Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses

Workshop report / session summaries / observations / recommendations
ABOVE: (March 2017) In East Rejaf, Juba, South Sudan, a Mine Wolf 240 remote-controlled mine clearing vehicle cuts an access lane in an United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) training area. Credit: UNMAS / Martine Perret

COVER: (June 2015) In Bentiu, South Sudan, an integrated patrol unit (United Nations Police, formed police unit [FPU], Mongolian battalion [Monbatt] and Ghanaian battalion [Ghanbatt]) carries out the Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate through night patrols, cordon and search, and riot management. Credit: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
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ABOVE: (May 2011) Zambian peacekeepers from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) patrol streets lined with looted items awaiting collection in Abyei, the main town of the disputed Abyei area on the border of Sudan and newly independent South Sudan.

Credit: United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) / Stuart Price
Acknowledgments

This workshop was supported by contributions from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies of Stanford University, the China-US Exchange Foundation, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Workshop facilities and administrative assistance were provided by the Stanford Center at Peking University. The workshop co-hosts are grateful for the support provided by all of these organizations, and to the workshop participants for their enthusiastic engagement and insightful thoughts.
ABOVE: (March 2017) UNMISS forces provide protection at designated times to women when they go out of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites to collect firewood and procure other non-food items. The women face potential threats of danger when leaving the PoC and may be subject to harassment, abduction, or sexual violence. Credit: UNMISS / Nektarios Markogiannis
Since the end of the Cold War, intrastate violence and civil wars have increasingly posed threats to regional stability in various areas of the world. Military intervention, economic assistance, and robust diplomacy have yet to solve the many problems associated with failed states. At the same time, China’s global exposure—in terms of trade, investment, and number of citizens living abroad—has increased dramatically. It has growing equities in states that are experiencing or at risk of political instability and domestic unrest. It is within this context that the idea for a joint U.S. and PRC workshop was conceived, as a way of helping Chinese, American, and other international scholars better understand each other’s perspectives regarding civil wars and intrastate violence.

From October 22–23, 2018, the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI) at Stanford University, in conjunction with the Institute for China-U.S. People-to-People Exchange at Peking University and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), gathered scholars and policy practitioners at the Stanford Center at Peking University to participate in the “Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses” workshop. The workshop was an extension of a project examining the threats posed by intrastate warfare launched in 2015 and led by AAAS and Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. The goal of this workshop was to facilitate frank discussions exposing participants to a wide range of views on intrastate violence and international responses.

The workshop was divided into sessions that assessed trends in intrastate violence since the end of the Cold War, examined the threats to international security posed by civil wars and intrastate violence, and assessed international responses, including an analysis of the limits of intervention and a discussion of policy recommendations. Participants also had an opportunity to make closing comments and recommendations for future research.
The workshop featured a keynote dinner address by Ambassador Fu Ying, chief expert of the National Institute of International Strategy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and former PRC vice foreign minister. There was also a lunch talk by Major General Xu Hui, Commandant of the International College of Defence Studies at the PLA National Defence University.

The discussions among the participants were candid and wide-ranging. On many issues there was disagreement, but a better appreciation of different viewpoints emerged as the workshop progressed. A summary of the discussions, by session and on a non-attribution basis, can be found in the main body of this report.
Assessing Trends in Intrastate Violence Since the End of the Cold War

The Chinese, American, and other international participants all agreed that intrastate violence has been increasing since the start of the twenty-first century. A PRC participant observed that intrastate violence remains concentrated in failed states—most often developing countries—and that root causes remain largely unchanged. This participant also noted that since the end of the Cold War, terrorism has been on the rise in failed states. An American participant explained that since the early 2000s, combatants in intrastate wars have been less likely to negotiate for peace. Others posited that with the rise of transnational terrorist organizations and cyber warfare, threats posed by intrastate violence have expanded in both type and scope.

