Thank you so much Jennifer for the nice introduction. It’s such a pleasure to be here. Sorry about the fire you know from Northern California but the air quality is still better than Beijing where I grew up. Like Jennifer said I’m going to present this paper on Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and how the public received this and this is joint work with Bruce Dickson at George Washington University. The motivation for this project really was from the current anti-corruption campaign in China and then, like Jennifer said, around 2012 or 2013, after Xi Jinping became the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, he started this very intensive campaign to crackdown on corruption. This is from one of his speeches in 2014, he said that the people really hate corruption and then we need to fight against corruption to win support from the people and then this is very clearly that his statement of one of the motivations for why he started the campaign. I'm not sure this is the only motivation and then, you know, we can talk about that real motivation is debatable but this is one of the motivations for starting the campaign, is to win the support from the people.

And this is not a unique Chinese phenomenon. This is actually happening across the world in many countries, for example, a lot of populist leaders, when they run for office, when they have campaigns, they all run on this promise to fight against corruption, for example in India Modi, Erdogan in Turkey and also in Hungary, Orban, they all run on this platform to fight against corruption. They promise people that once they got elected, they will arrest all those corrupt people, and also this is also happening in this country, you know, when Trump was running two years ago, he was also promising to “drain the swamp” once he got to Washington, he did fire a lot of people, that's true, but we don't know whether he's draining the swamp. But the question is always, you know, does this work, you know when you promise people that you know, I want to win your support by cracking down on corruption whether this became effective in winning the support from the people, you know, do corruption investigations actually increase or decrease public support.

In today’s presentation, I will talk about my theoretical framework and then provide some context about the current campaign in China and also show my empirical evidence, and then draw some conclusions about what we can learn from the current campaign. We have a lot of studies on corruption already in the social sciences, we know a lot about the causes of corruption. You know, one of the primary findings from that literature is that corruption is highly correlated with the level of economic development. So, the richer you are, the less corrupt the country is. And also, we know a lot about the effects of corruption on economic development and there's still a debate, but I think the dominating voice is that corruption is bad for economic growth. Although there’s this dissenting view which says that corruption can grease the wheels, that we can, you know, make the bureaucracy work faster. When they’re really slow you can actually bribe your way into the bureaucracy, make everything faster, but the dominant view is still that the empirical evidence, for example, is that corruption is bad for economic development.

And then, we also know something about the public opinion side of corruption, that is, we know that when people think the government is corrupt, they will punish the government. There are lot of studies showing that when the public sees the incumbent government as corrupt, they will punish them in the re-election, that is, the more the government is perceived to be corrupt, the less likely they will be re-elected. And also, we know that perceived corruption is bad for political trust. You
know, when people think the government is corrupt, they will decrease their level of political trust, and they will increase government, anti-government, protests. They will take to the streets and then also this is undermining regime’s long term legitimacy. So corruption is a bad thing. When people perceive the government to be corrupt, this is really bad for both the government and also for the society. But we don't really know about the effects of anti-corruption campaigns on public perceptions, you know, there are a lot of anti-corruption campaigns in the world when the leaders are fighting, are cracking down on corruption, we don't really know about the effects of this on public perceptions, on public opinions on regime support, especially in authoritarian regimes.

There are lot of studies in democracies but we don’t know how this works in a non-democracy like China. The conventional wisdom about anti-corruption campaign is, this is also very popular view in China, is that when leaders start an anti-corruption campaign, you know, when the leader, top leader starts to investigate corrupt officials, the leaders can really signal benevolent intentions. So, you know, when I start investigating bad guys and then I'm going to put them into prison, I'm going to signal to the society that I'm a good guy, I'm the good guy and then I'm going to fight with you against those bad guys, I will put those people in prison, so that through the anti-corruption campaign, I can signal my benevolent intentions. And also I can show how responsive I am to the society, you know, if you hate corruption, this is, you know, from Xi Jinping's quote, the idea is I know you hate corruption, you know I'm with you, I'm the good guy, you are good people, I will fight with you against those bad people in the political system and put them into prison. So that the idea is, when I do this, I will show how good I am as a leader, therefore, as a result, people will support me more, when I show that I'm fighting with you, know we're on the same team against those bad people, you know you should support me, so as a result of an anti-corruption campaign, people should support the regime more, when they see anti-corruption.

