

Mike Hayden 170519 Podcast

Operator: You are listening to a podcast from the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Phil Taubman: Okay. Welcome everybody to this event on behalf of CISAC and FSI. I am Phil Taubman. I will circle back in a minute to explain a little bit more about my connection here. But first of all, I want to make sure we all agree on the ground rules, which couldn't be easier to agree on. The discussion will be on the record.

I am here today because General Hayden kindly agreed to come to Stanford five years ago when I launched a course at Stanford based on my 30 years of experience as a reporter and editor at the New York Times.

Particularly because when I was serving as Washington Bureau Chief of The Times, it was at that moment that The Times learned for the first time about a post 9/11 NSA eavesdropping operations; which of course we also subsequently learned much more about years later from Edward Snowden. There commenced a discussion with the Bush administration about whether The Times was going to publish that story. General Hayden who at the time was the Director of NSA and I were appointed in effect as the two point persons for those discussions. I obviously represented the New York Times; and General Hayden, the Bush administration. These discussions went on for over a year. I won't go into any detail now.

We ended up holding the story for a year as many of you may remember. Eventually, we published it. That was the beginning of my relationship with General Hayden. When I decided to retire, and come to Stanford, and teach and write books and do a course on press government conflicts over the disclosure of national security secrets; I thought, "Gee, wouldn't it be great if General Hayden came out and met with my students on the week in which we discussed this showdown between the Times and the Bush administration;" which he kindly....

He returned yesterday for an encore performance. He of course is here today with a bigger audience. General Hayden really needs no introduction. I will just remind you. He served as Director of the National Security Agency. He was in that job when he was dealing with me. Then, he subsequently became the first principal DNI, Director of National Intelligence. Then, he completed his government service as Director of the CIA. He is now a principal at the Chertoff Group in Washington.

When I did General Hayden; I guess it was last fall to come and speak to my class, and come to CISAC in mid May. I sort of suspected there might be a little bit that we could talk about. There are definitely no shortages of issues to discuss today.

General Hayden and I will have a conversation for maybe 40 minutes or so;

then, we will open it up for all of you to ask questions of him. I think as an ex-newspaper editor, I am drawn to the news. Let's start with the most recent news; which the item I will pick is among many.....

Michael Hayden: – Door one. Yeah, okay.

Phil Taubman: Right. It's the furor that developed just this week over the disclosure that President Trump had shared. Some classified information with the Russian Foreign Minister and Russian Ambassador in Washington. That blew up into a major controversy, which of course, was subsequently overshadowed by other events this week. The thought of already or one that.

But, let me ask you as someone who spent many years of dealing with the most classified government intelligence; and also dealing with relationships, and with allies with whom the United States shares intelligence. It depends on that sharing. Why don't you walk us through? I know you were not involved with this particular episode. But given your background, why don't you walk us through what issues you think were raised?

Michael Hayden: Sure.

Phil Taubman: What damage might have been done in this instance?

Michael Hayden: Thanks Phil. This, it's kind of a multi-layered response to Phil's direct question. I mean, we can kind of think of it as diagnosis, alright. One element is a fever. A fever hurts. That's important. But generally, fever represents something deeper going on inside the body, alright.

You have got the symptom. Then, you have got the real issue. Telling the Russians information that went beyond his briefing points. It went beyond his portfolio. Probably that the institutions of government had to agree with, a very good reason; it should not be shared with the Russians.

Breaking the pledge, what we call the third party doctrine; which is if you give me something, I can't give it to someone else unless you have given me your approval, which is really a holy writ inside the intelligence community. We really do respect that even though as you might imagine, it becomes bureaucratically burdensome to make sure you have got a tag on all of the information you have. You know what is yours. What is not yours. That is bad enough.

Okay. That causes harm; so much harm, if you read the broad outlines of the story. It caused Tom Bossert, who is a pretty senior guy under H.R. McMaster to call NSA and CIA to warn them. That the president had gone beyond this material and shared it with the Russians. I mean, clearly this is not a trivial coloring outside of the line. It's important. That said though,

we're still in the symptoms box here.