While most in attendance agreed that the threats from intrastate violence are growing, they did not agree on what the international response should be. In particular, they did not agree on whether or not foreign powers should intervene in failed states. One U.S. scholar argued that due to the increased lethality of modern weapons, and the growing risks of cross-border pandemic diseases, disruptive cyberattacks, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, countries could not afford to ignore political breakdown in states. However, many Chinese scholars took the position that intervention by outside powers often renders the situation worse and more complicated. One Chinese scholar acknowledged that some severe problems resulting from failed states, such as the threat posed by ISIS, must be addressed collectively by the international community in order to be solved. From the viewpoint of several PRC participants, however, the creation of ISIS itself was the result of a previous misguided foreign intervention. All accepted the starting point that unilateral intervention requires great caution.

There was, however, little consensus on what non-intervention actually means. American scholars questioned whether Chinese overseas investment can realistically be classified “non-intervention” since it often influences the domestic politics of recipient countries. One asked if a country on the receiving end of PRC economic spending would view large-scale infrastructure projects as non-intervention. One Chinese scholar acknowledged that PRC investment abroad can have political consequences but offered that there is a significant difference between economic and military intervention.

Chinese, American, and other international scholars also disagreed on how much deference to give the United Nations when a country or coalition is making a decision whether or not to
Chinese participants argued that only the UN can sanction foreign interventions into failed states. Other scholars agreed that ideally the UN should sanction all foreign intervention. Nonetheless, they emphasized that some scenarios, especially those involving pandemic diseases or immediate national security threats, might require timely intervention to avoid more dire consequences. One scholar emphasized that the UN is unable to field security forces capable of dealing with more intense conflicts such as those in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Several American participants also noted that given the current geopolitical climate and intensifying major power competition, getting Russia, China, and the Western powers to cooperate in sanctioning a foreign intervention into a failed state is extremely difficult.

Although participants disagreed on whether foreign powers should intervene in areas prone to intrastate violence, most agreed that the primary driver of civil wars is the breakdown of a country’s political system. This led to a discussion as to what model should be used to bolster or restore political stability.

One Chinese scholar stated that the West traditionally advocates a “liberal-peace” model that emphasizes building liberal democracy coupled with economic development driven by open markets. From the Chinese perspective, the problem with this approach is that institutions within a failed state are too fragile to mediate disagreements between political parties or factions. This, they argue, weakens the power of the central government, making it difficult to establish political stability and control the security environment. Instead, several Chinese participants advocated for a “development-peace” model. This model emphasizes government and social stability over early reliance on liberal democratic political and open economic institutions. They pointed to the examples of China, South Korea, and Singapore as countries whose economies flourished despite their having focused more on national stability rather than on liberal democracy.

Noting the lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, several Americans in attendance acknowledged that the liberal-peace model has not always worked but questioned whether the development-peace model would produce better results. Referring to examples such as North Korea, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and the PRC prior to 1978, they argued that while these
countries might be considered examples of political stability, it is clear that the governments did not always act in the interests of their citizens and were not necessarily positive actors on the world stage. Another participant stated that leaders sometimes want a strong government in order to crush domestic opposition, and not to develop their own countries for the greater good.

Concluding this session, several Chinese participants acknowledged that they are predisposed to nonintervention, yet their thinking on the topic is evolving. One stated that the PRC has not had the capability to intervene until very recently and that as its capabilities develop, so will the views of its leaders regarding intervention. All participants agreed intervention is best done under UN authorization, but there was no consensus on what conditions would be necessary for a foreign intervention into a failed state to be deemed legitimate without UN authorization. Finally, though all acknowledged the shortcomings of the liberal-peace model, opinions differed greatly on how to create a strong government that puts the interests of its citizens first and contributes to regional stability.
ABOVE: A Mongolian Peacekeeper keeps watch on one of the UNMISS compound’s gates in Bentiu, South Sudan. In 2014, this Protection of Civilians site housed over 40,000 displaced persons.

Credit: UNMISS /JC McIwaine
Workshop attendees agreed that the threat posed by failed states is complex and multifaceted. Panelist presentations and dialogue focused on the challenges posed by large-scale refugee and migrant movements, private security contractors, pandemics, ever-morphing militant jihadist-inspired terrorist movements, and great power rivalries.