However, in this paper we want to put forward a competing theory, and then we are going to show some evidence that we are telling the truth, that is, we are saying that, you know, this is not how it works, we are saying that citizens usually have some prior beliefs about how corrupt the officials are so, that is, they have some expectations about, you know, how corrupt the officials are. They have this understanding, and this understanding is based on rumors, may be, around private information, maybe they have interacted with the government before and then they have seen some bribery, for example, going on in the government, and they form their expectations about how corrupt the officials are, so they have this prior understanding about how corrupt the officials are. And what happened during the campaign is, suddenly the citizens receive a lot of information about actually how corrupt the government is, right, during a campaign the regime needs to justify why you do this and then to justify this they need to review a lot of information about the corrupt officials, and you need to really show to the people that they are really corrupt. You know, I will crack down on this person, or I arrest this person, not because I hate him, not because he's not on my team, but because he's really corrupt, so you need to show a lot of evidence on media, for example, on TV, that this guy is really corrupt.

And then citizens sometimes are shocked, you know, they, they receive a lot of information about how corrupt the officials are, and sometimes this information is shocking to the citizens who had actually, you know, very high expectations about how clean the government is before the campaign, so they saw government is actually very clean, but during the campaign, they see so many scandals, and then they see the details of the scandals, they are surprised by the amount of corruption in the government. And then as a result, you know when they are surprised they they realize, oh the government is more corrupt than they thought, and then they decrease their support for the
Okay, then they start to question the integrity of the whole body of officials, they start to realize oh, you know, if the top people, you know the Politburo members are so corrupt, you know, this means the whole system is probably corrupt. And then they update their beliefs about how corrupt people are, and then they decrease their support for the whole regime. For this audience, I probably don't need to talk too much about what's going on in China but just, very briefly, this is the strongest and longest anti-corruption campaign since 1949, right, you know the Mao era has some anti-corruption campaigns but also every new leader basically when they took office, they have a anti-corruption campaign, you know, under Jiang, under Hu, and this is, but this is very special, this is the the longest and also the strongest. So far, yesterday had check news, 261 vice-ministerial level and above, including the PLAs, you know, the generals are investigated and more than 350,000 officials in total have been investigated, this is a huge share of the whole body of civil servants in China. This reached the highest level, the rumor before the anti-corruption campaign was you cannot really touch the Politburo Standing Committee members and but then there was one Zhou Yongkang who was on the Politburo Standing Committee, was investigated, you also have two former Politburo members Guo Boxiong and Xu Caiho, who were both military officials who were investigated. One of the special things about this campaign is, Xi Jinping really goes after retired officials because, in the rumor before this was, you know, once you retire, you have a soft landing, you are fine, right, but this time, all three of them at the top, the top tigers, the big, biggest tigers were retired when they were investigated.

As Jennifer just mentioned, you know, there has been this debate about what really motivates Xi Jinping to do the campaign. One view says that this is really about political purges, right, this is about Xi Jinping cracking down on his enemies. There was a New York Times article by Murong Xuecun in 2014, I think, in which he argues that if you look at the provinces where Xi Jinping worked or, you know, Xi Jinping was the party secretary of Fujian, for example, Zhejiang and Shanghai, you see fewer corruption investigations in those provinces compared to the provinces where Xi Jinping didn't work before. And then there's a paper by Zhu Jiangnan and Zhang Dong, scholars based in Hong Kong, which shows that the anti-corruption campaign was carried out in a biased way, that is, if you have connections with the top leaders you were less likely to be targeted in the anti-corruption campaign and then they used the data from the first two years of the campaign, you know, from 2012 to 2014. There's also another view that says that, oh, this is not, you know, really politically motivated, is really a sincere effort to clean up the government, this is, you know, a very systematic effort made by Xi Jinping to clean the government and then to make sure that, you know, we are rooting out corruption or to build a clean government. There's a paper by Melanie Manion at Duke University, which shows that, you know, as a result, the government did become cleaner, and then there's another working paper by Lu Xi and Peter Lorentzen and which shows that using more data than the Zhu and Zhang paper using data from the first five years of the campaign, they show that having connections with one of the Politburo members doesn't really protect you, so that is, you know, everybody was fairly targeted during the campaign.

