the problem around violence and criminality called for an operation aimed to retake those territories.

The Pacification Process
To give a glimpse of the pacification operation to the audience, Henrique explained step-by-step the work carried out by the police before and after the main occupation. “The first action [in retaking a territory] is carried out by the special police units. This is a symbolic move, to reaffirm the state’s decision to retake that space. Within this strategy [of overwhelming the criminals by sheer force], we worked on a tactic plan: We announce our arrival [beforehand as a warning], but we do intelligence work, mapping out possible escape routes in order to arrest criminals,” he began. As a result of the work carried out previous to the first police action in those territories, according to Henrique, the retake of the community takes place with no major conflicts. “Yes, we announce our operation, but the strategy is about much more than that. In our last occupation (Complexo de favelas da Maré, comprised of 15 communities with 120 inhabitants) 162 criminals were arrested, and that includes the leader of the faction that controlled that region,” he said, highlighting the operation’s potential for initial effectiveness.

Once the initial police forces—and sometimes, national troops—enter the territory, the pacification process begins. “After the intervention, we have the implementation of the UPPs. Today, we have 37 UPP units installed, some of them with 100 policemen and others with 700—depending on the size of the population. Next, we come in with the evaluation and the monitoring of results,” Henrique explained. He pointed out the need to establish a relationship with the community right from the beginning of
the process, building rapport and communicating what is to take place in operational terms. “The first thing we do is to have a meeting with the community. We need to break the ice and open a dialogue. It’s ideal that we sit to discuss with and listen to the community. The citizens have a ‘scream trapped inside’, and this is something notable in this process,” he shared.

Expanding on the follow-up work carried out the UPPs, Henrique believes they bring in a new philosophy, opening up the possibility for the beginning of something new. “We remove the special forces and introduce the [UPPs], that are trained to do this work. We work with young police officers, avoiding those who have already been through too many conflicts,” he explained.


Assignment
Respond to the items below on a separate sheet of paper.

1. Describe the pacification process step-by-step. (e.g., What happens first? Who enters the territory first? What happens next? When and how are the community members engaged?)

2. Why do the police announce their arrival beforehand? What do you think are the benefits of this tactic?

3. Colonel Henrique notes that the Pacifying Police Units recruit young police officers, “avoiding those who have already been through too many conflicts.” Why do you think only these officers are recruited into the UPPs?
Crime and Policing in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas

Rio de Janeiro’s favelas
- More than 800 favelas in Rio
- For years, governed by drug traffickers; little or no police presence
- Account for 20–25% of Rio’s population
- Distrust between favela residents and police

“Pacification” plan
- Goals:
  o Drive out criminal organizations
  o Establish permanent police presence
  o Rebuild trust between residents and police
- Specially trained police called “Pacifying Police Units” or “UPPs”
On-screen text:
The Use of Lethal Force by the Police in Rio de Janeiro and the Pacification Process
a discussion with Beatriz Magaloni

On-screen text: Beatriz Magaloni, Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Professor Magaloni: The Program on Poverty and Governance… We are a team of researchers—
faculty, post-doctoral students, doctoral students, and some undergraduate students—and we
work in what we see as action-oriented research that can have an impact in the world on issues
that matter to us. We are very much focused on poverty and the problem of violence. Most
of our research focuses on Latin America, which is the most violent area of the world. Fifty
percent of the world’s deaths by firearms occur in Latin America. The share of the population
of Latin America is much lower than that, so it’s by far the most violent region of the world. It
also concentrates 41 of the 50 most dangerous cities. And I want to emphasize that the type of
violence that we are observing in Latin America is not related to civil war or ethnic violence, but
it’s related to criminal violence—drug trafficking. Most of this violence is concentrated in cities,
and within cities, in the poorest neighborhoods of the cities.

On-screen text: What is the relationship between poverty and violence?

Professor Magaloni: Poverty causes violence, but violence also perpetuates poverty. So this is
like a vicious circle. For example, in the case of the city of Rio de Janeiro, we have been able to
geo-reference all the homicides taking place in the city from 2005 until the present, and we know
how many homicides take place almost by [the] hour and every day. With these data, we have
also been able to correlate with the existing levels of poverty in the neighborhood [and] lack of
provision of public goods—lack of, for example, electricity or sanitation. What we find is that
there is a very strong correlation between lack of services, poverty, and violence.