One American scholar explained that the reason refugees depart their birth countries (whether due to deteriorating security or targeted persecution), combined with how host countries receive those refugees, are two important factors in determining the ultimate success of refugees’ social reintegration. When discussing private security contractors, a Chinese participant noted that countries use contractors for interventions into failed states because it is politically less costly than using national militaries. Both an American and a Chinese participant reported on the difficulty of controlling pandemics that cross international borders. In areas prone to intrastate violence, it was noted that the solution to most pandemics requires behavioral changes among the local population. This, in turn, demands immense amounts of informational and political legitimacy, of which failed states have very little. One participant explained that a government’s response to a pandemic outbreak can seriously affect its relations with neighboring countries; for example, China’s slow initial reaction to the 2002–03 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic temporarily impacted its relations with Southeast Asian nations.

Regarding international terrorism, an American participant noted that jihadist terrorist organizations have adapted to foreign military intervention by addressing local grievances and franchising out operations to regional groups that understand conditions on the ground. Everyone agreed that cooperation at the local, regional, and international levels is necessary to address these challenges.

In addition to agreeing that international cooperation was essential, most participants also believed that there are occasions when foreign intervention is necessary to address these types of challenges. There was no common view, however, on who should be responsible for said intervention and what the scope of that responsibility should be. One Chinese scholar advocated that the United States should take the lead in bearing the primary responsibility for solving the current Middle East crisis, because, in his view, the U.S. invasion of Iraq
was largely to blame for the failed states across the Middle East. An American participant stated that assigning responsibility is often difficult because centuries of complicated history can create underlying causal factors that are the real driving forces behind contemporary events.

Because pandemics often occur in the same places where intrastate violence is at its worst, Chinese and American participants said that it is necessary to determine ahead of time who has the responsibility for intervening to stop them. Since many pandemics occur in war-torn areas, medical response teams usually need security details to support their efforts. However, most countries are unwilling to provide such a capability and are sometimes also unwilling to allow an external military force to enter the country to assist. One American participant felt that security experts, in conjunction with medical professionals, should take the lead in planning plausible, effective responses in the case of an outbreak of a pandemic in a failed or unstable state. Left to medical professionals alone, pandemics in war-torn areas cannot be adequately addressed.

All participants believed the UN was the ideal institution to manage these issues. Some Chinese scholars argued that without UN agreement on how to address these challenges, no country should intervene. The U.S. and international scholars emphasized that the UN has often been ineffective in taking on these challenges and that there are frequently costs associated with inaction. As terrorist groups and instigators of intrastate violence become more linked to local societies via marriage or franchise operations, they become more difficult to defeat. Additionally, the longer the international community waits to deal with refugee crises or medical pandemics, the more difficult resolving these situations becomes. Several Chinese participants acknowledged that international inaction might make the problem worse but expressed their belief that the best way for a foreign intervention to achieve legitimacy is through the UN.
Workshop participants agreed that international responses to civil wars are fraught with limitations and that there is no consensus on which approach works best in each circumstance. In this session participants discussed the limitations of security force assistance (SFA) programs, the difficulty of building political institutions in countries that have decentralized or dynastic leadership, and issues surrounding the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P).

An American scholar posited that SFA programs frequently fail due to the diverging interests of the intervening power’s and host nation’s political leadership. Intervening powers typically try to fight terrorist organizations and promote domestic stability, while a host nation’s political leaders may merely have the goal of retaining power. Many U.S.-backed SFA programs are designed to create an apolitical professional military capable of maintaining security. The host nation political leadership, however, may see such an armed force as a potential threat to its power and adopt subversive countermeasures.

Participants proposed two solutions for this problem. The first is to create an incentive structure that aligns the interests of the intervening nation and the host nation. The second is to emphasize the creation of smaller, highly trained special operations–type units that are capable of defeating the most dangerous terrorist and insurgent groups, yet are not large enough to pose a significant threat to the host nation’s political leadership. Additionally, one American participant believed that the U.S. military needs to do a better job of making SFA a central effort within the American armed forces and to ensure the assignment of high-quality personnel. When discussing the possibility of using the UN to conduct SFA missions, one participant believed this would not be practical because nations generally like to use their own militaries to conduct SFA efforts rather than work through the UN, as doing so provides more leverage to the contributing nation.