What we will do is to leave the debate to themselves, you know, we cannot answer the debates because we, you know, I cannot get into the mind of Xi Jinping, I don't really know him, I cannot talk to him, so I don't know what he's thinking who started the campaign. What we tried to do is to
look at how the public perceives the campaign, so that's our goal, so we want to leave the motivation to future research. One comment I want to have is, so far, it seems that, you know, what happened in the last, like year, you know, when Xi Jinping abolished the term limits, it seems that part of the motivation is to consolidate his power, right, we didn't see any opposition when he abolished the term limits earlier this year, right, and we didn't see any public opposition to this move earlier this year when Xi Jinping tried to abolish the term limits. So it seems that, at least one of the effects, you know, not the motivation, but one of the effects of the campaign is to have the political purge and then to consolidate Xi Jinping's power.

One thing very special about this campaign is the amount of publicity that we have seen on traditional media but also on social media that is there has been a lot of coverage of the specific scandals that have been revealed during the campaign. This is Bo Xilai's case, you know, Bo Xilai's case was the most public trial that I ever seen you know in my whole life. I was born in the 1980s, I've seen the Chen Liangyu case, you know, some of you might remember, this is the party boss of Beijing who was arrested after Jiang Zemin went to Beijing, and then it was a public trial, but it was not really public because we have seen only a small part of the trial, but the Bo Xilai trial was complete coverage, you know, you can see the whole trial, you can see every discussion, you can see all the evidence. And then this is the villa that the Bo Xilai family bought in France, and then was shown during the trial, and then in the Zhou Yongkang case, for example, a lot of the media reports focused on his mistresses, you have, all the in the central television station postings and then, you know, who became his mistress, a lot of reports on this. This is on the Ling Jihua case, the secretary to Hu Jintao, and when he was arrested, a lot of reports about his son who died in a car accident, he was driving a Ferrari in Beijing and then there's two girls on the car, and he died in that car accident. This is the living room of Xu Caihou who was a military general and then this is a whole wall made of jade, and a lot of media reports about this. So, you know, you see a lot of public coverage on media about how corrupt the officials are, and then, I don't know about you, but, you know, when I saw this, I was shocked, and I'm a political scientist, I know something about how the system works, but I'm still shocked by the amount of corruption, the level of corruption they actually had, and then the amount of cash, for example, that we found in the bedroom of those officials and, for example, those, the villa in France, I didn't know this, right, the mistresses. And then, you know, the public was also shocked by this, you'll probably know that survey research consistently shows that Chinese citizens consistently trust the national government more than they trust local governments, right, this is the opposite from this country, in this country, people think people in Washington are all really bad but their mayor is good, right, but in China, you know, Chinese people think the people in Zhongnanhai, the people in Beijing are great leaders, they are really nice people, they think about the people, they take care of the people, but it's their county head or their mayor, you know, they are the bad guys. So when this information was revealed, and then this is about the top leadership, this is about a Politburo Standing Committee member, this is one of the top leaders in China, when this information was revealed to the public, I'm sure they were shocked, you know, they start to think, oh, I thought those people in Beijing are good, but then they saw, you know, all the detailed information about how corrupt they are, they were surprised to find even national leaders are bad, they're probably worse than their local leaders because, you know, they have more power, they can take more money.