That's probably manageable. We can probably make that fever go down. I know the speculation that it was Israeli information. But frankly, it almost doesn't matter whose it was. It's probably manageable. The reasons it's manageable is that everybody wants to be friends with CIA and NSA.

I mean, the flow of information between American intelligence and any partner; the flow is dominated by the American information going in that direction. It would be insulted. They would be angered. They would be worried. They may be a little more cautious going forward. But I think, they will swallow hard. There will not be any lasting damage to the relationship.

Yeah. It is not an important. The third party rule is or for a reason. You do too much, you just start not get intel, but manageable. What I think the backdrop is in thought. I guess why I think it kind of went viral. Why people pushed the information out the door. It was that it was symptomatic of a broader pattern of behavior, of an administration, and actually a president who was on good day spontaneous, on a bad day erratic.

Not well briefed and not interested in being well briefed; he doesn't do his homework. He feels as if his instinctive way of handling situations will be quite sufficient for these kinds of meetings. I think the bureaucracy pushed this out the door, not because of the great offense here. But because, they're starting to see the handwriting on the wall. That the pattern of life that they're about to enter is doing an awful lot of sweeping up behind a White House that just can't, won't, doesn't get control of itself.

I think that's really the issue. It's the pattern rather than the specific. I mean, I will give you another one. We lean on our South Korean allies to put THAAD, Theater High Altitude Air Defense missiles in the southwest corner of the country. I mean, it benefits South Korea. But, it's a card we want to play in the triangular match with North Korea and the Chinese.

This thing has got radar fans that sweep almost all of Manchuria. The Chinese begin to hyperventilate. My, this is threatening us. You put it.... It's not. I mean, yeah. We get a better look into China. But that's really not why we did it. But, the Chinese don't accept that.

They have really turned the screws up on the South Koreans. I mean, there is a rich economic dialogue and trade between the two countries, including a lot of tourism. The Chinese put a lot of pressure on the South Koreans through their economic levers. The South Koreans suffered for it, seriously. There is a South Korean electoral – election going on. It's not a scheduled one. It's there because the previous president had been impeached.

The THAAD deployment is part of the campaign. Then, the president, as a

stray _____ [00:10:03] – our president as a stray _____ [00:10:06] was talking about THAAD. He says, yeah, one more thing. They have got to pay for it, too. That's a billion dollars over there. They are going to pay for it. I am going to renegotiate that trade deal, too. Because we're going to sell more stuff to Korea.

Then H.R. McMaster, the National Security Advisor, who looks like those guys with the broom be on the circus parade. Okay. He has got a call to the South Koreans, and in essence say, "Pay no attention to the words of the president of the United States." A long answer, that it's important. You can cabin the immediate thing. If it were a one-off, it probably might not have leaked. But, because it's part of this broader thing, I think the permanent government. I think is a better phrase than the deep state. It's kind of pushing back, saying this has got to stop.

Phil Taubman: I want to come back to the broader picture for a second. But you would have as good an idea as anybody as to whether the disclosures of the type of disclosure that the president made to the Russians in effect exposed sources and methods for collection of the information –

Michael Hayden: Yeah.

Phil Taubman: – About the laptop threat. How seriously would you characterize that?

Michael Hayden: A couple of second order effects, alright; so when H.R. McMaster, whom I have got the highest regard for. He goes out there and says the president did not discuss sources and methods. I then wrote; and it's appeared in the Post, this Russian Post this morning. I then wrote when I was talking to people like him. He would say, "We're not talking about sources and methods." One of my constant arguments was very often; yeah, you're just talking about fact of, right. Then my point was, yes. In many instances, fact of points in the direction of fact how. That the release of the fact provides information that a good intelligence service could then work their way backward to the source.