On-screen text: How is Rio de Janeiro addressing issues of poverty and violence?

Professor Magaloni: This was, I think, in 2010. I led a group of Stanford students from the
Master’s [Program] in Public Policy here at FSI [Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies] to Brazil, and we interviewed with several government officials and NGOs. We were
exploring issues of governance, development, international relations. But one of the aspects that
we focused on was security. We spoke with the Minister of Security—Mariano Beltrame—back
then, and I was very impressed by the initiative that he was leading, which was the introduction
of the Pacifying Police Units in the favelas of Rio.

I was able to go to one of these favelas and speak with the police commander of the UPP unit
there. I was very impressed by the work they were doing. They were trying to create trust
among the community. They were creating courses for the kids on karate and martial arts.
They were also working with the kids on vegetable gardens. For teenagers and older they were
creating [courses on] different forms of boxing. So the goal of the Pacifying Police Unit was
really to try to build trust among the community and build a more humane and proximate
police. Traditionally the police had never really gone into these areas and when it entered the
areas it really entered to confront criminals and kill very many people. So the population was
really very distrustful and continues to be very distrustful of the police.
I got very interested about this also because I come from Mexico and I’ve done research in
Mexico, and I know how hard it is to get a police [force] that works. The police often [are]
involved with the criminal organizations. That’s part of the reason criminals operate with
impunity. So I said “I want to understand what’s going on there.”

We spent a couple of years doing interviews in the favelas, interviewing with the police, until
we developed trust among Beltrame and the police itself, and they started to trust us with
confidential information. We started mapping all the homicides in the city. We started mapping
how police behave, whether police were shooting in excess or not. We are developing a very
large study that we are going to be presenting this December that focuses on the use of lethal
force by the police and ways to limit that force.

One of the interventions we are going to be doing in one of the favelas of the city—Rocinha,
which is one of the largest favelas in Brazil—is that we are going to add miniature cameras on
the police to observe how the feeling of being observed restrains use of force, and hopefully also
increases trust among the community. Doing these types of studies approximating the police is a
very hard thing to do as researchers because the information is sensitive. It’s often not easy to be
trusted. And as I say, I think that in many areas of the developing world, the police [are] part of
the criminal organizations. So with this information we are going to be positioned to understand
a very important question about policing in the developing world, which is twofold: (1) how to
create a more humane police, how to restrain excessive use of force among the police, and (2)
how to create technological devices that can help restrain excessive use of force.

On-screen text: What have you learned from your research?

Professor Magaloni: One of the aspects that has been important in our work is to humanize the
police. One of the findings that I think is important is we did a survey to 6,000 members of the
police—around 20% of the entire corporation—about experiences of violence they suffered in
childhood and adolescence, both to themselves and their families or close friends. We found
that the police [have] been embedded in a very violent society. Around 45% of the officers report
having witnessed a homicide. Many of them report having been victims of crime themselves or
their families, having heard gunshots constantly in their childhood. We did a statistical analysis
with these data, and we were able to demonstrate that those officers who disproportionately
suffered violence in childhood tend to engage in more violence. I think this is a very important
finding that humanizes the police, but also highlights a problem maybe of selection—so, who
selects into the police. Maybe knowing this information we can devise better ways of identifying
who should or [should not] join the police. So that was a very important finding.

Another finding is that they are under a lot of stress. They really live in constant confrontation,
and that obviously creates a lot of stress. Stress causes more violence; violence causes stress. I
think that in highlighting these results, interventions can be devised to help officers deal with
this stress and enable them to escape the spiral of violence. So that’s another very important
result of ours.
And finally, we discovered that police use of force—which is not surprising, considering what has happened recently in Missouri in the U.S.—that it concentrates disproportionately in poor neighborhoods, and that it hits the poorest the [most]. One of the interviews with the police highlighted that officers know when they are dealing with very poor individuals, they know that they don’t have a knowledge of their rights, and they know that they can treat them with less respect. I think this is important. We have to be aware of these biases against the poor. I think that’s another very important finding of our research.

On-screen text: What are the prospects for reducing violence in Rio?