An American participant stated that another reason international responses to failed states are sometimes ineffective is that in some countries (such as Mali), the political leadership intentionally diffuses power among relatives and encourages societal divisions so it can protect its own position. Several American and Chinese scholars agreed and emphasized that any international response must account for the many divergent identity groups in failed states. Familial or religious identity is often more important than national identity, making it difficult
to develop a cohesive national government or military.

A Chinese participant noted that the UN had tried to build consensus around intervention by adopting the framework of R2P. He added that the concept of R2P is amorphous because not everyone agrees on the nature of the humanitarian disaster in question or on when a military intervention should be authorized. Western countries, he asserted, often conflate humanitarian disasters with human rights issues. Vocal criticism of weak political regimes’ human rights records only serves to further undermine local leadership, thereby making it more difficult for the established government to restore stability. The scholar stated that sometimes the issues surrounding intervention are so complex that it is best to just let the actors involved in a civil war fight it out. Once a winner emerges, the international community should work with that new government to build domestic stability.

Another Chinese participant expressed his belief that the United States was undermining prospects for international cooperation in the Middle East with its withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Agreement. The likely result will be the further escalation of regional tensions and the eruption of proxy civil wars.

The session wrapped up with a Chinese scholar stating that the best international response to failed states is one with a UN authorization, that is effective in nature, and is permanent in that it deals with the central issues of the conflict. This participant went on to declare that this is why the PRC advocates “building a shared community for all mankind.”

BELOW: (August 2018) The Canadian Armed Forces deploys an Air Task Force to Gao to enhance the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) operations with aeromedical evacuations to safeguard UN forces as well as transport and logistics capacity. Credit: MINUSMA / Marco Dormino
International Response Options: Best Advice to Policymakers

In this session participants continued their exploration of appropriate international responses to civil wars and intrastate violence. Topics included the creation of buffer zones; the value of not insisting on regime change when intervening; the utility of foreign military bases; and the importance of major powers staying engaged in and committed to the process of dealing with failed states.

One participant stated that the creation of buffer zones is a state strategy for dealing with the spillover effects from neighboring countries afflicted by civil war and uncontained violence. Ethiopia, for example, created buffer zones along its border with Somalia. While this action may have violated traditional norms of sovereignty, it has been effective in minimizing the impact on Ethiopia of internecine warfare within Somalia. Several participants agreed that if the goal of a buffer zone is merely to protect one’s own country from the effects of a neighbor’s civil war, then this option should be considered. While agreeing with this point, other participants noted that not all buffer zones are legitimate; if a state creates a buffer zone with the goal of acquiring territory, that could further destabilize the situation.

A Chinese scholar argued that intervening countries must neither insist on regime change nor meddle in the domestic political affairs of the countries in which they intervene. He agreed that many of today’s problems are very complex and do require international intervention, but the goal should be limited to the cessation of violence and prevention of humanitarian disasters. Any intervention, he emphasized, should be limited in scope and only occur under UN authorization in order to give the operation required legitimacy.

Another Chinese scholar noted that as PRC overseas trade and investments continue to grow, especially in areas exposed to political risk, its number of foreign military bases will increase. The Chinese naval base in Djibouti—which serves as a logistics hub to support anti-piracy missions, protect economic investment, conduct non-combatant evacuation operations for Chinese and foreign civilians, and provide a platform for UN missions—might serve as a model for future overseas military installations. The participant added that China is the last of the UN P-5 members to acquire overseas military bases and that the nature of its bases is fundamentally different from those of the United States. The U.S. bases were created as a result of the Allied victory in World War II and are used to project American power abroad. The PRC base in Djibouti is not based upon the outcome
of a war, but the result of a bilateral agreement. Additionally, the mission of the PRC base is merely to extend the logistic reach of the People’s Liberation Army and to protect Chinese economic interests; it is not a power projection tool in the mold of American installations.

When discussing how the mission of providing logistics and protecting economic interests is different from projecting national power, most participants agreed that the distinction is not always clear. Asked to compare the PRC base at Djibouti to the newly constructed bases in the South China Sea, the Chinese scholar responded that the latter installations were built upon Chinese territory, whereas the Djibouti base is in a foreign country and that they are, therefore fundamentally different.