There is a danger there. There really is. The other interesting part. I keep referring to H.R. McMaster going out there, and saying these things. I already told you the regard I have for him. That's not a good thing. But, the National Security Advisor is being rolled out as part of what might fairly be called the political defense of the president for an unarguable misstep.

I can't imagine that he or Dina Powell, who is his deputy; whom I also know and have high regard for. I cannot imagine they were comfortable doing that. A kind of answer to both questions, Phil, I mean. There are concentric circles of harm going out from the event.

Phil Taubman: Would you guess– ? I know. You don't know the sources and methods that were used in this case. But, would you suspect the technique that was used or

the collection method that was used is proven now to be unusable going forward?

Michael Hayden: I don't know the specifics, alright. I am purely speculating.

Phil Taubman: Okay.

Michael Hayden: I don't go back for briefings. Okay. My sense is this is probably a technical collection activity, right. But, it may be enabled by high risk human activity just given the nature of the target. You have got these things. You have got technical collection. It can be ended by this simple action.

Right, you just stop using the communications device. You're done. It doesn't matter, if you put a gazillion dollars in to creating access. When it's revealed, the cure is really quite cheap for the other side. Hang up the phone....

Phil Taubman: One more question about Trump's relationship with the intelligence community. Let's reverse the videotape here for a minute and go back to the campaign. Very heated comments by candidate Trump about the intelligence community; and then, of course, the day after, or just a few days after his inauguration, he went out to address the staff of the CIA at Langley.

You undoubtedly have lots of friends still in the intelligence community and at the CIA. What did they make of the references to Nazis? What did they make of his speech in front of the wall with the stars commemorating the fallen CIA officers?

Michael Hayden: Those of you who are living peacefully in California; and who don't follow this minute by minute as those of us who live inside the Beltway. The sequence of events are in the interregnum between the election and inauguration day, and the Russian connection, and the high competence judgment. The multiple tweets about these are the guys who brought you the Iraq weapons of mass destruction fiasco. Nazi like behavior, never using the word intelligence without these near sneering quotes around intelligence. The tweet, so you have got this. It is building.

Someone wisely recommends to the now president. That was a good idea. You need to go to Langley. The day after the inauguration, he goes to Langley. I am told, Phil. He had a pretty decent nonpublic meeting with the counterterrorism folks. Okay. Then, he goes out to the concourse where the big shield is, the iconic entryway and to the old headquarters building.

That's the one you see in all of the movies when they want you to think they're filming inside the CIA. He is standing on the right side in front of 117 stars; one third of which have been put up there since 9/11. He is looking across the concourse at the statue of Wild Bill Donovan, OSS. Then a lift

from the Gospel of John; you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

It's good so far, okay. Then he just interrupts himself. I mean, if you read the tape and look at the YouTube. He begins to refer to the stars behind him. He doesn't finish the sentence. You remember, yeah.

Phil Taubman: I remember that, yes.

Michael Hayden: He goes into the size of his inauguration crowd. How often he has been on Time magazine as a cover. It was just horrible, right. It just – and again, back to what I tried to describe earlier. You got the footfall here, alright, the unforced error. I get it. That's bad. But, it's symptomatic of a broader picture. In this case, he doesn't get it, right.

For example, he is looking at the Gospel of John. You shall know the truth, and the truth shall... That is what he is staring at on the far wall. He says; this whole thing that you and I have an issue between us. That's fake news. The press is making that up. These are intelligent people. They know that's not true. It was not a good day.

Phil Taubman: Let's segway over to the Russian hacking during the campaign. You know a lot about cyber security. For a layperson like me, the storyline looked absurdly easy from the Russian standpoint. The Clinton campaign was wholly unprepared in terms of cyber security. Is this typical of our political party institutions. Is this typical of our government institutions in Washington? Are we child's play for the Kremlin, or for China; or other nations that want to interfere in our internal processes?

