Closed Borders, Open Coffers: The Nativist Nanny State and the Rebranding of the European Far Right

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1. The Blurring of Left and Right

In the postindustrial French town of Hayange, the mayor is a thirty-nine-year-old gay vegetarian who used to be a left-wing activist with a group called Workers Struggle. Things have changed. Now the young mayor, Fabien Engelmann, is a Front National (FN) member and sees halal meat as a harbinger of Islamization. Despite his own diet, Engelmann sees the absence of pork as truly worrying—“a conquest of France through its dishes.” In late 2016, he moved to evict the well-known charity association Secours Populaire from its local office, accusing it of being pro-immigrant and in league with his old Communist Party comrades.

It is impossible to understand the rise of the FN without looking at the demise of the French Communist Party, which was the continent’s largest on this side of the Iron Curtain. As the party collapsed, its members and adherents were left rudderless. Distrustful of the establishment and searching for a state that protects them, many have turned to the FN. Indeed, in France’s postindustrial north and east, uneducated working-class people, whom the left once saw as its base, now vote for Marine Le Pen. And now that Marine Le Pen has made a point of dissociating herself from fascists and skinheads, ex-leftists are now at the center of the FN’s modernization campaign.

For many years, observers of European politics viewed the 2002 French presidential election, in which Jacques Chirac defeated Marine’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, as a moment of triumph over the forces of xenophobic populism. Terrified by the prospect of a far-right victory, the French left—including Communists, Greens, and Socialists—threw their support behind Chirac, a pillar of the center-right establishment. This electoral strategy effectively isolated the FN, depicting the party as a cancerous force in the French body politic. Chirac won the election with an astronomical 82 percent of the vote, trouncing Le Pen by the biggest margin in a French presidential election since 1848. Raucous celebrations spilled into the streets of Paris. “We have gone through a time of serious anxiety for the country. But tonight, France has reaffirmed its attachment to the values of the republic,” Chirac declared in his victory speech. Then, speaking to the joyous crowds in the Place de la République, he lauded them for rejecting “intolerance and demagoguery.”

But May 2002 was not, in fact, a moment of triumph. Rather, it was the dying gasp of an old order in which the fate of European nations was controlled by large establishment parties. Jean-Marie Le Pen was an easy target for the left and for establishment figures such as Chirac. He was a political provocateur who appealed as much to anti-Semites and homophobes as to voters upset about immigration and drew his support largely from the most reactionary elements of the old Catholic right. He was a familiar villain, and his ideology represented an archaic France—a defeated past. Moreover, he did not seriously aim for power and never really came close to acquiring it; his role was to be a rabble-rouser and to inject his ideas into the national debate.

Today, Europe’s new far right is different. From France and Denmark to the Netherlands and Germany, a new wave of right-wing parties has emerged over the past decade and a half, and they are casting a much wider net than Jean-Marie Le Pen ever attempted to. And by deftly appealing to fear, nostalgia, and resentment of elites, they are rapidly broadening their base. Unlike her incendiary father, Marine Le Pen ran a disciplined political operation during the 2017 French presidential campaign and has proven that her party can win upward of 45 percent of the
vote in regions from the Côte d’Azur in the south, where she took 49 percent, to Pas-de-Calais in the north, where she won a 52 percent majority. She and her Danish and Dutch counterparts are not—as some on the left would like to believe—unreconstructed fascists or inconsequential extremists with fringe ideas lacking popular appeal.

These parties have steadily chipped away at the establishment’s hold on power by pursuing a new and devastatingly effective electoral strategy. They have shed some of the right’s most unsavory baggage, distancing themselves from skinheads, neo-Nazis, and homophobes. And they have deftly co-opted the causes, policies, and rhetoric of their opponents, seeking to outflank the left by blending a nativist economic policy—more welfare, but only for us—and tough anti-immigration and border security measures. By painting themselves as the protectors of social benefits that are threatened by an influx of freeloaders, they appeal to both economic anxiety and fear of terrorism.