One international participant argued that the international community must not give up on failed states, as the world is too interconnected to simply permit civil wars to run their course. Intervening powers need to have a better understanding of local conditions within violence-prone states and work to develop governments that not only can address security issues, but can provide services, manage dissent, and build trust with their publics. This scholar said that sometimes the West gets overly focused on national elections, and this may not be the only path to legitimacy. Additionally, intrastate conflicts are connected. There are international, regional, and domestic elements; therefore, solutions often cannot be imposed by just one actor.

This session concluded with participants discussing the role of the UN in addressing regions prone to intrastate violence. Most attendees agreed that the UN, since the end of the Cold War, has achieved a number of limited successes in its application of the “standard treatment regime,” which includes brokering ceasefires and political settlements, dispatching peace enforcers and peacekeepers, and providing some foreign assistance. However, it has proven incapable of dealing with large-scale problems (e.g., Libya and Syria); moreover, the increasing geopolitical competition of major powers may further diminish UN effectiveness. In fact, the creation of buffer zones is an indicator of UN inaction.

Several Chinese participants insisted that the UN must be involved in any intervention. Another international participant, however, said that the UN cannot deal with non-state transnational terror groups such as Al-Shabaab, so it is the responsibility of regional states and, at times, of the major powers to address the problem. One scholar stated that the UN was designed to prevent national armies from crossing borders; it was not designed to confront non-state actors. In the absence of international action, countries concerned for their own security have no choice but to take unilateral action, with or without UN approval. A Chinese participant acknowledged that it is sometimes unreasonable to expect a country to wait for UN approval to counter a dangerous and imminent threat, adding that the PRC government would likely strike a terror group plotting to attack the Chinese homeland even without UN approval.

American participants mostly agreed that intervention without UN authorization is not ideal and that most international interventions have limitations; however, they believed that there is a downside to inaction—a great power’s decision not to involve itself can also have negative consequences. One participant said that for the UN to be more effective, the authority of the secretary-general needs to be strengthened, regional groups need to be empowered, and the great powers need to be invested in bolstering
the UN. Great powers should not obstruct UN measures merely for the sake of opposing a rival power; rather, they should be interested in making the UN work properly.

**CLOCKWISE FROM TOP RIGHT:** Abdeta Dribssa Beyene, Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, Ethiopia; (center) Stephen Krasner, Stanford University; Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University; (left) Li Chen, Renmin University, and (right) Stephen Biddle, Columbia University; Paul Wise, Stanford University.
(June 2014) An UNAMID (African Union—UN hybrid operation in Darfur) peacekeeper from Tanzania watches over the camp for internally displaced persons (IDP) in Khor Abeche, South Darfur, from a watchtower in the UNAMID’s compound. Credit: Albert Gonzalez Farran / UNAMID
Observations and Recommendations

During the workshop’s final session, Chinese, American, and other international participants provided their final observations and recommendations for future conferences. Below are the highlights:

Observations

• There were different opinions on how close the Chinese, U.S., and other international viewpoints were regarding intervention. Many American scholars believed that U.S. and Chinese perspectives differed greatly, while several Chinese participants stated that they were surprised by how U.S. and Chinese positions seemed to converge.

• Many American participants questioned whether the PRC would remain so steadfastly opposed to intervention as its interests and capabilities expand. The Chinese participants acknowledged that their views and policies are evolving on this topic, but they argued that intervention should not be used as a pretext by foreign powers seeking regime change.

• Regarding the concept of intervention, several Chinese participants offered clarification by noting that the PRC is not categorically opposed to intervention; it is opposed to interventionism. They also acknowledged that the UN is slow and inefficient but stated that it provides protection to weaker states and can stop great powers from bullying smaller countries. One Chinese scholar proposed bestowing regional organizations, such as the European Union and African Union, with the authority to sanction interventions, as these organizations are nimbler than the UN.

• Several U.S. scholars repeatedly emphasized that there is a cost to non-intervention. One cautioned, however, that interventions can be exploited by militant jihadi groups to improve their ideological appeal and to capture resources from the enlarged coffers of the host nation.
• One U.S. scholar posited that it is incorrect to state that foreign intervention is the primary cause for intrastate violence, when in fact local, political, and socioeconomic conditions, along with historical legacies, are more decisive.