Michael Hayden: Yeah. We probably are. This is hard. You don't need to be condemnatory of anybody. I mean, this stuff happens. If you have got a persistent, advanced persistent threat, you're not stopping them. They are getting in. Now, we probably didn't make this and expend a whole lot of energy. President _____ [00:18:44] here. These guys have suffered in Estonia through an attack. Because of that, have taken measures to make their web on which they rely even more than we do, tougher than ours.

We could do more. It is hard to make this go away through just... In fact, you cannot make it go away through defensive measures. To rehearse a story, almost certainly the Russian Federation used Russian criminal gangs and other affiliates; which is how they do this. You get a bit of a cut out. The Russian criminal gangs are allowed to succeed or allowed to exist inside the Federation. It is like the Godfather I, scene one when the wedding is on the lawn. The Godfather is holding court inside the library. The undertaker comes and says, "Godfather, Don Corleone, and my daughter; yes I will grant you this favor. But, I may come to you from time to time for a service."

That's the relationship between Don Vladimir and the Russian cyber gangs. I suspect President _____ [00:19:46] would confirm that an awful lot of what happened there in 2007, came from the gangs working on behalf of Russian foreign policy. That's what happened here. The gangs break through, and go into the DNC, not a heavy lift; pull the information out, and give it to the Russian security services. Okay, so far, all we're talking about is honorable international espionage. Okay.

Michael Hayden: _____ [00:20:11].

Michael Hayden: Yeah. Hey, if I could grab the e-mails from the United Russia; and if I thought they were worth anything, we would do it in a heartbeat. Getting the e-mails of a major political party inside a global competitor is an accepted international practice. Alright, so far no foul; but then, the Russians took the next step, which was to weaponize the information. To turn it around, and push it back into the American information space through their subsidiary, WikiLeaks, and through another whole set of sites they created called DCLeaks.

Then, they had an army of trolls who would touch the data, and a whole bunch of other fake news stories. Touch it in a way that the Google algorithms would think that the data was trending; and pull it forward into the American information space. Then, to be really candid, opponents of Hillary Clinton would then forward and be part of the forwarding of these really outlandish news stories.

It is by the way – that's all fact. We all know that. That's okay. It's not forensics, alright. It's everything that intelligence can do to say that's true.

It appears that the motivation moved throughout the campaign. At first, they just wanted to mess with our heads. Check, I did that. They wanted to punish her. Because he hates her. He does. They did. Then, they wanted to injure and undercut the validation of soon to be President Clinton. Then, August-ish, and September-ish, they began to kind of say, "I think I could win."

Then, the high confidence judgment of your intelligence services is they work to put their thumb on the scale. To actually move folks in the direction of Donald Trump. Now, that's all true. They try to affect the American election. Only two presidents on this planet who refused to say that last sentence, ours and the Russian president. Everyone else agrees. The Russians attempted to affect the outcome of the election.

Their effect is not measurable. It's not just unknown. It is unknowable. I generally just say at this point; so we're done talking about that. Donald Trump is the legitimate president of the United States. But, this stuff really did happen. This is called a covert influence campaign. Other intelligence services in the world have conducted covert influence campaigns. As

practitioners, they would be able to tell you that covert influence campaigns are unable to create fractures in a society.

All covert influence campaigns can do is to exploit and worsen preexisting fractures. Give the Russians credit; they knew us at least as well as we knew ourselves, and knew our openings, and drove through those openings with their messaging. In terms of collaboration, okay, and which is now the ongoing investigation. I want you to very harsh judgment. The only collaboration that covert influence campaign probably needed was an American political atmosphere in which people had thought it was legitimate to lock her up at multiple campaign rallies. An opposition candidate that validated the legitimacy of WikiLeaks. Beyond that, they probably didn't need any more help.

Phil Taubman: I would observe as a journalist. There was also, whether witting or unwitting, very clever flipping of the American press. I certainly would argue is one of the pillars of our democratic system, the free press. This campaign of hacking and then pushing stuff out through WikiLeaks flipped the free press into an instrument that furthered this campaign.