Also, all the information is so available on the social media, you know, with WeChat that you probably use, all these scandals are circulated on WeChat. There's also an app that is circulated on WeChat, this is a Tencent app that widely circulated on WeChat in 2016, where you can just click and then choose a, your hometown, choose a location, for example, your hometown, and then you
can immediately see how many people have been investigated in that locality. You can choose the province you are from, your can choose the municipality, you can even choose the county and then see how many people have been investigated in that county, so the information on the anti-corruption campaign is so widely circulated that everybody knows something about the campaign. And then another thing that was very interesting is, all the localities were competing to show how corrupt they are or, you know, how many corruption investigations they have had, there have been rankings of this, you know, so that for a long time in the last 6 years the media will rank all the provinces, and then say, oh, this province, you know, the language they use is very interesting, they don't say, you know, how corrupt they are, but they say how intense the anti-corruption campaign has been carried out in this province, right. So you can be a winner if you arrest a lot of people, right, this is, you know, this is a very good example, this is about Chongqing and then they brag about this, they say, you know, in the last year, since May, we have had 12 officials being investigated, we are ranked the highest among all the provinces, and they're very proud to say this, you know, we have done this really intensively. And as a result, people, you know, get this information because all the provinces are trying to compete on this ranking and are trying to investigate more people, starting to investigating more people, so people get to know how many cases that are happening in their own province.

To study this, you know, our goal is to see when people are exposed to anti-corruption campaign or corruption investigations, how does that change their regime support for the Communist Party. And this is very difficult because a lot of things happened, and then, you know, people's perception, people's regime support for the Communist Party is determined by a lot of things, you know, your income, your education, whether you're a Party member, you know, what happened in your locality, things like that, but luckily, we were able to do this in a way that, you know, we designed and implemented two original national surveys, one before the campaign, one during the campaign. This data has never been used by other people, so this is the first time that we can do two surveys, one before and one during the campaign. And then one survey we did in 2010, this is two years before Xi Jinping took power, the second survey in 2014, this is two years after Xi Jinping took power, and then also, what's amazing about this dataset is that we use exactly the same questionnaire so, you know, four years after, we use exactly the same questionnaire, we use exactly the same sampling design. We also relied on the same survey institute, this is the survey institute at Peking University, we worked with them, which means that the results we get are not attributed to how we design the survey differently. So, say, for example, we see some changes in regime support from 2010-2014, it's not because we design the surveys differently, we actually do exactly the same thing in these two waves, and then we can say confidently, say that the changes are attributed to things happen outside of the survey, you know, during the anti-corruption campaign, for example. And then the research design is, the intuition is this, right, a lot of things happen in these four years, now we can look at how people change their regime support in after two years of campaign, that is, we measure their regime support in 2010, and then you have the anti-corruption campaign, and then after two years of the campaign, we measure the regime support again, so we can see how this changes over time. But also we have done this in a lot of provinces in China, we can also look at the different levels of anti-corruption campaign in different places, how does that change people's regime support because in some provinces, for example, there were a lot of investigations, in other provinces there were very few investigations, so we can combine these two variances, the two differences, to see, you know, compared, for example, the idea is, compared with 2010, how does corruption probes change people's regime support, as the research design. More information about the surveys, in 2010, we interviewed almost 4000 people in China, this is a national sample, we draw this randomly from the whole population, about 61 percent of the targeted population responded to our survey. Four years
later, we interviewed about the same number of people, not the same people so, the four thousand here are different from the four thousand there, this is, you can call them repeat cross sections, and then about 63 percent of them responded to our survey. In both surveys we targeted at the same prefectures across the same provinces, so we went to about 25 provinces and then we went to 49 prefectures, these are the same that we repeat in the second time of the survey. There were, you know, six provinces we couldn't go to, they were Tibet, Xinjiang and Qinghai, those western provinces we had a lot of trouble getting access to.