• Another American participant acknowledged that the United States and some Western countries seem to be moving away from multilateralism to bilateralism, which could complicate efforts to develop collective approaches to respond to civil wars. This participant asked, if the multilateralist system is deemed important to China, what is the PRC prepared to do to fix and save it?

• Several Chinese participants emphasized that the United States does not have the same respect for sovereignty concerns as the PRC and many developing countries do. An American participant argued that such respect was evident in U.S. opposition to the Russian annexation of Crimea and further encroachment on Ukrainian, Georgian, and other Eastern European countries’ sovereignty.

• One Chinese scholar stated that even though the PRC believes UN authorization is almost always required to legitimize foreign intervention, this does not mean it will be passive in the absence of UN-authorized intervention. He went on to say that China has been more active in mediation and multilateral coordination to deal with these issues than it has been in the past.

• There was convergence among most participants in the framing of two stabilization models: “liberal-peace” (emphasizing political and economic institutions) and “developmental-peace” (focusing on sociopolitical stability and economic modernization), the former favored by the West and other parts of the developed world, the latter promoted by China and some developing countries. It was agreed that local context matters greatly in the application of any model by outside powers.

• Many participants were impressed by how much Chinese thinking regarding intervention had changed in the last ten years, influenced both by the realities of an increasingly multipolar world and by the extraordinary growth of PRC influence and interests.
Recommendations for Future Workshops

• There are many areas where China and the United States disagree regarding the utility and appropriateness of intervention. There may be areas of possible convergence, however, such as financial coordination, contingency planning for pandemic outbreaks, countering global terrorist networks operating within failed states, and supporting regional responses to civil wars. Participants agreed that it would be fruitful to spend more time looking for and then discussing areas of common interest rather than focusing on areas of disagreement.

• Many participants said that any follow-on workshop, in addition to discussing the conventional aspects of treating civil wars, should also include on the agenda unconventional issues such as cyber warfare, drones, and irregular tactics. Additionally, participants were eager to discuss how the UN and other multilateral institutions could address these issues.

• Several participants stated the need to invite more practitioners such as those with UN, NGO, and regional organization (such as the African Union) experience, international law experts, veterans of peacekeeping operations, and political leaders from countries experiencing civil wars.

• Many scholars highlighted the need for the inclusion of case studies. Some scholars said Chinese, American, and international participants might find more in common if they focused on real-world examples rather than theoretical ones. A scholar specifically noted that Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Yemen are places where both the United States and China are engaged, and a future conference could analyze the full range of response options to each crisis.
ABOVE: (June 2014) A child with her mother walk to their shelter in a new settlement in the Zam Zam camp for Internally Displaced People (IDP), North Darfur. Thousands of people, mostly women, children and the elderly, sought refuge in the Zam Zam IDP camp following an armed militia attack on their villages more than three months earlier.
Credit: Albert Gonzalez Farran / UNAMID
Workshop Agenda

We provide the workshop agenda here to facilitate an understanding of the dynamics of each session. Remarks made to open each session of the conference were solely for the purpose of focusing and encouraging discussion and dialogue. As such, no part of the summary information presented in this report is attributable to any of the moderators, session presenters, or discussion facilitators whose names are provided in this workshop agenda.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22

9:15AM–9:30AM  Welcome by Mr. Cheng Jiashu, Executive Director, Stanford Center at Peking University

9:30AM–10:00AM  Opening Remarks and Workshop Agenda

- Jia Qingguo  Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University
- Karl Eikenberry  Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, Stanford University

10:00AM–12:00PM  Session I: Assessing Trends in Intrastate Violence and International Response Since the End of the Cold War

Chair: Wang Dong  Associate Professor, School of International Studies; Executive Deputy Director, Institute for China-U.S. People-to-People Exchange, Peking University

- Stephen Krasner  Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
- Charles Call  Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
- He Yin  Associate Professor, China Peacekeeping Police Training Center
- Ouyang Wei  Former General Secretary, National Security Lab, National Defense University
- Cheng Xizhong  Researcher, Chahar Institute