Because the press is impossibly competitive. That will never cease to be the case. When John Podesta's – it's not a _____ [00:24:34] e-mails – were really released, the news media was frantic in trying to publish that information. You took organizations like the New York Times and Washington Post; which I think a lot of us would think of as organizations that are vital to the civic life of our country. You sort of turn them into a kind of anti-matter in a very effective way. What do you think that Vladimir Putin's end game is here?

Michael Hayden: Yeah. President Obama was right in saying on their very best day, these guys are pretensions to be a regional power. We're not going back to the bipolar world and the balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union. They have a lot of internal structural problems in the economy of the population, which is going down; a lack of entrepreneurship and difficulty of extracting oil, and energy, and in tough to reach places – the global cost of oil, and so on.

I said on Morning Joe. It's more than a year ago now after one or another Russian sin. Joe, he's doing this with nothing more than a pair of sevens in his hand, right. I mean, he has got no picture cards. But, he keeps bidding the pot. He keeps bidding it. Because frankly up to that point, no one was bidding against him. The folks weren't pushing back. I said this last night over dinner.

Michael Hayden: _____ [00:26:10].

Michael Hayden: It's a little bit of a silly metaphor. But, I think it really does have a whole lot of truth. If you picture. We're all here eating lunch, okay. Just picture, if we had a little kids' table over here. Alright, that's where Vlad has got to sit.

Okay. Because his country doesn't have all of the stuff that the big people have. He knows he can't make his chair at that table much bigger, back to the limits; the declining population and the declining entrepreneurship, and the lack of Democracy, and so on.

But, he really does want to eat at that big table. In fact, his legitimacy as a Russian leader is based on a promise. I am going to get us back to the big table. Sure, it certainly can't be quality of life, alright. But I am going to take care of your pride here. But, he can't make his table or his chair any bigger. Every night he comes over here near our big people table with a saw. Every night he cuts off about a quarter of an inch from the big persons' table. He does it over a long period of time.

Sooner or later, that big people's table is going to be so low that he is going to slide his chair over. It's going to look like it fits. It's going to look like it belongs. That in my Saturday morning cartoon way is my explanation for the attack on American Democracy, and French Democracy, German Democracy, and the support for Brexit, and the attack on the European Union, and the attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It's to pull us down to a level where he now can be competitive with what he knows or his limited tools.

Phil Taubman: Let's switch over to ransomware.

Michael Hayden: to the happy news?

Phil Taubman: Yes. We'll switch over to another item in the news these days, the ransomware attack. This goes right back to your old agency at NSA. They have cooked up a lot of this stuff. Then, it leaked out. Now it has come back to torment all of us. What the hell is going on, Mike, if I may ask you?

Michael Hayden: I see our time is up. There are a lot of factors bearing on the problem. If you get my book, chapter nine is the one about the cyber domain. Frankly, it is the least remarked chapter in the book when I go out and talk about it. It was the toughest one to clear.

There's actually a lot of stuff in there. One of the things that I talk about in chapter nine is our putting an office called TAO, Tailored Access Operations on steroids. That is the office that we would have used to go after United Russia's e-mails.

Alright, it is the active signal. Normal signals intelligence, you have got the antenna and the ether. You are waiting for a communications. Tailored access is don't wait for them to send it. Let's just go to where they keep it. We bust into the network. We extract it, alright. We really began to accelerate in my time there TAO, Tailored Access Operation, active SIGINT [PH], and commute to the target; and steal the data from the network. Don't wait for

them to transmit it. That stuff that was allegedly leaked in Vault 7, no?

Phil Taubman: No. That's the CIA.

Michael Hayden: That's CIA. Anyway, in whatever – they have....

Michael Hayden: – Shadow Broker.

Michael Hayden: – Shadow Broker?

Michael Hayden: Yeah. Thank you. That is allegedly from the TIO toolbox, alright. The tools that Tailored Access Office developed. Again, I don't go back for briefings. I can't confirm what I'm reading in the press. But, it sounds plausible. I already told you what I know. What I can tell you?