How do we measure people's regime support? So we use this idea from David Easton, a political scientist who came up with this idea to measure so-called diffuse support, this is people's support for the regime, not the support for particular leaders, this is your overall support for the regime. So we ask people, you know, how much do you support the central government from 0 to 10, give me a number, and how much do you support the central party, 0 to 10, as we ask this for the central government, also for the central party, we also ask, you know, your level of trust, you know, how much do you trust the central party, how much do you trust the central government, and we got the results. Unfortunately, we couldn't ask people's support for Xi Jinping, we really wanted to ask this question but, you know, through some bargaining the survey institute said, no, you cannot do this, that will bring them a lot of trouble, so the the higher authorities will just stop this project if we have this question on the survey, so we couldn't ask people's support for the individual leader in China.

You might say, you know, there probably, this so-called social desirability bias that what what if people lie, right, you know, we asked them how much do you support the party, you know, this is a very dangerous question to answer. They probably have a lot of trouble answering no or, you know, zero on that 0 to 10 scale. So to tackle this problem we also in the survey, ask how much do you fear when you criticize the government. And you can also say this question is also sensitive because, you know, when you feel the danger when you criticize the government you don't want to answer this question as well so we also look at how many people didn't answer this question because, if this is a sensitive question, all the people who choose to say I don't know or no response, right, so we can look at how many people actually didn't choose to answer this question and we can control for this, we can control for whether you answer this question, we can also control for if you answer the question you know how much political fear you have, so this is one way to deal with the problem of social desirability bias. And then I was talking to some students this morning, and I got the same question, you know, how do you do surveys in China and get sincere responses, you know, what if people lie. So I told them a study that, there was this one study conducted by Tang Wenfang, the professor at Iowa University, and he did this survey with college students in China, what he found is that college students in China tend to over report their criticisms of the Chinese government, that is, they actually, they're not so critical, but they tell the surveyors that, you know, I don't really like the party, I hate the party because they want to appear cool to their peers, you know, it's not, it's not very cool, you know, to support the regime, so they actually are over critical of the regime. So, you know, there are probably biases in the responses, but I think the directions of the bias is, you know, they're both, right, so you know, some people over report some people under report.

And now, we also need to measure how many corruption investigations that have happened in different localities and we use this WeChat app that I just talked about. This is, you know, designed and then compiled by Tencent, the biggest Internet company in China, and I just hired an RA who is a computer scientist to scrape the whole thing. There's a database behind this app, and he was able to scrape the whole dataset and, actually, I'm very happy that I did this in 2016 because I heard that, after that, is no longer available, so people can no longer scrape the dataset. This is what the
raw data looks like, so it has the name of all the corrupt officials, their positions, the reason for investigation. I actually took some time to look at all the reasons, there was one guy, a poor guy, a county head, who watched his friend playing mahjong and he was investigated. So you see a lot of ridiculous reasons on that list and then also very nicely, you know, we also searched all the people on the Internet and we found the exact date of the announcement, so we know exactly, when the announcement was made, not the date of the investigations, of the date of the announcement of the investigation. Also we know from the position, we can also code the rank in the bureaucratic system so, for example, this is a 'ju chu' or this is a 'ju bu'. We can code the rank, and we can know exactly how much power this guy or this person has.

And then we only take the investigations that happened between our two surveys, and so we finished the first survey in December 2010, so we chopped the data, we only took those corruption investigations that was carried out between January 2011 to July 2014. This is the beginning of our second survey, so we want to look at the investigations that have happened between our two surveys. There were about 4,000 of them, we know you know again the name the position, the rank. This just shows you the what the data looks like, mapping the number of investigations, this is again by 2014, so the map has changed a lot since then but at that time, you know, Sichuan was a big one because Zhou Yongkang had a lot of connections in Sichuan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong. This is just the raw numbers, the sheer number of investigations. We can also look at, you know, per million people because the population size is very different in different provinces, we can look at the number of investigations per million population and that changed a little bit, you have more darker, for example, colors in those western provinces but also Jiangsu and this is Hebei.