Professor Magaloni: What we observe is that [in] some places, the impact has been amazing in reducing dramatically both the violence itself and the use of force by the police. That is a very important finding. So we know that the intervention has dramatically reduced the use of lethal force by the police, which is a very important result. But we also have seen that in some favelas where criminal organizations are very strong and they’re very armed and powerful, the intervention is less successful. In these places, the UPP still behaves very much like the police used to behave before—very violently—and there is a lot of confrontation. So I think we can understand with this research the conditions under which you can really reduce violence with this approach of proximity, and the conditions where you might need other types of interventions. So there’s been success.

Another good indication is that Mariano Beltrame, who is the Minister of Security, is now reelected to his position. There were elections in October, and there was a question whether the UPPs were going to continue. So the government was reelected, and he will continue as the Minister of Security. I think it’s very important to give continuity to this process, because every time something goes wrong—every time, for example, the police kills in excess, every time the police is killed—forces on both sides call for stopping the reform. There is always a temptation: “No, let’s go back to the military strategy that we followed before.” Many members of the police want to go back to that strategy. And so it’s important to give continuity because this process is a very challenging one, and it’s not going to be easy. It’s not going to be easy to change the culture of violence among the police itself and the violence in the city.

Here I have to mention that the violence comes from drug trafficking, and the fact that there are a lot of arms and weapons in the streets. And so in that sense, there is a strong connection with what is happening in the U.S., what is happening in Mexico, what is happening all over Latin America. The increase in violence in general in the region is very much related to drug trafficking. I think people have to understand in this country that the main market for drugs is the United States. So there [are] a lot of externalities that that is causing for Latin America, Central America.
Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic

For Handout 3A, Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic: Living Under the Drug Traffickers’ Rule

1. Who were the original bocas? What was their relationship with the local community?
   Prior to the 1980s, the bocas were small scale businesses yielding amateurish profits, and run by long-time community residents in their 30s and 40s who had family and affinity ties within the local community. Their relationship with the local community was respectful (e.g., evidenced by their willingness to conceal their weapons, their prohibition of drug consumption in the public spaces of the favelas, and their role as benefactors in the community).

2. How and why did the bocas change? How did this change the bocas’ relationship with the local community?
   The cocaine trade brought to power a new generation of heavily armed younger men who often clashed with enemy factions and police. A turf war emerged, and drug dealers began to tighten their control on social life in order to protect their markets. Some favelas were taken over violently by the “migratory” drug trade, and local residents became increasingly disenfranchised, with their everyday lives becoming more and more controlled and restricted.

3. What is the “law of silence”? What are its effects on residents’ lives?
   The “law of silence” dictates that residents are not allowed to contact certain people outside the favela, in particular members of other drug factions or the police. The silence is a way through which the boca maintains full control of what happens within its turf. This means that residents have no access to official channels of justice (e.g., police and courts) and that local law and social order are controlled exclusively by the drug traffickers.

4. How are conflicts resolved and justice delivered by the drug traffickers? What are the effects of this system on crime and crime reporting?
   Because residents have no access to official channels of justice (e.g., police and courts), disputes are settled by the drug boss, who judges who is “right” and distributes penalties to whomever he deems appropriate. Punishments are extremely harsh and always physical, ranging from beatings to execution. The threat of execution managed to virtually end certain types of crimes like rapes and robberies. But the harsh nature of punishment also meant that residents who did not wish for a violent end to minor conflict found themselves completely cut off from any possibility of conflict mediation.

For Handout 3B, Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic: Failed Attempts to Regain Territorial Control

1. What were the policing approaches like under Governors Brizola and Franco? Describe the crime and policing environment.
   Leonel Brizola tried to implement community policing in the mid-1980s, but these efforts failed due to intense resistance from the police themselves and the challenges of confronting an increasingly powerful drug trade. Moreira Franco’s governorship (1987–1991) was marked by escalating crime rates, the intensification of conflicts, the return of police raids, and the consolidation of the policy of repression that held the respect for human rights as a secondary consideration.

2. What is community policing?
   Community policing is the system of allocating police officers to particular areas so that they become familiar with the local inhabitants.
3. What was the “Wild West gratuity”? What effect did it have on police behavior?
   The “Wild West gratuity” was a financial incentive for police to kill. It ranged from 50 percent to 150 percent of the officer’s monthly salary. It caused a drastic increase in police-caused deaths; the average number of monthly police-caused civilian deaths jumped from 3.2 to 20.55 in the months following its implementation.