The new populists have also effectively claimed the progressive causes of the left—from gay rights to women’s equality and protecting Jews from anti-Semitism—as their own, by depicting Muslim immigrants as the primary threat to all three groups. The result is that liberal democrats have begun to denounce Islam in the name of defending Enlightenment values, giving birth to a new form of far-right politics dressed up in progressive garb. As fear of Islam has spread, with the populist right’s encouragement, these parties have presented themselves as the only true defenders of Western identity and Western liberties—the last bulwark protecting a besieged Judeo-Christian civilization from the barbarians at the gates.

They have steadily filled an electoral vacuum left open by social democratic and center-right parties, who ignored festering resentment for years, opting for moral purity and political correctness rather than engaging with their own voters’ growing anger over immigration—some of it legitimate, some of it bigoted. When it was already too late to prevent an exodus of angry working-class voters, establishment parties began to adopt the rhetoric of populist xenophobes, legitimizing their ideas as the “new normal” and pushing the entire political spectrum to the right.

2. The New Culture Wars

Much of the new right’s success on the cultural front can be traced to the brand of populism first perfected by the iconoclastic Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn. On May 6, 2002, one day after revelers filled the streets of Paris to celebrate Jacques Chirac’s victory over Jean-Marie Le Pen, Fortuyn was gunned down by a radical animal rights activist as he emerged from a radio interview outside of Amsterdam. In national elections nine days later, Fortuyn’s eponymous party, the Pim Fortuyn List, became the second largest in the Netherlands with 17 percent of the vote.

Pim Fortuyn’s time in the limelight was short, but it was transformative. A former Communist and openly gay man who boasted of sleeping with Muslim immigrants in Holland while calling for a ban on Muslim immigration, he was an electrifying figure in a country known for its staid politics. Fortuyn had begun his political life on the far left. He was active in Communist groups and later tried to join the Labor Party. But it was his homosexuality, which he wore on his sleeve, that pushed him to the right. When a journalist asked him about his views on Islam in
February 2002, he replied, “I have no desire . . . to have to go through the emancipation of women and homosexuals all over again.” Moreover, there were not many countries where someone as openly gay as he was could succeed in politics. “I take pride in that,” he said. “And I’d like to keep it that way.”

Before founding his own party, Fortuyn had tried to join an establishment center-right party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). The party’s leader at the time, Frits Bolkestein, had been one of the first figures to speak critically about immigration in the early 1990s. He remembers Fortuyn as a talented but inflammatory politician. “He had a thoroughly theatrical personality, and that played in his favor,” Bolkestein, now in his eighties, told me. “I didn’t want him to be in my parliamentary group, so I cold-shouldered him. . . . He would have acted as a fragmentation bomb.”

Fortuyn took his explosive rhetoric elsewhere and formed his own party. By fashioning a new type of far-right politics in progressive garb, he redirected the entire national debate in a way that has endured. Fortuyn pushed the right toward a form of conservatism that could work in a country with progressive views toward homosexuality, prostitution, and premarital sex. Fortuyn proved that the winning argument for the European far right was not an American-style appeal to conservative religious values but the claim that it was protecting women, gays, and secularism from backward Muslims.

It was Fortuyn who blazed the trail for the new generation of far-right leaders across Europe. His brand of plainspoken political incorrectness and his depiction of Islamic culture as a backward and reactionary threat to the hard-won progressive values of Western Europe would provide a potent template for a modernized far right.

After the assassination, an up-and-coming politician named Geert Wilders attempted to fill Fortuyn’s shoes. Wilders started out working as a young staffer for Bolkestein in the VVD’s party offices. Speaking of his old understudy, Bolkestein is disdainful but not dismissive. “He has two arrows” in his quiver, says the former party leader. “The first arrow is indeed xenophobic,” but the second is the same thing as the left: “To protect the workingman, which really should have been done by the Labor Party.”

But as Labor moved away from its old base toward a more culturally liberal middle-class constituency, many of its voters started to look elsewhere. “They made a fatal mistake and really continue to make that mistake,” Bolkestein says of his old political rivals, with a tinge of satisfaction. Faced with “the choice between the foreign-born and the labor classes, they chose the foreign-born . . . and they’ve paid for it dearly.” In March 2017, in a calamitous election result, 80 percent of Labor’s MPs lost their seats, leaving a party that had once been the country’s largest with just 9 of the Dutch parliament’s 150 seats.