12:15PM–1:30PM  Lunch and Keynote Address

Keynote Speaker: Xu Hui  Major General Commandant, International College of Defense Studies, National Defense University

1:45PM–3:45PM  Session II: Threats to International Security Posed by Civil Wars and Intrastate Violence

Chair: Vanda Felbab-Brown  Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution

- Martha Crenshaw  Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
• **Sarah Lischer** Associate Professor of Political Science, Wake Forest University
• **Paul Wise** Richard E. Behrman Professor of Child Health and Society and Professor of Pediatrics and Health Policy, Stanford University School of Medicine; Core Faculty Member of Center for Health Policy and the Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
• **Yuan Zheng** Senior Fellow and Director, American Foreign Policy Studies, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
• **Li Shaoxian** President of Chinese Academy of Arab Studies, Ningxia University
• **Yu Wanli** Chief Strategic Officer, China Security Protection International Risk Management Consulting Co., Ltd
• **Luo Yanhua** Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University

4:00pm–5:30pm  **Session III (Pt. 1): International Response Options–The Limits of Intervention**
Chair: **Xu Hui** Major General, Commandant of the International College of Defense Studies, National Defense University
• **Stephen Biddle** Professor of International and Public Affairs, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
• **William Reno** Director, Program of African Studies, Northwestern University
• **Luo Lin**–Professor & Dean, Middle East Studies School of Beijing Language and Culture University (BLCU); Director, International and Regional Studies Institute of BLCU
• **Lyu Rui** Senior Fellow, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

6:00pm–8:00pm  **Dinner and Keynote Address**
Keynote Speaker: **Fu Ying** Chief Expert, Academic Committee of the National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and former Vice Foreign Minister

**TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23**

9:00am–10:30am  **Session III (Pt 2): International Response Options–Best Advice to Policymakers**
Chair: **Charles Call** Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
• **Jean-Marie Guéhenno** Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
• **Abdeta Dribssa Beyene** Executive Director, Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation (CDRC), Ethiopia
• **Liu Jianfei**  Professor and Director, Institution of International Strategic Studies, the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party

• **Li Chen**  Assistant Professor and Director, International Security and Strategy Program, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China

• **Gong Jiong**  Professor of Economics, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE)

10:45am–11:45am  **Session IV: Summary by Rapporteurs and Closing Discussion**

Session Moderators: **Jia Qingguo**  Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University; and **Karl Eikenberry**  Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, Stanford University

11:45am–1:00pm  **Lunch**

1:00pm  **Workshop Concludes**
ABOVE: (March 2011) A child collects bullets from the ground in Rounyn, a village located about 15 km north of Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur. Credit: Albert Gonzalez Farran / UNAMID
Workshop Participants

Stanford University and
American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Workshop Co-Chair

Karl Eikenberry  Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI),
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC), Stanford
University

Abdeta Dribssa Beyene  Executive Director, Centre for Dialogue,
Research and Cooperation (CDRC)

Stephen Biddle  Professor of International and Public Affairs, School
of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

Charles Call  Associate Professor, School of International Service,
American University and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution

Martha Crenshaw  Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies (FSI), Stanford University

Vanda Felbab-Brown  Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security
and Intelligence, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution

Jean-Marie Guéhenno  Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings
Institution

Sarah Lischer  Associate Professor of Political Science, Wake Forest
University

Stephen Krasner  Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies (FSI), Stanford University

William Reno  Director, Program of African Studies, Northwestern
University

Todd Richardson  Major, United States Marine Corps; Foreign
Area Officer Student, United States Embassy Beijing; Workshop
Rapporteur

Paul Wise  Core Faculty Member of Center for Health Policy and the
Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research, Freeman Spogli
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Belinda A. Yeomans  U.S.-Asia Security Initiative, Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center (S-APARC), Stanford University
Institute for China-U.S. People-to-People Exchange at Peking University

Workshop Co-Chair

Jia Qingguo  Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University; Director of the Institute for China-US People-to-People Exchange

Workshop Deputy Chair

Wang Dong  Associate Professor, School of International Studies and Executive Deputy; Director of the Institute for China-U.S. People to People Exchange at Peking University

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