4. For what reasons did the GPAE experiment fail?
   The GPAE was undermined by reports of police corruption and its failure to end drug trafficking and the presence of armed dealers in the slums.

5. Who are the milícias? Why did they come about, and how did their role and motivations evolve over time?
   Milícias are armed groups composed of corrupt police, firemen, prison guards, and others that were initially formed to offer protection to local residents and small business from drug traffickers. Over time, militias started charging for their services and establishing brutal control of favelas just like the drug traffickers.

For Handout 3C, Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic: UPP—A New Beginning?

1. What are the four steps of the pacification stage? Describe them.
   In the first phase, “Retomada,” officers from the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) stage a massive, coordinated operation to retake control of the favela from the drug gangs. This is followed by the “stabilization stage,” when the patrolling of the favela remains under responsibility of the BOPE. The “definitive occupation” is then consolidated with the control of the area by the newly inaugurated UPP unit. This is often accompanied by a “choque de ordem” against various forms of unsanctioned activity.

2. Why did UPP Social emerge? What purpose is it meant to serve?
   UPP Social emerged based on the recognition that the immediate success of UPP in disarming the drug traffickers in the favelas and giving people the freedom to come and go in safety, did not guarantee the creation of conditions for new economic, social, and political opportunities for favela residents to improve their lives. The UPP Social program therefore aims to consolidate the peace and promote the long-term social development of the favelas through the coordination of various social services.

3. What is the three-stage process of UPP Social? Describe it.
   The pre-implementation phase starts after UPP takes over the territory. UPP Social enters with a group of local coordinators who talk to local associations, community leaders, and the general population, to get a sense of the most pressing demands. Next is a socio-economic assessment of the favela and a UPP Social Forum, which brings together representatives from all key municipal secretariats, local leaders, the local UPP police commander, and private sector representatives to discuss the main demands identified and possible responses. Lastly, a team of UPP Social local coordinators is placed permanently in the community, carrying out daily visits to be mediators between them, the government, and other services’ providers.

4. In general terms, where have UPPs been established? What is the geographical pattern?
   The first three favelas were geographically diverse, but since then UPPs have been established chiefly along the “Olympic belt,” around the locations where Rio will host the Olympic Games in 2016.
5. How did the two invasions of the Complex of Alemão differ?

*The first invasion (2007) involved 1,200 police officers and resulted in 19 people being killed, many of whom showed evidence of having been executed. The second operation (2010) was broadcast live on television and involved 2,000 officers, armored Navy ships, tanks, and helicopters. This time, the occupation took place without any incident of note.*

For Handout 3D, Situating UPP in Rio’s History with Drug Traffic: What Makes the UPP Different from Previous Policies?

1. What is the goal of the UPP program? How is this goal different from previous initiatives’ goals? Why has this narrower goal contributed to the UPPs’ success?

*Whereas previous initiatives attempted to end drug dealing in the favelas, the UPP program’s goal is narrower and more realistic: to rid the streets of weapons of war. By changing its goal from “ending drug dealing” to “ending arms circulation in the hands of drug-trafficking gangs,” the UPP shifted the public security debate. The program could then focus on the “recovery of territories,” effectively committing to an agenda geared more toward freeing residents from the control of drug traffickers.*

2. What is the relationship between “social” and “security”? Which must come first? Why is social development an important component of the overall UPP program?

*Security must be provided before social development programs can be implemented in the favelas. The UPP program emphasizes social initiatives in the belief that they are necessary in order to sustain the program’s effects and achieve its ultimate goals.*

3. How has the UPP program led to an improved image for the police force? What tactics have been used to improve the image of the police force?

*The UPP program’s achievements and aims have been thoroughly publicized in the media from the beginning. This intentional public relations push has led to an improved image for the police force. Some examples of UPP media exposure include: continuous publicizing of UPP officer training and “intellectual officers”; former officers appearing on the nightly news as public security specialists; and publicizing the role of women in charge of UPPs.*

4. Why has the private sector largely come to support the UPP program?

*The UPP program’s public support in the mainstream media has led many businesses to support it, as well. Furthermore, Rio de Janeiro’s ongoing transformation into becoming a stage for large international events offers the city’s business sector a new role in the running management of the city. Sections of the business class have therefore started to support the UPP and the security their provide for Rio’s transformation.*