Bolkestein himself has undergone a strange evolution in the eyes of the Dutch public, one that mirrors the shift experienced by the society as a whole. The left used to detest him and see him as “a fearmonger, even a racist.” Indeed, Bolkestein himself admits that he was appealing to voters who felt no one would say out loud what they were saying behind closed doors. “One must never underestimate the degree of hatred that Dutch people feel for Moroccan and Turkish
immigrants. My political success is based on the fact that I was willing to listen to such people.”

And like in France, where much of the 1968 generation’s brightest intellectual lights have veered right, Dutch leftists have in recent years swung to the right out of antireligious fervor and defense of what they see as liberal values under attack from Muslims. Though Bolkestein has long since left the political arena, his ideas have become a rallying cry for people who once hated him.³

3. Welfare Chauvinism and the Populist Right’s New Economic Platform
Fortuyn offered the new European right a winning template for fighting the culture wars but these parties would not have achieved such impressive electoral results without an equally ambitious rebranding of their economic agenda. As Social Democratic Parties across Scandinavia and Labor Parties in Holland and Britain moved away from their traditional blue-collar base and sought to attract voters from the growing educated middle class, their focus and core values shifted away from defending the welfare state and generous social benefits. The populist right has deftly seized that political terrain.

For years, it was assumed that the far right in Europe would stick to an antisocialist economic platform. In 1995, a well-known academic study of the far right aimed to define a formula for success for right-wing populist parties in Europe. At a time when these parties had barely made a dent in parliaments, the authors, Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann, concluded that in order to win, parties would need to combine commitment to free-market principles with a platform that criticized diversity and multiculturalism.

But they did anticipate a possible alternative model for success; they called it “welfare chauvinism,” a strain of politics that could emerge in societies where contributors to a generous welfare system no longer see themselves as being in the same boat as some of those reaping the benefits. Likening the welfare state to a club, they argued that welfare chauvinism could lead to calls for exclusion or expulsion in order “to preserve national club goods.” Certain voters might become hostile to immigrants because they are themselves the existing beneficiaries of a welfare state, and they fear a broader backlash against the welfare system—or its financial collapse—if immigration rates increase. These welfare chauvinist voters are distinct from run-of-the-mill xenophobes who don’t care about welfare cuts and simply hate all foreigners.

If new right parties pursued this course, the authors predicted, they would move to the left economically, arguing for protection of the welfare state and increased social benefits—but for natives alone. Their platforms would combine hostility to immigrants, a strong sense of nationalism and patriotism, and the redistributionist politics commonly associated with the left. Although the authors underplayed the relevance of their own theory at the time, it has profound implications for European politics today.

Rather than combining nativist immigration policy with free-market economic policies, which seemed to be the trend on the European right in the 1970s and 1980s, the new right did something different, dealing an even more devastating blow to the left. The so-called populist right gradually became more socialist than the socialists on economic policy and made a direct appeal to the working class.
In small wealthy nations like Denmark and Holland, populist parties have succeeded in portraying the welfare state as the exclusive property of native-born citizens, a hard-earned jackpot to be protected from the grasping hands of undeserving new arrivals. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) siphons votes away from the left on a platform of reducing immigration and safeguarding Denmark’s welfare benefits for native-born Danes. The same is true in France.

4. Marine Le Pen, Champion of the Working Class
Although Marine Le Pen prefers to avoid the phrase “welfare state” (“That’s a socialist concept,” she insists), she has appealed directly to this yearning for a large, nurturing state that fights for the little guy and not the rich. “I defend fraternity—the idea that a developed country should be able to provide the poorest with the minimum needed to live with dignity as a human being. The French state no longer does that,” she told me. “We’re in a world today in which you either defend the interests of the people or the interests of the banks.” And she has seen results. She pointed to the 2015 local elections in the northern Pas-de-Calais region. “It was socialist-communist for eighty years,” she says. “I won 45 percent.”xiii She took over 52 percent there in 2017.