Yeah, we do that. We stockpile these kinds of tools. There are a couple of really interesting subplots here. One is what we call the equities decision. If you believe the press; and I just have to say it that way. Okay. If I forget to say that, pretend I said it throughout that, and based on press accounts.

NSA discovers this vulnerability inside of Windows XP. Then, it develops a tool that allows it to exploit that vulnerability. Whenever NSA discovers a vulnerability, it has to make a legal operational and moral decision. What do I do with my knowledge of the vulnerability? You realize that NSA has both offensive and defensive responsibilities. It steals other legitimate intelligence targets' information.

But it also is designed to protect Americans from similar activity from foreign actors. Now, you have got a vulnerability in Windows XP. NSA has to make a decision; patch it, make it public and patch it, or keep it secret and exploit it. We have always had to make that decision. That decision has existed since the agency began.

But, the circumstances, the ambient background within which that decision is made now is really quite different. Because in most cases when we discover a vulnerability, it's a vulnerability on a piece of equipment that is almost always in broad general use, including use by people protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It's not a hole in a Russian cryptographic system for strategic rocket forces; which you probably wouldn't care about – whereas a hole in Windows XP, you might. If you're still using Windows XP.

You had this equities decision. The fulcrum between offensive defense is shifting. Because more and more the vulnerability is discovered not in the isolated network of a legitimate foreign target. But, it is discovered in a piece of kit that is in general use. Another dynamic that we used in the vulnerability, the equities decision is a concept we called nobus, n-o-b-u-s,

nobody but us.

It meant, it was yeah. There is a hole there. But, it is so hard to find. If it is so hard to exploit, unless you are a multibillion dollar National Security Agency; unless it requires something like NSA to exploit it. Then, the instinct is let it ride. Because even though the vulnerability continues, others can't take advantage of it.

That is shifting, too. Because the universe of nobus is actually getting smaller as other nations and even private sector elements become more and more talented. You had this gap vulnerability in Windows XP. I don't know this. But, connecting the dots about what it is I know. It appears that NSA informed Microsoft. That triggered Microsoft issuing the patch last March for the vulnerability that this exploited. Then, it was just a question. Who had good systems administrators? Who didn't?

When you look at where it was most effective. The lion's share of the badness were in countries like China, Russia, and the Ukraine. Who are almost certainly using pirated Microsoft software. That would not normally then get the patches and the updates from those who were using licensed equipment. The second major issue, sorry, this is a long answer. But, it's a pretty rich question.

The second major question is, okay, I got it. I got the vulnerability part, Hayden. I see how that kind of works. How about the weapon part? How about the tool you developed to go do this? That's honorable espionage. In the book, I talk about how we just put the throttle all of the way forward to develop these kinds of tools. I am comfortable with that. I can defend that.

I know how we use them. We don't use them against you, even though you do use XP. We use them against other people who use XP. I mean, I agree with that argument. Phil and I talked about this yesterday. The argument I can't win however is – but, if you can't keep control of the weapon, why will I let you have it in the first place? It's a little bit like, well yeah. We have lost a couple of B-2s. But still, they're good. They are good. We need to keep them.

I mean, it's in that realm. Phil pointed out a quote of mine in yesterday's New York Times in which he thought it was a little stark. In which I said, look, I can defend what these agencies do. I cannot defend them losing control their tools. If they can't control their tools, then we have to seriously consider whether or not we will allow them to have such tools. That's how serious an issue I think this will be.

Phil Taubman: I think that is speaking of that same story. Scott Shane who wrote it is someone you know as well.

Michael Hayden: Yes.

Phil Taubman: It really raises the broader question where you have got a multibillion dollar American intelligence agency that is developing technologies of an order completely different from the weapons technologies that we were accustomed to in our history until recent decades and recent years. The current technologies, if they get out, can be turned against the American people. They can be turned against citizens all around the world. That is an entirely different ballgame. It in some ways, the only weapon systems that we developed that had this global capacity for destruction, nuclear weapons. Doesn't this raise a real ongoing long-term problem for NSA? How it is going to maintain the confidence of the American people and the Congress.