We can also look at, you know, what was the rank of those people who were investigated, we can weight the data by the bureaucratic rank they have, the idea is if you investigate a big tiger, for example, I will give you a higher weight. If you investigate, for example, a lot of little flies that carry little weight, so we can weight the data by the ranks they have and then you see a very similar picture that in Sichuan, for example and then you know the coastal provinces as well. Okay, so those are my so-called independent variables. I want to look at how this, how the number of investigations in your province where the respondent lives, how that affect your regime support. So the first thing I want to do is do a very simplified version of this, that is, you know, let's just say I would divide all my respondents into two groups and then if you have seen, you know, a lab experiment, you know, what this means, for example, you can, you can do a treatment group, you can do a control group and in medical research, for example, you give some people pills, real pills and that's the treatment group, you give some people placebo that's the control group. You see whether the pill, whether the new medicine works right and in this case I can also do the same, using the same logic, and I can divide my respondents into two groups, you know, the treatment group is the respondents who were exposed to a lot of corruption investigations, above the mean, the number of investigations in the province is above the mean of the whole nation. The control group is very simply the respondents in those provinces that had below the mean number of investigations. I can see in the very simplified version how this changed people's regime support.

And what we found is really surprising but also really interesting. So what happens here is, just look at this one graph for example, this is trust in central government, this is, you know, the outcome variable, and in 2010, no matter where you are from, you are from Sichuan or Jiangsu, it doesn't matter, your level of support, or your level of trust in central government is here, this is very high, you know, 7.7, you know, in a zero to ten scale. But what's really interesting is, what happened afterwards. That is, four years later, after the campaign, if you are in those provinces where there
were a lot of corruption investigations, your regime support kind of went downward a little bit, but if you are in those provinces where there were very few corruption investigations, your regime support increased, and then when you compare the difference, this is the effect of the campaign, right, so the idea is, you give people pills and then see whether those pills work. This is, you know, the effect of the campaign, when you see a lot of corruption investigations, how that changes regime support, right, and then you see similar patterns in all the four graphs, which means when we use trust central government or support central party, we get the same results, that is, more exposure to the corruption investigations will actually decrease regime support.

We also run some regressions, we use a more complicated model and then use the continuous measure of corruption investigations, no longer dividing people into treatment control, just use the number of investigations, for example, in a province. And then we get the same results, that is, it's negative, which means the more corruption investigations that happen in your province, the lower support you have for the communist party and also for the central government. And this is true with or without controls, you know, I mentioned those variables that are important for people's regime support, for example, your income, your education, your ethnicity, your hukou, your income, so on and so forth. We control for those variables, we get the same results.

Okay, so how much, and how big is the effect, right? What we estimate shows that about 200 corruption probes, if there were 200 corruption investigations, that will decrease citizens support for the regime by 0.4 on a 0 to 10 scale. This is very big, actually, we think about, you know, the level of support of Chinese citizens on average is about 7.6 or 8 and then this means, you know, you will go down from 8 to about 7.6 with only 200 corruption investigations. As I said, so far, we have 350,000 corruption investigations and I think about, you know, the the sheer effect of the campaign on people's regime support. Even by 2014, in those provinces in Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong and Sichuan, there have been more than 400 corruption investigations carried out. We also, in our research, we also do a lot of so-called robustness checks to get away, you know, try to get rid of the results because this is really surprising, we try to see whether we can do something, you know, make small changes to our data or to our model to get rid of the results and then we we couldn't, so we we try a lot of things, we just can't get rid of our results, so our results are really strong and robust.