Marine Le Pen’s populism borrows more from the left than the right. “Even if she dresses it up with extreme right-wing semantics, it is the people against the elites. The little guy against the bosses,” says Julien Aubert, the MP for the center-right Républicains from the southern Vaucluse region, near Avignon.xiv

The FN’s rising fortunes are partly a result of its shift from a purely nativist stance to a broader economic platform, even before Marine took the reins. The elder Le Pen had started to lay the groundwork for today’s antiglobalization and anti-EU position by adopting some rhetoric familiar to the French left. This new formulation, combined with a robust defense of the welfare state, had the power to draw in new constituencies.xv If there is an ideological comparison to Le Pen’s current program, it is Peronism in Argentina, Aubert maintains. “She has tried to combine the legacy of her far-right father with a left-wing program.”xvi

Indeed, Le Pen is no fan of the financial industry; the book Banksters has a prominent place on the shelf behind her desk, and her critique of economic policy is perfectly calibrated to appeal to both young antiestablishment radicals and old leftists who resent fat cats at the commanding heights of the economy. She insists that socialists have forsaken whatever claim they may have had to representing the interests of workers. Sounding more like Bernie Sanders than Donald Trump, she argues, “The financialization of the economy has done us great harm; we want economic patriotism, we want an industrial policy that defends the strategic interests of France.”xvii

5. The Nativist Nanny State’s Threat to the Traditional Left
The theory of welfare chauvinism explains why so many former Social Democrats in Scandinavia and Holland and former Communists in France have gravitated to the populist right. Historically, they have been the beneficiaries of a generous state. Now, feeling abandoned by the left and Labor Parties that ostensibly represent their interests but instead support open
immigration policies, they are terrified that their benefits are threatened by newcomers.

In the past three decades, Denmark’s DPP has moved steadily in the direction of welfare chauvinism, combining left-wing economic policy and a strongly authoritarian nationalist message against immigration. Today’s Danish “far right,” which is now the second-biggest party in parliament, has come a long way since 1973, when the Danish right was led by Mogens Glistrup, a man who boasted he had paid zero income tax and ran on a strict antitax platform. (He eventually spent a few years in jail for tax evasion.) Since that time, new leaders have made immigration the central issue and moved to the left in their support for a robust welfare state.

At the same time, the risk of competition and conflict in the labor market has confused and divided the left, which likes to view itself both as supportive of needy refugees and as a defender of the working class. When refugees arrive in a new country, they tend to gravitate toward the capital and largest cities. In Copenhagen and its suburbs, there are fewer and fewer unskilled jobs available for Danes without an education or for foreigners who lack the language skills and qualifications to get skilled work. Much like parts of the Rust Belt in the United States, where manufacturing jobs have been replaced by a knowledge economy, the sort of stable blue-collar jobs that were once abundant have disappeared.

This economic backdrop has had an impact on the refugee debate, even at a time when some Danish companies wish they could find manual workers. The mainstream political debate has been reduced to two options: Pay refugees a low wage to clean floors and wash windows, and risk dragging the general wage level down, or, alternatively, invest in education to bring everyone up to a level where they can qualify for the new economy jobs that are available.

For the DPP, it’s quite simple: letting refugees in and letting them work “will toss out Danish persons who do not have skills from the Danish labor market,” says the MP Kenneth Kristensen Berth. If the hordes descend on Denmark and there is no longer a strict minimum wage, he claims, then employers could pay workers five kroner (less than one dollar) per hour. The staunchly free-market Liberal Alliance party has supported an entry wage, more out of hostility to the welfare state than out of empathy for refugees. “If nothing is done about the fact that people can just come to Denmark” and receive social benefits, Berth argues that will probably benefit the free-market right in the long term, destroying the welfare state. Why would you be “willing to pay like 50–60 percent of your income in taxes if you are not absolutely convinced that this money goes to well-deserving people?” he asks.

This is precisely the sort of political outcome feared by some welfare state scholars writing in the early 2000s; they worried that perceptions of undeserving welfare beneficiaries would sap support for generous welfare benefits and provide “openings for right-wing populist parties that combine anti-immigrant nativism with attacks on the welfare state.” But only half of that equation materialized. That’s because welfare cuts don’t win elections in countries like Denmark—the Liberal Alliance won just 7.5 percent of the vote in the 2015 election—and the welfare state is not in danger of disappearing.