Michael Hayden: Yeah. That is why I gave Scott the quote. He called me. He had already written a story. The story is about – and you lost that. You lost that. You lost that. What's going on? I mean, it's just going through all the things that had happened. He said, "You got anything to add?" I said, yeah. I gave him the quote. If you can't. . . .

I can prove what it is they're doing is effective, lawful, and appropriate according to U.S. constitutional concerns, and reasonable expectation of privacy, the laws of armed conflict, and accepted international practice, and check, and check, and check. I can win that. I can't win. They can't control them. I don't know what. How the American people should be expected to let's keep them. That is a really important question now for the leadership of the agencies, both the NSA and CIA that I headed. Yeah.

Phil Taubman: Let's widen the aperture here for a second. Go ahead.

Michael Hayden: Can you say at all about why you're not able to keep control?

Michael Hayden: All of these incidents took place –

Michael Hayden: It's _____ [00:37:13] here.

Michael Hayden: – Long after I left government. Therefore, I don't know. You would have thought Manning would have been a wake up call. Frankly, that was bad. But, that was down at the secret level. That was irritating, and not all that destructive. Although, there were dangers. Okay. But when you go up to Snowden, and to this stuff here. That's really into the most precious stuff we have. That should be compartmented, cabined, and limited access, and so on.

Now, they're rolling out. It appears that we are most victimized by insiders. The newness is the insiders are not working for anyone else. If you think of how we can catch spies. It's because spies are working for these people. You catch the connective tissue going back to the state actor for whom they work.

Or, more ideally, you penetrate the other state actor and learn who is working

for them, which is the best counterintelligence technique. These folks are sui generis. They are self-motivated to go do that. Therefore, the first time you learn. The first time you should learn that something is wrong is when they start downloading things they shouldn't have. If you miss that, your next indicator is stuff showing up on the outside world. All of the tools you have practiced and developed for counter-intelligence were kind of built to stop state sponsored spies. Now, you have got this whole new phenomenon.

Phil Taubman: This will be my last question. Those of you who have questions. Harold is going to keep a list. You can indicate to him now, if you want to ask a question. Mike, if you pull back a bit. How would you assess the greatest strategic threats to the United States over the next ten or 15 years?

Michael Hayden: Yeah. Well, thanks Phil. What I do. I think it has said a lot. What I do to answer it. It is not a dodge of the question. But, it's the only way you can answer it. I create this little X, Y axis thing here. Okay. If this is how bad could it be? This is how much time you have got. Okay. What I do. I say down here, and not existential.

But, it could go bump tonight. I throw in terrorism and even cyber, alright. Because I don't think cyber reaches the existential level yet. They're important. They're not downplaying them, alright. But, in the broader scheme of things, what's really driving them is their urgency and immediacy. Somebody at SFO – some young youngster makes a bad decision at SFO tonight. We could be looking at the lower corner of the graph and saying that was a bad thing.

Down here, important and more urgent than catastrophic or apocalyptic terrorism, and cyber threat. Then, I go out here, three to five, and six. I got another bubble. This one is further up the vertical axis. It is more serious. There I have got a shot, a group of states that I label overall ambitious fragile and nuclear. There, I put the North Koreans and the Pakistanis. I throw the Iranians in there. Because that agreement ages off. That's where I draw....

That's where I group the Russians. Okay. Then I go out here at ten to 12. Then, I got a bubble way up here, more important than either of those. That bubble I label the Sino-American relationship. I am careful to label it the Sino-American relationship and not China. Because I don't want you to think of China the same way just looped in, in North Korea. It's getting that relationship right – is probably the pass fail effort of the 21st century. Phil, anyhow....

Phil Taubman: Okay. Great.

Michael Hayden: Thanks Phil.

Operator: You have been listening to a podcast from the Stanford Center for

International Security and Cooperation.

[END OF TAPE]