OK, so like I said, our theory really relies on this core assumption that people have this prior beliefs, they have some understanding about how corrupt the officials are, and then during the campaign they update, right, so they see the news, they see how corrupt, for example, Zhou Yongkang is, and then they got this new information, they start to update their beliefs about how corrupt officials are in China. So we want to test whether this is true, you know, we have this strong assumption, we want to know whether the data supports this. In the surveys, we ask people this question, in general, do you think the officials are honest from 1 to 4, right, you can say, I don't think they are honest, or you can say, they're really honest, and then we can compare, for example, people's answers to this question before and after the campaign, right. This is, you know, their so-called prior beliefs about the integrity of the officials, and I see whether the campaign change this perception. And what happened is the same, that is, before the campaign in 2010, people have the same level of perception, they think that, you know, on 0 to 4 scale, they think, you know, about 2.4, people think that the officials are honest, but then these two groups diverged after the campaign, right, so when you are in a province that had a lot of corruption investigations, you don't think they are honest anymore, so you update your perception, but when you were in the province with very few corruption investigations, you really think the officials are honest, right, so this is very strong evidence that they're updating their beliefs.
Also, we can show that, you know, the effect of the campaign really is, the strongest for people who had very strong prior beliefs, that is, for people who thought the officials were clean, the campaign was a shock, right, because they think the officials are very very clean and then when they see the scandals, they are shocked and then this is the results which show that, you know, the campaign only has a negative effect on your regime support when you have a high prior belief, that is you, you know originally before the campaign you thought they are clean and then the campaign will really decrease your regime support. But for people who thought the officials were already corrupt, the campaign doesn't have any effect.

The last thing we do is, you know, I keep talking about media and then, you know, how the media reports on this, so it's very important that people need to receive that message from the media, they need to watch TV, they need to, you know, get all the scandals on their app on WeChat, for example. And so we want to look at how the exposure to media can condition this effect. And in our surveys, we ask, you know, whether they use social media such as WeChat to read news about national affairs. This is not perfect measure because we really want to know whether they know about the anti-corruption campaign, but since the anti-corruption campaign was so salient in that period, so if you read something about national news, you will know something about the campaign. So this is a matter of how exposed you are to the social media. And we found the same thing, that is, for people who are really exposed, you know, they use the social media, they use WeChat a lot, the campaign will have a strong negative effect on their perception, the regime support, but for people who don't use much about you know who don't use social media, it doesn't have an effect, which means the effect really channels through your exposure to the media. You need to you know be exposed to the media to get the signal from the regime.

Okay, we also test another hypothesis. This is something that also came up in the conversation this morning, whether the campaign has slowed down China's economy. This is something that, you know, people are very interested and then the rumor is, during the campaign, the officials, they are worried about, you know, getting in trouble, right, and then they stop doing anything, they stop all the investment, they stop all the projects, and then this campaign has slowed down Chinese economy. We have seen some qualitative evidence of this, I mean some localities have seen some reports that the local officials, they just don't do anything, and they stop other projects. This is another alternative mechanism for us to find the negative effects on regime support because, if this is true, then it means that the campaign affected people's regime support by slowing down the economy, that is, you know, in the places where you have a lot of corruption investigations, the economy there became slowed down and then people decreased their support for the regime because of this slowing economy, right. We also test this hypothesis, we didn't find any support, this is a little bit surprising to me because I was actually hoping that we find something, but at least by 2014, you know, we can do this by including more data but at least by 2014, our second survey was conducted, we didn't find any support that the campaign has slowed down Chinese economy. We look at, for example, GDP growth rate, the growth rate per capita GDP, the growth rate of aggregated GDP, we didn't find anything there, there's no effect on the economy by 2014.

Okay, to conclude, we find this, you know, somewhat surprising and also counterintuitive conclusion that the more the regime publicly punishes corrupt officials, the more the public punishes the regime. You are in this dilemma for Xi Jinping, I think, when he tried to punish public officials to win public support, but the result is actually very counterintuitive, also counterproductive. It actually backfires, that is, when you publish those detailed scandals of the
corrupt officials, you will shock the people, and then actually make them less likely to support your regime. But, again, you know, we cannot draw a strong conclusion about people's support for Xi Jinping. You know, when I went to China, I found there's actually a very strong support for the leader. What we found in this paper is, we found that people have lower level of support for the party but maybe they have a stronger support for the leader, for Xi Jinping himself, but, you know, because of political sensitivity, we cannot ask that question, so we don't really know the answer. With that note, I'll stop here, and then I'm happy to answer your questions.