Søren Espersen, deputy leader of the DPP, is blunt on this point. All that the center right has left of its traditional policies “is lower taxation, which nobody listens to anymore,” he scoffs. “They
don’t do that in Denmark. It’s a discussion you don’t have.” The idea of a cradle-to-grave welfare state is still holy to most Danes, and American-style welfare cuts simply do not sell.xxii But welfare chauvinism does. “We don’t want to change our welfare system,” Espersen explains. The DPP wants to protect it for those who are deserving; and for him, that is native Danes and those with valid work permits. When it comes to the entry-level wage for refugees, “we are against that because it presses the wages down and also makes it impossible for Danish people that are citizens to get those lower-paying jobs. We have a minimum wage here of 180 kroner per hour [about $25].” The DPP line is very clear: state revenues should be spent on Danes, not on newcomers.

A key to selling the DPP’s argument is convincing voters that hardworking Danes are subsidizing the undeserving foreign poor rather than their down-at-heel countrymen who are deserving of solidarity. “If the idea spreads,” says Berth, that taxpayers’ money is going “to people who just don’t want to work themselves or don’t want to do anything for themselves, they just want to have money back, then, of course, people will not be willing to pay such a large amount of money in taxes.”xxiii What is left unsaid is that the DPP has been instrumental in spreading the impression that immigrants are leeches. As Thomas Gyldal Petersen, the Social Democratic mayor of a small commuter town outside Copenhagen put it, the DPP has placed asylum seekers and everyone else in a catch-22. “Immigrants can’t do right,” he says. “When they’re unemployed, they’re a burden to society. When they’re in a job, they just stole the job from a Dane.”xxiv

6. Conclusions
In the 1970s and 1980s, the far right was preoccupied with libertarian economics and American-style conservatism; it was not an electorally successful formula. Then, in the mid-1990s, the sociologists Maureen Eger and Sarah Valdez argue, “the radical right ceased to be economically right-wing.”xxv And that is when it began to win.

The motivations of voters who abandon establishment parties for the far right are complex. Some are racist xenophobes who resent immigration and are nostalgic for an imagined past when their countries supposedly had no problems. But many are “reluctant radicals” who have grown increasingly angry at state institutions that they see as elitist and undemocratic.xxvi These voters resent the establishment parties because they have failed to address basic issues like rising housing costs, fraying public services, unemployment, and cuts to welfare benefits. When the only politicians who show any interest in their grievances are on the far right, the consequence is the rise of anti-immigrant populism. New arrivals present an easy target for blame, and far-right parties have masterfully manipulated economic anxieties by offering to both shore up the welfare state and stop the flow of immigrants.

By treating the new European populists in the same way as the older free-market incarnation of the radical right, many analysts are missing the source of their success. Parties that oppose immigration and defend the welfare state are fundamentally different from those that oppose both.xxvii Today’s populist right defends the welfare state while subscribing to a nativist understanding of immigration that depicts Muslim immigrants as a civilizational threat to white Christian Europe. Any effort to defeat them must begin with an understanding that their economic policies are in many ways identical to those once advocated by the socialist and social
democratic left while their understanding of democracy is illiberal and crudely majoritarian.

NOTES
6 Frits Bolkestein, interview by author, Amsterdam, July 4, 2016.
7 Merijn Oudendam, interview by author, Amsterdam, April 20, 2016.
8 Frits Bolkestein, interview by author, Amsterdam, July 4, 2016.
10 Ibid., 31.
12 Ibid., 261–262.
14 Julien Aubert, interview by author, Paris, May 17, 2016. Indeed, when Aubert’s former party boss, Nicolas Sarkozy, attacked the FN in the 2007 campaign, he went after them on economic policy rather than identity issues, trying to tar them with the label “extreme left.” It had the effect of shoring up the centrist and economically conservative vote even if the FN was drawing votes from the working class.
18 The modern-day DPP grew out of Glistrup’s Fremskrætspartiet (Progress Party). Although his platform was primarily anti-tax in the 1970s, he eventually embraced anti-immigration views in the 1980s, warning of “Mohammedans” coming to Denmark. He was a mentor to Pia Kjærgaard, who was a prominent member of the Progress Party and later founded the DPP.
20 Kenneth Kristensen Berth, interview by author, Copenhagen, March 4, 2016.
22 Søren Espersen, interview by author, Copenhagen, April 13, 2016.